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Young Europeans with immigrant background live in societies that practice different models of 
national identity, where nations continually define themselves through citizenship policies, politi-
cal rhetoric, and everyday social interaction that signal membership to be more open, or more 
closed, to those without native roots. In other words, young immigrant minorities are constantly 
receiving signals about whether or not they are accepted as part of the national community. This 
dissertation investigates how these 'working national identities' influence immigrant minorities’ 
civic integration, defined as their identification with the national-civic community and their par-
ticipation in political life. Denmark and Sweden, broadly similar societies with historically simi-
lar immigration patterns, differ in their citizenship policies, political debates over integration and 
levels of discrimination. Using this variation, the dissertation analyzes primary survey and inter-
view data collected among immigrant-minority young adults in both countries to observe the ef-
fects of their citizenship policies, political debates and social inclusion on those minorities' per-
ceptions, and the influence of those perceptions on their civic integration. 
I find that social inclusion increases minorities' national identification, while politician 
concern raises the likelihood that they will vote. But causes of engagement in other forms of po-
litical action vary more: while minority men are more likely to engage in political action if they 
perceive their groups to be excluded, women are more likely to do so if they identify with the 
community. Throughout, I find men to be more affected by the exclusion of their own ethnic and 
religious groups than women are. Further, higher levels of exclusion and greater politicization of 
minority issues in Denmark mean that these factors have stronger effects there, but also raise par-
ticipation by spurring interest in national politics.
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction: Investigating Civic Integration
Since people began organizing themselves into political communities, certain boundary mecha-
nisms have defined who is considered a part of each community, and who may help decide its 
laws and its future. With the rise of the nation-state, large 'national' communities--including nu-
merous local and regional groups tied together by a sense of common history, common culture 
and common future--more or less corresponded to political borders (Smith 1986). Despite what 
so many national history textbooks have suggested, their consolidation was rarely 'natural' , but 
occurred through political, economic and cultural transformations interacting with linguistic, ge-
ographic and cultural divisions (Anderson 1983; Colley 2005); through institutionalization of 
transport, coercive and educational structures (Weber 1976; Gellner 1983; Tilly 1992); and not 
least through forced expulsions and bloodshed (Marx 2003). The incorporation of new people, 
whether voluntarily or coerced migrants, was nearly always present in these processes and was 
seldom harmonious. But in most times and places, they have been considered too few or insignif-
icant--with the important exceptions of the classic 'immigration societies' of the United States, 
Canada and Australia--to be seen and written about as part of the main story of national develop-
ment. That can hardly continue longer, especially in Western Europe, where immigration since 
the Second World War has transformed most of what were once 'nation-states' into ethnically and
religiously plural societies. Not surprisingly, those national communities--now all quite liberal 
democracies--are responding to these inflows of people in various ways. Their citizenship rules 
allow more or less access to naturalization, their political and public spheres debate standards of 
belonging and the role of specific immigrant groups in society, and their populations talk about 
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and interact with the 'newcomers'--many of whom are visibly distinct from the native majority--
in ways that variously express openness, distance or even contempt.
Throughout Western Europe, then, millions of young people with immigrant-minority 
background--many of them born and raised there--are now coming of age in these contexts, 
meeting sharply divergent sets of rights and opportunities for citizenship and full societal partici-
pation. As such, their identities as social and political actors are forming in societies with quite 
different citizenship policies, political debates around integration and minority-related issues, 
and social treatment of minorities. Together, I argue, these elements constitute a sort of operatio-
nal or 'working' national identity that exists in aggregate within the boundary-defining institu-
tions, debates and popular ideas of society--and is in turn perceived by immigrant-background 
minorities themselves. How do these policies, political rhetorics, and social inclusion or exclu-
sion actually affect them? What kinds of citizenries, in other words, are these working national 
identities actually creating? 
This research project takes on these questions by investigating how citizenship policies, 
political elite attitudes and social inclusion influence civic identification and participation among
young people of immigrant background in Denmark and Sweden. While factors such as family 
background, education and social environment play a role, the project investigates how these two
countries’ drastically different citizenship policies and seemingly different levels of social inclu-
sion and political rhetoric shape minorities' identification and participation, and to what extent 
they are actually leading to divergent levels in those outcomes. It also investigates the extent to 
which these effects are mediated by the intensity of individuals’ identification with their minority
ethnic or religious groups, and whether national identification seems to be a key to whether indi-
 2
viduals actually participate or not. In doing so, it aims to build an account of what types of poli-
cies and societal factors are most likely to shape civic integration.
1.1 Why Civic Integration?
The number of immigrants and their descendants--most notably from Muslim-majority countries-
-has grown rapidly over the past half-century in most of Western Europe. The European publics 
have become much more ethnically diverse; and Islam is a growing presence in the European re-
ligious landscape. These population changes have spurred intense debate over social problems, 
cultural difference and security threats. At the very least, receiving societies need these new resi-
dents to be integrated to an extent that they will be willing and able to contribute to societal and 
economic stability, and this has long driven government policies to spur immigrant education and
employment. But as many socio-economic integration indicators improved in the 2000s, minori-
ty youth crime and riots and episodes highlighting Islamist radicalization persisted and in some 
places increased, bringing both scholars and government integration agencies to believe that 
deeper civic engagement is an essential factor for long-term societal stability. Moreover, such en-
gagement by a majority of a population grounds the normative and functional foundation for 
democracy and its sustainability. Since an increasing proportion of nearly all Western European 
and North American societies is constituted by immigrants and their children, their levels of civic
belonging and involvement may be said to have increasingly important implications for the 
strength and stability of those democracies. Knowledge of what drives such engagement among 
immigrant minorities, however, is quite limited.
Yet why study civic integration in particular? Most national and comparative scholarship 
on immigrant integration in Europe analyzes factors affecting either acquisition of social prac-
tices or linguistic, economic and education benchmarks (e.g., Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; 
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Koopmans 2010). This work is undeniably important. Yet we also need to know more about the 
civic outcomes of immigration: under what conditions do immigrant minorities1--especially 
those who are young and will constitute part of the 'receiving societies' populations for decades 
to come--feel a part of their national community and participate politically in it?   
This project terms such immigrant-minority engagement in civic life as ‘civic integra-
tion.’ This term has been used before, and at an accelerating pace over the last several years. 
Most scholars who use it focus on policies intended to incentivize, support or require immigrant 
acquisition of some combination of competencies, attitudes or practices (varying in content from 
state to state, and indeed from policy-maker to policy-maker) believed likely to result in functio-
nal or engaged members of society, and in some cases to shut out those individuals who cannot 
live up to the rules. Christian Joppke (2004) clarifies that such ‘civic integration’ policies by and 
large concern themselves with individuals, in contrast to multiculturalist approaches or policies, 
which aim to incorporate groups. The concept has perhaps most notably been used by Sara Wal-
lace Goodman (2010), who has constructed a 'civic integration index' (CIVIX) that builds on 
Marc Howard’s (2009) Citizenship Policy Index.
Goodman conceptualizes civic integration as additive, as expanding on economic and po-
litical integration: “Civic integration policies express the idea that successful incorporation into a
host society rests ... on individual commitments to characteristics typifying national citizenship” 
(Goodman 2010). According to Goodman, “civic integration promotes attributes of membership 
and, like the root word suggests, the traditional membership category is that of civitas, the condi-
tion of citizenship. States have moved to define these citizen-like attributes as having skills that 
1. The term 'immigrant minorities' is used throughout the dissertation to signify both immigrants and their 
immediate descendants of immigrants; for brevity, it is interchanged with simply 'minorities.'
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enable participation, including language, country/society knowledge, and a set of liberal-democ-
ratic values” (Goodman 2012). Civic integration policies, as Goodman defines them, are thus fo-
cused on bringing or pushing immigrants to acquire such “citizen-like attributes,” which she 
identifies chiefly as being made up skills to enable participation or values to ensure participation 
in accordance with liberal democratic norms. 
It is crucial to note that when Goodman, Joppke and others engaging in the debate over 
immigrant integration and citizenship policies or ‘models’ in immigrant-receiving countries dis-
cuss ‘civic integration,’ they really mean civic integration policies or approaches to making poli-
cy with the intention to spur integration into civic life and the instruments used to implement the 
policies (e.g., specific requirements or language or knowledge exams). Few scholars have thus 
(to my knowledge) yet referred to ‘civic integration’ in terms of civic integration outcomes 
among immigrant minorities. This study does so, assessing what influences civic integration in 
terms of actual integration processes and outcomes.
As the varying content and “thickness” of national integration policies demonstrate, it is 
no simple or objective task for scholars to define what constitutes civic integration. More simply 
put, how can we say what indicates that certain people are ‘integrated’ into the civic nation, and 
others are not? 
I define civic integration in terms of attitudes and practices that demonstrate an indi-
vidual’s feeling of belonging in a national community and his or her political participation in 
that community. I do so because, while political participation is the classic barometer of civic en-
gagement in democratic societies, participation levels are sometimes not high among even non-
immigrant populations. By extending assessment of civic integration to include national identifi-
cation as well as civic participation, I include a characteristic--whether a society’s members feel 
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themselves a part of it and share a common identity with most others in it--that is important for 
the civic community but much more prevalent in most societies than political participation alone.
At the same time, I investigate the relation between identification and participation--whether 
identifying with the national community makes immigrant minorities more likely to participate 
politically in it. This study thus investigates these two outcomes that I consider to dually consti-
tute civic integration, while studying whether one element meaningfully influences the other--
whether identification is a key driver of participation.
I do not, however, consider linguistic competence, societal knowledge, or certain liberal 
or social values to be indicators of civic integration itself in the context of this study. While 
Goodman, Joppke and others identify such competencies and attitudes as some of those targeted 
by civic integration policies, I focus on outcomes most directly related to engagement in the na-
tional community. Language competence is held fairly constant in the study (with most analyses 
including only subjects with competence in Danish or Swedish). While I investigate elements of 
basic societal knowledge and of shared civic norms, and the extent to which these are related to 
identification and participation, I keep them analytically separate from those outcomes. I choose 
to do so, first, because it holds the study's measures of civic integration--absolute measures of 
belonging in the national community and of participation--to ones that could be used anywhere 
(regardless of the dominant civic norms consensus). Second, it allows me to avoid making the 
study's core definition of civic integration subject to political debates about what the content of 
the desired norms should be in a given context, in which certain norm conceptions (however lib-
eral and widely held they may be) are sometimes purposefully highlighted to target certain 
minorities. 
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1.1.1 National Identification: Definition and Importance
I conceptualize national identification as an individual’s level of association or closeness to the 
national civic community in which he or she resides. Being usually based on states’ territory, na-
tional civic identities have the potential to act as cohesive identities that include all people who 
live (or who have lived for a significant length of time, among other things) within each state. In 
ethnically and religiously plural societies, national identities are potentially superordinate, able to
incorporate different ethnic or religious subgroups (some of which may previously have been 
outgroups) into a common identity (Huo et al. 1996; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Transue 2007).
Why is the identification of immigrant minorities with the broader national community 
potentially important? Individuals’ categorization of themselves as part of social groups, we al-
ready believe, carries implications for 1) their interpretation of actions by others perceived to be 
within and outside of those groups and 2) their linking of the group’s outcomes and welfare with 
their own sense of well-being and possibly to a more positive valuation of the group (Brewer 
1991; Brewer 2001; Stone and Crisp 2007). A growing psychological (and limited political sci-
ence) literature on superordinate identities finds that higher identification with superordinate than
subgroup identity makes individuals more likely to value societal authorities and priorities rela-
tionally, rather than with narrower instrumental interest (Huo et al. 1996). It also finds that higher
levels of superordinate identity are likely to reduce intergroup bias (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000), 
but that this relationship is contingent on making that superordinate identity salient (Stone and 
Crisp 2007). Recent application of these findings in political research finds that superordinate 
identity salience increases the likelihood that individuals will prefer policy outcomes that have 
potential to benefit the larger political community rather than just their ethnic (or other type of) 
subgroup (Transue 2007). Taken together, these suggest that immigrant minorities with higher 
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levels of civic identification are likely to evaluate the civic community more positively, to show 
less bias toward other subgroups (including the ethnic majority), and to prefer outcomes that 
benefit the society more broadly to outcomes that are related to minority groups alone. Yet psy-
chological research has found that the behavior of 'peripheral,' or non-prototypical members of 
social groups--such as ethnic minorities within larger societies--is usually more difficult to pre-
dict than that of prototypical members (Schmitt and Branscombe 2001; Jetten et al. 2003; Wirth 
and Williams 2009). Immigrant minorities might be said to be archetypal 'peripherals' in the soci-
eties in which they live, with their status as members an open question, and one that is probably 
dynamic over time. Immigrant minorities' identification with a broader national community, then,
does not necessarily develop similarly to that of majority individuals, but should be studied on its
own terms and in relation to factors that may particularly affect minorities. National identifica-
tion, then, is a potentially important factor in minority behavior in 'receiving' societies, and its 
causes and effects among immigrant minorities in particular must be examined.
This project assesses national identification directly. Existing comparative data on levels 
of national identity among minorities is extremely limited, especially in Europe: though multi-
national surveys such as the Eurobarometers have begun to assess national identity, these sam-
ples generally include too few minorities to make useful inferences; further, studies that measure 
it among minorities tend to be limited to single national contexts or do not assess many of the 
factors thought to be important to civic integration. Because individuals may retain subgroup 
identities alongside active civic identity, this study also measures respondents' levels of identifi-
cation with their ethnic and religious groups (those they report belonging to). Each of these 
group identifications is assessed in terms of centrality, connection and commitment (Settles 
2004; Leach et al. 2008; Simon and Ruhs 2008). Identity is thus assessed along three dimen-
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sions: the national community (Denmark /Sweden), the respondent's self-reported national-back-
ground or ethnic group, and the self-reported religious group. This allows investigation of the ex-
tent to which subgroup identifications coexist with, and moderate processes of, identification 
with the national community. 
1.1.2 Political Participation: Definition and Importance
In addition to examining national identification, this project focuses on political participation in 
the national community as well. It defines this somewhat broadly, including both electoral and 
non-electoral forms, such as activism through giving resources, contacting media and officials, 
and protest activity. Theoretically, there is reason to expect different dynamics to drive electoral 
and non-electoral participation (as outlined in Chapter 2); therefore, the two types are analyzed 
separately.
Yet why does political participation among immigrant minorities matter? From minori-
ties' own perspective, participation is the channel through which they can make their voices 
heard and their interests represented--to influence the political system in the direction of their 
own preferences. From a normative societal perspective, participation by all members of society 
is a democratic good that ensures more equal representation and distribution of goods within the 
political system. Participation by as many as possible ensures, in the long run, that the system 
will be more stable over time, as it will incorporate a broad spectrum of the people's preferences 
into its decision-making by peaceful, democratic means (Easton 1965). In any case, whether or 
not immigrant minorities participate in a political system is meaningful for how its laws, its insti-
tutions and its citizenry itself are likely to develop in the future; it is, therefore, a matter of em-
pirical interest even for those who do not share normative democratic concerns over minority 
participation.
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 Studies of political participation among immigrant minorities are more common than 
those examining identification. These generally analyze minority-majority or inter-ethnic varia-
tion, and look to naturalization and voting as key incorporation outcomes. Many of these studies 
are largely limited to single national contexts (e.g.,Wüst 2000; Anwar 2001; Ramakrishnan and 
Espenshade 2001; Leal 2002; Togeby 2003; Togeby 2004; Doerschler 2004; Bueker 2005; Goli 
and Rezaei 2005; Michon and Vermeulen 2009; Quintelier 2009; Maxwell 2010; Levin 2013). 
Much of this work contributes considerably to our understanding of minority participation, yet it 
does not help us understand how levels of inclusion in different national contexts are likely to in-
fluence it. However, a growing literature investigates participation cross-nationally (Koopmans 
and Statham 2001; Odmalm 2005; Statham et al. 2005; Koopmans 2007); this contributes to my 
considerations and design here. Yet it is important to consider whether and how the policies and 
practices immigrant minorities meet in different national contexts affect their identity and partici-
pation. This should pave the way to a better understanding of how differing levels of national in-
clusion, as they meet immigrants in practice, are forming new citizens and civic communities, 
and to knowing how identity dynamics play a role in this.
1.2 The Main Question: How is Civic Integration Shaped by Different National 'Models'?
Societies approach their immigrant communities and the task of 'integrating' them quite different-
ly. In the civic sphere, politicians implement broad spectra of integration and citizenship policies 
(often coupled with efforts to control the inflow of new migrants through immigration and asy-
lum policy). Those same politicians and others in the public sphere occasionally use political and
public debate to encourage or admonish immigrant minorities directly, but more often they talk 
about them to stir support among a broader audience of voters. And throughout the broader soci-
ety, people and organizations interact with immigrant minorities on a daily basis. The political 
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and social actors embodying these 'national models' have various purposes for what they do, 
many of them not even related to a desire to affect civic integration. 
Policy makers' preferences for citizenship policy are shaped by previous policies; by 
ideals of what a citizen of their nation should be; by normative ideals and international obliga-
tions concerning universal rights and equal access; and also by beliefs about how a given policy 
is likely to affect immigrants' behavior, either as a part of working toward naturalization or as a 
result of getting it (Faist, Gerdes and Rieple 2004; Howard 2009; Manatschal 2012). Policy mak-
ers in the same national systems often have very different intentions when they make citizenship 
policy, and only sometimes do these relate explicitly to integration outcomes. 
Politicians and other public voices addressing immigrant minorities may wish to signal 
inclusion and resolve inter-community conflicts, or to court political support from minority com-
munities. However, in contrast to the United States, where a rapidly growing minority population
is changing electoral politics, pushing politicians of all stripes to adjust their rhetoric and even 
their policy programs (Junn and Haynie 2008; Schmidt 2010), in most Western European coun-
tries immigrant minorities still make up only a small part of the voting public. Thus, most politi-
cians in Western Europe who speak about immigrants and integration do so in order to collect 
support from people other than immigrant minorities; however, some speak about integration 
specifically to promote more universal ideals of national identity and social rights (Koopmans et 
al. 2005). 
And finally, in society more broadly, individuals and organizations speak about and inter-
act with immigrant minorities based on certain standards of general civility, as well as on opera-
tive definitions of 'normality' and membership in society. While these definitions may be argued 
to form broad societal consensuses in aggregate (Pehrson, Brown and Zagefka 2009), they and 
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the motivations for particular statements or action are nearly as many as the number of people 
living in a national community. 
Most scholars who study these aspects of political and social life--citizenship policy, po-
litical discussion concerning immigrants, and the attitudes of majority populations toward im-
migrants--do not concern themselves with civic integration outcomes among immigrant minori-
ties, though of course there are exceptions. Yet throughout the literatures that focus on them 
(which generally remain separate), the scholars who do take time to consider impacts on minori-
ties most often express assumptions that they have some effect on minorities themselves without 
theoretically grounding or empirically investigating those assumptions. Happily, there are impor-
tant exceptions to this--for example the work of Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham and colleagues 
(Koopmans and Statham 2001; Duyvené de Wit and Koopmans 2005; Statham et al. 2005), of 
Deborah Schildkraut (2005), and of Karthick Ramakrishnan and Thomas Espenshade (2001; Ra-
makrishnan 2005), among others. 
Among these spheres, the national-model 'inputs' in the form of citizenship policy are the 
most clearly institutionalized and easiest to compare, and a productive literature has emerged 
examining national citizenship and integration regimes, the national identity conceptions and 
party politics that lay behind them, and the possible trends of 'convergence' (or lack thereof) to-
ward which they ostensibly point (e.g., Joppke 2007; Joppke 2007; Jacobs and Rea 2007; Joppke
2008; Howard 2009; Goodman 2010; Joppke 2010). This literature responds to Yasemin Soysal's
thesis (1994) that national citizenship is waning in importance, and helpfully compares citizen-
ship regimes from normative and policy perspectives. Yet the policy-comparative agenda of this 
work leaves implications for civic integration outcomes to the realm of assumption, as Howard 
does in his notable 2009 book comparing citizenship regimes. Yet what are the civic conse-
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quences of making citizenship more or less accessible to immigrant minorities? Some policy 
makers and scholars believe that more access will result in better civic integration--whether 
through some (previously) unspecified mechanism of increased belonging, or simply because it 
grants full voting rights to more people. Standing in contrast to this is the idea that limiting ac-
cess--making people 'jump through hoops' of longer time, higher language competence and 
greater societal knowledge in order to be able to naturalize--will make a better citizenry, by push-
ing some to 'integrate' who would not otherwise have done. 
The purpose here is to examine the extent to which, and the conditions under which, civic
integration actually develops under these 'national models'--not only among first-generation im-
migrants themselves, but also among the broader community of immigrant minorities. Does a 
citizenship policy's impact extend beyond the individual who either can or cannot acquire citi-
zenship, to influence groups of people who believe it negatively affects people like them? This 
would mean that restricting citizenship could have a negative effect even among individuals who
have it or know they could get it. However, citizenship policy does not exist in a vacuum; it is 
developed and perceived in conjunction with specific political and social environments. 
I argue that we must consider these three spheres of policy and practice--usually the focus
of separate literatures (on integration and citizenship policies themselves, on party dynamics or 
political speech, and on social relations or discrimination)--as together constituting an operative 
'national identity' as it is communicated to immigrant minorities. Examining and comparing the 
effects of differing models can help us understand their effects on civic integration. In this study, 
I therefore investigate whether and how differing levels of legal, political and social inclusion 
levels in society affect immigrant-minority young adults' civic engagement; how they interact 
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with other factors to do so; and how their effects compare and combine with those of socio-eco-
nomic and other background characteristics. 
Defining civic integration in terms of 1) identification with the larger national community
and 2) participating in that community’s political life, this study asks, more specifically:  
What are the effects (on national identification and engagement) of:
 Inclusive vs. exclusive models of citizenship?
 Political elite signals of inclusion vs. exclusion
 Inclusion of minorities within society (e.g., lower levels of discrimination)?
1.3 Study Design
Denmark and Sweden offer an opportunity to investigate these questions with a controlled 
comparison of sorts; one might even go so far as to call it a natural experiment: immigrant mi-
norities have come to or grown up in one of these two societies that are similar in being multi-
party democratic, extensive welfare-state societies, but at the same time have citizenship and in-
tegration approaches to incorporating immigrants that differ as drastically as any in Western Eu-
rope. With relatively few differences distinguishing the two countries in terms of social and eco-
nomic policies affecting immigrant-background minorities, I take advantage of these settings to 
investigate what, if any, effect the countries' different approaches to integration are having on 
civic integration among minorities themselves. To do this, I use primary survey and interview 
data to investigate the extent to which differing national-identity boundaries--as perceived by mi-
nority young adults--shape their national identification and their participation, as compared to 
other demographic factors and to minority identifications. To be sure, resources and social back-
ground are expected to contribute to immigrant minorities' identification and engagement, as 
they have been found to do among mainstream (majority) populations. Yet it is important to test 
1) whether immigrant-background minorities form different perceptions of inclusion through cit-
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izenship, politics and social interaction  in the two countries, and 2) how these perceptions shape 
their national identification and political participation, in comparison with each other and other 
factors.
To do this, I designed and conducted a three-phase research project consisting of a main 
survey, a follow-up survey experiment, and in-depth interviews in both Denmark and Sweden. 
To recruit representative and comparable respondent groups that included similar groups of im-
migrant minorities in each country, I requisitioned random samples from the national registries, 
then conducted name screening using Arab and Turkish name lists (developed by demographic 
and health researchers in the U.S. and Germany). This produced a final sample with three sub-
samples from each country: one including individuals of likely Arab origin, one of likely Turkish
origin, and one randomly sampled from those not screened into those groups (totaling 2167 indi-
viduals in each country). Sampled individuals were contacted by letter, and where possible by 
phone, to recruit them to the main survey, which was administered online. Respondents for the 
follow-up survey experiment and interviews were recruited within the main survey. 
The main survey was developed by consulting previous survey and measurement work in
related areas of political science and social psychology, and was pre-tested using cognitive inter-
viewing. It included a number of items newly designed or combined for the purpose, most no-
tably relating to the measurement of respondents' identification with their minority groups and 
the national community, and of minority experiences and perceptions in society. Despite being 
designed to produce a representative and large respondent group, however, the main survey is 
weakened by a poor response rate, with 438 respondents (including about 280 immigrant-back-
ground minorities) completing most survey items. However, while this group is more limited 
than the countries' general populations, it still allows for examination of what factors drive civic 
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integration outcomes, and whether the national approaches and contexts affect these. This is ob-
servational data, and the study's analyses using them thus bear the limitations associated with 
such data, chief among them the challenge of 'showing' causal direction between the variables 
studied, especially since many of the study's variables of interest are perception and attitude-
based. To confront this challenge, I proceed through the analyses with caution and consider each 
step theoretically; so the study engages in a considerable amount of statistical analysis, including
mediation analysis that tests the role of intervening variables in the process, as suggested by 
theory.
Chiefly in response to this same causal challenge, I also designed and carried out a survey
experiment among a group of repeat respondents from the main survey. Assigned randomly to ei-
ther a positive or negative treatment condition, respondents were shown either a text emphasiz-
ing social and political inclusion (+) or exclusion (-) of minorities in Danish/Swedish society. 
The survey then assessed each respondent's perceptions of inclusion/exclusion, level of national 
identification, and intentions for future participation. Respondents' personal differences on these 
measures between the main and follow-up surveys were then analyzed to test for effects differ-
ences among the positive and negative treatment groups. The survey experiment was adminis-
tered to 118 respondents; 60 of these were immigrant minorities. The experiment revealed some 
interesting aspects of how minorities with certain pre-existing beliefs perceive messages about 
minorities; but its main findings were insignificant (as presented briefly in Chapter 6). This is 
likely due to the treatment's superficial nature in relation to the deep and long-term nature of the 
main outcome of interest, national identification levels (discussion of this, and more details about
the design, are presented in Chapter 4).
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In addition to the two survey modules, the project also included in-depth interviews with 
25 minority main-survey respondents, in order to more closely examine mechanisms posited by 
the hypotheses and the survey data themselves, and the experiences that lay behind minority per-
ceptions and attitudes. Insights from the interviews are used to supplement quantitative findings 
from the main survey throughout the analysis chapters. In addition to these, I also conducted 
background organizational interviews in each country to examine minority recruitment into 
organizational life, and the role played by associations in building civic competence and engage-
ment. These were conducted with youth parties, unions, ethnic and religious organizations.
This is in many ways an exploratory study, testing not only mechanisms I originally ex-
pected might be at work, but examining a variety of social and attitudinal factors that political 
science, sociological and social psychological scholarship have suggest may play roles in 
processes of identification and engagement. I have insisted--sometimes stubbornly--on continu-
ing to ask 'big questions,' and I investigate them using broad, mostly observational data, while 
using the Danish/Swedish comparison to get more explanatory leverage. I have done so because 
I believe we don't yet know enough about how and why young immigrant minorities identify 
with and engage in society to conduct a narrower study. And further, since these dynamics in-
volve societal influences and individual attitudes that (we believe) have an aggregate impact on 
individual outcomes over time, we simply cannot 'get at' most parts of the process with a chiefly 
experimental design. We must, then, learn more about the factors and mechanisms at work before
we can proceed with a research agenda that is more narrowly focused on different parts of these 
processes. This study is a step in that process, highlighting important relationships that can in-
form further research in the field.
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1.4 Preview of the Argument and Dissertation Structure
While I argue that signals of immigrant inclusion or exclusion in a society are likely to affect im-
migrant minorities' civic integration, they can only be expected to affect individuals' attitudes and
behaviors if they are perceived by them. Chapter 2 presents a theoretically grounded framework 
for understanding and explaining this process--how and why immigrant minorities are likely to 
perceive and respond to such signals. They do so in part because they identify with the minority 
ethnic and religious groups that are the objects of inclusion or exclusion, and in part based on 
their own personal experiences. They form an idea of whether or not they are accepted now, and 
are likely to be so in the future, as part of the national community. It proceeds to suggest that we 
can gain by thinking of signals of inclusion and exclusion as constituting 'working national 
identities:' national boundary definitions as expressed in citizenship policy, political debate and 
social interactions are aggregated in a society and communicated to immigrant minorities repeat-
edly, and over a long period of time. 
Accordingly, where such national definitions differ, as they are believed to do in the Dan-
ish and Swedish contexts, they are expected to produce divergent perceptions of inclusion among
immigrant minorities in those contexts. In turn, minorities are expected to identify more highly 
with the national community as they perceive themselves and their groups to be included in the 
national context. In testing this, the project aims to test whether such identification is more close-
ly related to some types of inclusion perceptions than to others. In addition, there are theoretical 
grounds to believe that signals of group inclusion or exclusion are likely to have greater effects 
on national identification 1) among minorities who identify more highly with their minority 
groups, and 2) in societal contexts where immigration and integration are more salient issues. 
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Minorities' political participation, it is theorized, is likely to be positively influenced by national 
inclusion signals 1) directly, 2) via heightened identification, and/or 3) by influencing civic atti-
tudes. Conversely, however, minorities may be spurred to participate more when they perceive 
exclusion. Additional factors--such as associational involvement and socioeconomic factors--are 
also considered likely to influence minorities' identification and participation. 
The theoretical groundwork is followed, in Chapter 3, by an overview of the Danish and 
Swedish contexts and national 'approaches' to incorporating immigrants through citizenship poli-
cy, political debate and attitudes on the part of the majority. Chapter 4 proceeds to outline the 
study's design, research methods and data, detailing how identification and participation were as-
sessed and indexed for analysis. 
In Chapter 5, I introduce the novel measures used for assessing perceived inclusion and 
examine whether immigrant minorities in Denmark and Sweden perceive different levels of in-
clusion (towards themselves, their ethnic groups and towards Muslims) in terms of citizenship 
access, political elite attitudes and social inclusion. These perceptions are explored and compared
using data from the main survey, with attention to how they vary with policy knowledge, time in 
country and education, and to how minority and majority perspectives differ. Excerpts from in-
terviews supplement the analyses with insights as to how minorities themselves describe specific
aspects of policy and the kinds of experiences on which they based their perceptions. The chapter
also compares immigrant minorities' reports of exposure to media coverage about immigration, 
integration, Islam and related issues in the two countries. It concludes by introducing some in-
dices of the inclusion measures to be used for analysis in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 6 investigates the influence of inclusion-related factors on immigrant minorities' 
national identification levels, in comparison with other background factors. Examining the role 
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of each type of perceived inclusion in shaping such identification, it finds gender to play an im-
portant role as well. From there, the analyses proceed with attention to possible effects differ-
ences among minority men and women, finding the largest differences relating to factors of 
group inclusion. I also test whether the effects of group-inclusion perceptions vary, as expected, 
with minorities' level of identification with their ethnic or religious groups, or with societal con-
text. Again here, I supplement the analysis with minorities' own words from interviews describ-
ing the meaning of different kinds of experiences and perceptions for whether they feel they be-
long as part of the national community. The chapter concludes by examining how national 
identification levels differ among minorities in Denmark and Sweden, and the role that inclusion 
in those societies (or the lack of it) is playing in producing those outcomes.
Chapter 7 investigates whether and how inclusion and identification shape the second 
component of civic integration: immigrant minorities' political participation. After first present-
ing the reported levels of participation among minorities in the two countries, it offers analyses 
of how they are related to perceived inclusion along the dimensions of citizenship access, politi-
cal elite attitudes, and social treatment, and to national identification levels--first for electoral 
participation, and then for other forms of political action. Given that gender is indicated (by 
Chapter 6's analyses) to be an influential factor in the extent to which minorities identify with the
national community, this chapter also examines whether gender moderates how key factors affect
participation. I follow up the main analyses with tests for whether these effects work via civic at-
titudes such as political interest, increased civic norms, trust in political institutions, and political
efficacy; and for how engagement in different types of associations--political parties, civic, eth-
nic and religious--affects each form of participation. I conclude the chapter by looking at how 
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participation differs among minorities in the two countries while taking gender into account, and 
examining how inclusion and identification factors are contributing to this.
The dissertation concludes with a summary and discussion of its findings. After high-
lighting the relative importance of the different types of inclusion for identification and participa-
tion, where citizenship access carries less influence than political or social inclusion, I highlight 
two main insights proceeding from the analysis. First, both the survey and interviews suggest 
that with greater integration issue salience in a society come more intense effects of inclusion on 
civic integration outcomes, as well as some contradictory dynamics where minorities are also 
spurred to participation through raised interest and associational engagement. Second, gender 
turns out to play an important role in these processes, most notably by moderating the effects of 
minorities' group-related perceptions of inclusion and exclusion on their identification and partic-
ipation. I highlight fruitful areas for future research concerning both these dynamics. 
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Chapter 2. 
Theorizing Civic Integration: Who Identifies and Engages?
Immigrant integration challenges us with two fascinating opportunities: to understand the 
process by which people with origins in one part of the world become part of a civic community 
in another; and to use these dynamics, where many factors are in flux, as a window to better un-
derstand processes of identification and political engagement more broadly. 
We know that societies are 'doing' immigrant integration very differently--with citizen-
ship policies, political climates and societal attitudes ranging from the accepting and inclusive of 
immigrant minorities to those that are closed to and exclusive of them. A number of studies have 
examined and categorized different national identity types and 'national models' of integration, 
citizenship policy and practice (Joppke 2007; Howard 2009; Goodman 2010); some of these 
examine those national models for their normative desirability and compatibility with liberal de-
mocratic principles as well (Favell 1998; Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005; Joppke 2006; 
Jacobs and Rea 2007; Joppke 2008; Howard 2009). Many of these scholars have speculated as to
how this is likely to influence socioeconomic or civic integration, yet only a small number of 
studies examine this methodically through inter-country and inter-subject study of civic out-
comes, most of which do not consider causes and effects of national identification (Koopmans 
and Statham 2001; Statham et al. 2005; Bloemraad 2006; Koopmans 2007; Mollenkopf and 
Hochschild 2009). Very few studies assess both identification and participation among immigrant
minorities; one exception to this is Odmalm's (2005) multi-country study, yet unfortunately its 
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measures of identification lack conceptual precision.2 Another is the recent cross-national TIES 
(The Integration of the European Second Generation) survey project, which assessed national, 
ethnic, religious and local identification, perceived minority/majority relations and participation 
levels among second-generation immigrants and majority individuals in eight countries (the 
project included Sweden, but not Denmark) (Fleischmann and Phalet 2010; Simon 2011; Crul, 
Schneider and Lelie 2012). Yet most existing studies that describe or compare the development 
of citizenship policy, integration politics or majority attitudes only speculate about how they are 
likely to shape minority group- and individual-level outcomes, and why. Existing work that suffi-
ciently examines how key factors of inclusion in national communities influence individual civic
engagement, then, is quite limited. This study responds by investigating: what impact do differ-
ent levels and forms of national inclusion have on civic belonging and engagement among im-
migrant-background minorities, and how might this occur? 
To investigate this, I have sought to learn both from what a growing social psychological 
literature tells us about how group membership functions, and from existing scholarship on fac-
tors thought to matter for whether immigrant minorities and citizens in general vote and engage 
in political action. I have then adapted concepts and measures from these literatures in order to 
study how different 'working' (or functional) national identities shape identification and engage-
ment among young adults with immigrant backgrounds--in two national settings chosen to allow 
insight into these relationships: Denmark and Sweden. I examine how these processes 'work' in 
these settings in order to learn, first, how and why immigrant-background young people become 
2. The study that lies perhaps closest to the present project in conceptual scope, Odmalm’s (2005) book 
investigates civic outcomes similar groups of immigrant minorities in Malmö, Sweden, and Rotterdam, Netherlands.
Odmalm links national policy and institutions, civic identity and participation, however the questions he asks to 
represent identification with society do not relate well to the concept of identity he describes theoretically--for 
example, 'I think Malmö is a safe city for immigrants' is one of the items included in Odmalm's identification scale.
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engaged members of their societies; and in turn, the extent to which such dynamics are unique to 
immigrant-background populations and to which they are consistent with 'mainstream' political 
scholarship on participation. In this, the study's aims are both specific and general: I aim to learn 
about how immigrant-background young people are identifying and engaging in Denmark and 
Sweden today, and why; and I use this to learn more about minority civic integration more gener-
ally and how this supplements mainstream scholarship on national identity and political 
participation. 
This chapter begins by building up a theoretical framework for thinking about how mi-
nority and larger group identities interact, using social psychological and sociological concepts 
and findings regarding social identity, stigmatization, peripheral group status and social group 
definition. It then examines what implications these hold for processes of national identification 
in particular. 
Having built up this framework of hypothesized dynamics of inclusion and identification,
I proceed to argue that contemporary national identities are in practice defined vis-à-vis im-
migrant minorities through social inclusion, political elite attitudes, and citizenship policy--
which I together term 'working national identity.' I propose that these elements function as sig-
nals to immigrant minorities of their present and future acceptance in the national community. 
Finally, the chapter presents expectations for this study. I hypothesize, first, that these ele-
ments of inclusion--as perceived by immigrant minorities in group-related and personal terms--
will affect immigrant minorities' identification with it, with expected moderating roles for minor-
ity group salience and identity. Second, I present hypotheses that national identification will, in 
turn, positively affect political participation due to increased political interest and sharing of 
civic norms. Third, I present expectations that (perceived) social and political inclusion have, as 
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signals of equality and political enfranchisement, meaningful impacts on political participation 
due to increased trust in political institutions and increased beliefs in political efficacy. These are 
followed by alternative expectations that low levels of perceived inclusion can actually drive in-
volvement to redress grievances. Finally, I outline additional factors to be included in the analy-
sis, especially considering the expected role of associational involvement--both mainstream and 
minority-ethnic or religious--in equipping for and mobilizing participation. 
2.1 From Social Identity to 'Working National Identities': Dynamics of Belonging
If we want to know what makes individuals with immigrant backgrounds feel a part of the natio-
nal civic community, we must begin by considering what makes people identify with groups in 
general, and then consider how that is likely to apply to national identities specifically. We must 
then examine how immigrant minorities are situated in relation to the national groups in the soci-
eties to which they or their parents migrated, what factors may be expected to have an impact on 
them in relation to national identity specifically, and how their minority identities may interact 
with the process of identifying with the nation. Section 2.1 develops this framework, while con-
sidering insights from existing literature, to present the argument for what is likely to influence 
immigrant-minority young people's identification with the broader national community.
2.1.1 From Social Identity Theory to National Identities
Identity is constituted by how people define themselves as persons, in terms of their own person-
al characteristics and in relation to social groups. Psychologists view the self as a 'multifaceted 
cognitive structure,' meaning that each individual believes certain things to be true about herself 
in specific domains, and holds these aspects in relation to each other (Markus and Wurf 1987; 
Fiske and Taylor 1991; Amiot et al. 2007). Some of these aspects are social, having to do with 
how one is related to other people and to social groups (that the individual and others believe ex-
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ist) in society. A ‘social identity’ is defined by Henri Tajfel as “that part of an individual’s self-
concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group ... together with 
the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (1981: 255). Social identity 
theory leads us to understand that people, once they have categorized themselves and others into 
social groups, have a tendency to favor members of their own group, meaning that social catego-
rization itself "is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group” (Tajfel and
Turner 1986: 13). The social categorization process, so natural to every individual, produces 
oversimplification and overestimates of group differences, leading to the heightening of per-
ceived differences, and in turn biases between different social groups (Hogg and Abrams 1988; 
Messick and Mackie 1989).
Yet people are not members of only one social group. They see themselves, and are con-
ceived by others, as members of multiple groups simultaneously--and these groups can be neces-
sarily nested in increasingly levels of inclusiveness (as a German is also a European), as Allport  
recognized (1954); they can be of the same type that are thought to be mutually exclusive (such 
as being Christian or Muslim)3; or they can be on different, crossing dimensions, whose degree 
of overlap and compatibility may vary both empirically (in fact) and cognitively (in people's per-
ceptions) (such as being female and an executive, or British and a Muslim). It has been found 
that 'crisscrossing' of categorizations, where some members of different groups share a common 
ingroup, produces lower ideas of intergroup difference (Deschamps and Doise 1978; Vanbese-
laere 1996; Crisp, Hewstone and Rubin 2001; Crisp, Stone and Hall 2006); and that such com-
3. Yet as Crisp and Hewstone mention in their review of multiple social categorization, increasing numbers of 
individuals now claim multiple identities of the same dimension, for example multiple ethnicities (see also Phinney 
and Alipuria 2006; 2007).  
 26
mon ingroup identities reduce intergroup bias along the still-different dimensions (Crisp and 
Hewstone 1999; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). 
This study focuses specifically on identification with national communities among im-
migrant-background minorities in particular. To do this, it takes multiple and overlapping identi-
ties into account--examining the role of minority ethnic and religious identifications and of their 
signalled compatibility with the national identity in shaping whether and to what extent minori-
ties feel themselves a part of the nation. In this, it is distinct from the majority of existing work 
on national identity. Most studies focus on national identification among ethnic-majority popula-
tions, sometimes distinguishing between related sentiments such as 'patriotism', 'national pride' 
or 'nationalism' (Feather 1994; Schatz, Staub and Lavine 2003; Li and Brewer 2004; Huddy and 
Khatib 2007; Mann and Fenton 2009). Still others examine how such national identity--and 
sometimes related variants of national attachment such as nationalism or patriotism or even na-
tional guilt--is linked to perceptions of or attitudes toward outgroups--either other countries or 
minorities and newcomers to the national society (Mummendey, Klink and Brown 2001; 
Verkuyten 2001; Roccas, Klar and Liviatan 2006; Kyriakides, Virdee and Modood 2009; 
Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown 2009; Clay, Barrett and 2011; Ariely 2012). Some of these studies 
examine the impact of national models of identity--in types usually distinguished as mainly civic 
or mainly ethnic--on how outsiders are treated in society. Wakefield and his co-authors (2011), 
for example, find that framing ingroup identity as more inclusive towards national members with
minority heritage positively affected majority individuals' willingness to help an ethnic-minority 
person. The position of immigrants and minorities has begun to be considered theoretically and 
studied empirically, with insights from classic intergroup theory and from newer work on com-
mon identities that can unify (previously divided) subgroups. The following section presents 
 27
these perspectives to build a framework of how to think about immigrant minorities and what 
might influence their national identification.
2.1.2 National 'Peripherals': Immigrant Minorities within Broader National Communities
The preceding sections have introduced social identity and self-categorization theory and related 
them to national identities. Yet how can we theorize the links between national identities with 
their levels of inclusion, and minority identity and political behavior? At first glance, this raises 
the dilemma of how to work theoretically with these dynamics as part of two processes that are 
theoretically distinct yet intensively related in the real world: immigrant minorities are at once 
involved in intergroup relations vis-à-vis the ethnic majority, even as they are learning whether 
the national ingroup may include them and determining whether they identify with that national 
ingroup. Since theories of intergroup contact are focused on how more equal and cooperative 
conditions of contact enable reduction of intergroup prejudice4--rather than identification with a 
broader, potentially unifying group identity, classic intergroup approaches by themselves are not 
really helpful for my purposes here. In this section, then, I consider work on stigmatization and 
social inclusion in light of and within recent social psychological research on multiple social 
identification in diverse settings, in order to build a framework to think about what factors may 
be expected to influence immigrant-minority identification with the national community.
Minority ethnic and religious identities have the potential to cause the minority individual
to be stigmatized in society--said to occur when a person bears "some attribute, or characteristic, 
that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular social context" (Crocker, Major and 
4. Beginning with Gordon Allport's foundational work (1954), there is substantial support within social 
psychology for the idea that contact between people of different groups, ceteris parabus, reduces intergroup 
prejudice, provided that four main conditions are present: equal group status within the situation, common goals, 
intergroup cooperation and support for authority. For summaries and further developments of the theory, see 
Pettigrew (1998); Brown and Hewstone (2005); and the extended work done by Gaertner, Dovidio and numerous 
colleagues (Gaertner et al. 1994; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Dovidio, Gaertner and Kawakami 2003).
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Steel 1998: 505). Whether they are first or second-generation, most immigrant-minority adults 
are fully aware of their being part of an ethnic, and possibly religious, minority--especially those 
whose ethnicity and/or religious practice makes them visibly distinct from the majority popula-
tion. Regardless of the level to which they identify with their ethnic (and/or religious) group, visi-
ble minorities cannot simply choose not to have minority traits attributed to them by others. As 
Erving Goffman wrote in his classic work on social stigma, "Visibility, of course, is a crucial fac-
tor. That which can be told about an individual's social identity at all times during his daily round
and by all persons he encounters therein will be of great importance to him" (1963: 48). As a vis-
ible physical characteristic, race has in particular been found to be a persistently salient factor 
used by people to categorize one another (Hewstone, Hantzi and Johnston 1991). More recently, 
religiously signifying clothing--such as headscarves worn by Muslim women--has been argued 
to instigate social categorization (and stigmatization) in much the same way that race does (Göle 
2003; Scott 2007; Joppke 2009; Kyriakides, Virdee and Modood 2009). As such, ethnicity and 
religious affiliation (especially when characterized by distinctive clothing or practices) often act 
as markers that signify the minority individual's distinctiveness from most others in society.5
For a minority individual, knowing that she bears minority traits or markers means know-
ing that most others in society will process the meaning of those markers when interacting with 
her. Therefore, she is likely to expect that the rights, status and inclusion most strangers in socie-
ty (those with whom she has no prior personal connection) will extend to most people of the 
same minority groups (or indeed to a broader swath of minority groups between which many ma-
jority individuals do not distinguish) will also be extended to her. Similar expectations, based on 
5. On its face, being distinctive can be a good thing, a positive aspect of identity that individuals regularly balance 
with group belonging in negotiating the extent to which they wish to assimilate with a particular group, as opposed 
to maintaining full distinctiveness at the cost of belonging (Brewer 1991).
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previous experiences, will also often be shared by other members of the same minority group(s) 
(Crocker, Major and Steel 1998). However, she does not only base her expectation of treatment 
on abstract ideas of which groups others are likely to type her with, and her perceptions of how 
most in society think about those groups; she has herself already experienced society and its re-
actions to her personally. Thus, each minority individual carries expectations of treatment and in-
clusion that are based on both abstract expectations based on knowledge of her minority-group 
membership and how it is seen by most others in society, and based on her own experiences of 
interactions in society. 
Each person does of course not only bear markers of her (visible) group identity, but 
many other traits as well. Some, like gender and class--will be visible and salient in most set-
tings; while others, like profession, will only be visible or salient in certain settings. Since she 
bears multiple traits--not only markers of the group identity that makes her a distinct, possibly 
stigmatized minority--she holds a degree of uncertainty about the extent to which her minority 
identity will determine others' treatment of her (Goffman 1963). Individuals will vary in the ex-
tent to which they link group-based expectations of treatment to actual experienced interactions, 
and to the treatment they expect to receive personally in the future. This may vary with the soci-
etal salience of both that particular group identity and of its distinction from the dominant group 
(McGuire et al. 1978; Purdie-Vaughns et al. 2008); it may also vary with the extent to which they
identify with their minority groups (Branscombe, Schmitt and Harvey 1999; McCoy and Major 
2003; Sellers and Shelton 2003).6
6. A similar relationship also seems to hold in reverse: Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt and Spears (2001) found 
minority group identification to increase with perceived discrimination from mainstream groups. However, changes 
in minority ethnic or religious identification are not examined in this study.
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 A minority person, then, self-categorizes with, and knows that others categorize her with, 
certain minority ethnic and/or religious groups. She likely identifies with minority groups (in ad-
dition to numerous other social groupings) to some degree. She perceives those groups' status 
levels within society; and she perceives those groups, and their difference from the majority, to 
be salient within society to some degree. In a process that is influenced by her minority identifi-
cations and by these perceptions of status and salience, she perceives the treatment of those 
groups and of herself within society. In contrast with lab settings that use groups constructed for 
a particular experiment, in real societal contexts immigrant minorities form such perceptions 
through many interactions over time. These perceptions then have an influence on whether, and 
to what extent, such individuals come to identify with the larger national community (Roccas and
Brewer 2002; Amiot et al. 2007). 
Roccas and Brewer propose that social identity complexity, or the extent to which indi-
viduals integrate different social identities into themselves, depends on both the long- and short-
term "accessibility of simultaneous membership in nonconvergent ingroups" (Ibid.: 99). In other 
words, the possibility of holding both (ethnic and religious) minority identities and the national 
identity simultaneously is crucial. Immigrant minorities are generally highly aware that they are 
not what psychologists term 'prototypical' group members; instead, they are 'peripheral' members
whose status and acceptance within the national community are in many cases ongoing, open 
questions, whose answer matters for whether they identify with it. Jetten and her co-authors ex-
tended this further by showing that not only past and present status within a group matters for 
peripheral members' identification with the group; their expectations of future acceptance in the 
group matters as well (Jetten et al. 2003). For immigrant minorities, then, the possibility of being
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part of the national community in the present and into the future is likely to matter greatly for 
whether they identify with that community.
2.2 National Identities Defined through Legal, Political and Social Inclusion
On what kinds of characteristics are groups, and national groups in particular, defined? Group 
definitions can of course be based on different criteria that are more or less exclusive towards 
outsiders who might like to join the group. Within social psychology, Brewer, Hong and Li 
(2004) proposed that a social group's common identity can be based on two types of shared char-
acteristics. First, a group's unity may be conditioned on perceived shared attributes and common 
heritage of the members, defined by a group 'essence' that is rather fixed over time (Yzerbyt, 
Rocher and Schadron 1997). Or second, a group's common identity may be based on facing a 
common problem, holding a common purpose, or acting in coordination to meet those goals 
(Ibid.). This second type of basis for group identity is more malleable over time. 
These types are analogous to heritage-based vs. norm- or terroritorially based national 
identities that have usually been identified as 'ethnic' and 'civic' in scholarship on national identi-
ties (Shulman 2002; Joppke 2006).7 Actors who perceive national identity as such may be said to 
follow, respectively, a more 'primordialist' or a more 'constructivist' logic (Cruz 2000). Yet in 
practice, most contemporary nations do not operate with either an exclusively ethnic or civic def-
inition of nation, but instead occupy some position on a continuum between fully closed (where 
no new non-hereditary members may join) and fully open (where anyone may become part of the
nation) (Brubaker 1999; Shulman 2002); even Anthony Smith admits this in his book The Ethnic 
7. Hans Kohn (1955; 1967) produced a typology that identified more ethnic vs. civic conceptions of nationalism as
being 'Eastern' vs. 'Western.' While the 'Eastern' was organic and mystical, based on heritage and origin myths, the 
'Western' was rational and associational (Smith 1991: 80-81). Yet this East/West dichotomy has been criticized for 
incorrectly over-generalizing these types of national understanding to national cases that do not hold them (Shulman
2002).
 32
Origins of Nations (1986). As Shulman (2002) points out, there is a large space between pure 
ethnic and civic types of national identity or nationalism (which he terms 'cultural'), in which 
certain characteristics and practices held and followed by the dominant national group such as 
language, customs, traditions and norms, are made key criteria for national belonging. The in-
crease in 'civic integration requirements' introduced into European immigration, integration and 
citizenship policies over the past decade (Joppke 2005; Joppke 2008; Goodman 2009; Goodman 
2010) may in some cases be interpreted as expressions of such cultural criteria in civic terms. Per
Mouritsen (2012) suggests that 're-nationalization' of national identity and civic requirements, 
where it has occurred, may be a reaction to increased dominance of international norms for citi-
zenship rights and standards that Yasemin Soysal (1994), among others, suggested were bringing 
a 'post-national model' of citizenship. 
Indeed, national ethnic majorities have been found to project their own characteristics 
onto the definition of the national ingroup, making the bar for national prototypicality more ex-
clusive towards ethnic or religious minorities (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999; Wenzel, Mum-
mendey and Waldzus 2007; Yogeeswaran and Dasgupta 2010). They do this to varying degrees, 
operating with national identity definitions that range over the continuum mentioned above. 
While individuals and institutions within the same country often vary in terms of how inclusive 
they see national identity as being, survey data indicate that there still exist broad national con-
sensuses (though not ascribed to by all citizens) over how each national community is defined. 
Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown (2009) examined survey data (from the ISSP national identity 
module) from 31 countries, and found that correlation between levels of national identification 
and anti-immigrant prejudice (among respondents who are mostly ethnic-majority) were related 
to certain criteria for being part of the nation--and importantly, that such effects occurred at the 
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national rather than individual level. This, they write, "demonstrates that the consequences of 
identifying with a group can be better understood by paying closer attention to the group defini-
tions that dominate in any given context" (Ibid.: 34, emphasis added). Despite individual differ-
ences, then, they find that national consensuses of who belongs in a nation do exist, and that 
these wield influence on processes and consequences of identifying with the nation.
Yet what elements actually constitute such group definitions, when the groups in question
are national communities? And further, how are those definitions communicated to immigrant 
minorities? National communities thus necessarily have social and political dimensions; and, 
where they are linked to corresponding states, they are also bounded legally, primarily through 
citizenship. That is to say, national identity boundaries are communicated through social interac-
tion and media representations of social interactions, through political messages (especially from
political elites) and through citizenship policy. I will now develop these concepts, before pro-
ceeding to expectations for how such messages, as perceived by immigrant minorities, are likely 
to shape identification and participation.
2.2.1 Perceptions of Inclusion through Social Interaction
First, as with all groups of people, nations are social communities. While some social groups are 
only made up of people who personally interact and know of each other, nations are constituted 
(as are many other kinds of groups) by mostly imagined connections between people who per-
ceive themselves to belong to the same national group, tied together by some shared (perception 
of) similarity and common experience, as Benedict Anderson pointed out in his Imagined Com-
munities (1983). While concrete social interactions with other members play a role in building 
and maintaining identification with any group, shared references and experience that bind na-
tions are also often passed through shared information sources such as media--this shapes com-
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mon language and cultural references, and in some ways plays a role in actually building com-
mon experience (Ibid.; Colley 2005). 
As potential or peripheral members of the nation, immigrant minorities accumulate infor-
mation over time about their present and future social acceptance in the nation--whether most 
members accept and will accept them as members--through both concrete social interactions and 
through the media. Social interactions give minorities more direct information about how people 
treat them personally. Through media coverage, they typically receive messages of inclusion or 
exclusion toward minority groups or to other individuals who are members of certain groups that
inform their perceptions of group-related social inclusion. Yet each type of perception--of social 
inclusion of one's group(s) and of oneself personally--undoubtedly influences the other: individu-
als may interpret some aspects of others' treatment of them personally as being based on their 
(visible) minority group membership (based in part on information about group inclusion/exclu-
sion in society more broadly);8 and they may also project their own experiences outward to form 
perceptions of how others in their group are likely treated. Thus, nations are social communities, 
and immigrant minorities' social acceptance in those communities is communicated to them both 
through personally experienced social interactions and through media representations of social 
interactions involving people with similar backgrounds to theirs in the same society. This, I ar-
gue, is likely to influence their own level of identification with the nation, and perhaps in turn 
their political participation in it (specific expectations for this study will be presented later in this
chapter).
8. Social psychologists have found that group status and stereotypes, as well as minorities' tendency to believe that
social mobility is possible regardless of group, can affect whether minorities perceive themselves to have 
experienced discrimination on the basis of minority group membership (Major et al. 2002; OBrien, Kinias and 
Major 2008).  
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2.2.2 Perceptions of Inclusion through Political Elite Attitudes
Second, because national communities often (though do not always) correspond to states and 
their institutions, national communities are also defined through politics. In this, political elites 
play an important role in defining the meaning, principles and criteria for belonging to the natio-
nal community through both political discourse and political priorities. Politicians do not always 
represent all or even a majority of the people when they do this, of course. Yet through their poli-
tics--both discursive and policy-oriented--they signal their attitudes towards newcomers and mi-
norities, sometimes generally and sometimes in reference to certain groups. At their heart, I ar-
gue, such elite attitudes communicate to minorities whether they are full and equal members of 
the political community. Such equality is normatively crucial in a democracy, as Iris Marion 
Young wrote: "Democracy entails political equality, that all members of the polity are included 
equally in the decision-making process and have an equal opportunity to influence the outcome" 
(2002: 52). But before minority individuals can feel this, they need to believe that key decision-
makers in society have some degree of regard for them as members of society, and are likely to 
care about their situation and perhaps about what they think. 
There are two ways in which minority individuals may form ideas of how political elites 
think and feel about (their own) minority groups, and perhaps by extension, to them or people 
like them. First, they may form ideas through the very presence or absence of acknowledgement 
of their minority groups, or people in situations similar to theirs, as being included in the audi-
ences of political appeals and debates involving elites. And second, minorities are also likely to 
form perceptions of political elites' attitudes based on political rhetoric about their minority-eth-
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nic and/or religious groups.9 This is what Young refers to as 'greeting,' or 'political acknowledge-
ment,' in her discussion of political communication (2002).  As Young points out, such greeting 
is often significant in its absence, which is often indicated by the omission of certain social 
groups from the intended audience of political communication: "If a social segment rarely if ever
appears as a group to whom deliberators appeal, and if there are few signs that participants in the
public debate believe themselves accountable to that social segment among others, then that so-
cial segment has almost certainly been excluded from discussion" (2002: 62). Such acknowl-
edgement, Young writes, is both the prerequisite and foundation for meaningful communication 
between members of a political communication: "As a political issue of inclusion, recognition is 
primarily a starting-point for political interaction and contest, rather than its end" (2002: 61).  
Minority individuals themselves are likely to notice such a lack of acknowledgement and respect 
as members of the political community, and to form perceptions of political elites' attitudes to-
wards their groups, and perhaps towards themselves, in response. 
While I suggested above that minorities' perceptions of social inclusion are likely to be 
formed through a combination of personally experienced interactions and through the mass me-
dia, it is likely that perceptions of political elite attitudes are formed mainly through messages re-
ceived through the media, as few will have personal contact with political elites. Such messages 
relaying political elite attitudes through the media--whether they refer to specific ethnic or reli-
gious groups or to certain minority figures or organizations--are likely to shape minorities' ideas 
9. And by extension, an individual such perceptions may be formed by listening to political rhetoric about other 
groups in society to whom he or she does not actually belong, but whom he or she believes are seen as similar by 
members of the majority population. For example, the perception an orthodox Christian from Iraq has about 
Swedish politicians' attitudes toward her own ethnic group may be damaged by negative political rhetoric about 
Muslim immigrants; though she is not a Muslim, knowing that many in the majority society are likely to assume that
all Arab immigrants are Muslims will make it possible that a negative signal about Muslims will cause her to think 
that politicians think more negatively about people of her ethnic group than she did before. 
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of how political elites think and feel about certain minority groups. Individual minorities may 
then relate those perceptions to ideas about political elites' likely attitudes towards people like 
them more personally. It is of course difficult to predict what perceptions individual minorities 
are likely to form; it likely depends on what information sources they depend on. Yet while they 
receive a variety of political signals that vary greatly from party to party or even by which indi-
vidual politician is speaking (through the media), it is expected that the differing general levels 
of rhetoric about and towards immigrant minorities in different societies is likely to result in im-
migrant minorities having, on average, different perceptions of it. Since political leaders are visi-
ble, usually elected, representatives of the larger population, their attitudes towards immigrant 
minorities (as perceived by those minorities) are likely to function as a signal of present and fu-
ture acceptance in the nation that is accumulated by immigrant minorities over time. Thus, while 
political elite attitudes towards minorities do not themselves fully constitute political inclusion in
a community, I have chosen to use them to represent political inclusion--here as perceived by im-
migrant minorities--within the context of this study. As with social inclusion, I argue that such 
political inclusion, or its lack, is likely to have an impact on their identification with the nation 
and their political participation in it.
2.2.3 Perceptions of Inclusion through Citizenship
And third, in addition to being social and political communities, nations that correspond histori-
cally and territorially to states are also bounded legally through citizenship. As Rogers Brubaker 
has written, the central question of citizenship and the politics surrounding it "is not 'who gets 
what?' but 'who is what?'" (1992: 182). Citizenship status is usually granted on the basis of 
heredity (jus sanguinis), territorial birth or residence (jus soli), or some combination of these 
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(Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002).10 T. H. Marshall, who pioneered a concept of modern citizen-
ship, after its extension to both genders and all races, as bringing a bundle of rights and duties to 
all members of a national community, defined it as "basic human equality associated with the 
concept of full membership of a community" (Marshall 1992: 6). Yet as any characteristic that 
helps to define a group, it is at once "internally inclusive" and "externally exclusive," showing 
who does and does not belong to the legal polity (Brubaker 1992: 46). And this is linked to its 
giving of equal status before the law; as Sassen writes, "insofar as equality is based on member-
ship, as a criterion citizenship status forms the basis of exclusive politics and identities" (2006: 
292). For most people, who are born and live their lives within the same state their parents did, 
citizenship and its capacity to delineate between member and foreigner is never a salient issue. 
They are simply citizens, and involuntarily so (Joppke 2010). 
But for immigrants and for many immigrants' children (in the absence of jus soli), citi-
zenship is an boundary of national membership that must either be crossed, where possible, by 
qualifying and applying for it, or lived with in its absence. States' rules for acquiring citizenship 
vary greatly. While several scholars have argued that European governments are actually con-
verging on a more civic, more demanding model of citizenship based on civic requirements and 
duties (Joppke 2007; Jacobs and Rea 2007; Joppke 2007; Joppke 2008; Triadafilopoulos 2011), 
there is still significant variation (with restrictive and liberal ends of the European spectrum well 
represented by Denmark and Sweden). Immigrants, and sometimes immigrants' children, must 
10. Citizenship policies are to some extent institutionalized expressions of historical or current social and political 
boundaries--that is, they reflect national identity as it has been defined at the times when citizenship legislation was 
written and amended, crystallized into legislation and rules. But today, they usually also reflect other rights-based 
considerations that are generally drawn from a combination of national and international human rights or citizenship
norms. 
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live up to existing requirements in the states where they live in order to acquire citizenship and 
become full legal members. 
 For the individual, the significance of acquiring or holding citizenship may be said to be 
twofold: it gives generally irrevocable access to certain rights available only to citizens, and it 
signifies full membership in the national community. T. H. Marshall traced the expansion of citi-
zenship rights to include civil, political and social rights; yet in many European welfare states, 
full civil rights, extensive social rights and even some political rights are available to most (long-
term) residents, leaving only full political rights uniquely available to citizens.11 Thus the rights 
that citizenship itself gives are sometimes social and in other cases almost only political, at least 
in welfare states such as Denmark and Sweden.12 Yet these are still meaningful; as Marc Howard 
writes in his important work on citizenship in Europe, "the right to vote and to run for office in 
national elections is still extremely consequential, in all countries" (2009: 6). I would put it 
somewhat more modestly: that where democracy functions so as to allow political rights to be 
meaningfully exercised, the political rights that come with citizenship are meaningful. 
The symbolic meaning of citizenship is assumed to exist but is less clear; often men-
tioned by scholars and policy-makers, it is believed that citizens will integrate better into their 
11. It is important to note that even with extensive civil and social rights to resident non-citizens, some social rights 
and in many cases the right to remain in the country is generally revocable, on the part of the state, especially in 
cases where an individual is convicted of serious crime. Several countries, including both Denmark and Sweden, 
allow residents who have lived in the country for several years (3 years in Denmark and 5 years in Sweden) to vote 
in local elections; but only citizens are allowed to vote in parliamentary and EU-parliamentary elections or to run for
office. 
12. Christian Joppke suggests in his book Citizenship and Integration (2010) that such a state of affairs may be 
creating what he calls a 'citizenship light'--"easy to access, with rights (and few obligations) that do not sharply 
distinguish citizens from certain aliens, a capped by thin identities." Joppke sees a converging set of increasingly 
extensive rights regimes combined with increasingly liberal citizenship policies; yet I believe Howard and 
Goodman's assessments are more on point: that sharp contrasts still divide the various (European) national 
integration and citizenship policies, which range from quite liberal (characterized, among others, by Sweden) to 
quite restricted (characterized, among others, by Denmark) (Goodman 2009; Howard 2009; Goodman 2010). 
Chapter 3 will further outline distinctions between the two national cases examined here.
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new society--socially, politically and economically--than similar non-citizens (Hansen 1998; 
Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002; Bratsberg, Ragan and Nasir 2002). Yet the symbolic or attitudi-
nal impact of being able to become a citizen or of naturalization itself is often assumed without 
grounding it theoretically; Howard writes that "it is logical to assume that naturalized citizens 
will tend ... to experience more loyalty to the new country," among other things (2009: 8); yet he 
does not explain why it is logical to assume this. Most individual immigrant minorities know 
whether or not they are citizens; and those who are not are likely have some perception of 
whether or not it is or will be possible for them to acquire. In addition, they may hold perceptions
of whether citizenship is available to most people in their minority ethnic and religious groups. 
While I suggested above that immigrant minorities were likely to project ideas about group-relat-
ed inclusion onto how political elites might think of them or people like them (as received 
through the media), with citizenship the reverse is more likely: not having so much information 
about how citizenship rules apply to one's ethnic and religious groups, they may project their 
own situation with citizenship onto their groups. However, they may also gain such group-related
ideas through the media, especially when changes to citizenship rules have been debated or 
introduced. 
I contend that the availability of citizenship acts as a signal to immigrant minorities, 
along with social inclusion and political elite attitudes, of present and future acceptance in the 
national community; as presented in previous sections, existing theory and work on stigmatiza-
tion and inclusion suggest that this is likely to affect their national identification. Yet whether or 
not the possession of or possible access to citizenship--for oneself or for one's ethnic or religious 
group--is related to immigrant minorities' identification with the national community is an empir-
ical question, one to be investigated here. 
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Investigating this is, however, somewhat problematic, since resident non-citizens in a 
country do not always acquire citizenship as soon as they qualify for it; rather, they make a 
choice--based on practical considerations such as ease of travel, but sometimes also based on the 
desire to have political rights or even out of gratitude to their adopted country for its openness to-
ward them, as Bloemraad found in her research among naturalized immigrants in Canada (2002).
Self-selection therefore accounts for many personal acquisition of citizenship. This problem may 
be partially addressed by basing the study of effects not only on differences between naturalized 
versus non-citizen immigrant minorities, but adding that information to responses from non-citi-
zens on whether they believe they would be able to get citizenship either now or later, if they 
wished to. In addition, it should be possible--as with perceived social inclusion and political elite
attitudes--to study the effects of perceived inclusion through citizenship available to one's minor-
ity ethnic and religious groups. Overall, immigrant-minorities' ideas of whether they, and perhaps
members of their minority group(s), can become citizens is likely to matter for their national 
identification and political participation.
2.2.4 'Working National identities': Social, Political and Legal Boundaries in Practice
The national community, then, is bounded socially, politically and legally. Inclusion in or exclu-
sion from the national community, I contend, is communicated to immigrant minorities through 
this triad of citizenship policy, political elite attitudes and social inclusion/exclusion. Taking 
them together, I argue that these three types of inclusion, as practiced by the dominant groups 
and institutions in society and as experienced by minorities, constitute 'working national identi-
ties' that are operative in each national context. 
Such working national identities vary over time and with contact with different institu-
tions and individuals, or in different cities or regions; but they will likely be meaningfully shaped
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by national context, as has been shown to some extent through multilevel survey research among
majority populations (Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown 2009). Immigrant minorities' perceptions of 
these factors, developed over time, are likely to vary between those contexts--in this study be-
tween Denmark and Sweden. The three types of inclusion may vary independently in practice; 
for example, a societal context could be more socially inclusive than politically or legally so. Yet 
in practice it is more typical that they correspond to one another, at least over the long term. Po-
litical elite attitudes and citizenship policy, especially, are likely to be related through legislative 
processes, where political elites institutionalize their own national identity definitions--perhaps 
with caveats pressed on them by international law and norms--within citizenship policy. Yet for 
immigrant minorities, who are on the 'receiving end' of a majority-held definition of the nation--
being included or excluded on the basis of whether they fit into it or not--all three are likely to 
matter. Together, legal, political and social inclusion in the national polity constitute full 
inclusion.
We might also say that full inclusion in the national polity requires all three types of in-
clusion to be in place: citizenship status together with high levels of both social and political in-
clusion.13 A lack of any one of these three types of inclusion may be argued to 'condition' the util-
ity or impact of the others. That is, a person enjoying full social and political inclusion, but 
lacking citizenship, will enjoy equality in social interactions and political rhetoric but will not 
have full political rights. Similarly, as Saskia Sassen points out, "legal citizenship does not al-
13. Hochschild and Lang  used a concept of 'inclusion' in their 2011 study, which compared perceived inclusion of 
self and others among general population samples in ten countries (using data from the International Social Survey 
Program); in that study, they also examined how such levels varied between citizens and non-citizens, and between 
majority groups and ethnic or religious minorities. Their measures are somewhat questionable, however, since their 
inclusion indices--while compiled using reliability checks and principal component analysis--include such varied 
concepts as national pride, criteria for being a national, and identity items such as feelings of closeness to one's 
country. Thus they blend several concepts together in their definition of inclusion that are held distinct in the present 
study.
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ways bring full and equal membership rights because these rights are often conditioned by the 
position of different groups within a nation-state" (2006: 292). This has been the case for many 
marginalized groups in various contexts across time, yet this configuration is increasing with the 
introduction of norms and rights conventions across the international system that press states to 
formally give equal legal, political and perhaps even social rights to their citizens and, to a lesser 
extent, to many long-term residents.
The question might be raised as to whether I am really discussing inclusion, where a per-
son is considered a member of a group, or equality, where he or she has equal status within the 
group and equal rights to participate in group activities. The answer, I believe, is that my concept
of national inclusion encompasses both: inclusion in the national community necessitates, at least
ideally, being an equal member. Something like what I mean is expressed in the concept of 'equal
citizenship' as developed by American legal scholar Kenneth Karst for interpreting how equality 
under the U.S. constitution is to be understood. In  'equal citizenship,' Karst wrote, "equality and 
belonging are inseparably linked" (1977; 1989: 2). In order for such equal citizenship to be in 
place, every individual must be treated "as a person, one who deserves respect, one who belongs 
to our national community" (1983: 248). It requires respect, but is violated by "degradation or 
the imposition of stigma;" it regards each citizen as "a participant in the moral community, some-
one who counts in the community's processes of decision. And a citizen is responsible to the 
community, with obligations to it and its other members"  (1983: 248). It is clear that for such 
full inclusion to be conceptually in place, all three types of inclusion I have raised here--legal, 
political and social--should be in place. Yet the question remains, whether immigrant minorities' 
feelings of identification with the national community and their participation in it are actually af-
fected by all three types.
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My goal here, then, is to examine whether each type of inclusion--as perceived by mi-
norities--is related to identification, and ultimately to participation. And, to the extent it is possi-
ble, to examine the extent to which group vs. personalized perceptions of these inclusion types 
matter for these outcomes. We have theoretical reasons to believe that all three types are related 
to identification, and by extension to participation. Citizenship is special among these, in that it 
actually gives access to national electoral participation, yet it remains relevant to examine what 
effect it may have via identification; as mentioned above, non-citizens' expectations of being able
to become citizens, and all minorities' ideas of whether members of their minority groups can do 
so, will assist in detangling the effects of citizenship rights themselves. In addition, we have rea-
son to expect that political elite attitudes--as perceived by minorities--are particularly related to 
the development of certain participation-facilitating attitudes (trust and efficacy) that are likely to
influence participation above and beyond, or perhaps independently from, the impact of identifi-
cation. Expectations as to how these relationships are likely to work are presented in the follow-
ing sections, with section 2.3 focusing on how these inclusion types are expected to affect nation-
al identification, and the following sections on how they, and identification in turn, are expected 
to affect political participation.
2.3 Expectations: Minorities' Inclusion Perceptions Differ with National Context
In brief, this thesis examines how the different ways in which national societies 'receive' their im-
migrant minorities into the national community influence those minorities' identities and partici-
pation in society. The analysis proceeds like a chain, examining whether and how: 
• different 'working national identities,' as I have just presented them, produce varying per-
ceptions of national inclusion among immigrant minorities;
• immigrant minorities' perceptions of inclusion in the national community affect their identi-
fication with it; and
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• those perceptions and identification levels among immigrant minorities, in turn, influence 
their political participation. 
The current section presents hypotheses for this study on the first point, the following section on 
the second, and section 2.5 on the third. Thus hypotheses relating expected country-level differ-
ences (labeled 'Hc') are presented in this section, while individual-level hypotheses (labeled 'Hi') 
are presented in the following two sections.
First among the types of inclusion examined is legal inclusion, or access to citizenship. 
As argued above, national communities (that correspond to states) are legally bounded through 
citizenship. Immigrant minorities meet existing citizenship policies in their national context, and 
form certain perceptions of the extent to which it is available to them if they wish it--ranging 
from 'I will never be able to get citizenship,' to 'I will likely be able to get it in the future,' to 'I 
could get it now if I wished,' to 'I already have citizenship.' They also form perceptions of how 
possible it is for most people of their ethnic and religious groups to get citizenship. I expect that 
such perceptions will correspond to actual citizenship regimes, though this is an empirical ques-
tion I investigate here.14 For this study, then, I expect that:  
Hc1. Immigrant minorities in a state with more liberal citizenship access will, other 
things being equal, perceive citizenship to be more available to themselves than those 
living in a state with more restricted access.
And similarly for group-related perceptions, that:
Hc2. Immigrant minorities in a state with more liberal citizenship access will, other 
things being equal, perceive citizenship to be more available to members of their minority
ethnic (and religious) groups than those living in a state with more restricted access.
Yet this is only likely to be true to the extent that immigrant minorities know something about 
actual citizenship policies. As John Griffiths writes in his work on the 'social working' of law, 
14. The Danish and Swedish citizenship policies will be compared in Chapter 3: Sweden has the more liberal set of 
citizenship rules, while Denmark has the more restrictive.
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"the actor may not ever have heard of a particular rule and, if he has, what he knows about it may
be distorted" (1999: 317). The link between citizenship policy and immigrant minorities' percep-
tions of them relies on whether they are aware of them; I therefore assess respondents' knowl-
edge of existing citizenship policies (on aspects such as as required years of residence and rules 
for native-born children of foreign citizens). I examine the extent to which minority respondents' 
ideas about policies is accurate, and further whether such knowledge conditions the link between
liberal citizenship policies and perceptions of citizenship access.
As outlined in the previous section, I also examine immigrant minorities' perceptions of 
political elite attitudes towards their minority ethnic and religious groups, as well as towards 
'people like them' more specifically. We generally assume that immigrant minorities living in so-
cieties with less political debate that takes a negative tone toward immigration and immigrant 
minorities, and where anti-immigration parties have less power, will have higher (more positive) 
perceptions of political elite attitudes towards their minority group(s) and towards people like 
them.15 Yet this is an empirical question, so I examine here whether:
Hc3. Immigrant minorities in a state with less negatively toned political debate over 
immigration and immigrant minorities, and where anti-immigration parties have less 
power, other things being equal, are likely to perceive more positive political elite 
attitudes towards their minority ethnic (and religious) groups than those living in a state 
with more negatively toned debate and where such parties have greater power.
And similarly, for more personalized perceptions, whether:
Hc4. Immigrant minorities in a state with less negatively toned political debate over 
immigration and immigrant minorities, and where anti-immigration parties have less 
power, other things being equal, are likely to perceive more positive political elite 
attitudes towards people like them than those living in a state with more negatively toned 
debate and where such parties have greater power.
15. The extent of anti-immigration political debate and the success of anti-immigration parties in Denmark and 
Sweden will be compared in Chapter 3: Denmark has more negative debate surrounding immigration and immigrant
minorities than Sweden does, and the populist Danish People's Party has had greater power, and been on the national
political stage longer, than the similar Sweden Democrats.
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Just as perceptions of citizenship access are likely to be conditioned on knowledge of actual poli-
cies, it is likely that the relation between national political debates and minorities' perceptions of 
political elite attitudes is likely to be conditioned on their level of media consumption. I will thus
examine whether it is the case that country-level differences in political elite perceptions are con-
ditional on media consumption (as self-reported by respondents).
And third, I examine immigrant minorities' perceptions of social inclusion in each nation-
al context. These are assessed through questions about social treatment of respondents' ethnic 
group, of Muslims, and of themselves personally; they are also assessed with questions about 
discrimination towards respondents' ethnic group, towards Muslims, and experienced by respon-
dents personally. However, as with citizenship access and political elite attitudes I first assess 
whether it is the case that immigrant minorities in societies whose majority populations are indi-
cated by previous research to have more inclusive attitudes and practices towards minorities, ac-
tually perceive higher social inclusion.16 Thus I test whether:
Hc5. Immigrant minorities in a society with more positive majority attitudes and practices
towards minorities (as suggested by existing research) are likely, other things being 
equal, to perceive higher levels of social inclusion towards their minority ethnic (and 
religious) groups than those living in a society with less tolerant attitudes and practices.
And similarly, for more personalized perceptions, whether:
Hc6. Immigrant minorities in a society with more positive majority attitudes and practices
towards minorities (as suggested by existing research) are likely, other things being 
equal, to perceive higher levels of social inclusion towards themselves than those living 
in a society with less tolerant attitudes and practices.
I have chosen the Danish and Swedish cases for this study; the case choice and compari-
son are presented in Chapter 3, which also presents aspects of the two national contexts believed 
16. Data from previous studies on majority opinion towards immigrant minorities and on experienced 
discrimination by minorities will be compared in Chapter 3: in general, the majority Danish population has been 
found to have less tolerant attitudes towards immigrant minorities than their Swedish counterparts.
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likely to affect minority perceptions and the civic integration processes examined in this thesis. 
Analyses testing the country-level hypotheses from this section are presented in Chapter 5.
2.4 Expectations: Perceived Inclusion Increases National Identification
Based on the understanding of social identities, stigmatization of minority characteristics, and 
peripheral status dynamics presented above, I argue that the extent to which immigrant minori-
ties perceive legal, political and social inclusion in the national community is likely to have an 
impact on the extent to which they identify with the national community. I will not repeat the 
theoretical framework engaging social identity, stigma and group inclusion dynamics here, but 
present expected relationships to be examined in the study on the background of that framework.
The first type of inclusion to be examined is access to citizenship. If it is right that im-
migrant minorities interpret this as a signal of whether or not they can be part of the national 
community, as I have suggested, then an individual's access to citizenship, whether already real-
ized or perceived, is likely to affect their identification with the national community positively, 
such that:
Hi1. As individuals perceive citizenship to be available to themselves, other things being 
equal, they are more likely to identify with the civic community.
However, most of perceived citizenship access is accounted for by actual naturalization in
the current study, with many more citizen than non-citizen respondents. Naturalization itself is 
partially self-selected, since not all individuals who fulfill the legal requirements for citizenship 
choose to apply--due to the rights already secured through resident status or through other exist-
ing citizenship(s); due to feelings of identification or loyalty to the state of origin; due to some 
other personal attitude or preference; or simply because some individuals are not informed of the
possibility or do not take action to apply. Further, it is difficult to study the effect of citizenship 
access as a symbol of inclusion vs. the effect of citizenship itself with the package of political 
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rights it brings, when examining effects on participation outcomes,  since some forms of partici-
pation become possible for the individual only with citizenship. For this reason, and because citi-
zenship policies may affect minorities by signaling inclusion/exclusion for their minority 
group(s) as well as for themselves personally, I also examine whether perceived availability of 
citizenship for one's ethnic-minority group or (if the individual is Muslim) for Muslims has an 
impact on civic identity, such that:
Hi2. As individuals perceive citizenship to be available to members of their ethnic (and 
religious) group(s), they are more likely to identify with the civic community.
Next, I examine immigrant minorities' perceptions of political elite attitudes towards their
minority group(s) and towards 'people like them.' To the extent that minorities have such percep-
tions, it is expected that minorities will interpret these attitudes as a signal of their present, and 
potentially future, acceptance in the national community. As such, these perceptions are likely to 
influence their identification, such that
Hi3. As individuals perceive political elites as having positive attitudes toward their 
minority group, they are more likely to identify with the civic community.
Hi4. As individuals perceive political elites as caring about people like them, they are 
more likely to identify with the civic community.
And third, I will also examine the relationship of immigrant minorities' perceptions of so-
cial inclusion--of their minority group(s) and themselves personally--in the national community 
to their national identification levels. Some existing work suggests that this is so. For example, a 
multi-national team of researchers with the recent TIES survey project found that among second-
generation minorities in six countries, individuals who had experienced less discrimination and 
who perceived improved relations between their ethnic group and the majority population report-
ed significantly higher levels of national belonging (Schneider et al. 2012). I investigate whether-
-as suggested by the social identity framework presented in the previous sections--higher percep-
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tions of social inclusion are related to higher levels of identification with the national communi-
ty, such that:
Hi5. As individuals perceive social inclusion toward their minority group(s), they are 
more likely to identify with the national community.
Hi6. As individuals perceive social inclusion of themselves in society, they are more likely
to identify with the national community.
I have argued, for each of the three types of inclusion, that the inclusion of minority 
groups in the nation is likely to matter to minorities and to influence their identification with the 
national community. Yet this relationship may actually vary along with two key factors--salience 
of minority identities in the national context, and respondents' own identification with their mi-
nority groups. First, the relationship is likely to be moderated by the extent to which minority 
group identities are salient in the overall society, since this likely affects whether individuals ex-
pect to be seen 'as' their ethnicity or religion in various situations. This should show itself 
through a national difference in effects of group inclusion on identification, where the effect is 
expected to be greater in societies where minority and immigrant-related issues seem more 
salient (in this study determined by national differences in reported exposure to media coverage 
about minority-related issues, among both majority and minority respondents). Thus it may be 
the case that:
Hi7. The hypothesized effects of perceived national inclusion (or lack thereof) toward a 
given ethnic or religious group upon national identification or participation will be 
greater in societies where minority-related issues are more salient. 
Further, the group-related inclusion-to-identification link is also likely to depend on the 
extent to which individuals identify with their ethnic and/or religious group(s). In other words, 
when a person has a higher level of identification with, say, her minority ethnic group, the idea 
that a national community is more (or less) open to people of her ethnic background belonging to
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that community will make a bigger difference for the extent to which she identifies with that 
community. All else being equal, then:
Hi8. The hypothesized effects of perceived national inclusion (or lack thereof) toward a 
given ethnic or religious group upon national identification or participation will increase 
with individuals’ identification with that group.
2.5 Expectations: Identity and Inclusion Influence Participation
I now turn my attention to the final part of the chain: how identity and some aspects of inclusion 
itself are expected to affect immigrant minorities' political participation--defined here as voting, 
having the intention to vote, and participating in various forms of non-electoral political action.17 
A key contribution of this study lies in its examination of whether and how both national identity
signals and the levels of national identification they help to shape have an impact on immigrant 
minorities' political participation in their national civic communities. In addition to presenting 
the methodological challenges of studying phases of a process ostensibly along a 'causal chain,' 
this demands a theoretical approach that synthesizes three literatures: social psychological schol-
arship on identity dynamics; studies of minority and immigrant-minority political engagement; 
and the much broader literature analyzing political participation and its antecedents among ma-
jority, or mainstream, populations. In the section that follows, I draw on all three of these to 
ground expectations about immigrant-minority political participation for this study. 
Briefly put, I propose that the inclusion of immigrant minorities' within the national com-
munity, as perceived by them, is a key driver of their political participation in it.  I propose that it
does so in three ways. First, I contend, immigrant minorities' national identification, itself driven 
by inclusion (as proposed in the previous section), likely drives their political participation. Sec-
ond, inclusion in the political community in particular--as communicated through political elite 
17. See section 4.5 for a description of how these are operationalized and measured.
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attitudes toward minorities--is likely to influence participation 1) by increasing trust in political 
institutions, and 2) by increasing a sense of political efficacy. I proceed now to ground and 
present these expectations.
2.5.1 Through National Identification: Mechanisms of Interest, Commitment and Norms
Social identity theorists have found that group identification increases activism related to the 
group (Tajfel and Turner 1986), suggesting that those who more strongly identify with the natio-
nal community are more likely to vote and participate in other forms of political action.  In two 
analyses using survey data from an original student study and from the 1996 U.S. General Social 
Survey, Huddy and Khatib (2007) find national identity to have a significant and positive impact 
on attention to politics and on (self-reported) voting. Bilewicz and Wójcik (2010) examine 
identification's effect on community involvement (though their study is focused on minority 
identification and minority community involvement). I therefore examine whether, other things 
being equal:
Hi9. As individuals identify with the civic community, they are more likely to participate 
in the political community.  
Where a relationship between identity and participation is found, I also examine whether 
this seems to occur through two key mechanisms: political interest and civic norms. According to
social identity theorists, identifying with a group makes members more likely to be interested in 
the group's welfare, especially where the particular group identity is salient . Therefore, identifi-
cation with the national community is expected to raise immigrant-minorities' interest in national
politics. Political interest, in turn has long been studied as both an attitude and a 'resource' that 
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spurs individuals to political action (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).18 I
examine therefore whether:   
Hi10. National identification increases participation via political interest.
However, it may also be that political interest rises not, or not only, with national identification, 
but with increased political concern about political processes or policies that might affect one 
negatively. If a person's attention is caught by a development that raises a threat or concern to her
situation, she may become more politically interested regardless of her level of national identifi-
cation. Such a dynamic, while not directly testable here, may confound or conflict with the hy-
pothesized identification-interest relationship. There are also likely some circular processes at 
work here; for instance, the politically interested person is more likely to have received citizen-
ship policy or political signals of national inclusion, which earlier in this chapter were hypothe-
sized to influence national identification levels. I am aware that these may confound these rela-
tionships somewhat, yet it is helpful to examine whether increased political interest can account 
for the expected identification-to-participation link, in order to better understand these processes.
Second, self-categorization theorists (itself a branch of social identity theory) predict that 
those who identify with a group are more likely to conform to group norms (Hogg and Turner 
1987; Abrams et al. 1990; Terry, Hogg and White 1999; Huddy and Khatib 2007). When the 
group identity in question is national, such norms may include civic norms such as the idea that 
'one should vote to be a good citizen' (Ibid.).19 I therefore examine whether:
18. There is a possible difference in genders on this point: past research in the United States by Verba, Burns and 
Schlozman (1997), for instance, has shown women to hold lower political interest than men; if that is found to be the
case within this study, it will be interesting to see whether the the identification-to-participation relationship differs 
accordingly between the genders.
19. For an excellent overview on factors that influence civic norms and various national configurations of support 
for various norms, see Denters, Gabriel and Torcal (2007). For work on the development of citizenship norms 
among youth in Scandinavia specifically, see Oser and Hooghe (2013).
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Hi11. National identification increases participation via civic norms.
Alternatively to national inclusion influencing participation through identification, it is 
possible that national inclusion affects participation directly--for this reason, I also examine 
whether perceived inclusion seems to account for more of the observed variation in participation 
than identification does, and as a secondary check, whether identification seems to 'mediate' the 
effects of inclusion as hypothesized. While such analysis--including both inclusion perceptions 
and national identification as explanatory variables--is problematic, since they are expected to be
related to one another and causal identification is problematic, it is important in order to learn 
more about whether such inclusion affects participation chiefly via national identification, versus
its wielding chiefly direct effects on it. 
In this part of the analysis, I do expect to find that perceived inclusion itself--particularly 
in the form of political elite attitudes--has some more effects beyond those via identification 
through mechanisms of 1) trust in political institutions, and 2) political efficacy. These are 
grounded and presented in the following two subsections. 
2.5.2 Through Trust in Political Instutions
It is likely that signals of national inclusion within society have an impact on immigrant minori-
ties' levels of trust in national political institutions; and that such trust plays a role in whether 
they participate or not. Individuals' perceptions of political elite attitudes towards their group(s) 
and themselves are, in particular, likely to be related to such trust. This is so because elite atti-
tudes serve not only as a potential signal of inclusion in the nation, but are also likely to inform 
individuals' expectations of whether political institutions are fair and have the capacity to be re-
sponsive. As Zmerli, Newton and Montero write, confidence in political institutions "entails a 
positive evaluation of the most relevant attributes that makes each political institution trustwor-
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thy, such as credibility, fairness, competence, transparency in its policy-making, and openness to 
competing views" (2007: 41). Connecting this to the understanding of trust more broadly, they 
continue, such confidence in political institutions further "entails the belief that [an institution] 
will not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner that is harmful to our interests or the na-
tion's, but will treat us, and other citizens, equally, fairly, and justly" (Ibid.: 41).20
What has been found to drive trust in political institutions? As an attitude that reflects in-
dividuals' own trust in broad societal institutions, it could conceivably be influenced by traits and
attitudes at the individual level, as well as characteristics of society and its institutions (as per-
ceived by the individual). While a significant literature has shown levels of generalized social 
trust and political trust to be correlated at the national level (Inglehart 1997; Rothstein 1998; In-
glehart 1999; Newton and Norris 2000; Putnam, Pharr and Dalton 2000; Newton 2001; Oskarson
2007; Freitag and Bühlmann 2009), findings on whether there is a link at the individual level 
have been mixed (Wright 1976; Craig 1993; Orren 1997; Hall 1999; Kaase 1999; Newton and 
Norris 2000; Uslaner 2000; Delhey and Newton 2005). Some recent studies, however, have 
found them to be related at the individual level (Freitag 2003; Glanville and Paxton 2007; Zmer-
li, Newton and Montero 2007; Zmerli and Newton 2008; Bäck and Kestilä 2009; Freitag and 
Bühlmann 2009; Newton and Zmerli 2011). There is also an overall consensus that political trust 
is correlated with evaluations of government leaders and performance (Hetherington 1998; Levi 
and Stoker 2000); and the variation of gaps in such trust between groups may be explained by 
group-specific government performance, as suggested by Abramson's (1983) findings that levels 
among American blacks swung with U.S. government efforts to ensure racial equality. Another 
20. While trust in political institutions is a narrower concept than 'political trust' (which can also include levels of 
confidence in both the competence, uprightness and fairness of decision-makers themselves at different levels) I will
sometimes refer to trust in political institutions simply as 'political trust' within this dissertation. 
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theoretical explanation explored in some work suggests that individuals' estimations of the fair-
ness and representativeness of decision-making procedures within political institutions also mat-
ter for political trust (Borre and Goul Andersen 1997; Rothstein 1998; Tyler 2000). Further work 
has also emphasized that this may be especially true among minorities whose confrontation with 
long-term socio-economic disadvantage and stigmatization in society may cause them to be 
alienated from society's mainstream political institutions. This leads me to investigate whether 
inclusion and fairness signals such as social inclusion itself or political elite attitudes, as per-
ceived by immigrant minorities, have an influence of political trust,21 such that:
Hi12. Those with more positive perceptions of social inclusion (towards them/towards 
their group(s)) are, other things being equal, likely to hold higher levels of trust in 
political institutions.
Hi13. Those with more positive perceptions of political elite attitudes (towards them/
towards their group(s)) are, other things being equal, likely to hold higher levels of trust 
in political institutions.
There is also another line of explanations extending far back within political science, 
which suggest that common identity in society brings greater political trust. David Easton sug-
gested this in his work on the foundations of political cultures and systems, writing that "some 
cohesive cement - a sense of feeling of community amongst the members" was likely necessary 
for the development and survival of a political system (1965: 176). The idea of a link between 
national identity or cohesion and political trust has been developed and tested among majority 
populations in more recent work as well (Mishler and Rose 2001; Berg and Hjerm 2010). It has 
not been widely studied among minority groups, though Maxwell (2010c) found that British 
Muslims who held a dual identity and felt British held significantly higher levels of trust in both 
21. For this study, I measured institutional trust in a number of societal institutions, using the same question 
wording as those used in the World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys (precise wording presented 
together with findings in Chapter 7). In my analyses of whether inclusion and identification impact political trust, I 
include social trust as an explanatory control factor. 
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the British Parliament and their local councils.22 This suggests that it is perhaps identification 
with the nation itself that may lead to political trust; I will test whether:
Hi14. Those with higher levels of national identification, other things being equal, are 
likely to hold higher levels of trust in political institutions.
In turn, we generally believe that trust in political institutions matters for whether citizens
at large care to invest their attention, time and energy into attempting to influence them democra-
tically. Many studies confirm that trust in institutions such as parliament increases electoral parti-
cipation (e.g., Grönlund and Setälä 2007; Hooghe and Marien 2013). Yet it has also been found 
to be negatively related to non-institutionalized forms of participation--that is, individuals with 
lower levels of trust in political institutions are more likely to participate in non-conventional po-
litical action (Kaase 1999; Ibid.). In examining the final part of the inclusion/identification-trust-
participation chain, then, I expect that:
Hi15. Trust in political institutions is likely to have a positive relation to voting.
Hi16. Trust in political institutions is likely to have a negative impact on other forms of 
political activism.
2.5.3 Through Political Efficacy
I also propose that (perceived) political inclusion is likely to positively affect participation by in-
creasing political efficacy. Conceptualized and measured in survey research since the 1950s, the 
concept of political efficacy refers to whether people themselves feel politically efficacious, or, in
everyday language, whether they believe their government will respond to them23 (Campbell, 
22. However, Maxwell (2010c) also found that Muslims immigrants initially tend to have higher levels of trust than
natives, but many undergo a certain 'acculturation effect' and adjusting (usually downward) over time to levels of 
trust similar to those among majority populations, a finding corroborated by Michelson in her work among latinos in
the United States, which showed lower political trust among second-generation than first-generation immigrants 
(Michelson 2003). Such a downward adjustment may be explained by the incorporation of citizen competencies and 
individualist values that produce greater demands and less deference towards political institutions (Ingelhart 1977; 
Fuchs and Klingemann 1995; Inglehart 1999).
23. This concept has been further broken down into 'internal' and 'external' efficacy, with the first representing a 
person's idea of her political competence and general ability to influence others, and external political efficacy to her
idea of the responsiveness of the political system (Lane 1959; Converse 1972; Balch 1974). Thus, while internal 
political efficacy is driven by a combination of diverse factors having to do with education, personality traits, and 
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Gurin and Miller 1954; Balch 1974; Iyengar 1980; Goul Andersen 2000). Ethnic minorities have 
repeatedly been found to hold lower external political efficacy expectations than their majority 
counterparts (Almond and Verba 1963; Finifter 1970; Abramson 1972; Verba and Nie 1972; 
Miller et al. 1981; Shingles 1981; Pollock III 1983; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Lijphart 
1997; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Michelson 2000; Tam Cho 2009; Austin, Middleton and Yon 
2012). Where the opposite has been found among some immigrant minorities (Maxwell 2010; 
Government Working Group for Better Integration 2011), minority/majority gaps are more often 
found to persist (Michelson 2003; Maxwell 2010). A few studies have examined why this is so, 
and what can explain exceptions to it: two studies focusing on latinos in the United States find 
that political trust is lower among people with higher perceptions of discrimination, whether ex-
perienced personally or perceived to affect one's group (Ibid.; Schildkraut 2005). And studies 
among American blacks have found that such level differences can be reversed where a minority 
community is highly politically represented and organized (Bobo and Gilliam Jr. 1990; Emig, 
Hesse and Fisher III 1996). I will therefore examine whether (perceived) national inclusion in the
social and political domains is related to immigrant minorities' political efficacy beliefs, such 
that:
Hi17. Those with more positive perceptions of social inclusion (towards them/towards 
their group(s)), other things being equal, are likely to hold higher expectations of 
political efficacy.
Hi18. Those with more positive perceptions of political elite attitudes (towards them/
towards their group(s)) other things being equal, are likely to hold higher expectations of 
political efficacy.
In turn, such external political efficacy--as an element of 'diffuse support' of a particular 
democratic political system--has long been identified as important for the both the functioning 
political personal knowledge and interest; external political efficacy is more related to the perceptions of the 
functioning and responsiveness of political institutions and leaders incorporating perceptions of political inclusion 
and attitudes of political trust institutions introduced above. 
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and long-term survival of democracies, since it is vital for maintaining both citizen participation 
in democracy and general trust in government institutions (Easton 1965).24 As such, it has classi-
cally been identified as being important driver of political participation at the individual level 
(Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Since politi-
cal efficacy beliefs are themselves driven by combined perceptions of personal political compe-
tency and government responsiveness, political efficacy must within this study be an intervening 
variable, where individual and system-level capacities (or, more precisely, the individual's per-
ceptions of these) come together, and in turn influence people's civic participation. This has also 
been found to hold in studies of ethnic minorities in various contexts; for example, Michelson 
(2000) found political efficacy beliefs to positively influence voting among Chicago latinos. It is 
also believed to increase participation in less conventional forms of political action. 
Hi19. Political efficacy is likely to have a positive relation to voting.
Hi20. Political efficacy is likely to have a positive impact on political activism.
2.5.4 Negatively, by Spurring Political Action
Alternatively, it may be that perceptions of political threat toward or social exclusion of one's mi-
nority group(s) actually spurs individuals to political activism in an attempt to combat the threat, 
or improve the situation for minorities in society. This argument was most famously introduced 
by Verba and Nie (1972) in their classic study of political participation in the United States, argu-
ing that American blacks who had a sense of 'black consciousness,' or the awareness that their 
racial group was unjustly oppressed, were more active than blacks without it and more active 
than whites of similar socioeconomic status; similarly, Guterbock and London (1983) also argued
24. And interestingly--relating this concept to the civic norms discussed above--political efficacy has also been 
conceptualized as a norm, in the sense that it can be an belief that democratic citizens, beginning from childhood, 
are taught they should hold, as well as representing such belief itself (and consequent participatory behavior); in 
other words, that one should trust that government will respond to them--this is of course somewhat related to norms
that one should vote and participate in democratic processes (Easton and Dennis 1967).
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that group consciousness can make minorities open to participation as a means of effecting social
change. There is also more recent empirical evidence for an exclusion-participation link. In a 
study focusing on immigrants in the United States, Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) find 
that awareness of hostile political rhetoric or legislation likely to affect one’s ethnic group drives 
minorities to participate politically to oppose it. Interview-based research among ethnic-minority 
and Muslim young people (in the United Kingdom) has found them to respond to both social and
political exclusion by engaging in political action (Eade and Garbin 2002; O'Toole and Gale 
2010). It may be, then, that:
Hi21. As individuals perceive political elites as having negative attitudes toward their 
minority group, they are more likely to participate in the political community.
Yet while it was first explained in the literature by pointing to a 'group consciousness' mecha-
nism, it could be explained even more simply. The argument for such a link could simply be ra-
tionalist one: when individuals who are members of (or just think they are perceived by others to 
be members of) a minority group perceive that group to be politically excluded, they will act to 
correct that exclusion by becoming more politically active. Of course, individuals must first have
the group affiliation (real or attributed to them) and be aware of it in order to perceive group ex-
clusion, but it does not presuppose high group identification or 'consciousness.' Indeed, other 
studies have found no direct group consciousness-participation link (Gurin and Epps 1975; 
Miller et al. 1981; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). 
It may be that such an exclusion-participation link is actually accounted for, especially in 
the study of non-electoral political action, by the combined effects of the contribution of low po-
litical trust and of positive political efficacy presented in some of the hypotheses above. Shingles
(1981) combined this idea with the group consciousness concept when he argued that Verba, Nie 
and the numerous other scholars who suggest that a sense group oppression is in itself sufficient 
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to push people to become politically active actually get the argument wrong by leaving out key 
intervening mechanisms that actually spur people into action. Following Gurin and her col-
leagues (Gurin et al. 1969; Gurin and Epps 1975; Miller et al. 1981), Shingles found that what 
Verba and Nie call 'black consciousness'  increases blacks' mistrust and their sense of political ef-
ficacy. Pointing to existing findings that mistrust and efficacy together increase political partici-
pation (Fraser 1970), Shingles pointed out that these two that, once raised due to black con-
sciousness, push blacks to become politically active. He appealed to previous findings on how 
different combinations of political efficacy and political trust bring people into various forms of 
participation. People who had both high trust and high efficacy, he suggested, were more likely 
to participate in 'allegiant activity' (conventional modes of access), while those with low trust and
high efficacy were more likely to take part in 'protest activity' (critical unconventional activity). 
Within this study, I conduct separate analyses to examine whether these expected relationships 
hold for electoral participation and for non-electoral political action, which correspond roughly 
to Shingles's concepts of allegiant and protest activity. 
2.6 Additional Factors
Throughout my analyses of the main process proposed above--where working national identities 
are expected to affect identification and ultimately political participation--I also investigate the 
roles played by other factors often believed to affect identification and participation. Chief 
among these is individuals' educational levels, which represents both contact with society and so-
cietal capacity. Indeed, while lower participation levels among minorities than general popula-
tions are a generally consistent finding (whether due to language problems, limited socio-eco-
nomic status or limited social capital), much of these difference have often been found to fall 
away when education, gender and socio-economic situation are accounted for (Verba, Schlozman
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and Brady 1995; Norris 2009). To examine whether these have a meaningful role in identifica-
tion and participation here, I also examine the effects of employment and income,25 as well as the
ethnic heterogeneity of respondents' neighborhoods at age 14 and at present, and of their closest 
friends (as reported by respondents). Immigrant generation may also be important to whether and
how individuals integrate in the civic community (Portes and Zhou 1993; Phalet and Swynge-
douw 2003; Ramakrishnan 2005); it should be stressed here, however, that in this study different 
'generations' of immigrants are not of different ages, and do not represent parent/child genera-
tions--rather, all respondents are young adults who either came to the country at age 12 or later 
(first generation), came as children before the age of 12 (1.5 generation), or were born in the 
country to two immigrant parents (second generation).26 Participation has also been found to vary
with ethnic group, time period and concentration of communities and their organizations (due to 
differing levels of social capital, politicized issues of interest to certain groups, and mobilization 
structures, it is argued) (Cole and Stewart 1996; Fennema and Tillie 2001; Ramakrishnan and Es-
penshade 2001; Jacobs, Phalet and Swyngedouw 2004).  I have therefore also run extra checks 
for many of the analyses to examine the impacts of ethnicity, religion and religiosity themselves 
to learn whether they have an effect on the main analyses--and to check whether the main results 
hold when controlling appropriately for minority group affiliations. This is important, since do-
ing so allows me to confirm whether immigrant minorities who are similar to one another in 
meaningful ways, such as ethnicity and background, show different levels of identification or 
25. However, the impacts of income will most often not be included in the main analyses, as many young adult 
respondents did not report it. It will instead be included in extra robustness checks--using both self-reported income, 
and using postcode-level average and median incomes, to check both the effects of individual and local area 
socioeconomic status.
26. Within all analyses, 1.5 and second-generation immigrant minorities are included together as 'second-
generation'. Though those of the second generation are not themselves immigrants, I often use 'immigrant minorities'
or 'minorities' in the text to represent the larger category of 'immigrant-background minorities.'
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participation due to the different contexts in which they live. Further, time in the country, age and
gender will also be included in most analyses.27 It may be that identification and participation are
greater among those who have spent more time in the (receiving) society, as classic research on 
integration assumed (e.g., Gordon 1964). Gender may also be a meaningful factor: Schneider et 
al. (2012), have found that young second-generation men report lower levels of belonging in 
their (receiving) national communities; however, Berry et al. (2006) report finding that im-
migrant-minority boys showed higher levels of psychological adaption to the receiving society (a
different type of measure, yet related to identification) than girls. And finally, in addition to these
individual-level factors, I also examine whether involvement in associations of several types in-
fluences political participation outcomes; grounds and expectations for this are presented in the 
following section.
2.6.1 The Influence of Associational Involvement
Political participation has long been seen to flow in part from community engagement--those 
who are active in the life of the community around them--even in more narrow religious, ethnic 
or other interest group activities--tend also to participate more in political life (Verba, Schlozman
and Brady 1995). Several mechanisms are proposed to account for the this. First, involvement in 
associations facilitates the learning of civic skills (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman and 
Brady 1995). Second, associations likely serve as channels and settings through and in which 
members acquire political information (Ibid.; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). And third, individu-
als involved in associations are likely to be recruited through the organizational structure and ac-
tivities for political activity (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Leighley 
27. While language is relevant to civic integration processes and outcomes (Stevens 1992; Espenshade and Fu 
1997), I do not examine the role of basic linguistic competence; instead, the analyses are conducted using only data 
collected from individuals who are fluent in the national language.   
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1996; Teorell 2003). Existing research highlights the role that formal and informal engagement 
in minority communities may play in civic identity and participation among immigrant minori-
ties (Leal 2002; Wald 2008; Quintelier 2009). While individuals whose informal contacts are 
largely limited to their minority group(s) are often thought less likely to identify with and partic-
ipate in the larger political societies, there is some reason to believe that engagement in ethnic or 
religious associations or civic society organizations may actually increase civic integration 
outcomes. 
In thinking about this likely relationship, it is important to consider why people get in-
volved in associations. This assists in guarding against misinterpreting findings that actually re-
flect spurious effects on participation, where some other factor makes minorities both more like-
ly to join associations and to participate politically. It can also shed light on how association-
participation links may be a result of the national contexts in which minorities live--such that 
conditions for minorities give opportunities and incentives to engage in association, which in 
turn raise their participation. Scholars have found many factors to contribute to associational in-
volvement, depending on the setting an the type of association. Chief among them for our pur-
poses here are gender, social status and resource factors such as education and income, social in-
tegration factors such as employment and network ties, and social and political orientations such 
as social trust and political interest (though these final factors might well be increased by associ-
ational involvement) (Curtis, Grabb and Baer 1992; Putnam 1993; and see Badescu and Neller 
2007 for an overview). Precisely because of the potential for spurious effects relating to social 
integration, this study does not investigate the role of associations in influencing minorities' na-
tional identification levels, but restricts the analysis to whether they heighten their participation. 
Ultimately, it is difficult to determine, at least within the scope of this study, whether factors like 
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social trust and political interest are more causes or effects of associational involvement; what is 
interesting here is whether they play a mediating or conditioning role in how levels of inclusion 
influence participation, and whether the effects of different association types vary.
Discussing the tendency for associational engagement to positively affect individuals' po-
litical participation, Myrberg (2004) points out that, since it is the case that (in Sweden, in his 
study) ethnic majority individuals generally participate in mainstream associational life to a high-
er degree than immigrant minorities, this relationship actually increases majority/minority 
inequality in participation rates overall. However, while he finds, in a later study (2011), that the 
association-participation link among ethnic-majority Swedes is largely due to already the already
socially or politically interested self-selecting to get involved in associations, among immigrant 
minorities the link is due to their building civic skills and sometimes being recruited to political 
activity once involved in associations--echoing Verba and Nie's explanation (1972). This rings 
true with Pollock's and Leighley's U.S.-based analyses of the association-participation link, 
which they find (in separate studies) conditioned by individuals' own incentives for joining 
(Leighley 1996) and the nature of the group (Pollock 1982; Ibid.). Further, associations have 
been found to provide a channel by which immigrant minorities who perceive grievances or ex-
clusion become active politically; this was found to hold especially for ethnic associations, and 
when minorities held both minority and national identity (Klandermans, Van der Toorn and Van 
Stekelenburg 2008). Thus associational life is linked to the other explanatory factors studied here
in multiple, and complex ways. While it is problematic to incorporate associational involvement 
simply into the 'chain' process model examined here (since it may theoretically be linked to mul-
tiple factors at different stages), I examine whether being involved in various types of associa-
tions is related to both electoral and activist participation. 
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In addition to engagement in political parties and in civic associations generally, I exam-
ine whether engagement in ethnic and religious associations, in particular, is positively related to 
voting and/or to political activism. Existing literature suggests that minority associations that are 
ethnically or religiously based can raise participation in politics or political activism within the 
broader society. Fennema and Tillie (2001) find ethnic associations and networks are found to in-
crease capacity for and likelihood of participation. Yet others have had mixed findings: Togeby 
found in a study of second-generation immigrants in Denmark of Yugoslav, Turkish and 
Pakistani backgrounds (2004a) that the effect of associational participation on political participa-
tion varied by ethnic group and by the type of organization in minorities were engaged, with dis-
parate effects on informal and formal participation.28 She also found mixed impacts of cross-eth-
nic associational membership (sports clubs and unions, in her study). Strömblad and Adman 
(2010) find that participation to be spurred by associational involvement generally, but not by in-
volvement in ethnic associations; though such ethnic associations do provide civic training, the 
authors conclude, they do not mobilize members politically to the extent that other types of 
organizations do. I will examine this here.
Membership in religious associations is also argued to spur political participation, again 
via the civic training, information and recruitment mechanisms mentioned above. This was first 
put forth in the 1960s and beyond by scholars attempting to explain the unexpectedly high (based
on socioeconomic status) levels of participation observed among black Americans; they found 
that black churches functioned as settings and catalysts for civic training and mobilization (Verba
28. Among those with Pakistani background, Togeby (2004a) found that being involved in ethnic organization had a
strong impact on informal political participation, but no impact on formal participation (voting in local elections). 
Among Turks, she found a weaker but significant impact on both informal and formal participation, but among 
Yugoslavs no impact on either form.
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and Nie 1972; Harris 1994; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Later studies have found similar
dynamics among different ethnic groups and denominations (e.g., Jones-Correa and Leal 2001), 
but have also found that different religious groups' theological and social focus on private, reli-
gious activity--as opposed to political activism--conditions the involvement-to-political partici-
pation link (Djupe and Grant 2001). This may well be relevant to many local Muslim associa-
tions in Europe, which often focus on religious teaching and devotion, and promote social 
activities among Muslims, rather than explicitly promoting political activity; indeed, some 
fundamentalist groups actively preach against political participation in non-Islamic political sys-
tems. Yet they may still function as settings of civic training and political mobilization, as Jamal 
finds in a study of American Muslims' mosque involvement and political participation (2005).
Therefore, there is a consensus that associational life and individual political participation
are, in general, positively related; but that this is due to multiple mechanisms, and these function 
different in different association types and contexts. For this study, I examine the relation be-
tween being engaged in associations in general, and in four types of associations, to test whether:
Hi22. Involvement in associations leads to greater participation.
To do so, I include separate factors representing involvement in a political party, in other (non-
minority) civic associations, in ethnic associations and in religious associations. A growing litera-
ture exists that explores the nature of these different association types and how they can play a 
role in spurring participation in different contexts. 
While the causes of associational engagement themselves are relevant to civic integration
processes, I do not conduct a broad investigation of why or how minority individuals become in-
volved in such organizations within the scope of the present study. This is in part due to the diffi-
culty of positing, even theoretically, that associational involvement initiates chiefly at any one 
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point in the process or causal 'chain' argued here--instead, individuals become involved with 
organizations through many channels and at different points in their own social and political 
lives, and for many different reasons. Such engagement may also be proposed as both an effect 
and a cause of many different types of competencies and attitudes.29 This was however, investi-
gated to some extent within follow-up interviews; thus I use insights from those interviews to in-
form my discussion of the overall findings and possible interactions between different aspects of 
the integration dynamics studied here and associational involvement, as with multiple other as-
pects of the identity and participation processes included in the study. I do not within this study 
examine the political activism or role of such associations themselves, though this has been 
examined in multiple existing studies (e.g., Odmalm 2004; Predelli 2008; Aptekar 2009; Jør-
gensen 2010).
2.7 Potential Objections to the Study
While it is societally relevant to learn how the ways immigrant-receiving societies are incorpo-
rating their immigrant minorities affects their civic integration, the study could be objected to on 
the grounds that it must confront pitfalls in clarifying causal relationships. I now address several 
of these in turn.
First is an objection to the idea that it is relevant to examine civic integration outcomes 
among immigrant minorities as being somehow caused by how national communities are re-
ceiving them or including them--could it not be that certain immigrants have self-selected into 
different countries30 upon the basis of certain characteristics that also bring them to identify and 
29. Some previous studies have examined this and its complexities; Sønderskov (2011), for example, investigates 
complicated relationship between social trust and associational engagement, finding evidence that trust increases 
membership in some types of associations, but that treating membership as an exogenous predictor of trust brings 
biased results. 
30. However, considerably more research has been conducted (chiefly within economics) on the self-selection of 
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participate more or less than those who chose other countries? In other words, could it be that the
national context-to-perceptions or, ultimately, national context-to-outcomes relationships are ac-
tually spurious? There is no way to fully answer this charge. Some immigrants have chosen their 
adoptive countries, and even looking only at second-generation immigrants would not really 
solve the problem, as the argument could simply be shifted to their immigrant parents, and would
apply to some characteristic that influenced their upbringing and education. This study is never-
theless helped by the fact that, while Denmark and Sweden have varied in the strictness of their 
asylum and family reunification regimes for the past decade, both societies had for several 
decades previously quite similar immigration histories. They also now extend considerable social
goods to newcomers (including child support payments, free language courses, universal health-
care, free schooling and university and extensive welfare systems) and are similar to one another-
-at least in international perspective--along numerous other cultural, political, economic, geo-
graphic and climatic aspects. Further, to the extent that young immigrant minorities or their par-
ents have self-selected migration to one of the countries, many of the characteristics that are like-
ly to relevant to this are included in the analysis as additional variables.
In addition, the inclusion-to-identification relationship could also be argued to function in
reverse. Social identity theory tells us that individuals tend to evaluate the groups with which 
they identify more positively (see, for example, González and Brown 2003), so could national 
identification not be causing individuals to perceive inclusion in society more positively than 
they otherwise would do? The answer is that it may be doing so--that a key causal 'arrow' of the 
study may in fact also run in the other direction, or may do so in addition to the main relationship
whether to emigrate or not (e.g., Borjas 1991; Chiswick 1999; Constant and Massey 2003; McKenzie and Yang 
2010), than on migrants' own selection of which country to emigrate to.
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I have posited here. While this positive evaluation effect of identification certainly exists and 
may also be operative here, social psychology presents us with theoretical arguments (many of 
them presented previously in this chapter) that suggest an inclusion-to-identification dynamic to 
be a just as probable, and very possibly a more fundamental, process relating to group identity. 
However, in order to test the hypothesized causal direction, I have built a survey experiment into 
my study to examine whether immigrant minorities exposed to a negative vs. positive treatment--
emphasizing either social and political exclusion or inclusion in nearly identical texts (this design
is presented in detail in section 4.2 on p. 140)--to test whether this causes a change in perceived 
inclusion and a corresponding impact on identification levels. 
Similarly, broader concerns may be raised with my attempts to establish causal relation-
ships within a posited chain of dynamics that may be interrelated in more complex ways--which 
may not only flow one way. In particular, analyses of proposed intervening mechanisms are 
problematic, it may be argued, since neither mediation analysis, structural equation modeling nor
other methods available can sufficiently solve problems of causal identification where chrono-
logical order or other clear indicators of causal order cannot be empirically established, and may 
produce biased estimates (Bullock and Ha 2011; Gelman 2011). Faced with the choice of drop-
ping analysis of such socially and politically relevant dynamics, and proceeding with awareness 
of the drawbacks of my model, data and the methods available, I choose the latter. Therefore I 
proceed with caution: investigating at each step the relationships between the investigated vari-
ables, while acknowledging these challenges and caveats through the analysis and discussion.
2.8 Summarizing the Model
After explaining and defining this study's definition of 'civic integration' as being constituted 
chiefly by national identification and political participation, this chapter has presented theoretical
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perspectives and expectations for what is likely to shape it among immigrant-background minori-
ties. Using these hypotheses and considerations, the dissertation investigates the extent to which 
inclusion in the national community along legal, political and social dimensions--as perceived by
those minorities themselves--increases the extent to which they identify with that community, 
and whether and how such inclusion and identification influence their political participation in it.
Figure 1 below summarizes the main relationships hypothesized here, with the three 'thick' ar-
rows representing the relationships expected in the three main parts of this 'chain' expected to be 
relevant to these civic integration outcomes (and which are analyzed, respectively, in Chapters 5,
6 and 7).
Figure 1. Overall prior model based on theoretical expectations. Variables in rectangles represent ob-
servable or self-reported background characteristics or reported behavior, while those in rounded rec-





































The following chapter presents the Danish and Swedish national cases, with comparison 
of their immigration histories and immigrant demography, along with an overview of factors ex-
pected to be relevant for civic integration processes and outcomes in the two countries. There-
after follows an outline of the research design and a presentation of the operationalization of the 
two main dependent variables of national identification and political participation (Chapter 4), 
before launching into the analysis of differences in immigrant minorities' actual perceptions of 
inclusion between the two national contexts (Chapter 5), and of factors that affect national identi-
fication (Chapter 6) and political participation (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 then synthesizes the find-




The National Case Settings: Denmark and Sweden
For this research, Denmark and Sweden provide ripe ground for comparison because—despite 
broad demographic, cultural, political and economic similarities, they vary greatly in the types of
policies, debates and attitudes whose impacts on immigrant-background minorities are examined 
here. The two countries are multi-party parliamentary democracies with small populations (5.6 
and 9.6 million, respectively). Historically mostly ethnically homogeneous, majorities of both 
countries’ populations affiliate with the Danish or Swedish Lutheran churches,31 but most are 
highly secular in belief and practice. Since World War II, the two countries have followed similar
political and economic paths, broadly speaking: each incorporated the middle classes into a com-
prehensive welfare system that was based on their expectations and included a universal rights 
regime (Esping-Andersen 1990). Sweden and Denmark also both have rates of social trust, insti-
tutional trust, civic involvement and political participation that remain consistently among the 
highest in the world (Larsen 2013; Torpe 2013). 
Beginning in the 1960s, the two states experienced similar immigration patterns: chiefly, 
immigrants came from less-developed countries for jobs. During the economic slowdown of the 
late 1960s to early 1970s, both countries reduced immigration flows to a trickle, allowing family 
members of residents and citizens to join them, and continuing granting asylum to refugees. Be-
ginning in the 1980s, however, refugees from the world’s hotspots began to flow to both coun-
31. Both the 'Danish People's Church' and the 'Swedish Church' are officially 'evangelical Lutheran,' but this should 
not be confused with most versions of Christian 'evangelicalism.' 
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tries, including significant groups from Iran, Iraq (including some Kurds) and Lebanon; more 
came in the 1990s from Bosnia, Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo. Both countries introduced special 
measures in the mid-1990s to allow for greater flows of refugees from the former Yugoslavia, es-
pecially Bosnia-Herzegovina. They had reasonably liberal asylum policies, and extended many 
benefits of the welfare state, including many resources for resettlement and language training, to 
the new residents. However, from 2002 the Danish government, together with the Danish Peo-
ple's Party, restricted the granting of asylum considerably. Since 2002, the two countries' intake 
of immigrants have diverged more sharply than at any time in the past, chiefly accounted for by 
their differing refugee policies. In 2006, when Denmark took in fewer refugees than at nearly any
other point in recent history, Sweden granted residence to more Iraqis than all other EU member 
states combined. The difference is continuing with the current Syrian civil war, with Sweden re-
ceiving large numbers of Syrians and granting many of them permanent residence automatically, 
to allow them to bring family members into the country as well (a measure similar to those used 
by both countries for Bosnian refugees in the 1990s). In September 2013, Denmark also loosened
its asylum policies somewhat due to the Syrian crisis, but its policies remain tighter than Swe-
den's. Figure 2 displays inflows of refugees to Denmark and Sweden during the period of 
1992-2012. 
Figure 2. Residence permits granted on basis of refugee status or similar in Denmark and Sweden, 
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1992-2012. In parentheses are main source countries for large incoming refugee flows.
As the figure shows, Denmark's more restrictive policies in place since 2002 have caused a dif-
ference in the two countries' intake of refugees that is much more stark than during the pre-2002 
period.
Total immigrant flows into Denmark and Sweden for the years 1960-2012 are displayed in Fig-
ure 3. As may be seen in the figure, Sweden's more liberal refugee and family reunification poli-
cies have resulted in a larger proportion of its immigrants than Denmark's coming from outside 
the EU.
Figure 3. Immigration to Denmark and Sweden, 1960-2011. Lower lines displayed for years 1999-2011 
indicate numbers of immigrants from the EU-27, with the ares within dashed lines indicating proportion 
of immigrants from outside the EU-27.
In 2012, there were 1,473,256 foreign-born individuals living in Sweden, or 15.4 % of 
the total population (of a total population of 9,555,893). 454,209 of those foreign-born were aged
15-34. The biggest groups of foreign-born in Sweden were (by country of birth) from Finland, 
Iraq, Poland, Yugoslavia, Iran, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Germany, Turkey, Denmark and Somalia. 
The same year, there were 448,736 individuals who were children of immigrants (with two im-
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Source: Eurostat, Statistics Sweden
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migrant parents) in Sweden; 145,828 of those were aged 15-34 (Table 1 presents these figures 
next to similar data for Denmark). 
Denmark Sweden
 all ages  aged 15-34  all ages  aged 15-34
Total population 5,602,628 1,356,411 9,555,893 2,432,327
Foreign-born 532,213 175,665 1,473,256 454,209
  as % of total   9.5 %   13.0 %   15.4 %   18.7 %
Descendants (2nd gen.) 142,865 52,243 448,736 145,828
  as % of total   2.6 %   3.9 %     4.7 %    6.0 %
Table 1. Foreign-born and children of two immigrant parents, total and in age group 15-34, in Denmark 
and Sweden, 2012 (sources: Statistics Denmark, Statistics Sweden).
As the table indicates, there were 532,213 foreign-born persons living in Denmark in 
2012, or 9.5 % of the population (which totaled 5,602,628). 175,665 of the foreign-born were 
aged 15-34 (12.9 % of that age group in the population). The largest groups of foreign-born were
(by country of birth) from Germany, Turkey, Poland, Iraq, Sweden, Norway, Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina, the U.K., Greenland and Iran. There were 142,865 who were children of immigrants (2.6 % 
of the population); 52,243 of those were aged 15-34 (3.8 % of people of that age group in the 
country). Table 2 lists the largest national groups (by country of origin) from outside the EU and 
Western Europe in Denmark and Sweden in 2012. 
Denmark Sweden
Turkey 32,245 Iraq 127,860
Iraq 21,119 Yugoslavia 69,269
Bosnia and Herzegovina 17,651 Iran 65,649
Iran 12,756 Bosnia and Herzegovina 56,695
Lebanon 12,118 Turkey 45,085
Pakistan 11,920 Somalia 43,966
USA 11,753 Thailand 35,554
Thailand 11,251 Chile 28,425
Afghanistan 10,993 Syria 27,510
China 10,566 China 26,824
Table 2. 10 largest non-EU 27 source countries for foreign-born residents in Denmark and Sweden, 
2012 (sources: Statistics Denmark, Statistics Sweden).  
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Post-1960 immigration patterns have changed the religious landscape of the two coun-
tries somewhat, bringing significant numbers of Muslims into Denmark and Sweden, roughly on 
par with increases in the Muslim populations of many Western European countries. While reli-
able religious affiliation statistics are hard to come by, since most Western European countries 
(with the exception of the United Kingdom) do not collect census data on religion, the Pew Re-
search Forum's ongoing research on religious affiliation throughout the world (most recent report
in 2012) provides us with perhaps some of the best comparable estimates. As of 2010, Denmark's
population was estimated to include approximately 230,000 Muslims, or 4.1 % of the population 
(Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2012). Muslims in Denmark come primarily from 
Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Bosnia, Iran and Somalia; the majority of second-generation Muslims are 
of Turkish and Pakistani origin. Muslims in Sweden were estimated to number about 430,000 
and make up about 4.6 % of the population (Ibid.). By comparison, Muslims constituted an esti-
mated 3.7 % in Norway, 4.4 % of the population of the U.K., 5.8 % in Germany, and 7.5 % in 
France (the Western European country with the largest Muslim population, in both percentage 
and absolute number) (Ibid.). Thus Denmark and Sweden have (estimated) similar numbers of 
Muslims, in relation to their populations, which are roughly in line with or fewer than those in 
much of Western Europe.  
Yet since the late 1990s, the two countries have pursued sharply contrasting integration, 
citizenship and religious-minority policies; the two national public discourses on immigrants, Is-
lam and the content of national identity have increasingly differed (Hervik 2006; Green-Pedersen
and Odmalm 2008); and survey data points to differing majority attitudes toward immigrant mi-
norities and Muslims. In this sense, Denmark and Sweden offer the opportunity to conduct a con-
trolled comparison--one might even go so far as to call it a natural experiment--in which im-
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migrant minorities have come to or grown up one of these two multi-party democratic, extensive 
welfare-state societies, which yet approach immigrant-background minorities through citizenship
policies, political debates and possibly even social treatment that differ as widely as any in West-
ern Europe. 
With these points of difference in focus, this chapter presents the Danish and Swedish na-
tional contexts for civic integration, to assist in formulating some more precise expectations of 
how civic integration may occur in the two systems. To do so, it describes characteristics of the 
two countries' approaches to immigrant integration--with focus on their citizenship policies, their
political debates and social attitudes towards minorities. In the process, it also profiles several as-
pects likely to influence civic integration processes in the two societies: their media environ-
ments, associational life and political institutions. I also include a discussion of the recurring me-
dia and political discourses in both Denmark and Sweden that hold the 'brother' country's 
approach to integration up as a (usually negative) example. In this, I show that these inter-coun-
try differences are actually a part of political debate in themselves--a debate for which this 
study's findings carry important implications, in addition to their potential contribution to our 
broader, theoretical understandings of how civic integration 'works.' The chapter concludes by 
drawing on these insights about the two countries to re-formulate the study's country-level hy-
potheses in relation to the Danish-Swedish comparison in particular. 
3.1 Citizenship Policies
3.1.1 Historical Development
It is difficult to find two countries in Western Europe with citizenship policies more different 
than the Danish and Swedish. Yet from the end of the nineteenth century until 2001, the Danish 
and Swedish nationality laws were based on Nordic cooperation (between Denmark, Sweden and
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Norway) in which nationality laws for the three countries were drafted in cooperation and there-
after adopted--in 1894 (Sweden) and 1898 (Denmark), again in 1924/25, and again in 1950, with 
smaller amendments made to the laws throughout the period. The policies were based on a gen-
eral principle of ius sanginis, or right to nationality through family ancestry, but both the coun-
tries maintained some possibility for acquiring nationality for long-time residents country. For 
example, residents in Denmark could gain citizenship after living there 15 years or more (10 
years for those from Norway or Sweden); in Sweden, the requirement was five years. In both 
countries, support of one's family and leading a respectable life were also required for naturaliza-
tion. In 1950, the required period of residence in Sweden before getting the right to naturalize 
was increased to seven years; this was reduced again to five years (and only two years for Nordic
citizens) in 1976. In 1952, the Danish residence requirement was reduced from 15 to 10 years (7 
for Nordic citizens); in 1968, this was further reduced to 7 years (3 years for Nordic citizens 
from 1968, 2 years from 1981). At no time during the Nordic-cooperation period was dual citi-
zenship allowed under either Danish nor Swedish nationality laws (Ersbøll 2006; Lokrantz 
Bernitz and Bernitz 2006). This meant that a naturalizing individual was required to renounce 
their previous citizenship, if they had one, upon acquiring Danish/Swedish nationality. During 
most of the period, both countries required foreign adults to have some competence in Danish/
Swedish language; this was formalized in Danish law in 1925. The language requirement was 
never formalized in Sweden, but it was required in practice until the late 1970s (Lokrantz Bernitz
2004).
From the beginning of the Nordic cooperation period, specific rights applied for children 
of immigrants born in the country or, in later versions of the law, resident from childhood. From 
1894, Swedish citizenship was automatically conferred at age 22 on those born to immigrant par-
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ents in Sweden (unless they renounced that right and had another citizenship); this was changed 
in 1950 to a process by notification. From 1898, the same right applied at the age of 19 to chil-
dren of immigrants born in Denmark. In 1968, the Danish law was amended to allow individuals 
residing in Denmark since the age of 10 or longer to become citizens between 21 and 23 years of
age. From 1992, stateless children born and residing in Denmark also gained the right to become 
citizens. In 1999, citizenship rights for second-generation immigrants were made conditional on 
the absence of a criminal record (Ersbøll 2006; Lokrantz Bernitz and Bernitz 2006). 
In 2001-2, the two countries' nationality laws diverged far more than before. In 2001, 
Sweden adopted a new Citizenship Act that continued many of the former requirements (like 5 
years' residence) but made them more universal, and expanded rights of citizenship to stateless 
children and persons to harmonize with European and international agreements. Most notably, 
the Swedish law introduced the allowance of double citizenship in nearly all cases (the only ex-
ception being for double citizens who had, at age 22, never been in Sweden). 
By contrast, Danish citizenship law was considerably tightened in 2002--along with many
other areas of immigration and integration policy--to require an increased period of residency, 
level of language competence, and demand for self-support. It also introduced a loyalty oath, and
a citizenship exam testing historical and societal knowledge. In addition, it revoked the general 
right of children of immigrants born or grown up in Denmark to become Danish citizens at adult-
hood; instead, they could become citizens together with their parents or must fulfill general adult 
requirements applying to immigrants. The Danish requirements for language mastery, self-sup-
port, and societal knowledge were furthered heightened several times between 2002 and 2010; as
were active citizenship requirements for permanent resident status, a necessary condition for get-
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ting citizenship. These developments in Danish and Swedish citizenship policy--some of the 
rules most relevant to immigrant-background minorities--are displayed in Table 3.32
Denmark
(laws: 1898, 1925, 1950, 2002)
Sweden
(laws: 1894, 1924, 1950, 2001)
residence requirement, 
adult immigrants              
(1898 - not defined)
1925 - 15 years (10 for Nordics) 
1952 - 10 years (7 for Nordics)
1968 - 7 years (3 for Nordics)
2002 - 9 years (for most)
(1894 - not defined)
1924 - 5 years 
1950 - 7 years
1976 - 5 years (2 for Nordics)
2001 - 5 years for all
children of non-citizen 
parents
1898 - automatic at age 19 to those born 
in country
1968 - automatic ages 21-23 for those in 
Denmark since age 10 or earlier
1999 - made conditional on no criminal 
record
2002 - no entitlement to nationality (ex-
cept for Nordic nationals): together w/ 
parents or regular rules apply
1894 - automatic at age 22 to those born in 
country
1950 - by notification at age 21-22 to those 
born in country
1969 - at 21/22, to those grown up in country
2001 - by notification to all stateless children 
born in Sweden or resident 3+ years; to 
children in country 5+ years (w/ perm. res.)
language, knowledge 
requirements
1925 - should master Danish language
1983 - requirements tightened
2002 - increased and formalized required 
level; added history and knowledge 
exam
2005 - increased required level further; no
exemption for applicants with PTSD
2008 - history and knowledge exam re-
quirements further tightened 
(required in practice until late 1970s)
support self and family 1925 - required
2002 - specific self-support requirements
2005 - strengthened requirement 
1925 - required
1976 - no longer required
double citizenship not allowed not allowed until 2001
2001 - allowed 
Table 3. Historical development of key naturalization rights and requirements in Denmark and Sweden, 
1894-2005 (sources: Ersbøll 2006; Lokrantz Bernitz and Bernitz 2006; Lokrantz Bernitz 2004). 
3.1.2 Context, Debates and Intentions of Citizenship Policy
Thus the Danish and Swedish citizenship policies, while once very similar, have diverged over 
time--gradually after 1950 but most sharply since 2001. Why such a divergence between two 
'brother countries'?  The first line of argument that some scholars put forward points to the large-
scale difference in how the two states were institutionalized from the early 20th century onward. 
32. I have not here addressed naturalization policies applying to spouses of Danish or Swedish nationals; for an 
excellent overview of developments of the policies, including those rules, see the excellent country-based overviews
by Ersbøll (2006) and by Lokrantz Bernitz and Bernitz (2006). 
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While the Swedish were developing a corporatist welfare model based on centralized institu-
tions, the Danish model has been argued to have be developed around decentralized networks--
with great implications for how the two systems would confront immigration: “In cultural terms, 
the Swedish model is geared to attempts to engender consensus, whereas cultural and identitarian
monoculturalism is the implicit precondition for the functionality of the Danish” (Hedetoft 2006:
5). The second points out differences in the default balance of power in the two countries in re-
cent history. While both national economic models are (or have until quite recently been) based 
on a solidaristic wage policy (with influential trade unions), an active labor market, financial and
monetary policies, as well as on a universal welfare state with a large public service sector, Den-
mark’s development through the last century has not been as dominated by its Social Democratic
Party as Sweden's has (Schierup, Hansen and Castles 2006). In Denmark, center-right parties 
have been in power during more of the post-war period than the Social democrats and their coali-
tion partners (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008). Against this backdrop, the argument goes, the
Danish and Swedish policy-making communities developed differently during the era of immi-
gration, producing differing immigration, integration and citizenship policies. In Sweden a broad 
consensus was thus built around a more open model of citizenship acquisition without cultural or
behavioral conditions. Challenges to that consensus were either short-lived or could not gain sup-
port from mainstream parties. In Denmark, however, protest parties developed that used the 
country's monocultural traditions as standards of expectation toward newcomers, gaining main-
stream traction for their position over time.
As outlined above, the two countries' immigration histories were largely similar (with 
some differences in particular labor and refugee migration streams) through the 1990s. During 
this period, Sweden pursued a more multiculturalist model of integration, cultivated by its intel-
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lectual elite and Social Democratic Party--a model that has largely been continued under center-
right governments. Under this model, Sweden offered financial subsidies to non-Lutheran reli-
gious groups and official bodies began to engage in consultation with minority religious bodies; 
strong anti-discrimination institutions were also developed. Denmark had no such multicultural-
ist or strong anti-discrimination institutions, but both countries did offer extensive welfare and 
educational benefits to immigrants. Beginning in the late 1980s to mid-1990s, however, the two 
countries' politics around immigration, integration and citizenship diverged more sharply. 
Tensions rose in the late 1980s and into the 1990s in both countries, as greater numbers 
of refugees arrived and concerns rose about minority youth involvement in criminality. Whereas 
attempts by the right-wing, anti-immigration Progress Party in the late 1970s and early 80s to re-
sist the progress of routine naturalization bills and to introduce new restrictions were rebuffed by 
the other parties, in 1994 the Liberals and the Conservatives (center-right parties) began to pro-
pose stricter naturalization requirements. Danish citizenship, they argued, must be deserved, so 
foreigners must show competency in Danish and have no debt to the state. This was the begin-
ning of the center-right's movement towards greater restriction of citizenship, which in the 1990s
resulted in some further restrictions being adopted (Ersbøll 2006). 
However, the Danish Social Democratic-led governments of much of the 1990s had 
largely addressed the difficulties of integrating newcomers by increasing resources--through wel-
fare and education initiatives--and the populist Danish People’s Party (DF, Dansk Folkeparti) 
gained significant support in the 1998 elections by accusing the government of ignoring integra-
tion challenges. DF thus gained by co-opting immigration and integration issues as their own, 
while still firmly supporting many aspects of the welfare state.33 After DF gained further to cap-
33. DF was formed in 1995 by Pia Kjærsgaard (the party's leader until 2012) and three other members of the ultra-
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ture 12 % of the vote in 2001, the 2001-11 center-right Liberal-Conservative minority govern-
ment--dependent on the DF’s support--implemented much of the party's immigration and integra-
tion platform. In the ensuing years much of the political establishment, from right to left, 
essentially adopted many of the terms set by DF on citizenship policy. As the policy develop-
ments described above indicate, citizenship (as well as other integration) requirements were 
tightened in multiple successive changes throughout that government's tenure--most notably in 
2005 and 2008. In addition, while DF's restrictive agenda in this area was somewhat limited by 
EU and international agreements, especially where it concerned citizenship for stateless persons, 
the party pushed the government to adopt measures requiring that the rules be implemented as 
strictly as possible within international guidelines. For example, in 2005 the coalition passed a 
law explicitly stating that exceptions to language, knowledge and self-support requirements 
(which otherwise were possible under extenuating circumstances of sickness or disability) would
not be granted on the basis of diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder, a condition suffered by
many refugees who had experienced torture and other extreme conflict situations. The conditions
for passing the citizenship exam--such as availability of the questions for study, time allowed for 
the exam, and number of correct answers required for passing--were further raised in 2008. 
I wish to note here that since the data were collected for this study, the Danish citizenship
policies have been moderated somewhat. When power shifted to a Social Democratic-led gov-
ernment (together with the Socialists and the Social Liberals, and with support from the Red-
Greens) in 2011, many observers expected significant changes in the laws. The government's 
coalition agreement (outlining the governing coalition's legislative and policy goals) stated that it
liberal, anti-immigration Progress Party's (Fremskridtspartiet) parliamentary delegation--thus DF had four MPs even
prior to its first election in 1998, when it won 7.8 % of the vote, and 13 seats in parliament. 
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planned to introduce double citizenship, to lower loosen requirements somewhat for getting citi-
zenship relating to language, knowledge and self-support, and to allow more exceptions for men-
tal illness or disability. These changes were agreed on by the coalition partners in June 2013; the 
lower language requirements and fee were changed in practice in the course of 2013,34 and the 
new citizenship exam was approved in December 2013. The new citizenship exam would, ac-
cording to the proposed law, be somewhat easier and would only include questions about 
present-day Danish society and institutions, rather than historical knowledge.35 The government 
is, at the time of this writing, still considering the implications of introducing double citizenship, 
so that has not yet been adopted in Denmark. The required residence time before naturalization 
remains at nine years (excepting some refugees with particular status under international law). 
Even with these changes, Denmark retains citizenship policies that are among the most restric-
tive in Europe. 
The debates surrounding citizenship standards bring some insight to policy-makers' con-
cepts of national citizenship and intentions for citizenship policy. In Denmark, the idea of de-
servingness as a criteria for citizenship acquisition has been voiced in the Danish debate since 
the 1990s, and was explicitly stated by the Liberal-Conservative government. This is to some ex-
tent linked to the above-named Danish practice, extending back to the nineteenth century, of nat-
uralizing by law every person to become a citizen; this has institutionalized the idea of Danish 
nationality as 'a privilege' to be granted by parliament, rather than an right conditional to the law. 
34. In Denmark, all naturalizations are specifically granted by parliament--with approximately two laws passed 
each year that list the names and city of residence of those individuals to be naturalized; thus the requirements for 
being included on such a bill do not themselves necessarily need to be approved by an action of parliament, but are 
administrative regulations that apply to the preparation of such bills. 
35. The changes would apply retroactively to all applications for citizenship submitted before their adoption as 
well. The new citizenship exam would first be administered in June 2014; until then, the previous exam would 
continue in use. The government also set aside funds to speed the evaluation of applications. 
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Leading Danish citizenship scholar Eva Ersbøll has characterized the Danish debate, stating that 
while the Social Democrats consider citizenship to be a signal by immigrants that they desire to 
integrate further in society; while the Social Liberals want to lower requirements since they con-
sider access to it "as part of the integration process and crucial for integration" (Ibid.: 132). 
For its part, the Danish People's Party aims to use citizenship policy first to reduce the 
number of naturalizations, both to slow the rate of demographic change in Danish society and to 
assure that politicians can have greater review and control of those individuals who are consid-
ered for citizenship (Ibid.). And second, the party aims for policy ensuring that citizenship is only
granted to immigrants who a endorse the Danish constitution and who appreciate and live ac-
cording to democratic rules, and established laws, not setting "foreign religious texts higher than 
democratic decisions" (Danish People's Party 2009)--thereby ensuring that the Danish citizenry 
includes people who adhere to certain principles and behavior they define as supporting the Dan-
ish democracy, the general welfare, and the continuation of Danish public culture. 
For most of the 2000s and beyond, nearly all the national Danish parties (with the excep-
tion of the Red-Green Alliance) have supported concrete language and self-support requirements 
for naturalization, but have differed on how high the requirements should be and on the role of 
citizenship in relation to integration. The Danish People's Party, as mentioned above, wishes to 
limit the number of naturalizations through strict requirements and to use them to enforce an idea
of what a citizen ought to be, and sees citizenship as "the goal of integration," as expressed by 
MP Christian Langballe in a parliamentary debate (concerning a routine naturalization bill) as re-
cently as November 8, 2013. The Social Democrats, however, while upholding the idea of re-
quirements to show integration as part of deserving citizenship, also insist that citizenship plays a
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role in the integration process by recognizing individuals as part of society, and motivating them 
to integrate further, as stated by MP Lennart Damsbo-Andersen in the same debate: 
Citizenship is a recognition of those foreigners who have made an effort to become a part
of the Danish community. They have proven that they want Danish society, that they 
speak our language, that they learn about our society. And therefore, they deserve to be-
come citizens here in Denmark. Citizenship is also an important step on the way to better 
integration. We are showing the new citizens that we recognize them fully as Danes; this 
gives them even more motivation to be a whole and active part of the society they are 
living in.
In addition, other parties such as the Socialists and the Social Liberals uphold the idea of some 
standards of citizenship while emphasizing that those standards must be attainable for im-
migrants, rather than excluding some who, due to a poorer educational background or disability, 
might never be able to pass the most difficult language or knowledge exams (a perspective 
shared by the Social Democrats as well, and forming the basis of the post-2012 changes). Social-
ist MF Karina Lorentzen Dehnhardt expressed this in the same November 2013 debate: "It is our 
hope that these new rules can give people courage to work toward becoming Danish citizens, 
simply because the goal is now reachable--that it simply is possible at some point in time." 
While dual citizenship has not been much debated in Danish public life, the left-of-center
parties and the Social Liberals have begun to advance support of it, while the right-of-center par-
ties maintain that dual citizenship should be avoided since 1) citizenship implies a loyalty to 
one's society that should not be divided, and 2) dual citizenship may cause may practical prob-
lems in terms of state protection in international situations, military service, etc., that are difficult
to resolve. 
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Thus the Danish debate has maintained ideas of deservingness and citizenship as some-
thing to be worked for by immigrants, but has centered on whether it is goal or part of the inte-
gration process, and on how restrictive the standards for naturalization should be. The parties' ex-
pressed intentions for citizenship policy, and their corresponding beliefs about how it is likely to 
bring certain outcomes about, vary greatly. The Social Liberals and the Red-Green Alliance have 
expressed the idea that giving easier access to citizenship would bring better integration. As re-
ported above, similar perspectives have been voiced by MPs from the Socialist and Social De-
mocratic parties, though the two parties have since the mid-2000s attempted to keep the issue 
from being further politicized, since high-profile discussions of immigrants and related policy, 
they believed, made them vulnerable to electoral losses to the Danish People's Party. The Danish 
People's Party, on the other hand, have not greatly concerned themselves with civic integration in
the sense that it is defined here; their influence on citizenship policy was intended to reduce natu-
ralizations overall, and to ensure that only those with high labor-market integration and extensive
knowledge of Danish language and culture would have full political rights. The intentions of 
their (former) coalition partners on the center right are less clear. The Liberals and the Conserva-
tives have used citizenship policy primarily to gain legislative support from the DF, with some 
policy makers expressing beliefs that the restrictions they implemented through the 2000s would 
themselves act as a motivating factor that would push minorities to gain competencies and quali-
fy, resulting in a better integrated minority public.
The developments in Sweden during the same period differed greatly from the Danish. 
There was little debate or controversy surrounding Swedish citizenship policy in the 1980s or 
90s. Two factors in particular have been argued to explain the stability and a lack of much politi-
cization or media attention in policy areas relating to immigration and citizenship in Sweden. 
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First, as mentioned above, Swedish politics operates to a large degree on seeking broad consen-
sus, and a consensus on these issues more particularly has existed for some time between the 
largest parties in the left- and right-of-center blocs--the Social Democrats and the Moderates 
(Faist, Gerdes and Rieple 2004; Lokrantz Bernitz and Bernitz 2006). Though Lokrantz Bernitz 
and Bernitz (2006) suggest that this alliance might be waning, there is as yet little sign that the 
parties disagree over citizenship policy. And second, they suggest that it comes as a result of the 
lack of populist parties in Swedish politics (other than a stint in parliament by the New Democra-
cy Party in 1991-94). "There seems to be a consensus in Sweden," they write, "that populist par-
ties should be avoided, and any attempt would probably fail to reach the public through the me-
dia" (Ibid.: 531). Citizenship policy is rarely discussed in Sweden (Ibid.), in part due to this 
apolitical handling of the issue and because procedures for naturalization are simple and it may 
be acquired at the same time immigrants typically attain permanent resident status (also more or 
less automatically), now after five years' residence. 
In this context, the move to enact a new Swedish law on citizenship in the years leading 
up to 2001was chiefly motivated by a general need to modernize citizenship policy (Ibid.). The 
commission assigned in 1997 to re-evaluate Swedish citizenship law, in its 1999 report, recom-
mended the move to allow dual citizenship and to lower requirements for those born or grown up
in Sweden and for stateless children (Citizenship Commission 1999). It recommended double 
citizenship in order to bring Swedish citizenship policy in line with a more globalized world and 
multi-ethnic society, contending that more immigrants in Sweden would be likely to naturalize if 
they were able to retain their previous citizenship, making political participation legally possible 
for more of the members of society, which "according to the Commission's view is positive for 
both the individual and for Swedish society" (Ibid.: 12, my translation). Especially interesting for
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this study, perhaps, is the commission's contention that the greatest advantages of dual citizen-
ship for the individual exist at an emotional level, in which "the sense of security brought by 
having one’s old citizenship can contribute to greater well-being and faster integration in the new
society" at the same time as the "inclusion" brought by Swedish citizenship "promotes integra-
tion through increased affinity with the Swedish society and more opportunities to participate ac-
tively in political life" (Ibid.: 203, 213, my translation). 
Supporters of the proposal argued much along the same lines, suggesting double citizen-
ship would allow immigrants in Sweden (and Swedes in other countries) and their children to 
both participate in and to feel belonging in both their 'new' and 'old' societies. Then Integration 
Minister Ulrica Messing, in a newspaper op-ed, expressed the belief that being naturalized would
increase integration in part by increasing identification with Sweden: "I want to make it easier 
for immigrants to become Swedish citizens. I want people to be able to feel at home in Sweden 
and to be able to identify with today's society. That promotes integration. I also want people to be
able to do that without needing to renounce their original citizenships" (Messing 2000). This idea
of greater integration being facilitated by naturalization and by dual citizenship in particular rest-
ed on the idea--not really opposed in the Swedish debates of the time, even by opponents of the 
law--that dual identities were possible, and even positive. Messing made this explicit, 
continuing: 
Double citizenship is quite consistent with our view of integration. Integration is about 
becoming involved in another cultural and social reality. But that does not mean that you 
have to give up your previous cultural identity. In a modern society marked by ethnic and
cultural diversity, it is natural that people have more than one identity. One can be both 
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Swedish and Arab, both Jew and Swedish, Sami and Swedish. Everyone has the right to 
choose their own identity and be respected for it. (Ibid.)
The national Integration Office actually also took a position in favor of the proposal for dual citi-
zenship, its director writing that the office considered the proposal "to be favourable for integra-
tion. It opens up new opportunities for many immigrants to feel that they are part of Swedish so-
ciety, and hopefully also to gain the sense of responsibility with regard to societal obligations 
that follows from fully equal rights" (Stjernkvist and Diaz 1999, translated and qtd. in Gustafson 
2002). In the debates preceding the new law, only the center-right Moderate Party raised opposi-
tion to the dual citizenship provision and suggested greater limits for those with criminal records.
Opponents of dual citizenship contended that the importance of national citizenship was not di-
minished by globalization; the Moderate Party's MPs submitted a motion to dismiss the recom-
mendations, stating that since citizenship gives the individual "clear and unambiguous rights and 
obligations in relation to the state, loyalty to one's country of citizenship "should be absolute"--
and thus should not be toward two countries (Gennser et al. 2000). The Moderates raised the 
problems Other opponent voices in the public debate agreed with these arguments about the po-
tential practical and legal problems. Yet even the political and public opponents of dual citizen-
ship worked on a premise of acceptance of the new, multi-ethnic Sweden, and of easily accessi-
ble naturalization. For instance, in an editorial opposing the idea, national daily Svenska 
Dagbladet began by writing that a modernization of the law was welcome, as Sweden had 
changed and become more diverse since 1950; but instead of double citizenship, it argued, the 
law would be better changed by easing access to citizenship in general (Editorial Board, Svenska 
Dagbladet 2000). The other political parties supported the recommendations, however; and when
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the vote was taken all parties in the Swedish parliament, in including the Moderates, ultimately 
voted for the new law. 
In short, in the decade leading to the present study, when the policies in place reflected 
the power of the center-right and the influence of the Danish People's Party, Denmark consistent-
ly pursued what can be termed a gate-keeping model that makes full membership conditional on 
increasingly restrictive competency requirements; while Sweden followed an open-membership 
model that makes citizenship available to all after a certain period, even while retaining a previ-
ous citizenship. The two countries’ citizenship policies at the time the study's surveys and inter-
views were conducted in 2012 and early 2013 (before the Danish government's moderate 
changes were formally proposed) are summarized in Table 1.
Denmark Sweden
residence requirement                9 years 5 years
language requirement high-school equivalency none
citizenship test history, civics questions none
welfare independence no more than 6 months of wel-
fare in 3 years prior to applying
none
work requirement actively employed at least 3 1/2
of last 4 years
none
penalty for committing felony permanent disqualification delay
children born in country to non-
citizens
under 18, together with par-
ents; over 18, immigrant rules 
apply
by declaration
double citizenship not allowed (unless qualify for 
both at birth)
allowed
Table 4. Citizenship policies in Denmark and Sweden, 2012 (at time of survey administration).
With policies so distinct from one another, the Danish and Swedish citizenship rules 
made them among the very most restrictive and most liberal in Europe. Christian Joppke in-
cludes Denmark, along with the Netherlands and Austria, in a group he calls 'the European hard-
liners,' "where an immigration control dynamic and nationalist rhetoric have invaded the citizen-
ship domain" and "populist right-wing parties have had a direct or indirect hand in shaping 
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legislation" (2010: 61). Marc Howard, in his indexing of citizenship policies across 15 Western 
European countries, finds the Danish policies to be among those that most restrict access, and the
Swedish to be among the most liberal in giving access to naturalization (Howard 2009). Sara 
Wallace Goodman, in her study of integration requirements attached to permanent residence and 
citizenship policies in Europe, finds the Danish and Swedish policies (as of 2009) to be on oppo-
site ends of the scale in terms of the degree of 'membership content' they enforce. While access 
to citizenship (and permanent residence) in Sweden required the least in terms of 'integration' 
milestones to be fulfilled, the Danish policies enforced a 'thicker' package of requirements 
(Goodman 2009; Goodman 2010). Figure 4, reproduced from Goodman (2010), shows Denmark 
and Sweden's placement along Howard's citizenship policy index (CPI) and Goodman's civic in-
tegration policy index (CIVIX), together with other Western European states.  As the figure 
shows, Goodman finds Denmark to be among the countries with the most restrictive and content-
laden policies--which she terms 'Prohibitive'--while she places Sweden among those with the 
most liberal access and least content-enforcing, or 'Enabling,' policies. 
Figure 4. Western European countries as positioned on Goodman's Civic Integration Index (CIVIX) and 
Howard's Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) (reproduced from Goodman 2010).
 94
Denmark and Sweden's citizenship policies for welcoming new legal members differ greatly, de-
spite their being quite similar societies along many political, economic and cultural factors--pro-
viding an opportunity to compare the effects of such closed and open policies on immigrant-mi-
norities' identification and participation in society. 
3.1.3 Direct Results of Citizenship Policy: Naturalizations
These naturalization policies have resulted in many more immigrants gaining citizenship 
in Sweden than in Denmark. This split is helped in absolute terms by the larger streams of immi-
gration to Sweden over the long term, but the period after 2002 has seen an especially sharp split 
between naturalization rates in the two countries (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Naturalizations in Denmark and Sweden, 1990-2012, in absolute numbers (upper graph) and 
proportional to residents in the country the previous year who were foreign citizens (lower graph).
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While naturalizations ticked up somewhat following the 2002 law changes in Denmark, a steady 
decrease can be observed from 2005 onward, reflecting successive restrictions of citizenship law 
during the period, and the implementation of strict language requirements in 2007. By contrast, 
Sweden's naturalization remained fairly steady for several years after falling from a natural peak 
(that had occurred due to Iraqi refugees, arrived in Sweden some five years before, becoming eli-
gible to gain citizenship), and has more recently risen again.  
The countries of origin reflected in the Swedish naturalization rates have varied with 
refugee flows (with a time-lag to reflect required term of residence). In 2000, 12,591 citizens of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina became Swedish citizens, making them by far the largest group (by previ-
ous citizenship) that year, followed by 5,134 from the Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia and 4,181 
from Iraq. Iraqis made up the largest group of naturalized Swedish citizens in the following 
decade: in 2012, 16,621 Iraqi citizens naturalized (the next largest groups totaled 2,247 from Fin-
land, and 1,908 from Thailand). Table 5 displays top source countries for new Danish and 
Swedish citizens naturalized in 2000, 2006 and 2012.
2000 2006 2012
Denmark Turkey 3096 Turkey 1125 Iraq 699
stateless 2382 Iraq 1113 Afghanistan 458
Iraq 2224 Somalia 923 Turkey 278
Sweden Bosnia-Herzegovina 12591 Iraq 12895 Iraq 16621
Fed. Rep. Yugoslavia 5134 Serbia & Montenegro 2073 Finland 2247
Iraq 4181 Finland 2975 Thailand 1908
Table 5. Changing sources of new citizens. Naturalizations to Danish and Swedish citizenship in 2000, 
2006 and 2012 from three largest previous citizenship groups for each year (sources: Statistics Den-
mark, Statistics Sweden).
This study investigates whether these policies--as they affect minorities individually and 
as ethnic and religious groups--influence the extent to which minority individuals identify with 
the national community, in comparison with other factors. Yet the effects of the Danish and 
 96
Swedish citizenship policies on immigrant-minorities' 'integration,' whatever they may be, are 
likely to operate in conjunction with, or even be overshadowed by, those of the political and so-
cial environments in the two societies--which are arguably just as distinct as their citizenship 
policies. In order to build expectations about how these might affect civic integration, the follow-
ing sections outline the countries' political debates and social attitudes relating to immigrants and
integration.
3.2 Immigrant Minority-Related Issues in Political Life
In addition to their contrasting citizenship policies, Denmark and Sweden are also settings for 
quite different political debates and climates regarding immigration, integration, citizenship and 
Islam. This is likely, according to to the expectations set out in Chapter 2, to have an impact on 
immigrant minorities' identity and participation, just as citizenship policies themselves are ex-
pected to do. As the above overview of the development of citizenship policy indicates, political 
debate surrounding immigration and related issues has been more contentious in Denmark from 
the 1990s onward than in Sweden. It is of course difficult to precisely characterize any country's 
political environment surrounding an issue, especially as it is chiefly communicated to the public
through diverse media. However, I outline here the two countries' debates by highlighting first 
the role of parties with a focus on immigration and integration in the two countries, and second 
considering the media environment around such issues. 
3.2.1 Influence of Populist Anti-Immigration Parties
The politicization of immigrant and integration-related issues is most concretely evident in the 
position and influence of the countries' populist, 'anti-immigration' parties.36 As such a party, the 
36. While these parties are often labeled 'far-right' (together with, for example, the British U.K. Independence Party,
Hollands Freedom Party (PVV) and France's Front National), this is misleading in relation to some of these parties, 
including the Danish People's Party and the Sweden Democrats, both of which combine anti-immigration and EU-
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Danish People's Party (founded in 1995 as a split-off from the populist Progress Party) emerged 
earlier onto the national state than the similar 'Sweden Democrats' in Sweden, and since its entry 
into Parliament in 1998 has gained more electoral traction, winning 7.4 % of the vote in 1998, 12
% in 2001, 13.3 % in 2007, 13.9 % in 2007, and 12.3 % in 2011. By contrast, the Sweden De-
mocrats were founded in 1988 but first entered Parliament in 2010 with 5.7 % of the vote. 
Perhaps more significantly, the Danish People's Party has since 2001 functioned as quite 
an influential part of the right-of-center 'blue bloc' in Danish politics, serving as pivotal support 
party to the 2001-11 Liberal Conservative minority government and, as mentioned above, having
many points of its policy program on immigration, integration and citizenship implemented. This
may be argued to be part of a larger European trend, in which the entry of populist right parties 
into mainstream policies has enlarged right-of-center blocs, center-right parties have adopted 
many of the populist-right's policies (for both principled and strategic motives), and the populist 
right has gained legitimacy (Bale 2003; 2008). In addition, in the 2000s the Danish center-left--
the Social Democrats and even the Socialists--largely accepted many of the restrictions the Dan-
ish People's Party had pushed through, in part because the DPP threatened them electorally 
among welfare-focused, traditionally Social Democratic voters, and the Social Democrats wished
to de-politicize immigration issues (Bale et al. 2010). 
The Sweden Democrats, however, stand outside the main Swedish political blocs (the 
center-right 'Alliance' and the left-of-center block formerly aligned in the 'Red-Green' pact), with
other parties refusing significant cooperation with them. This distance has sometimes been ar-
gued to be due to the Sweden Democrats' connections to neo-nazi movements earlier in its histo-
ry. Green-Pedersen and Odmalm write that moves by mainstream parties from the late 1990s to 
skeptical priorities with strong advocacy for many existing welfare policies, especially those that impact the elderly.
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mid-2000s to propose rule restrictions, having to do with start-help for newly arrived immigrants
or with citizenship, opened up a policy and electoral space in which the Sweden Democrats 
could mobilize and win increased support (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008). However, the 
center-right parties making these proposals never raised fundamental opposition to the liberal na-
ture of most Swedish immigration and integration policies, and never signaled willingness to 
work with the Sweden Democrats. Instead, the center-right, when they came to power in 2007, 
continued the existing citizenship policies and made moves to tighten initiatives for stronger la-
bor-market and language integration. The latter was tied to start-help, but had no consequences 
for permanent residency or citizenship. Furthermore, the center-right's rhetoric has continued to 
affirm the idea of a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Sweden throughout the period.  There is, as of
2013, little sign of this changing in the near future, with the mainstream parties insisting that they
will not cooperate with the party in this policy area. This is even less likely to change if the pop-
ulist party leaders Marine Le Pen of the French National Front and Geert Wilders of the Dutch 
Freedom Party convince the Sweden Democrats to join their 'European Alliance for Freedom,' a 
coalition of EU-skeptical and populist-right parties who will operate as a party group in the Eu-
ropean parliament (to hinder further EU integration) if they gain sufficient strength in the 2014 
European parliament elections (Traynor 2013; Mestre, Stroobants and Truc 2013). The Sweden 
Democrats were sharply criticized for possible ties to the group not only in Swedish public de-
bates (Eriksson 2013), but also by the Danish People's Party, especially because the National 
Front's early connections with neo-nazi groups still taint its reputation (Larsson 2013). DPP vice-
chair Søren Espersen said in November 2013 he was 'shocked' that the Sweden Democrats might 
make such a move and warned them against it. The DPP, he declared, would not cooperate with 
the alliance, and said that if SD entered into the alliance, then "we are not interested in any co-
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operation with the Sweden Democrats" (Quass 2013). The SD, for its part, has not yet officially 
joined the group; in a November 2013 op-ed, SD International Secretary Kent Ekeroth stated that
the party would decide after the May 2014 elections whether or not to join (Ekeroth 2013). Inter-
estingly, Ekeroth himself was as of February 2014 listed, along with his party affiliation, on the 
Alliance's website (eurallfree.org) as its treasurer, suggesting that the ties between SD and the 
alliance may be quasi-official despite his denial. 
Political opinion polls in summer 2013 placed the Sweden Democrats' popularity among 
voters at as much as 10 %, a significant improvement over their 2010 result--though this would 
potentially, make them the country's third-largest party, both blocs' prime ministerial candidates 
have said they still would not work together with the party in a potential coalition. Danish Peo-
ple's Party's popularity among voters was measured in August 2013 at around 18 %, well above 
their 2011 election level and even close to overtaking the Social Democrats' position as the coun-
try's second-largest party (after the center-right Liberals) (Lund 2013). Thus, while the Sweden 
Democrats (SD) are gaining power over time, the Danish People's Party holds a far more dom-
inant position in Danish politics than the SD does in Sweden. As reactions to the potential partic-
ipation of the SD in Le Pen's alliance shows, the parties' positions are likely to be reinforced by 
their European coalition strategies, with the DF taking a more moderate road. While the SD may 
grow in European influence as a result of its entry into the alliance, it is not likely to gain legisla-
tive influence in Sweden from it; on the contrary, it is likely to be isolated further, at least in the 
short term.
3.2.2 The Role of Media Coverage
In addition to the position of these parties on the two countries' political scenes, the tone and 
content of their political debates and media coverage regarding immigrants, integration and Is-
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lam have often been argued to be quite different, with a more negative tone in Denmark. Yet it is 
difficult to characterize the Danish and Swedish political and media debates with certainty. 
Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) conducted a media analysis of immigration-related articles
from 1987-2004 from two major newspapers in each country;37 they found broad similarity, 
though with higher percentage of Danish articles than Swedish using a negative tone during the 
last several years of that period. In a comparative review of how the immigration issue has 
grown in salience much more in Denmark than in Sweden over the past two decades, Rydgren 
(2010) mentions the large amount of media coverage given to the issue (and specifically to the 
Danish People's Party) in Denmark, but does not really examine Swedish media on the issue. The
Swedish media have sometimes been criticized by Swedish academics for a negative tone re-
garding immigration and related issues, yet the Swedish media have for many years carried a 
much more muted tone regarding immigration, integration and immigrant-background minorities
that mirrors the tone political debate in the country: chiefly examining problems concerning mi-
nority communities from a socioeconomic, rather than ethnic or immigration-related, perspec-
tive. Within this study I examine the extent to which individuals from the two countries report 
having seen media coverage of issues related to immigration, integration and Islam, as an indica-
tor of the salience of such issues in the two societies. If there is some variation in political inclu-
sion/exclusion signals, as perceived by individuals in the two countries, I use this variation to 
examine whether and how that affects individual minorities' levels of identification with the Dan-
ish or Swedish national community.
37. Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) analyzed articles from Politiken and Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten in 
Denmark, and from Dagens Nyheter and Expressen in Sweden.
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A week of nightly 'unrest' in several Stockholm suburbs in May 2013 brought this 
Swedish media approach, and Danish/Swedish differences in addressing minority-related issues, 
to light. While Swedish newspaper articles seldom mentioned the ethnic origin of the young men
involved in setting fire to cars and schools and throwing rocks at police and fire-fighters, and in-
stead focused on problems of unemployment, education and city segregation, their Danish coun-
terparts placed focus directly on the rioters' immigrant origin and on the Swedish media's failure 
to do the same. 
The center-right daily Jyllands-Posten's editorial staff, for example, wrote in their daily 
editorial on May 25, 2013: "The perpetrators, who in the established Swedish media are neutrally
discussed as 'young people,' are immigrant boys with Muslim background as young as teenagers,
who, instead of resting and sleeping and freshening up for the next day, are out in the streets aim-
ing their aggression at other people's property and the public order... The problem is not material,
but cultural. It is based in a deep difference between the mentality that has formed rich and well-
functioning Sweden, and the foreign mentality that the aggressive part of immigrant youth are 
displaying. It is time to admit the truth" (2013). Jyllands-Posten and other right-leaning sources 
were not the only sources of Danish finger-pointing at so-called Swedish naïvité, however. Poli-
tiken, a center-left daily, also chimed in with its own editorial during the same week. The piece 
first cited Swedish Dagens Nyheter journalist Alexandra Pascalidou, who described the problem 
as "a complex cocktail of poverty, frustration, xenophobia, disempowerment, geography and 
class. And gender" (Pascalidou 2013). Politikens editorial board then went on to respond: 
In this list of almost all thinkable explanations, one glimmers in its absence: that over 
80% of the approximately 12,000 inhabitants of Husby have another ethnic background 
than Swedish... Just as wrong as it is to reduce the riots to a question of ethnicity and cul-
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ture alone, it is just as naive to try to separate out that factor from this complex cocktail. 
It is not meaningless, that whole cities actually live in a parallel culture far away from the
Swedish elite's neighborhoods...Sweden has generally been far better than Denmark at in-
tegrating foreigners in politics, culture and societal life. But the riots show that there are 
also problems... It would be a fatal mistake if the center-left in Sweden makes the same 
mistake as here and too late opens its eyes to the fact that immigration also brings chal-
lenges to a welfare society that must both be discussed openly and confronted politically. 
(Editorial Board, Politiken 2013, my translation)
This line of debate was widespread in the Danish media at the time. Overbearing Swedish politi-
cal correctness was, on the Danish right wing, blamed for faulty handling of integration itself and
for denial of ensuing problems; and, on the Danish center-left, for risking giving political capital 
to the populist Sweden Democrats. Danish commentary about the episode sometimes carried an 
undertone of schadenfreude, or at the very least an attitude of 'we told you so,' as displayed in the
cartoon from Danish daily BT. 
Figure 6. Danish humor over the May 2013 unrest in suburban Stockholm, from Danish newspaper BT 
(Police officer: "Youth with immigrant background have for some time committed extensive vandalism in 
the Stockholm suburb Husby.... in frustration over a lack of future outlook." Companion: "Tell me ... what
happened to 'Sweden, the People's Home,' anyway?"). Artist, Carsten Graabæk (2013).
However, even with the different media approaches to discussing incidents and conflicts 
involving minorities in the two countries, it must also be said that modes of labeling minorities is
in everyday use becoming more similar over time. In both Danish and Swedish media, one can 
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today find increasing references to ethnic-minority individuals as "Danes/Swedes with another 
background" or simply "Danes/Swedes," for example when they are interviewed about an event 
happening in their local community, are consulted as experts or are named in connection with an 
achievement--especially when it occurs in an international context. It may be that, despite persis-
tent differences in addressing minority-related issues, the Danish and Swedish media cultures in 
relating to minorities will become more similar over time.
3.2.3 Islam in Public Life and Debate
As the episode highlighted just above suggests, while in Sweden 'problems of integration' are 
generally discussed more as being symptomatic of socioeconomic inequality and discrimination, 
cultural and ethnic differences have often played central roles in Denmark. Perhaps most promi-
nent in such debates has been the theme of Islam. While the roles of Islam and Islamism in socie-
ty are debated in both the Danish and Swedish public spheres, the tone in national media and pol-
itics may be said to be more confrontational in Denmark. Discussion of Islam played most 
famously in the Danish public sphere in the wake of the 2005 'Mohammed Cartoons' (Rose 2005;
Klausen 2009), but that 'crisis' has been argued to have escalated precisely because Islam and Is-
lamism have been the subjects of contentious debate in Denmark since the 1990s (Larsen and 
Seidenfaden 2006), and because the Danish political sphere had no established channel for medi-
ating such conflicts. A parallel (though perhaps not so prominent or provocative) episode oc-
curred in Sweden in 2007, when regional daily Nerikes Allehanda published a cartoon of the 
Prophet Mohammed as a dog drawn by artist Lars Vilks as a protest against art galleries' refusal 
to exhibit his work (Ströman 2007), the government reacted to protests by engaging in dialogue 
with Muslim groups, consulting with the Swedish Muslim Council and visiting the Stockholm 
Central Mosque (Carlborn 2007; Carlborn 2007). 
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These episodes illustrate that the countries differ not only in the tone and content of their 
public debates over Muslims and Islam, but also of practice in terms of religious institutions and 
consultation with their Muslim communities. In Denmark, religious minority rights remain more 
limited than those enjoyed by the state Lutheran church (Mouritsen 2006). The Swedish Luther-
an church, by contrast, was disestablished in 2000, while public support of some minority reli-
gious organizations has increased since the 1970s (Gustafson 2002; Alwall 2002; Gustafsson 
2003). In addition, Swedish Muslim communities are more consolidated and institutionally en-
gaged—in terms of having formed organizations to represent them in public discourse and filling
a routine consultative role—than their Danish counterparts (Sander and Larsson 2002; Larsson 
and Lindekilde 2009). As with Muslim groups, minority ethnic organizations are also more rou-
tinely and meaningfully consulted in Swedish public life. Danish social and political life, interna-
tionally and in Danes' own national self-perception, is like the Swedish defined by its strong as-
sociational culture (Torpe and Kjeldgaard 2003). Though many of these groups are active in 
providing educational and social activities for their members, these groups play little direct role 
in Danish public life. Researchers comparing the political voice and impact of ethnic associations
in the two countries have generally concluded that, while Muslim organizations have to some ex-
tent eclipsed their ethnic counterparts in the public sphere, minority organizations in Sweden 
seem to play a more consistent and meaningful role in public life (Togeby 2003). In a passage 
worth citing at length here, Togeby speculates as to the reason for this:
One can ask, then, what meaning the sometimes heated immigration debate in Denmark 
and the strong pressure towards assimilation has for the relations between immigrant 
organizations and political authorities. The most important is assumedly that the space for
action is different in Denmark and Sweden. In Sweden, the norm system tells political 
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leaders to listen to the immigrant groups and their organizations. It would be politically 
unwise for a Social Democratic minister in Sweden to act in a way perceived to be 
against the ethnic organizations' interests. While in Denmark, by contrast, such actions 
are more likely seen to express strength and political courage. ((Togeby 2004), my 
translation) 
However, while the Swedish political sphere has seen more group consultation than the Danish, 
it must still be emphasized that since the 1980s the Swedish model of integration in general has 
long emphasized the individual--focusing on general programs for labor-market participation and
anti-discrimination, for example, that serve interests of integration while perpetuating the general
welfare model and individual freedoms (Gustafson 2002; Breidahl 2012).
3.3 Levels of Social Inclusion
I have set forth expectations that, in addition to a country's citizenship policies and degree of 
what I called 'political inclusion' of immigrant-background minorities, the degree of social inclu-
sion that those minorities meet through interaction with others within society is also likely to in-
fluence their civic integration. Focusing on Denmark and Sweden, it is then important to consid-
er whether the divergent citizenship policies and political debates in the two countries are 
compounded with different levels of such social inclusion. This question is made even more rele-
vant by voices in the Danish academic and media spheres that have raised doubts as to whether 
the Danish/Swedish differences in approaching immigrants and integration, clearly seen in policy
and political debates, actually exist among the broader publics. Real public opinion in Sweden, 
the argument goes, is likely quite similar to that in Denmark--but may not be fully or honestly 
expressed due to a culture of political correctness pressed onto 'ordinary' Swedes by a cos-
mopolitan political elite. This Danish view of Sweden is more often than not an implicit, so can-
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not be pointed to with hard evidence; yet indications of it manifest themselves in the debate. Re-
sponding to a critical article by a Swede about the Danish integration debate and practice, one 
Danish writer expressed such ideas in a 2011 op-ed titled "Dear brother Sweden, sweep first be-
fore your own door:"
With you, my dear brother, I see no debate, no criticism of religion, no discussion of what
Islam is, and what that religion can bring. Not even when a suicide bomb exploded in 
Stockholm, could I hear anyone there discuss this issue. There is only room for such de-
bate as can go on in hiding, in obscure corners of the internet. Is the opposite of a witch 
hunt really silence? Is silence in itself a virtue? (Villemoes 2011)
One scholar summed up the the dominant views in each country about the debates and opinions 
in the other: "The Danish immigrant debate has shocked Swedish politicians, who have charac-
terized the debate as hostile to foreigners and almost self-destructive. On the contrary, the 
Swedish criticism and immigration politics is perceived from the Danish side as mistaken and 
criticized for suppressing a real debate, which results in increased problems" (Jørgensen 2006). 
This idea is also expressed, however, by some Swedish voices. In 2010, a regular blogger for 
Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten (himself a Swede of immigrant background active in the 
Sweden Democrats) responded to the killings of several individuals of immigrant background in 
Malmö, Sweden, by the 'Malmö sniper' by writing that such incidents were likely only just be-
ginning, if Sweden did not shed its reluctance to directly discuss problems of integration; instead,
Sweden must "democratically let frustrated and dissatisfied speak out" (Mishra 2010). Thus the 
idea exists, primarily in Denmark but among some in Sweden as well, that the Swedish political 
elite's approaches to immigrants and integration is somehow divided from the real public opin-
ion, but that a culture of political correctness stifles criticism of immigrants, Islam and current 
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approaches to integration. Whether or not this is the case--and whether or not Swedish and Dan-
ish public opinion and treatment of immigrant minorities is meaningfully different--is an impor-
tant empirical question that has a likely bearing not only these debates, but also on immigrant 
minorities' own civic integration.
There is some indication from existing survey data that public opinion in the two coun-
tries is meaningfully divided in this area. International surveys conducted over the past few 
decades have sometimes included items measuring people's ideas about immigrants, Muslims, 
and ethnic minorities. These overwhelmingly reflect the opinions of ethnic-majority populations, 
especially in countries such as Denmark and Sweden, where immigrant minorities make up a rel-
atively small proportion of the population and generally make up an even smaller proportion of 
survey respondent groups. The European Social Survey, for example, asked respondents to indi-
cate their opinions as to whether they would like to see few vs. many immigrants come to their 
country who were of a different ethnicity or race from the majority population, and from poorer 
countries outside Europe. It also asked them to indicate the extent to which they felt that im-
migrants enrich or undermine the country's cultural life, and are good or bad for the country's 
economy. Figure 7 displays responses in Denmark and Sweden (with a few other European coun-
tries for comparison) from 2000-2012. 
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Immigrants are good for the country's economy
Figure 7. Mean responses to key items about immigration and immigrants in society in Denmark and 
Sweden, European Social Survey, 2002-20012  (as compared with means for France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway and the UK).
As the figures show, public opinion in the two countries on all these items--with the partial ex-
ception of the question regarding immigrants' being good/bad for the economy (lower right)--is 
significantly different throughout the 2000s and beyond. On the other three items, public atti-
tudes in Sweden are consistently more positive towards immigrants, by a wide margin, than in 
any of the other Western European countries. While expressions of opinion on surveys may in-
deed by somewhat influenced by standards of public discussion in a given context, these re-
sponse differences are so wide that a real and consistent difference in public opinion over these 
ideas seems the most likely explanation.
Because we wish to learn about factors influencing immigrant-minority civic integration, 
and considering the contention about whether such differences in public opinion really exist 'on 
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the ground', it is enlightening to examine how immigrant-minority individuals in the two society 
actually report being treated; and how they perceive it to be, given their long-term experiences in
the societies. Some existing data points to immigrant minorities in Denmark experiencing dis-
crimination at higher rates than those in Sweden. The EU Fundamental Rights Agency’s 2009 
survey of experienced discrimination in the EU-27, for example, found discrimination rates in 
Denmark to be higher than EU averages for similar groups, while Sweden’s were lower (see Fig-
ure 8) (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2009). 
Figure 8. Experienced discrimination as reported by minority respondent groups in the European Union; 
reproduced from the EU-MIDIS Main Results Report, with lines added in margins to indicate Danish and 
Swedish minority groups.
While 46% of sub-Saharan Africans in Denmark reported experienced discrimination within the 
past year, 33% of the same group in Sweden reported it (vs. an EU average of 43% in the same 
study). Further, 42 % of Turks reported experiencing discrimination in the past year, compared to
an EU average of 26% (that group was not investigated in Sweden), while only 10% of Iraqis in 
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Sweden reported it (Iraqis were not surveyed in any other country for that study, so there is no 
comparative number).
3.4 Using These Differences to Study Civic Integration
Given these differences, the investigation of civic integration within and between the two 
national settings is thus useful in that they settings provide an ideal ‘most similar systems’ 
comparison controlling for many broader-scale economic, social, political and cultural factors 
but differing along factors of interest—giving opportunity to examine whether and how the coun-
tries’ integration policies and definitions of national identity are affecting civic integration, and 
what accounts for potential variation across both countries, groups and individuals. Yet whether 
immigrant minorities' experience of access to citizenship, political inclusion and social inclusion 
varies between the two countries is an empirical question that I investigate--on average I find, as 
reported in Chapter 5, that minorities in Sweden experience higher levels of inclusion than those 
in Denmark do. I then use this variation to investigate how such perceived social inclusion (along
with legal and political) influences identification and participation in Chapters 6 and 7.
Based on the two countries’ stark differences in integration and citizenship policies, dif-
ferent political rhetorics on integration and indications from survey data on different levels of 
tolerance and discrimination,38 we should, based on my primary hypotheses, expect greater indi-
vidual political integration--all other things being equal--of immigrants in Sweden (measured in 
self-reported practices and identity), due to the greater political and social openness of national 
belonging evident there (provided, first of all, that a difference in perception of such openness is 
assessed among that country’s minorities than among Denmark’s). However, it may also be that 
38. The EU Fundamental Rights Agency’s 2009 EU-MIDIS study on discrimination against minorities in Europe, 
already mentioned above, found rates of discrimination that were higher than the EU average for those ethnic groups
in Denmark, but lower than the average for similar ethnic groups in Sweden.
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the looser conditions for long-term residence and naturalization in Sweden result in lower levels 
of individual integration, since there are fewer institutional incentives pushing minorities to gain 
capacities (e.g., language ability, employment, education and societal knowledge) that are gener-




In order to investigate whether and how different levels of inclusion in society affect identifica-
tion and political participation, I designed and administered an original survey to young adults of
both majority-ethnic and immigrant background in Denmark and Sweden. This was supplement-
ed by a follow-up survey experiment and in-depth interviews, each with a number of the main 
survey's respondents. In this chapter, I outline the design, sampling and administration of the 
study's main survey and follow-up modules. 
The study's main empirical investigations are conducted with the main survey, which 
aside from collecting information on many potentially relevant background variables (including 
ethnicity and religion), takes stock of respondents' perceptions of inclusion on the legal, social 
and political dimensions; their levels of identification with their ethnic and religious groups as 
well as with the broader national society; and the extent and form of their political participation. 
The survey experiment was designed to first present a randomly assigned treatment emphasizing 
either a more inclusive or exclusionary approach towards immigrant minorities to repeat respon-
dents from the main survey, then to assess their perceptions, identification levels and anticipated 
participation, post-treatment. This experimental design was introduced primarily as an attempt to
resolve a lack of clear causal direction between some of the study's main variables. Though it can
already be noted here that the attempt to do so was unsuccessful, with the experiment bringing 
no main results and therefore few implications for the study's main findings, it did produce some 
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insights as to how minorities' perceptions of inclusive or exclusionary messages vary with prior 
exposure to such ideas. And third, the study's follow-up interviews were designed to supplement 
the main survey data analysis with greater richness, using young minorities' own words--espe-
cially with an aim to add clarity or insight to processes or mechanisms that cannot be fully scruti-







Collect data on all variables of interest: socio-economic, 
ethnic and religious background data; identification with 
national, ethnic and religious groups; perception of citi-
zenship policies and political institutions; perceived in-
clusion of minorities; perceived discrimination levels and 
experienced discrimination; political interest, civic asso-
ciation engagement, political participation
Young adults ages 18-34
Control group
minority group 1 (mostly 
Turkish background)





Measure effect of positive treatment text (suggesting 
national openness toward minorities) vs. a negative text,
on national identification and desire to participate. Will 
also measure ethnic and religious identification again.




Investigate directions and mechanisms of effects on 
civic nation identification participation, using respon-
dents’ own descriptions.
Minorities repeat respon-
dents from main survey
Table 6. Overview of study modules.
4.1 Main Survey
In order to assess the experiences, perceptions and attitudes of young adults in both countries re-
lating to the political situation for immigrant minorities, their identity and participation, I devel-
oped a survey combining several original measures with already existing items. I then tested it 
and prepared it for use in both national contexts and languages. First randomly sampling young 
adults from the national registries, I constructed a smaller final sample, in which specific minori-
ties were overrepresented, by using name screening. I then recruited respondents in several phas-
es by mail, phone and email, and administered the survey through a web-based survey system.
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4.1.1 Survey Development
The main survey was developed with reference to previous survey and conceptual work in politi-
cal science, sociology and social psychology dealing with concepts and measures of ethnicity, 
identification, religiosity and political participation, and by consulting with experts in survey and
interview practice in Scandinavia and in measurement of identity concepts. 
In the pilot phase, the survey was administered online in the researcher’s presence to 33 
respondents of both ethnic-majority and ethnic-minority background, ages 17-27.39  The respon-
dents were informed that they would be involved in testing a survey. Each respondent used a giv-
en link to access the survey, and then filled the survey out on computer. The respondent group 
consisted of 16 men and 17 women.  The respondents’ ethnic backgrounds were Danish (11) , 
Arab (7), Turkish (4), mixed Danish-immigrant40 family backgrounds (3), Kurdish (2), Afghan 
(2), Vietnamese (2), Somali (1) and North African (1). Six of them were not born in Denmark--
five of those came to the country as refugees. The mean age of the group was 18.7 years. 
I employed cognitive interviewing to investigate the ease and meaning of the questions 
for respondents, asking respondents probing questions while and after they took the survey, on 
whether or why a particular question seemed difficult to answer, and asking about the thought 
process that led them to answer as they did (Jobe and Mingay 1989; Collins 2003; Presser et al. 
2004; Beatty and Willis 2007). Several respondents engaged naturally in “thinking-aloud,” in 
which a respondent actively discusses what she is thinking as she reads questions and decides 
39. Test respondents were recruited through ethnic minority networks for young adults in Denmark, through local 
contacts in the community, and through a high school. All respondents were led through an appropriate informed 
consent process. Institutional Review Board approval was obtained for human subjects research with minors, with 
appropriate consent considerations and procedures, for survey pre-testing.
40. Danish-Iranian, Danish-Dutch, and Danish-Polish.
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how to answer. I brought up topics raised by respondents or difficulties they had expressed, as 
well as asking intentionally about the survey’s key questions on identification. 
All pilot interviews were audio-recorded except one (where a respondent requested that it
not be). Interview transcripts and survey responses were examined and coded for statements ad-
dressing the items to be tested, as well as statements reflecting on the meaning of concepts rele-
vant to understanding the questions. These data were used to investigate the following questions:
which questions posed problems to respondents, and in what way?  Were questions understood to
refer to the same concepts by most respondents, and if not why not? And finally, what do the pat-
terns of survey responses and respondent comments suggest for improving the survey?
First, regarding the content and flow of the survey as a whole, respondents provided their 
reactions spontaneously and in response to direct questioning in terms of their general impres-
sion and emotional reaction. Several responses were heard multiple times. Several main reactions
were seen. First, several respondents found the survey “interesting,” with one (ethnic-majority) 
respondent expressing that he had been surprised by what his own responses were -- they were 
“different than I had thought they would be.” Similarly, several ethnic-minority respondents ex-
pressed that they were glad they had taken the survey; even thought they found it difficult, they 
felt that it had gotten them “to think over” what the questions were asking--they explained that 
they were talking especially about the identity questions, about how their various ethnic and reli-
gious identities were to them in relation to their Danish identity.  
The second main reaction heard was that for several (ethnic-minority) respondents it was 
“good to be able to express” what they were thinking or had experienced (especially in terms of 
discrimination), or what their opinions were about how things are politically for minorities. 
These respondents expressed a sense of having been heard that made them feel satisfied. Some 
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even expressed that while they felt irritated or sad at the social processes (discrimination, politi-
cal exclusion) raised by some of the later questions in the survey, they felt that the questions 
were phrased in a way that reflected the reality they knew and that allowed them to express their 
ideas.
However, several respondents (both majority and minority) expressed dissatisfaction, 
sadness or in the case of two respondents even feeling somewhat put upon or insulted by the fo-
cus in the survey on questions having to do with Muslims and minorities in society, and on dis-
crimination and exclusion.  Two (ethnic majority) respondents felt dissatisfied because the ques-
tions addressed society more generally, but did not allow them to say how things were, for 
example, within their own class, where relations between groups were much better, where they 
were “usually one group.” Respondents made two constructive suggestions to help with these 
problems. First, the survey’s political questions could be rounded out by inserting several non-
minority related questions that would still be interesting to get data on, such as tax or welfare 
politics. Second, questions could be included to all respondents asking about how things were in 
their everyday environment. Both of these suggestions were incorporated into the final version of
the survey analyzed in this dissertation. 
The process also assisted with correcting various phrasing, presentation and coding errors
that were affecting how questions were being presented to respondents. There was no evidence 
of problems with the overall format in which the online-administered questionnaire was present-
ed, or with the requirements for respondents to answer and then advance from one page to the 
next. 
In addition to evaluating survey's form and content in general, the pre-test used cognitive 
interviewing chiefly to investigate the functionality and interpretation of the survey items them-
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selves. To do so, the initial survey testing used multiple assessments for each of these elements, 
as well as some more open items to allow freer answers on political identification, to attempt to 
hone the final instrument’s ability to assess civic and minority-group identification.  Though the 
entire survey instrument (including items on respondent background, political engagement and 
perceptions of inclusion/exclusion) was tested by pilot-phase respondents, cognitive interviewing
around the pilot version focused primarily on the identification items. Five pre-test findings re-
garding subjects' interpretation of specific items are worth noting here.41 First, self-categorization
questions asking respondents to identify their 'ethnic or national background' and their religion 
worked well, as did inclusion of references to these responses in subsequent identity-related 
questions.  
Second, an item asking respondents about the extent to which they feel themselves 'a 
member of Danish society,' at the end of a list of belonging items (part of your local community, 
Danish/Swedish, European, [part of ethnic group], [part of religious group]), was judged unreli-
able after respondents described their interpretations of it in several differing ways (see Figure 
9). This item had been added to the Eurobarometer-style identification items (already adapted to 
include ethnicity and religion) in order to potentially give opportunity for those who do identify 
with the nation, but who read 'Danish' as being an ethnic descriptor (as it is often used in Danish)
to indicate that they do feel they belong. 
41. Pre-test findings were presented in longer version in a conference paper at APSA's 2011 annual meeting, 
available upon request.
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Figure 9. Eurobarometer-style identification question, as adapted and used in pilot survey (2011). Prob-
lems with differing interpretations of the 'member of Danish society' item became apparent.
But instead, the item caused a great deal of reflective thinking and some difficulty among re-
spondents, and interview discussions revealed that the term was being interpreted very different-
ly from one respondent to another. A great number of them answered differently on the two 
dimensions (‘Danish’ and ‘a member of Danish society’), and respondents expressed at least 
three distinct ideas about what the 'member of society' item meant. First, several respondents 
contrasted the two terms by explaining that they saw ‘member of society’ as a member of the col-
lective society and ‘Danish’ as having to do with personal identity, in the words of one. Another 
described more fully: 
“This [‘Danish’] is how I see myself, and that [‘member of Danish society’] is how others 
see me... It is more in relation to hair color, skin color and ... name. It’s the first impression,
right? It’s just, I would never ever be seen as a Dane.” 
Second, a few respondents saw being a 'member of society' in terms of whether one participates 
in society in an everyday, functional way, and sometimes as well in terms of organizational or 
political life. As one said, 
‘“A member of society'... Yes. I do participate.” 
Another explained that he thought 
"about the fact that I am getting an education, and could get a job and pay taxes, etc.” 
And third, still others interpreted it as being politically informed and engaged, of 
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“seeing myself as a citizen in modern society, and the way we distribute things and think it 
should function.” 
The respondent who said this contrasted it with a more cultural concept of ‘Danish.’ Another 
(minority) respondent defined societal membership this way, but with a different conclusion: 
“Danish society for me means politics. And politics says nothing to me. At all.”  
Since the 'member of society' belonging item brought such different interpretations when includ-
ed in the battery in that form, I concluded that it was not a reliable measure of national belong-
ing, and did not use it in the main survey.
A further item-related finding of the pre-test involved the components of identification in-
cluded on the pilot survey referring to the national, ethnic and religious dimensions of identifica-
tion (detailed description of measures used on the final survey may be found later in this chap-
ter). For each of the three identity dimensions, in addition to the more general Eurobarometer-
style measure mentioned above, respondents were asked for the extent to which they ‘identify 
with,’ ‘are glad to be,’ ‘feel strong ties with,‘ and see an identity as an ‘important part of who 
they are.’  This study adapted those questions to be used for religious belonging as well as ethnic 
and national, and respondents reported no problems with these questions, other than the fact that 
some felt that they had been asked the same question too many times (this was especially the 
case for  some ethnic-majority respondents, who were administered questions on religion after 
they had checked ‘Christian’ previously despite low religiosity -- they expressed annoyance at 
being asked about Christianity and their religion/faith so many times).  The only question of this 
set that produced doubt as to its being a useful identification indicator was the satisfaction ques-
tion--whether one ‘feels glad to [live in Denmark/be Turkish/ be Muslim].’42 Comments during 
42. These wordings are borrowed from studies in social psychology examining multiple components of salient 
ingroup identities (Luhtanen and Crocker 1992; Doosje et al. 1998; Leach et al. 2008; Simon and Ruhs 2008).
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the think-aloud interviewing and survey responses themselves indicated that there was much less
variation on the ‘glad’ questions, even when respondents expressed very different levels of 
identification along the dimensions elsewhere--it seemed to be more of a measure of general sat-
isfaction with or acceptance of one’s life. As such, these satisfaction items were judged to be less
indicative of group identification than the other available indicators.
Fourth, though minority respondents did not indicate difficulty or great differences inter-
preting questions about Danish identity, they differed in terms of how immediate or reflection-
demanding those questions were. For some, it was easy to answer, because they did feel Danish 
and were “already clear on it. I knew it.”  This was the case for some ethnic minorities that found
it immediately easy to answer that yes, they do identify as Danish, as well as for others who 
thought that
“it was the easiest question I was asked, if I am Danish. Even though I was born here and 
have Danish citizenship and have lived here for 18 years, it was the easiest question to an-
swer whether I was Arab or Danish ... [answered that] I was not at all a Dane.” 
For others, however, it was more difficult to arrive at an answer. However, several respondents 
confirmed that strategy of assessing the multiple identity dimensions together actually assisted 
their answering, since they were sure that they would be able to express identification with more 
than just one dimension. One respondent said that she could easily express strong identification 
as both Danish and Turkish once she saw that her ethnic group (Turkish) was also included in the
following part of the question: 
“It was wonderful that ‘Turkish’ was part of it. Otherwise I wouldn’t have answered it.” 
Further, several minority respondents mentioned in interviewing during or after they took
the survey that they felt they could answer identity-related questions more fully--in other words 
explain more fully how they identified with different groups--if there had been items that re-
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ferred to concrete situations, rather than just general identification questions--“it depends on the 
situation.” At home, explained one,
“I feel myself ‘zero’ Danish, but at high school, not because I feel myself ‘zero’ Turkish 
there, but I feel more Danish, because it’s there that I speak and think.” 
"Yes," said another,
"It’s situation-dependent. You can drink tea with an older Turk and feel yourself Turkish. 
And you can sit in a Danish church because you’ve been forced to go by your school-
teacher, and feel yourself very Danish.”  
One respondent pointed out that this variability does not mean that it is constantly changing, but 
rather that it is more or less consistent in certain settings:
“I know there are some places where I always feel more one than I do the other.” 
Nearly all pre-test interviewees either actively suggested or were very positive towards the idea 
of including several setting or situation-specific questions in the survey, since it would allow 
them to explain and express how their multiple identities came to the fore at different points in 
their everyday lives. This suggestion was incorporated into the final version of the survey.
And finally, the survey and interviews together indicated that more ethnic-majority re-
spondents insisted on identifying themselves more individually. On an item that asked respon-
dents to check as many or as few labels as 'they would ever use to describe themselves' (with 
several possibilities including as Danish, [ethnic], [religious], [hyphenated], 'immigrant', and 
'other'), several majority respondents typed in more individual, or less socially salient identities 
(such as ‘scout’ and ‘gamer’) in the ‘other’ field. As one commented:
I am a little more individualistic, I wouldn’t describe myself as Danish or something like 
that. There are of course some characteristics, like what race I have, that I share with oth-
ers, that type of group. But I’m on the computer a lot, online a lot, so when I describe my-
self I wouldn’t say Danish or where I live or which religion, but more maybe my field of in-
terest, my difference as a  person, that’s what I identify with. Having been born in 
Denmark, I can’t do so much with that.
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This is indeed reflective of findings in social psychology pointing out that “minority members’ 
self-interpretation is much more focused or centred on their respective group membership than 
that of majority members, so that ingroup status is much more likely to ‘hit the heart’ of minority
members’ self-interpretation' (Simon 2004: 105). This may be so because the chance that they 
meet outgroup members in their everyday lives is so much larger, or because the majority out-
group “represents the normative and often more powerful reference point” (Kampmeier and Si-
mon 2001: 454).
These direct and indirect suggestions for adapting or changing concrete survey items and 
these theoretical reflections suggested by respondent reactions and answers in the pre-test were 
examined and carefully considered, many of them incorporated into the final version of the sur-
vey. In its final form, the main survey included items to collect information from each respon-
dent regarding: 
• basic background data: age, gender, household income, education, years of educa-
tion, current/past employment status, social class (self-estimate)
• group affiliations: ethnicity, religion, religiosity, minority group identification (ethnic and
religious; measures original or adapted from previous surveys and work, details in 
section 4.4)
• immigration history (if relevant)
• citizenship status
• perceived citizenship access (self, for non-citizens; and group; original measures) 
• knowledge of actual citizenship policy (original measures)
• perceived social inclusion (personal and group; measures original and adapted from 
Simon & Ruhs 2008)
• experienced/ perceived discrimination (personal and group; adapted from the EU-
FRA's MIDIS study on discrimination (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
2009)
• perceived political inclusion (personal and group)
• national identification (original and adapted, see section 4.4)
• political participation (adapted from multiple surveys, section 4.5)
• other key perceptions and attitudes: political interest, civic norms, trust in political in-
stitutions (European Values Survey, see ), political efficacy, generalized social trust 
(the Rosenberg scale, see Rosenberg 1956), cultural knowledge, prior exposure to im-
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migrant-related issues in media, political knowledge (self-reported), perceived efficacy
of avg. citizens.
The measures used to assess national identification and political participation (the dependent 
variables of this study) are described, together with information on items for minority group 
identification, in sections 4.4 and 4.5 below). Other measures are described in full as they enter 
into the analysis in Chapters 5-7. Appendix 3 displays the content of the entire main survey (see 
p. 365). The surveys were then translated to Danish and Swedish; the two translations were de-
veloped with reference to each other as well as to the English version and any original sources of
survey items that had previously been used in those languages. 
4.1.2 Sampling Method
Since the study examines levels of, and factors contributing to, minority national identification 
and political participation among immigrant minorities, I constructed a sampling design that al-
lowed for comparison of similar minority-background groups in the two chosen countries, along 
with an otherwise similar control groups of individuals not in those groups in each country, to al-
low for comparison with levels of the variables of interest in the two societies more broadly. Fur-
ther, forming a special interest in young adults of immigrant background--since these young 
adults were likely to represent the 1st, 1.5 and 2nd generations43 (in terms of immigration), given 
the timing of the migration waves in the two countries, and since they were likely to give 
stronger indications of how civic engagement is likely to develop in the two countries in the 
future. 
43. The '1.5 generation' are people who arrived as immigrants as children, together with their parents, while 1st and 
2nd generations are, respectively, those who arrived themselves as teenagers or adults and those were born in the 
receiving country to immigrant parents. Goodwin-White (2007) defines the 1.5 generation as those who have 
immigrated before they reached 12 years of age.
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With these aims--of similar minority and control groups in both countries, and a young 
adult population--several sampling strategies were considered to find the most optimal design, 
given the project's available funding. The national registration of all legal residents in Denmark 
and Sweden, where the two national statistical bureaus have a vast amount of data linked to all 
individuals' records, gives possibilities for registry-based sampling and statistical research there 
to a much higher extent than in the United States. The first looked at was therefore to order a ran-
dom sample of specific ethnic- or national-origin groups, as well as a control group, from each of
the national registries. One variable linked to these registries in both countries is parents' country
of birth, so it is possible to randomly sample individuals from certain national-origin groups 
from those registries; however, funding was not sufficient to sample in this way, as the bureaus 
would only do so for a survey they themselves (are paid to) carry out. With this design prohibi-
tively expensive, a second possibility circumventing the registries was considered: to sample 
high school and technical school classes in both countries. This plan had several positive aspects.
First, entire classes would be surveyed at the same time, meaning that the (mostly ethnic-majori-
ty) control group would be the young minorities' actual peers and a sort of mapping of intra- and 
inter-ethnic friendships would be possible--allowing for study of social network effects on civic 
integration (a relationship suggested social psychology--see, for instance, (McFarland and Pals 
2005). Second, high response rates were likely, especially where on-site survey administration 
was possible. Third, focus groups and individual interviews might be conducted on-site in 
connection with the survey. But the plan's flaws outweighed its positives: differences in the 
structures of different educations would make it impossible to sample classes in an even way 
across different types of program (for example between certain technical programs and more 
classical university-prep courses). The sampled students would only make up a small part (16-20 
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years old) of the larger young adult age range of interest, and many of the younger of these might
yet be so politically aware. The sampling would not catch many first-generation immigrants; and,
most problematically, the students sampled would not be socio-economically representative of 
the young adult population as a whole--and the disproportion of leaving out all who take no post-
school education would in all likelihood be strongly correlated with the civic integration out-
comes of interest. 
Fortunately, a third and more promising strategy was found that would take advantage of 
the national registries at a lower research cost. Instead of sampling using parents' birth countries, 
the discovery of name analysis using indexes--a lesser known (but increasingly used) method of 
ethnic categorization on the basis of available information, people's names--would make it possi-
ble to screen a random samples of individuals in the age range of interest in each of the countries
to form sub-samples of likely ethnic origin, provided that ethnic name indexes could be obtained 
(for an outline of name analysis as a method for ethnic classification, see (Mateos 2007)). Health 
and demography researchers in the United States and Germany who have developed, respective-
ly, Arab and Turkish name lists for use in health and ethnicity studies focusing on Arab-Ameri-
cans and Turkish-Germans, agreed that their lists could be used for sample selection for this 
study (Razum, Zeeb and Akgün 2001; Morrison et al. 2003; El-Sayed, Lauderdale and Galea 
2010).44 While other name lists have been developed for other national origin groups (for exam-
ple, for use in identifying South Asians in Britain, and of Chinese-Americans and Latinos in the 
United States), these two name lists were selected for use in this study because individuals of 
44. The referenced papers account for the development of the two name indices, and the following two are 
validation studies as well: Oliver Razum et al., 2001 "How useful is a name-based algorithm in health research 
among Turkish migrants in Germany?" Tropical Medicine & International Health; and Abdulrahman El-Sayed et al. 
2010, "Validation of an Arab name algorithm in the determination of Arab ancestry for use in health research." 
Ethnicity & Health.
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Arab and Turkish origin are of theoretical interest for this study -- the two groups are significant 
immigrant-minority populations in both Denmark and Sweden, and represent various immigra-
tion waves and grounds for migration (for example labor, family and refugee entry). With the 
name indices in hand, the following sampling plan was developed:
1. Determine proportions of Danish and Swedish population aged 18-34 that (likely) have
Turkish or Arab ethnic background.
2. Using these proportions and likely response rates, order preliminary samples from the na-
tional registries large enough to provide sufficiently large sub-samples from these origin
groups.
3. Conduct name analysis matching to screen the preliminary samples for individuals of
likely Turkish and Arab origin.
4. Randomly select final Turkish and Arab sub-samples from the individuals found by name
screening.
5. Randomly select final control sub-samples from those remaining in the preliminary
samples.
Thus, the sizes of the preliminary samples ordered from the national registries are based on a cal-
culation using the proportion of each country’s 18-34 year-old population who are likely of Turk-
ish or Arab origin (first or second-generation immigrants). For each country, it is calculated what
sample size is needed to produce a final respondent count of approximately 300 individuals from
each of the Turkish-background, Arab-background and control subsample groups, assuming a 
40% response rate for the minority-background groups and a 45% response rate for the control 
group. Thus the required preliminary sample sizes are determined using the smaller of the two 
minority proportions in each country (.018 and .013, respectively, in Denmark and estimated in 
Sweden) in order to obtain a sample large enough to screen subsamples for recruitment, in each 
of the two countries, of approx. 667 individuals from each of the two minority-background 
groups and 750 for the control group. These numbers were then rounded up (to 44,000 in Den-
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mark and 59,000 in Sweden) to ensure sufficient numbers of individuals from the minority 
groups of focus (see Table 7).












Arab:     1.8%
Turkish: 1.8%
44,000




Arab:     4.3%
Turkish: 1.3%45 
59,000
Table 7. Preliminary sample sizes. Preliminary samples determined necessary, based on assumed re-
sponse rates and estimated proportions of the relevant background groups within the 18-34 year-old 
populations.
Based on these expectations, I acquired random samples of 44,000 and 59,000 individu-
als aged 18-34, respectively, taken from the Danish and Swedish national registries. After for-
matting those preliminary sample information correctly, I then used the name lists referenced 
above to automatically screen them for individuals of likely Arab and Turkish origin, using the 
same procedure to screen the Danish and Swedish registry samples.46 I then dealt with cases that 
had been screened positive by both lists, manually changed the sample group of individuals like-
ly to have been falsely screened positive for Arab or Turkish background (e.g., in the case of sev-
eral Danish or Swedish surnames also found on either list) and those likely to have been falsely 
screened negative (e.g., where unusual letters had caused problems for the statistical software), 
again ensuring that the same procedures were used for both screenings. The name analysis 
produced sufficient groups of likely Turkish and Arab origin in each country; Table 8 shows the 
45. Figures are based on data from the two national statistics bureaus, Statistics Denmark and Statistics Sweden. 
Danish proportions are based on precise data kept on individuals aged 18-34 who are both immigrants and children 
of two immigrant parents with background in Turkey and the Arab countries. But Swedish proportions are partially 
estimated using precise Swedish data on immigrants aged 18-34, and an estimate using the Swedish immigrant 
population of all ages from those countries of origin, minus recent immigrants and using total immigrant population-
to-descendants calculation based on the Danish figures for similar groups--since Statistics Sweden keeps no major 
statistical categories of descendants.
46. Sample-to name index matching was conducted using the 'reclink' command (Blasnik 2010) using Stata 
(version 12.1) (StataCorp 2011).
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numbers of individuals actually screened into the sample groups for likely Turkish and Arab 
background, in relation to the number expected from my original estimation. 








Denmark Arab background 792 1096 750 
Turkish background 792 835 750
Sweden Arab background 2537 2097 750
Turkish background 767 840 750
Table 8. Results of name screening. Estimated likely screening results prior to screening, actual num-
bers of individuals screened into the likely background groups, and final sample totals (randomly select-
ed from the screened groups).
As the table shows, the Arab name list screened greater numbers of individuals than the Turkish 
name list in both countries; as expected, this gap was larger in Sweden. The rough correlation be-
tween the prior estimate and actual screening results is not surprising, given the approximate na-
ture of the estimates of proportions of each young-adult population constituted by these groups 
(in Sweden especially); the nature of the name lists, which are an only approximate tool for dis-
cerning population groups; and the screening process, which requires manual screening in sup-
plement to the automatic name analysis. However, they were not very far off, and provided 
enough individuals within each sub-sample for the purpose. After deriving these groups, I 
reduced each of the minority sub-sample groups to 750 individuals each in each of the two coun-
tries using random selection. I then used random selection to reduce the remaining individuals 
(not screened into the two likely minority-background groups) from each national preliminary 
sample (42,069 in Denmark, and 56,063) to control sub-samples totaling 667 individuals each. 
These 2167 individuals from each country--667 control, 750 likely Arab background, 750 likely 
Turkish background--were then targeted for recruitment to take the main survey.
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4.1.3 Recruitment, Procedures and Response
The survey itself was administered online through a secure survey administration system, in 
Sweden during the months of June-September 2012, and in Denmark in September-December 
2012. Sampled individuals were first sent a letter with a personalized code to access the survey. 
Those who did not respond initially, and for whom telephone numbers could be found, were con-
tacted by phone and asked for an email address; those who gave email addresses were sent 1-3 
emails with a direct, personalized link to the survey. 
However, the response rate was poor. Discounting the 99 sampled individuals who cer-
tainly never received any information about the survey (whose letters were returned and for 
whom no alternate contact information could be found), 13.7 %, or 580 individuals, entered the 
online survey site. Of these, 71 (or 12.2 % of those who entered) responded 'no' to the request for
consent, and were shown directly to the survey's exit screen; 509 individuals (87.8% of those 
who entered, and 12.0 % of the possibly contacted sample) answered 'yes' and filled out at least 
part of the survey. 
Of these, 438 individuals (86% of those who consented) responded to most or all survey 
items--giving a total response rate of 10.3 % of the sample who possibly received recruitment 
materials (and 10.1 % of the original sample). 5.5 % of the overall sample completed most sur-
vey items after the initial letter; a further 4.8 % were recruited through the follow-up calls and 
emails. Of those with whom the project had confirmed contact (who either responded 'yes' or 'no'
online after the letter, or who were reached by phone/email, a total of 1412 individuals), 31% 
completed the survey. The overall response rate was somewhat higher among ethnic-majority 
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than minority individuals (13.8 and 8.8%) , and somewhat higher in Denmark than in Sweden 
(12.2 and 8.5%). Further response statistics can be seen in Appendix 1, p. 362). 
While survey response rates have been declining steadily in the United States and West-
ern Europe over the past two decades (De Leeuw and de Heer 2002), this study's response rate is 
particularly low, and lower among minority-targeting subsamples than the 'mainstream' subsam-
ples. Response rates are known to often be lower among ethnic-minority groups than among 
mainstream population samples, due, among other things, to "language barriers (among some 
groups), lack of trust, wariness of government authorities, perception that the research is unim-
portant or that their contribution is unimportant, reluctance to have their information written 
down, and a feeling that they have been over researched" (Erens 2013: 59). In addition, the 
mixed-mode method of survey data collection, including web administration--which is known to 
bring lower response rates--may also have exacerbated non-response (Atkeson et al. 2011); and 
this perhaps in combination with problems more particular to minority samples. The mixed-
mode is becoming more widely used in recent years, since it allows cost-efficient (web) data col-
lection among representative samples (Ibid.). But since it has not been much used, to my knowl-
edge, among samples with high concentrations of minority subjects, it is difficult to state the ex-
tent to which this study's response rate is comparable to other similar studies.
Concerns might be raised here about whether data from a survey study with such a low 
response rate is useful for analysis, since it may produce unrepresentative and biased estimates. 
That is, while unbiased population estimates based on survey answers assume that answers from 
the sample's non-respondents are 'missing at random' from the survey data (Rubin 1987), it is 
quite possible that their 'missingness' is actually correlated in some way with one or more key 
variables of the study. Non-response has three principle sources in survey research which may 
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also apply for this study: failure to deliver the survey request to the sampled person, refusal to 
comply with the survey request, and inability to respond to the survey (Groves et al. 2009). In 
many cases, these different sources of non-response affect different estimates produced from the 
survey data (Ibid.). I now consider the possible presence and impact of each of these for this 
study.
Failure to deliver survey request. As described above, sampled individuals were primarily
asked to take this study's main survey by letter, with telephone and email contact for those whose
further contact details could be obtained. The use of mail recruitment leaves substantial uncer-
tainty as to how many of the sampled persons actually received the survey request. On one hand, 
the addresses used are relatively reliable, as they come from the Danish and Swedish national 
registries.47 At the same time, however, some individuals do live at addresses at which they are 
not registered, and this problem may be particularly acute for this study's sample group, for two 
main reasons. First, because immigrant minorities are often more transitory in their living 
arrangements than other members of the population, and may even leave the country again with-
out informing the public registry; in 13 cases, my assistants or I learned that the sampled person 
'had left the country' either temporarily or permanently. Importantly, immigrant-background indi-
viduals who did not respond after the initial letter were also more difficult to contact by phone 
than others, since more immigrants and minorities have card-based (pre-paid) mobile phone 
numbers than those with no immigrant background. In some cases (54 in Sweden, 45 in Den-
mark), non-contact was confirmed--since the letter was returned, and no alternate address or oth-
er telephone number could be found for the person. The rate of confirmed non-contact was near-
47. Since in these registry data are used to administer a large number of state services and even private payment 
systems (the latter especially in Sweden), they are more likely to be up-to-date than the majority of registries--
private or public--in other areas of the world.
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ly identical among minority- and majority-targeting sample groups in Denmark (2.5 %), but were
more different in Sweden (2.5 vs. 1.0 %). It is likely that there were additional cases of no con-
tact, but where the letter was not returned; but the extent of this is unknown. To the extent that 
failure to get the survey request to the respondent (by mail and/or by telephone) is driven by im-
migrant minorities' having less stable living and economic situations, it could be correlated with 
variables meaningful to the study, such as socioeconomic status, participation in the labor mar-
ket, and to belonging and engagement in their communities.
Refusal to comply. It is also possible that non-response due to subject refusal is correlated
with key variables in a way that could introduce non-response bias to the study's analyses. In this
study, sampled individuals could refuse to participate in one or more of four ways: by declining 
to log on to the survey site after receiving the request by letter; by not answering a phone call 
from the investigators; by declining to give an email address when asked for one over the phone; 
and/or by declining to respond to the survey after having received one or more email requests 
(with an embedded, unique link to the survey). It is unknown how many saw the survey request 
letter and declined, but it is reasonable to assume that the majority of recruitment letters that 
were not returned reached the sampled individuals; so a substantial proportion of sampled indi-
viduals likely refused to participate in this way: simply by declining to do anything about it. For 
as many as 2828, or approximately 65 % of the sampled persons (the number whose letters were 
not returned, but who were not reached by phone), this was the only means of refusal. A further 
512 (11.8 %) declined when contacted by phone, and 334 (7.7 %) did not participate (thus de-
clining) after receiving one or more emails. 71 (1.6 %) individuals entered the survey site but re-
fused to give their consent to participate, and a further 71 (1.6 %)  individuals dropped off during
the survey, so were not considered complete responders. However, it is not possible from the data
 133
to distinguish motives for refusal of most of those persons. However, for refusals made over the 
phone, my assistants and I kept counts of those who simply refused (294, or 57 % of phone re-
fusals), vs. those who cited language problems or difficulties accessing or using the web-based 
survey format; these grounds bring us to the third main type of non-response, inability to 
respond.
Inability to respond. Since the survey itself was conducted in only Danish/Swedish and 
English (with the English responses not used in most analyses in the dissertation), it is not sur-
prising that the study's sample, which included some recent immigrants, included individuals 
who, when contacted, cited insufficient fluency in the survey languages as grounds for not being 
able to participate. Refusals on these grounds were somewhat more common in Sweden than 
Denmark (41 persons vs. 16 persons), which is consistent with expectations that there would be 
more first generation immigrants in the Swedish minority sub-samples, due to differing immigra-
tion and demographic patterns in the two countries. Such refusals are obviously a particular 
problem for studies involving immigrants, and this study has also been hampered by it. This 
presents a substantive problem for this study, since it is likely that individuals with less fluency 
in the national language is less engaged--through attitudes and practice--in the broader communi-
ty than those who are proficient. A further 31 persons (15 in Denmark, 16 in Sweden) refused to 
participate on technical grounds (e.g., lack of web access, no email address). Those who lack 
technical resources or know-how (or both), we can conjecture, may be less likely to be informed 
about news and developments in the broader society, and are certainly less well-placed to partic-
ipate in the broader community through virtual fora (which are included, for example, in some of
the measures of political participation in this study). Further, it is likely that each of these 
grounds--inability to participate due to language or technical difficulties--applies to a number of 
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additional persons in the sample groups who were not reached by phone. The extent of this is un-
known, but should still be understood to pose a potential liability to the study. 
It is impossible with the available data to discern the extent of each of these sources of 
non-response (non-contact, refusal to comply and inability to respond) for the current study, and 
thus difficult to estimate the particular directions of non-response bias. Yet how do responders 
differ from non-responders as a combined group? Though socioeconomic data is is not publicly 
available in either country48 at a scale sufficiently detailed to compare respondents from non-re-
spondents in as robust a way as we would wish, I have used the only data of this nature available 
to me--mean income levels by municipal in Sweden, and by voting districts in Denmark (some-
what more detailed), both from 2009.49 Thought these figures are three years older than my sur-
vey data, and are somewhat different from one another, they give a baseline that allows compari-
son of those who responded to the survey, with those who did not. I find that, in Denmark, there 
were no significant differences between respondents and non-respondents--as a combined sam-
ple, and when taking each of the three sub-sample groups separately. In Sweden, however, I do 
find that respondents from the 'Arab-background' sub-sample came from municipals with signifi-
cantly higher mean income levels than those of non-respondents from that group; there are no 
significant differences within either the control or 'Turkish-background' sub-sample groups. 
Thus, while I do not find differences across the entire sample, this rough response analysis using 
municipal and district-level do indicate that for that sub-sample group in Sweden, there is a rela-
48. As might be expected, the Danish and Swedish national statistics bureaus do collect and have data on many 
different metrics of income, education, etc. at detailed level that would be useful here, such as at the postcode level, 
it is only available for use in exchange for fees which were beyond the means of this project. Their data is publicly 
available at the levels of regions, and sometimes municipal areas. 
49. The Swedish data report mean income per person aged 30-64 in each municipal (administrative areas at the city 
level, these often include areas that include more than one town, especially in less populated areas), and the Danish 
data report mean household income in each voting district (sub-city level). 
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tionship between response probability and local area income. This is of course a concern for rep-
resentativeness of the data, as is the low response rate in general. However, it must be noted here 
that the Swedish index of local area income is much finer (with 1530 areas and levels represent-
ed for the Swedish sample group) than the Danish (which only encompasses 88 areas/levels). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that more difference is found in Sweden than Denmark; it leaves us
unsure as to how we should interpret the implications of this for the study as a whole. The differ-
ence makes it more difficult to claim that the data and analysis resulting from this study represent
the immigrant-minority, or indeed, majority populations in each country in general. Yet tests of 
relationship between the variable used for these comparisons--local area income--with key vari-
ables of the study are inconclusive, showing few meaningful trends. The meaning of this differ-
ence in responders and non-responders by area income for actual non-response bias is thus quite 
difficult to estimate.
However, for the purposes of this study, the most important aspect is that the respondent 
populations can be considered comparable. For this reason, it is relevant to consider potential 
concerns as to whether the higher response rate in Denmark indicates that the Swedish respon-
dent group is less like the general population of young adults than those in Denmark are, and that
the two are dissimilar in a meaningful way. Since it is quite possible that self-selection into the 
active respondent group may be correlated with one or more traits that also contribute to civic in-
tegration outcomes or to contributing factors, this is a valid concern--especially since more posi-
tive attitudes and outcomes are expected among Swedish minorities based on my hypotheses; 
thus, one may be concerned that by working with a datset whose Swedish response group is 
more limited, I may be engaging in what is rigged to be an 'easy test' of the hypotheses. 
 136
These are valid concerns, yet there are some indications that the problem is not so large 
as might first be suspected. First, t-tests comparing the groups of (self-reported) minority respon-
dents show no significant differences in self-reported income levels between minorities in the 
two countries; minority respondents in Denmark reported very slightly higher income than their 
Swedish counterparts (t = 0.15), while Swedish majority respondents reported somewhat higher 
income than Danish majority respondents based on self-reported income levels (t = 1.40), and 
significantly higher using a combined measure including standardized scales of the local income 
data from each country (t = 3.45). Second, t-tests show no significant difference in reported 
length of education (in years) between the national respondent groups, whether combined or ana-
lyzing majority and minority respondents separately, in reported length of education (in years). 
In addition, the Danish respondent group has higher levels of generalized social trust than the 
Swedish group. And importantly, neither social trust levels nor education were significantly dif-
ferent among respondents from the 'Arab-background' sub-samples in Sweden and Denmark 
(though as described above, respondents from that group in Sweden came from areas with signif-
icantly higher mean income levels than non-respondents from that group). A greater number of 
the Danish respondents also, when asked several simple cultural knowledge questions about na-
tional systems and events (about elections, the monarch and a widely-celebrated holiday), scored
higher than the Swedish group, responded correctly to two of the three questions.50 These 
50. The three 'cultural knowledge' questions were as follows:
1. How often must parliamentary elections be held in [Denmark/Sweden]  (response choices: 'At least once every 
4th year'/ 'At least once every 6th year' / The prime minister has full power to call elections when it suits him/her' / 
'Don't know')
2. What is the [Queen/King's] political power in [Denmark/Sweden]? (response choices: '[She/He] may adopt laws 
and control the military when [she/he] wishes to.'/ '[She/He]has no political power, but must sign when new laws are
passed and new governments are formed.'/ '[She/He] may control [Danish/Swedish] diplomatic relations with other 
countries.'/ 'Don't know')
3. Sweden only: What festival do most Swedes celebrate in June each year? (response choices: National Day/
Midsummer's Eve/ Walpurgis Night/ Don't know)
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comparisons suggests suggest that, despite the somewhat higher response rate in Denmark and 
the suggestion of greater response bias among the 'Arab-background' group in Sweden, the two 
groups are similar enough that they may be compared in analysis, especially since most of the 
study's analyses will take account of several basic background variables.
While the method of name analysis was intended to limit the respondents largely to eth-
nic-majority, Arab-background, and Turkish-background respondents, the resulting respondent 
group from these sub-samples was more diverse than expected. To assess respondents' actual 
group backgrounds and affiliations, the survey asked them to indicate their ethnicity and religion 
using items formatted as displayed here.
Figure 10. Items used to assess respondents' religious and ethnic affiliations, as they appeared in the 
survey.
While the Turkish name list was quite reliable in only screening individuals of Turkish or 
Kurdish origin into that sub-sample, the Arab name list was not so precise, screening individuals 
of Pakistani, Iranian, and Somali (among others) origin into the 'Arab' sub-sample. In addition, 
individuals of other origins were present in the 'control' sample. Table 9 displays those respon-
3. Denmark only: What do most Danes watch on television at 6:00 p.m. every New Year's Eve? (response choices: 
The Prime Minister's new year's speech/ The Queen's new year's speech/ A church service from the Copenhagen 
Cathedral/ Don't know)
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dents who completed most items on the survey by self-reported ethnic background and religious 
affiliation. 
Ethnicity Denmark Sweden Total
Majority 90 68 158
Arab 25 24 49
Turkish 42 10 52
Kurdish 31 18 49
Pakistani 20 5 25
Iranian 5 10 15
Afghan 8 5 13
Somali 8 2 10
Eastern European 5 4 9 Religion Denmark Sweden Total
Fmr. Yugoslavia 0 6 6 Christian 70 59 129
Other W. Euro./ N. American 6 1 7 Muslim 127 62 189
Mixed majority/other 14 8 22 Other 8 4 12
Mixed minority/ other 0 5 5 No Religion 42 54 96
Other 4 14 18 Don't know 10 1 11
Total 258 180 438 Total 257 180 437
Table 9. Survey respondents (completed most survey items), by self-reported ethnic/national back-
ground and religion in Denmark and Sweden, respectively.
Thus, while the sampling design was intended to produce two samples that would be ethnically 
quite similar in the two countries and would allow for ethnic-group level comparisons, the actual 
respondent group was far more diverse and was somewhat different between the two countries. 
In particular, there are greater numbers of Turkish and Kurdish respondents in the respondent 
group from Denmark than in the group from Sweden. In addition, a somewhat larger proportion 
of Swedish respondents reported having 'no religion.' This ethnic diversity in particular raises a 
challenge to the analysis; however, the analysis can be conducted by taking account of back-
ground data about the individuals, and by performing extra checks of findings that account for 
ethnicity and religion. 
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4.2 Experimental Follow-Up Survey
Because key hypotheses of this study suggest causal dynamics that are, it maybe argued, impos-
sible to prove using observational data, I chose to supplement the main survey with a follow-up 
survey experiment involving a group of repeat respondents from the main survey. 
4.2.1 Objectives and Design
The main purpose of the survey experiment was therefore to further examine whether inclusion 
affects identification (and perhaps participation) by analyzing whether randomly assigned condi-
tions that emphasized either inclusion or exclusion of immigrant minorities in Danish/Swedish 
had differing effects on identification levels or intended participation levels. It was also designed 
as a follow-up module to the main survey in order to make use of prior levels of the relevant per-
ceptions, identification and participation levels for each respondent--meaning that the analysis of
the survey-experimental data had the potential to be robust even with a moderate number of sub-
jects, since differences between the treatment groups could be measured in terms of each respon-
dent's difference from his or her own prior responses. The idea was, essentially, that if I could  
manipulate respondents' perceptions of inclusion through a randomized intervention, I could 
more accurately say something about inclusive or exclusive contexts--and the perceptions they 
cause--actually influencing identification and possibly even participation levels.
Since the main survey already had provided baseline information about perceived inclu-
sion, identification and participation for each respondent, and since I wished to gain information 
about the effects of both inclusion and exclusion, I designed an experiment that assigned respon-
dents to either read one of two treatment texts:
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Negative treatment (emphasized exclusion) Positive treatment (emphasized inclusion)
Despite the fact that many immigrants and their chil-
dren are now a part of [Danish/Swedish] society, there
is still a conflict about who may really belong to the 
country, and what it means to be [Danish/Swedish]. 
While society is changing, there are still many [Danes/
Swedes] who have a hard time seeing people with 
other backgrounds as ‘[Danish/Swedish]‘, and this 
affects how people treat each other in politics and in 
everyday life. This attitude is especially prevalent 
among older [Danes/Swedes], but it exists among all 
age groups.
These ideas influence not only how people think about
[Danish/Swedish] society and behave toward one 
another. They also have an effect on [Danish/Swedish]
democracy. Some politicians and parties say it is im-
portant that the [Danish/Swedish] Christian cultural 
heritage continues to be a foundation of [Danish/
Swedish]ness, and they have spoken of Islam as a 
threat to this. Among those are the [Danish People's 
Party (its leader, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, is picture 
here) / Sweden Democrats (their leader, Jimmie 
Åkesson, is pictured here)].
Despite the political debates now and then over integra-
tion of minorities, more and more people in [Denmark/
Sweden think that anyone who wants to, can be [Dan-
ish/Swedish]. Over time this is effecting how people 
treat each other in politics and in everyday life. This atti-
tude is especially prevalent among younger [Danes/
Swedes], though it is on the rise among all age groups.
This development not only influences how people think 
about [Danish/Swedish] society and behave toward one 
another. It is also having an effect on [Danish/Swedish] 
democracy. The number of elected representatives with 
minority background in Parliament and in local city 
councils continues to grow--[Nadeem Farooq, MP (R, 
pictured) / Amir Adan, MP (M, pictured)] is one of these. 
They represent the changing society, and they have a 
role in forming [Denmark's/Sweden’s] future.
Table 10. Survey experiment: negative and positive treatment texts.
For each respondent, the follow-up survey began with one of these texts, accompanied by a pho-
to of the politician mentioned towards the end of each. They then answered two questions about 
the extent to which each of the two aspects of inclusion or exclusion they had just read about--re-
garding how Danes/Swedes think about immigrants in the society, and the political environment-
-were things they had heard about often in the past. These questions were designed to assess this 
information, but were also intended to bring respondents to think more extensively about the 
treatment text. They were then asked a number of questions repeated from the main survey, to re-
assess the extent of change in their perceptions and attitudes along those variables since the main
survey. Towards the end of the survey, they were asked two questions to assess the extent to 
which they perceived and remembered the main message of the treatment text they had read.
As with any survey experiment, this design carries both strengths and weaknesses. First, 
the overall design is strong in that it take advantage of prior attitudes for each individual respon-
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dent to enable robust estimation of any effects. Second, the experimental design is strengthened 
by using treatment texts that emphasize inclusion or exclusion of immigrant minorities in both 
social and political spheres, since the use of both spheres and such opposing perspectives is more
likely to indicate whether they produce different effects (in terms of identification and intended 
participation) than a treatment/control contrast would do. Third, these treatment texts do not en-
gage in deception of respondents, but use accurate descriptions to emphasize positive or negative
aspects of the situation involving immigrant minorities in the two countries. Fourth, the design 
allows nearly identical texts to be shown to respondents in Denmark and Sweden. And fifth, in 
emphasizing either anti-immigration parties or minority politicians in each country, the treat-
ments were accompanied by very similar photos (for full contents of the follow-up survey treat-
ment texts and questionnaire elements unique to that survey, see Appendix 4 on p. 377). 
However, the design may be argued to be weakened by the very fact that the treatment 
texts emphasized both social and political aspects of inclusion or exclusion--while re-assessment 
of respondent perceptions of inclusion in both spheres should help clarify effects related to each 
sphere, the treatment of both types of inclusion could be said to 'muddy the waters' by leaving 
doubt about which aspect of inclusion/exclusion influences any observed attitude changes from 
the main survey. In addition, the ways that the positive and negative treatment texts discuss the 
political environment could be said to be different in nature, rather than negative/positive sides of
the same issue--since the negative text mentions an anti-immigrant party and its discussion of Is-
lam in the public sphere, while the positive text mentions minority incorporation and representa-
tion in each country's political sphere. Finally, the overall design might be said to be weak in re-
lation to the kinds of perceptions the treatments are intended to manipulate: briefly reading one 
treatment texts with an accompanying picture, it might be said, is likely to have little impact on 
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the kinds of perceptions and attitudes that individuals normally form over years of repeated inter-
actions in a society. If few effects are found, this may be one explanation as to why.
4.2.2 Recruitment, Procedures and Response
Respondents were recruited for the follow-up survey in the final screens of the main survey, be-
ing asked whether or not we might contact them to take a brief follow-up questionnaire. Those 
who answered 'yes' were requested to enter their email addresses for use in follow-up recruit-
ment. 87 main-survey respondents from Sweden answered that they were willing to be contacted 
for the recruited follow-up survey, or 48.3 % of those who completed the main survey. 124 indi-
viduals, or 48.1 % of those who completed, did so in Denmark. The rate was similar for those 
with majority and minority background. Those who volunteered to be contacted for the follow-
up survey were not significantly different than others who completed the main survey with re-
gard to country, age, gender, or time in country, nor in terms of variables relevant to the main 
analysis, such as national identification, political trust or electoral participation. However, main 
survey respondents with longer educations were more likely to volunteer for the follow-up sur-
vey; this was especially true among respondents with immigrant-minority background. Those 
with greater political action engagement (one of the measures for political participation used in 
the main study, see section 4.5 below) were also significantly more likely to volunteer to be con-
tacted for the follow-up survey than main survey respondents with lower levels of engagement. 
While the survey experiment was designed to study the impact of inclusion or exclusion-
emphasizing messages among immigrant minorities, I chose to include the ethnic-majority re-
spondent volunteers in the target follow-up group as well. I did so because the extent of change 
in their perceptions and attitudes would provide a sort of 'control' group--not being expected to 
be as greatly affected by the treatments--to which that of minorities could be compared; and fur-
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ther, they could be included at no additional cost, due to the methods of recruitment and 
administration. 
With the group of volunteers compiled for follow-up survey recruitment, I then assigned 
each individual to either the positive or negative treatment condition. To ensure that roughly 
equal numbers of the different minority and majority groups in the sample were assigned to each 
treatment condition, I randomized selected half of those from each original sub-sample group 
into each condition. This procedure produced the following assignment of treatment conditions 










Denmark negative 17 15 28 60
positive 18 16 29 63
Sweden positive 12 10 19 41
negative 13 11 19 43
Total 60 52 95 207
Table 11. Survey experiment: assignment of treatment conditions across original sub-sample groups.
These individuals were then sent recruitment emails including a uniquely identified link to the 
online survey. Those who did not respond initially were sent second, and then final-reminder 
emails encouraging them to participate. 
Of the 207 individuals contacted for the follow-up survey, 129 responded, giving a re-
sponse rate of 62 % for the follow-up survey. The response rate was highest, at 67 %, among the 
original control group; among the 'Arab-background' sub-sample, it was 58 %; and among the 
'Turkish-background' sub-sample, it was 55 %. Among those with ethnic-majority background, 
there were not significant differences in terms of gender, age, education or even income of local 
area between those who responded and those who did not. However, among those with im-
migrant-minority background, women were significantly more likely to respond than men were; 
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and having a longer education or a higher level of social trust made minorities significantly more
likely to respond as well (these analyses use data from the main survey). Among those of both 
majority and minority background, respondents did not differ significantly from non-respondents
by their previous levels of national identification, political trust, or political participation.
4.3 Follow-Up Interviews
Since the main survey data are necessarily limited by the survey format to focus on certain 
ranges of responses and variables thought to be relevant a priori, I also supplement the main 
analysis with qualitative data gathered through in-depth interviews with a small number of the 
main survey's minority respondents in each country. In addition, these interviews were intended 
to help explore the mechanisms and relationships that would be analyzed with the survey data. 
The initial goal was to conduct 15-20 interviews in each country. 
As with the follow-up survey, all respondents were asked towards the end of the main 
survey whether they were willing to be contacted for an interview. Those who answered 'yes' 
were asked to provide a first name and contact information in the form of a phone number or 
email address. Fewer answered yes to interview recruitment than for follow-up survey recruit-
ment: 138 individuals, or 32 % of all main survey respondents who completed most of the sur-
vey. The rate was 35 % among immigrant-minority respondents, the target population of the in-
terviews. Here again, minority respondents with longer educations were more likely to answer 
'yes' to being contacted for an interview than those with shorter educations. The likelihood of 
volunteering to be contacted also rose significantly with minority respondents' reported level of 
political action engagement. 
These responses produced a list of 41 minority respondents who were willing to be inter-
viewed in Denmark, and of 39 who were willing in Sweden. These individuals were then 
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grouped in first, second and third-priority groups for phases of interview recruitment--aiming to 
recruit individuals whose level of national identification varied to the widest extent possible (us-
ing their survey responses), and to achieve a group of interviewees who varied in terms of ethnic 
origin. 
These individuals were then contacted by phone or email, beginning with the first-priori-
ty groups, and moving to the other groups as needed. This recruitment, sometimes using repeated
contacts, produced interviewee groups of 10 individuals in Sweden, and 15 in Denmark. Inter-
views were conducted in person or by phone, using a prepared guide including questions and 
content prompts (see Appendix 5 on p. 381 for the full interview guide in its English version; 
Danish and Swedish versions were developed and approved prior to use as well). Interviews 
were audio-recorded and transcribed. Interview texts were then coded for content relating to dif-
ferent topics and themes that related to citizenship, social and political inclusion; to national 
identity definitions and personal identification; to associational involvement, voting participation
and other kinds of political engagement; to political interest; to subjects' own stories, with focus 
on immigration background, school experience and life goals; to political interest; and to the ex-
perience of living in the Danish or Swedish society with their particular ethnic and religious affil-
iation. A list of interviewees,' with basic background information, can be found in Appendix 6 on
p. 385. 
In addition to the main follow-up interviews with individual respondents, I also conduct-
ed some supplementary interviews with organizations thought relevant to processes of the expe-
rience and incorporation of young minorities in the Danish and Swedish societies--with youth 
party organizations, unions, ethnic organizations, Muslim organizations, and umbrella associa-
tion-organization and funding bodies. These were conducted to gather background information 
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about how associations may play a role in the mobilization of youth and young-adult minorities 
in society and politics, and how these may differ in the two countries.
4.4 Measuring Identification
Since this study examines how national approaches to incorporating immigrant minorities affects
those minorities' identification with and participation in the national communities, it is important 
to assess those outcomes with conceptual and methodological rigor. The present and following 
sections outline how this study conceives and measures identification and political participation.
“Social identity scholarship,” write Rawi Abdelal and his colleagues in their widely-
examined 2009 book Measuring Identity, “suffers from...conceptual issues and coordination 
gaps” (2009: 18). Conceptually, they, insist, the field needs to find ways to compare different 
identity types and to operationalize conceptual advances on identity in our measurement of it. In 
terms of coordination, scholars must build more “consistency and clarity in defining and measur-
ing identities” and coordinate these methods across disciplines and subfields. While the book it-
self offers studies using instruments built on widely diverging methodological approaches, there 
remains much work to be done to operationalize the concepts of multiple overlapping identities 
to the research at hand and to projects like it. This is especially the case since many foundational 
studies in the field of minority/majority identity were conducted in laboratories and, where real-
life minority and majority groups were involved, were not often addressing immigrant-back-
ground minorities, but minority and majority ethnic groups long present (usually in the United 
States). 
This project limits its focus of social identifications to each individual's possible national,
ethnic or religious social identity groupings. For each person in the study, the national communi-
ty of interest is either the Danish or the Swedish, and the ethnic and religious communities of in-
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terest are those ethnic and religious groups with which respondents themselves indicated an affil-
iation (by reporting their family's ethnic/national background(s) and their own religion). This 
study’s survey instrument was constructed using insights and instruments from previous studies, 
with an eye to adapting existing tools to a novel project and context as well as to using some ex-
isting question wordings that would allow the project’s results to be compared with already exist-
ing data. In terms of identity, this project aims primarily to assess respondents’ identification 
along national, ethnic and religious dimensions.
In addition, each of these dimensions of identification is measured on a continuous scale 
using multiple continuous items for each dimension. This may be contrasted with operationaliza-
tions of identity that view it as a yes/no question--whether someone identifies with a group or 
not--or as a choice between groups--for example choosing ethnic over national identity. Such a 
discrete-choice approach is for example used by David Laitin in his book Identity in Formation 
(1998), which investigated 'identity choice,' or whether Russian minorities in the Baltic states in 
the 1990s chose to invest in learning the national language or not (he found that they chose to 
when the benefits of doing so, in terms of material opportunities and community support, out-
weighed those of not doing so). It is also used, though allowing for dual identification, by Citrin 
and Sears (2009) in their study of how various demographic factors and naturalization affect 
whether individuals from different ethnic groups in the United States identify as Americans only, 
with their ethnicity only, or with both identities (finding that American whites think of them-
selves much less in ethnic terms than blacks and latinos do; but that Hispanic and Asian im-
migrants tend to increasingly identify as 'just American' as they acquire citizenship). However, 
Fleischman and Phalet's examination of second-generation minorities in several European cities 
(2010) perhaps comes closest to my own approach in its analysis of young minorities' identities, 
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as measured continuously on multiple dimensions (though using only one survey item per 
dimension).51 
This study thus examines dynamics of identification with in relation to three social 
groupings--national, ethnic and (where applicable) religious. For each of these dimensions, 
measures were developed and tested (as outlined in the first section of this chapter) to reflect the 
multiple components of identification. Social psychologists have identified multiple possible 
components that can be argued to constitute people's social identities.52 Using this literature as a 
guide for conceiving and measuring core aspects of social identity, the main and follow-up sur-
veys assessed identification by measuring three components of the chosen social identity dimen-
sions: centrality of the given group identity within a person's own identity, a person's feeling of 
being connected to other members of a group, as well as general affiliation or belonging to the 
group. 
National identification items were presented to all respondents, while ethnic and religious
identification items were only presented to respondents who had previously indicated an ethnic 
background or religious affiliation. The web-administered survey system allowed these questions
to be posed to each respondent in reference to their previous indications of which ethnic and reli-
gious affiliation. For example, if a respondent had previously responded that they had a Turkish 
background (see Figure 10 on p. 138), one of the ethnic identity items was phrased: "Being Turk-
51. Fleischman and Phalet's paper uses data from the multi-country TIES (The Integration of the European Second 
Generation) Project. See the book edited by Crul, Schneider and Lelie (2012) for a summary of the project's 
findings. 
52. See Leach et al. (2008) for an evaluation of frameworks for conceptualizing and measuring social 
identification.
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ish is an important part of who I am" (with response choices ranging from '1 - not at all,' to '7 - 
completely'). 
To examine whether the various identification items together represent represent identifi-
cation with these social groupings, and to determine how best to construct a conceptually sound 
index for each identity dimension, factor analyses were run on the sets of items. When the natio-
nal identification items were analyzed (with Varimax rotation)--including other items originally 
assessed as well, for example reflecting commitment to the well-being of people in society--4 
items--assessing group importance, ties and feeling a part of society, as well as the main (non-sit-
uational) Eurobarometer item were indicated to represent one factor. An index was therefore cre-
ated using these four items, which together were calculated to have a scale reliability coefficient  
(Cronbach's alpha) of α = .723.53 As an extra check, reliability coefficients were also calculated 
respectively for minority and majority respondents in each country; for all four groups, α for the 
four items included in the index was over .70. 
As mentioned, I also measured respondents' levels of identification with their ethnic and 
religious groups, where applicable. For each of these, a combination of three items assessing 
general belonging, centrality and connection was found to reliably represent respondent identifi-
cation levels. In addition, the difference between each individual's level along this index and the 
mean of all ethnic-majority respondents from the same country (Denmark or Sweden) was used 
to create yet another variable indicating each respondent's national identification level in terms of
its difference from the national-majority mean (this is similar to the procedure used for Dinesen 
and Hooghe's (2010) work on acculturation of generalized trust). 
53. While Cronbach's alpha has been criticized for not being an ideal indicator of scale reliability, it is still 
considered a useful indicator of reliability and is in fact a lower bound, or conservative, estimate of it (DeVellis 
2012).
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For the ethnic items, a reliability coefficient of α = .640  was calculated when including 
the responses of respondents who had indicated an ethnic-minority background who answered all
three items (N = 250). For the religious items, a coefficient of α =  .823 was found using the re-
sponses of Muslim respondents who answered those items (N = 194). The component items were
compiled into indices for identification which each dimension (using all non-missing responses 
from the indices for each respondent). The items forming the main identification indices, with 
original theoretical or item sources, are listed in Table 12.
dimension component item response scale source
national general 
belonging
To what extent do you personally feel 
Danish/Swedish?
To a great extent/ some-
what/ not really/ not at all
Eurobarometer
I feel I am part of Danish/Swedish 
society. 
1 (not all all) -
7 (completely)
Simon and Ruhs 
2008
centrality Living in Denmark/Sweden is an im-
portant part of who I am.
Citrin and Sears 
2009




To what extent do you personally feel 
[member of ethinc group]?
To a great extent/ some-
what/ not really/ not at all
Eurobarometer 
(adapted)
centrality Being [member of ethnic group] is an 
important part of who I am.
1 (not all all) -
7 (completely)
Citrin and Sears 
2009
connection I feel strong ties with other [co-
ethnics].




To what extent do you personally feel 
Muslim/Christian/[other religion]?
To a great extent/ some-
what/ not really/ not at all 
Eurobarometer 
(adapted)
centrality Being Muslim/Christian/[other religion] 
is an important part of who I am.
1 (not all all) -
7 (completely)
Citrin and Sears 
2009 (adapted)
connection I feel strong ties with other [co-
religionists].
Simon and Ruhs 
2008
Table 12. Measuring identification: items used to measure national, ethnic and religious identification in 
the main and follow-up surveys.
Since religious affiliation and practice play into individuals' self-conceptions and atti-
tudes not only as a social identity, but also in terms of commitment to the religion or faith itself, 
religiosity was assessed in addition to religious identification. The main survey included several 
measures of religiosity (using items commonly included in international survey research):
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item response scale source
How important is God in your life? 1 (not at all) - 
10 (very important)
World Values Survey
How important is your religion to you? adapted from World 
Values Survey
(see Norris and Ingle-
hart 2004, p. 41)
How often do you pray, outside of religious services? (6-point scale, from 'never' to 
'several times a day')
How often do you attend religious services or meetings,
excepting family events?
(8-point scale, from 'never to 
'more than once a week')
Table 13. Items used to measure religiosity in the main survey.
Scale reliability analysis of these items calculates a coefficient of α = .887, indicating that they 
are likely expressive of an underlying concept, i.e., religiosity. The items were converted to 0-1 
ranges and indexed (with averages of answered items to allow individuals with missing respons-
es on some of them to be included).
Examining religious identification and religiosity together, I find them to be highly relat-
ed, with a 0.789 correlation. If one makes the assumption that religiosity leads in some part to re-
ligious identification, bivariate OLS regression indicates that 62% of variance in religious identi-
fication is explained by religiosity (with and without controls for age, gender, years of education,
time in country, and country of residence). As might be expected, this relationship varies some-
what with ethnicity and religious affiliation. Figure 11 shows this relationship among all respon-
dents who indicated a religious affiliation and answered at least one item from each index. 
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Figure 11. The relationship of respondents' level of religious identification (with their declared religious 
group) to their level of religiosity, with a fitted line displaying the relationship.
In addition to the general items assessing national and ethnic identification, items were 
also added referring to more concrete contexts, in response to suggestions made during the pilot 
phase. Ethnic-minority respondents (those who had indicated an ethnic-minority background pre-
viously in the survey) were also asked in the main survey about the extent to which they identi-
fied as Danish/Swedish and part of their ethnic group (using a specific group reference) in sever-
al concrete situations (see Figure 12).
Figure 12. Measuring identification: situation-specific items used to measure national and ethnic identifi-
cation (as they would have been presented in the survey to a respondent in Denmark who had reported 
having Turkish background).
In addition to the above items measuring identification with one type of social group, the main 
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pare their levels of national and ethnic identification, and of national and religious identification 
(shown in Table 14). 






If you were to compare your feelings 
about being Danish/Swedish and be-
ing a part of your ethnic group, would
you say that you feel ...
only Danish/Swedish / 
more DK/SE than [ethnic]/ 
equally DK/SE and [ethnic]/ 










If you were to compare your feelings 
about being Danish/Swedish and be-
ing [Muslim/Christian/[religion]], 
would you say that you feel ...
only Danish/Swedish / 
more DK/SE than [relig.]/ 
equally DK/SE and [relig.]/ 





Table 14. Measuring identification: items used to assess respondents' comparison of their national 
identification to ethnic and religious identification.
It is important to note that these two survey items do not assume that national and minority 
identities are negatively related, or mutually exclusive in any way; neither do they assess or as-
sume anything about the level of identification with each identity (except that it is most likely 
very low or non-existent with one identity in the case where a person responds that they 'only' 
identify with the other). On the contrary, and individual could have quite high levels of identifi-
cation with both their national and ethnic groups and respond that they feel 'equally Danish and 
Turkish,' or that one is higher than the other; they could also give the same responses while hav-
ing quite low levels of identification with both groups. However, it must be noted that some re-
spondents reported reading the questions as though they assumed the two identities to be mutual-
ly canceling in some way--perhaps because the responses, when displayed, range from an 
appearance of high to low affiliation with the national group.  
It is also interesting here to comment on how the identification levels with national and 
minority identity groups observed among the study's minority respondents relate to one another. 
Existing literature is quite ambiguous on this point. Some studies have found negative correla-
tions between ethnic-minority and national identities, highlighting social, political and psycho-
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logical barriers to unifying group identities among both minority and majority individuals--for 
example among Arab Israelis and Dutch with Turkish roots (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007; Abu-
Rayya and Abu-Rayya 2009). However, it has also been argued that these studies were conducted
during periods of heightened conflict over these identities in their particular contexts (Chrysso-
choou and Lyons 2011). Another study found that young Turkish-ethnic subjects did not see 
Turkish cultural maintenance as contradicting adaptation to Dutch identity (Verkuyten and Thijs 
2002), and yet another found both positive and negative correlations between national and ethnic
identities among different groups of young adults with Turkish and Moroccan origin in Holland 
and Belgium (Fleischmann and Phalet 2010). 
Meanwhile, this study's respondents with immigrant-minority backgrounds report, over 
average, levels of identification with their national and ethnic groups that are somewhat positive-
ly correlated in both Denmark and Sweden (with correlations of .315 and .240, respectively, 
when including immigrant-background minorities in the country for 2+ years). The correlation 
between the national and religious identification levels of Muslim respondents in the two coun-
tries was also positively, though somewhat lower than for ethnic identification (.168 in Denmark,
and .099 in Sweden, again including those in the country 2+ years).
4.5 Measuring Political Participation
In addition to national identification, the study's other outcome of interest is of course political 
participation. Measuring such participation may be said to be more straightforward than assess-
ing identification--in part because it has been done more widely, and in part because it involves 
asking respondents to report which concrete political behaviors they have participated or intend 
to participate in. Yet it still requires some precision and intentionality in defining what types of 
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political action are to be included in 'participation,' and in measuring and compiling respondent 
involvement in those spheres. This section outlines how this was done for the present study.
For the purpose of this study, I define 'political participation' to include voting (reported 
and intended) and involvement in certain other forms of political action. The first type of partici-
pation--through voting--was measured through a items concerning hypothetical voting, eligibili-
ty, and actual voting in recent elections.
item posed.. concept measured item response choices
to all intention to vote 
(in hypothetical election)
If there was a parliamentary 
election tomorrow and you had
voting rights, would you vote?
Yes, I would vote/
No, I would not vote/
Don't know
to all voting eligibility Are you eligible to vote in [Den-
mark/Sweden?
Yes, in both local and national 
elections/
Yes, in local elections only/
No, neither eligible for local or national 
elections




Did you vote in the last parlia-
mentary election?
Yes/ No




Did you vote in the last local 
election?
if not eligible grounds for eligibility 
status
Why are you not eligible to 
vote?
Not a permanent resident or a citizen/
Not a citizen/
Don't know
Table 15. Measuring participation: items used to assess voting, voting eligibility and intention to vote.
The first item in the list, about intending to vote in a hypothetical election, was posed to all re-
spondents. The further items asking about actual voting were posed only to respondents who in-
dicated they were eligible to vote in national and/or local elections (non-citizen residents of Den-
mark and Sweden who have been in the country for 3 or more years are eligible to vote in 
municipal and regional elections). 
The survey also asked respondents whether or not they had, during the previous year, en-
gaged in a number of different forms of action in order "to achieve improvements or hinder 
things getting worse in the [Danish/Swedish] society." These included action with money 
through donation or boycott; writing to newspapers or in [online] discussion forums; signing pe-
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titions; contacting political decision-makers; volunteering by collecting money for a cause or 
working with a party; and engaging in activities that involve physical presence, such as meetings 
or demonstrations. To put these various reported forms action into measures of that would facili-
tate comparison by type and with an overall measure, I combined them into four types. These 
represent action through money, written action, contacting decision-makers, and more intensive 
activities requiring coordination or physical presence. The 15 forms of political action assessed, 
with their composite types, are displayed in Table 16.
Type Action 
Money




Donated money to group or cause
Write
𝛼(all) =   .58
𝛼(min) = .61
Signed petition
Written to newspaper or newssite
Written online post
Contacted media about concerns
Contact
𝛼(all) =   .61
𝛼(min) = .59
Contacted MP




𝛼(all) =   .47
𝛼(min) = .43




Table 16. Political action items, as grouped into types (with scale reliability coefficients for all respon-
dents and minority respondents, respectively). Response options for all items were yes/no. 
Observed levels of electoral and political-action engagement are compared and analyzed in 
Chapter 7.
4.6 Structure of Analysis
Chiefly, the dissertation investigates the hypothesized links between inclusion, identification and 
participation as parts of a supposed 'causal' chain, examining the relationships of each factor to 
the others around it in the model using quite simple analysis techniques--first investigating dif-
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ferences between the countries, then investigating the inclusion dimensions' effects on identifica-
tion as related to other factors, then investigating their effects on political participation, with ex-
tra attention given to the role played by participation-facilitating attitudes in the 'process.'
This approach carries (and shares with the study's overall causal model of expected relations) 
some problems of possible endogenous effects. How can we show, using the data, that some of 
these 'causal arrows' do not flow in the other direction? Empirically, for instance, there is little 
difference in the evidence of one-time survey data to indicate that heightened inclusion produces 
or shapes heightened national identification, rather than the reverse. 
The follow-up survey experiment was intended to help address this challenge. In con-
ducting the analysis, however, I find that its treatments have no main effects on minorities' natio-
nal identification levels--most likely because the treatments presented were too brief and superfi-
cial to influence an attitude usually formed over long period of time, through many and repeated 
experiences and interactions in society. At the same time, it is a possibility that the experiment 
showed no main effects not because of a weak treatment or other possible design flaws--but 
rather due to an actual lack of causal effect 'flowing' from inclusion to identification. Yet even 
without the experimental data shedding light on the study's main investigations, it may also be 
used to investigate some aspects of the mechanisms and moderators influencing how minorities 
form perceptions of inclusion levels in society.
Weaknesses of the experimental results notwithstanding, the main survey--together with 
insights from the follow-up interviews, and some supplementary results from the experiment--
still provide a rich base of observational data with which the study's main questions can be inves-
tigated. This is accomplished foremost through quantitative analysis of the main survey data--
through significance testing of means differences and regression analysis to investigate each 
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'step' of relationships hypothesized lead from national integration approaches to civic integration 
outcomes: 
• from the national contexts to perceived inclusion (investigated in Chapter 5); 
• from perceived inclusion (and other factors) to national identification (Chapter 6); and 
• from inclusion, identification and other factors to political participation (Chapter 7). 
Several phases of these investigations are supplemented with findings from the follow-up inter-
views. Mixed-method studies present significant challenges--among them that the standards for 
inference expected from one method used, such as the analysis of the survey data here, will not 
be attainable using another method. Still, it is crucial to use interviews to 'put flesh on' the skele-
ton of the study's survey--using them to highlight points of interpretation or give insights about 
otherwise conflicting or confusing results, as well as to assist the study's data in expressing a re-
ality of immigrant-minority human experience that reflects what young adults with such back-




Findings: Perceived Inclusion in Denmark and Sweden
Feelings of inclusion and exclusion in a society are never simple, especially for young people 
who have lived there all or much of their lives, and will most likely stay there--but whose family 
background, language and religion persistently mark them as different. They receive many, many
signals throughout their lives and on a daily basis that concern their status and belonging in soci-
ety. These signals of inclusion are expected to influence their national identification and their po-
litical participation, via minorities' own perceptions. Since it is expected, based on previous stud-
ies, that such signals differ in Denmark and Sweden, what perceptions do respondents in the two 
countries actually report having, and what kinds of experiences are forming those perceptions?  
This chapter gives an overview of the data collected on such perceptions among the 
study's young adult immigrant-minority and ethnic-majority respondents in both countries, 
comparing them between groups in each country, and between similar groups in the two coun-
tries.54 It examines perceptions relating to the three inclusion dimensions identified in Chapter 2-
-legal, political and social--in terms of respondents' perceptions of their own level of personal in-
clusion along each of those types, and of inclusion of relevant groups in society (ethnic minori-
ties in general, co-ethnics and Muslims). While these data may not be fully representative of mi-
54. All analyses reported in this chapter use data from respondents who have been in the countries for two or more 
years, in order to exclude respondents who may only be in the country temporarily, and to ensure greater 
demographic similarity between respondents in the two countries, given than Sweden has more recent immigration. 
Where education is used as a variable only those with more than 5 years of basic education are included, to exclude 
those few respondents with very short educations from having an inordinately large impact on results.
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norities in Denmark and Sweden in general, they help us compare minority perceptions in the 
two countries. Along the way, it uses insights from the study's interviews to highlight the sorts of 
experiences that shape those perceptions, and what they might indicate about the current state of 
inclusion in the Danish and Swedish societies. 
5.1 Legal Inclusion: Access to Citizenship
Expectations that citizenship policy influences minority civic integration rest, in part, on the as-
sumption that different policies translate to immigrant minorities' actually having diverging per-
ceptions of citizenship access. So, given the very different citizenship policies in the two coun-
tries, do young adult respondents in the two countries differ in their perceptions of whether 
citizenship is accessible for themselves, and for certain minority groups? The answer is 'yes,' 
though not to the extent that the policies would lead us to expect. Survey and interview responses
together suggest that this smaller-than-expected gap is due primarily to low levels of knowledge 
about what citizenship policies actually are.
5.1.1 Personal Access to Citizenship
As expected based on citizenship policies and general naturalization rates in the two countries, 
more ethnic-minority respondents in Sweden report having citizenship in the country than their 
Danish counterparts do, as may be seen in Table 17 below. While 63.5 % of the young Danish re-
spondents with self-reported minority ethnicity have citizenship (single or dual), 72.8 % of the 
Swedish do, and many of these Swedish citizens have double citizenship (allowed in Sweden but
only available in Denmark to those who qualify for both citizenships at birth, for example those 
whose parents have different citizenships).  
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country Denmark Sweden
non-citizens 36.5 % 27.2 %
double citizens   5.4 % 28.1 %
DK/SE citizens only 58.1 % 44.7 %
N 148 103
Table 17. Citizenship of ethnic-minority respondents.
Among non-citizens, the presence of stricter citizenship policies in Denmark seems to affect re-
spondents' ideas about whether they can able to get citizenship now or in the future, when com-
pared with non-citizens in Sweden. Data constructed from two questions asking non-citizens 
whether or not they believe that they will be able to get Danish/Swedish citizenship now and the 
future (both including 'don't know' response options) indicate a significant difference (p = .003) 
between non-citizens in the two countries, even when controlling for age, gender, years of educa-
tion and time in country.55 However, the small number of non-citizens in the respondent group 
means that these data may not be indicative of ideas among young non-citizens in the two coun-
tries more generally.  As Figure 13 (left box) shows, non-citizen immigrant minorities in Sweden
perceive citizenship to be more accessible to them than their counterparts in Denmark do, with 
the greatest difference between non-citizens who have lived fewer years in the two countries. 
The right-hand box shows data for the same indicator among both citizens and non-citizens of 
immigrant background in the two countries; these converge among those who have been in the 
countries longer, due chiefly to the fact that among those in the country for a longer period, those
55. For analysis purposes, I combine the two types of data--whether individuals have citizenship or not, and 
whether non-citizens believe they can get citizenship now or in future, if they wish to. This approach, which equates 
non-citizens who believe they could get citizenship now (if they wanted it) with actual citizens, avoids the self-
selection problem raised by analyzing the effects of citizenship itself. I create a combined indicator for personal 
citizenship access, ranging 0-1. For this indicator, those who already have citizenship or believe they could get it 
now are coded 1, non-citizens who do not think it possible now but who do think it possible in the future are coded 
0.5, and those who answered 'don't know' or do not think it possible in the future are coded 0.
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with citizenship greatly outnumber those without (among this respondent group, for example, 88 
% of immigrant-minority respondents who had been in the countries for 10 or more years were 
citizens).  
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Figure 13. Perceptions of personal access to citizenship among non-citizen (right box) and all (left box) 
immigrant minority respondents in the two countries. Perception measure constructed from questions 
about citizenship status and perceptions of availability. Fitted values (linear prediction), controlling for 
age, gender and years of education, robust std. errors, using OLS regression. 
Using this measure, perceptions of citizenship access are significantly higher among immigrant 
minorities (both citizens and non-citizens)in Sweden than among those in Denmark (p = .001, 
controlling for time in country, age, gender and years of education). Thus I find confirmation for 
Hc1 (see p. 46)--that immigrant minorities in a state with more liberal citizenship policies (here 
Sweden), other things being equal, perceive citizenship to be more available to themselves than 
those living in a state with more restricted access (here Denmark).
There was little variation among the study's follow-up interview subjects in terms of their
potential access to citizenship; none of them expressed doubt that they would be able to get it 
once the formal residence requirement was completed, if they wished to. However, several Dan-
ish respondents expressed uncertainty as to whether they, or people they know, even wished to 
try for citizenship, because of the required citizenship test's difficulty and perceived irrelevance 
to everyday life in society, and to its being required even for those who had grown up in the 
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country. A 21 year-old woman of Kurdish background who came to Denmark as a young child, 
but does not yet have Danish citizenship, expressed it in the following way:
It's this whole thing with, that you have to take a Danish citizenship test where you have to 
prove how Danish you are, and it must be measured and weighed. And I think that's a lit-
tle--I don't know--I've gone to nursery school, and up to university [here]. I don't think I 
need to really prove how Danish I am, by taking a test for it. It has maybe also been a case 
of principle. But now I've promised my mother to take the test, while I have exams going 
on in my studies.... so it's really for practical considerations that I haven't done it yet. (DK 
Interview 5, February 2013)
Another young woman of Kurdish origin, age 26, who was born in Denmark but first became a 
citizen as a young adult after taking the test, was not satisfied that she had been required to do it, 
and told about friends who felt they could pass, but did not want to take it:
Very, very many choose not to apply. I know a whole lot of my acquaintances, who don't 
feel like applying. Because they feel that the citizenship test is a personal attack. They feel 
that--one of them, she says, 'Really- I was born in Denmark and go to university! They 
want me to take some far-out test, that asks for line and verse of, I don't know, Hans 
Christian Andersen's poems or something that not even an ordinary Danish citizen would 
know.' ... Many have said that they have taken those sample tests that are around, and 
they can do them--they just don't want to take the test... And I understand them... Be-
cause it's like saying, 'you're not too good, so therefore you just have to go through an ex-
tra test, okay?' (DK Interview 8, April 2013).
These interviews thus complicate the picture somewhat, showing that citizenship access is not 
only a question of being able to fulfill requirements, but that requirements laid out in citizenship 
policy can also operate as barriers to citizenship that some who likely could fulfill them, are not 
willing to, because of what those requirements represent. 
5.1.2 Access to Citizenship for Co-Ethnics and Muslims
In addition to examining the access to citizenship that immigrant minorities perceive for them-
selves, I also assessed the extent to which they think it is available to people of their own ethnic 
and religious groups in the same society.56 Figure 14 displays immigrant minority and Muslim re-
56. In two items referring to specific groups in society, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with the 
statement: "It is possible for most ___ in Denmark/Sweden to become Danish/Swedish citizens if they wish to," 
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spondents' beliefs about whether it is possible for people of their ethnic group (left box) and 
Muslims group (right box) to get citizenship in Denmark/Sweden, in relation to respondents' 
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Figure 14. Perceived citizenship availability for co-ethnics (left) and Muslims (right) as related to respon-
dents' time in country, among ethnic minority and Muslim respondents in Denmark and Sweden (con-
trolling for ethnicity (box 1 only), age, gender and time in country). Fitted values, linear predictions, ro-
bust std. errors, using OLS regression.
As the graphs show, minority respondents' perceptions of citizenship access for their own ethnic 
groups and for Muslims are significantly higher in Sweden than in Denmark (at a level of p = 
.006 regarding co-ethnics, p = .007 regarding Muslims)--showing support for hypothesis Hc2 
(see p. 46), which proposed that minorities in states with more liberal citizenship policies (here 
represented by Sweden) perceive citizenship to be more available to their group(s) than those 
living in states with more restrictive policies (here Denmark). 
When asked whether they thought the country had 'good' rules for gaining citizenship, 
most Danish interview respondents answered negatively--saying that the rules were "too strict," 
"terrible," "ridiculous" or "unfair." Most of the Danish interviewees expressed awareness that the
using a 1-7 response scale (1= 'Totally disagree'; 2= 'Totally agree') (scaled 0-6 in the Figure 14). Respondents who 
indicated ethnic minority background were asked about their self-reported ethnic group, majority respondents were 
asked about 'ethnic minorities in Denmark/Sweden;' all respondents were  asked about Muslims. 
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Danish citizenship rules raise barriers to naturalization for many others with immigrant back-
ground--by requiring children of immigrants born in the country or resident since childhood to 
fulfill certain work and self-support requirements, as well as to pass the test; and by applying 
needlessly strict language or knowledge requirements to immigrants who contribute to society 
but did not have the capacity to fulfill them. A 22 year-old woman, a Danish citizen of Somali 
background who came to the country as a child, mentioned the barriers to the 1.5 and second 
generation:
I have good friends who have grown up here and gone to school here all the way through, 
but because their parents haven't had citizenship, then they suddenly need to have a per-
manent job for a year or something - so I think it's a shame - because they have been here,
they have gone to school, they have gone to kindergarten here. They don't know anything 
else but this, so the fact that someone is saying that they should be treated like someone 
who has just arrived to the country--I think it is just so lousy.  (DK Interview 11, May 2013)
Another young woman, 26, saw these rules, as far as they regard the second generation, as funda-
mentally unfair:
I think these rules that are there now are discriminatory. On this point at least: it may be 
that one's parents don't have citizenship. But if you are born and raised in Denmark, and 
have been through the Danish school system, then I think it is far out that just because 
there's someone whose parents are Danish, they can get it automatically. But this person 
can't get it. (DK Interview 8, April 2013)
And a young man of 22, himself arrived as a very small child with his parents from Iraq and Syr-
ia, echoed this sense of inequality for the second generation:
There are people who were born and raised here, who have lived here their whole lives, 
gone to school, etc.--who are just as Danish as a non-Dane can be, and who--on a techni-
cality--don't have the right to get citizenship. I think that's very strange. While there are 
other people who, I think, need a Danish passport much less, but can get it. There's really 
no balance in it. (DK Interview 4, February 2013)
These ideas were repeated during the Danish interviews, with this idea--that many from the sec-
ond generation must confront barriers to getting a citizenship that should be theirs by right, was 
repeated by several respondents in strong terms.
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Also expressed was the idea that the Danish rules are so strict that they keep immigrants 
who work and pay taxes in Danish society, but who are for some reason incapable of fulfilling 
the specific language or knowledge requirements. A 23 year-old man of Turkish background, 
himself born in Denmark, put this in personal terms by telling about his father's inability to get 
citizenship:
He has not exploited the public system. And someone like him can get rejected, because 
doesn't have the language for it, he doesn't have the abilities for it. So my father, he has a 
Turkish passport, unlike all the rest of us--we have Danish passports. So it's like he's shut 
off from our family, you can say, on that point. So he can't pass it. When he goes to take it 
-- he can't, he doesn't have the competencies for it. 
(Interviewer: 'Has he tried to take the exam?') 
No, because we know it beforehand. He has schooling through the Turkish public school's
fifth grade, no more. And then he's worked the rest of his life, you might say. It is only first 
now, when his body can't handle any more, that we have applied for public assistance [for 
him]. So despite his hard struggle, someone like him is not approved. So that is, I think, 
unfair to him. (DK Interview 10, May 2013)
For this young man, it is the injustice of too-strict requirements being applied to his father, who 
has contributed to Danish welfare and society, that exemplify the current citizenship rules. Men-
tions by other interviewees about the "absurdity" of the content of the citizenship exam--in that it
tests on things that are not relevant for functioning in Danish society today, also contribute to this
idea of needlessly high restrictions affecting many immigrant-background individuals who for 
some reason are not able to fulfill them.
By contrast, most Swedish interviewees thought that the Swedish rules were good, and 
none expressed the idea that the rules provided significant barriers to naturalization for any sub-
stantial groups of minorities. Only one expressed dissatisfaction with the Swedish rules--he felt 
that it was unfair that immigrants like himself who came to Sweden to study or work (and "who 
pay taxes and contribute") must wait longer to get citizenship than those who came to be with a 
Swedish partner or spouse (SE Interview 9, December 2012). 
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Despite these objections to certain restrictions, several respondents in both countries 
mentioned that they feel it is allowable, even good, that a country has some rules to limit access 
to citizenship for immigrants (as opposed to the second generation); they simply stressed that 
these rules should be fair and relevant to life in society. Interestingly, the interviews also indicat-
ed that--despite some people expressing fairly strong opinions about the rules when directly 
asked about them--these rules take up little of their attention; only one interview subject men-
tioned citizenship rules spontaneously, despite talking extensively with all about their experi-
ences and ideas concerning immigrant minorities' position and status in their country. In addition,
while minority interviewees in Denmark differed from those in Sweden in their general ideas and
feelings about their country's rules, many mentioned that they did not know very much about the 
rules, and some had incorrect understandings of the rules. Finally, these interviews reveal that 
much of the knowledge and opinions that many immigrant-background minorities have about cit-
izenship policy are based on personal experiences and on the experiences of people they know. 
This may help to explain why the Swedish interviewees had much less to say about it; in a natio-
nal system where citizenship application is simple, and the right to acquire citizenship is more or 
less gotten automatically after a fixed residence period, the experience of dealing with the exist-
ing policies is a minimal one, and problematic for very few. 
And indeed, the survey data bear this lack of knowledge about citizenship rules out. To 
check whether respondents' ideas about citizenship availability were based on their perceived and
actual knowledge of citizenship rules, both minority and majority respondents were also asked 
three knowledge-related questions. To gauge perceived knowledge of the rules, respondents were
first asked to indicate how well they understood the Danish/Swedish citizenship rules.57 To assess
57. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following statement: "I have a 
reasonable understanding of the Danish/Swedish citizenship rules" (responses ranged from '1-Disagree totally' to '7-
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actual respondent knowledge of the rules at the time, they were asked (on a later 'page' of the sur-
vey, so as not to influence their answers to the perceived knowledge question) two questions 
about 1) the time in residence required for most immigrants to acquire citizenship58 and 2) how a 
non-citizen born in Denmark/Sweden may become a citizen.59 
How informed are young adults of minority and majority backgrounds about citizenship 
rules in the two countries? On the one hand, there are reasons to expect better awareness of actu-
al rules in Denmark, since citizenship rules have been a much more discussed political issue in 
Denmark than in Sweden over recent years, with the rules being changed several times in the 
first country but not in the latter during the 2000s. On the other hand, the frequent rule changes 
and relative complexity of the Danish laws have made it less likely that ordinary residents will 
understand the rules.
country group '3 years' '5 years' '9 years' 'don't know' N mean years 
required (se)
Denmark ethnic minorities 9.6% 33.3% 34.0% 23.1% 156 6.5 (.21)
majority 8.8% 28.6% 15.4% 47.3% 91 5.8 (.31)
Sweden ethnic minorities 18.6% 59.8% 2.0% 19.6% 102 4.6 (.12)
majority 17.4% 24.6% -- 58.0% 69 4.2 (.19)
Table 18. Knowledge of citizenship rules - required length of residence in country, among ethnic-minori-
ty and majority respondents (cells highlighted in gray are correct responses, response choices range 
from smaller to greater requirements, left to right). On right, mean beliefs of years' residence required for 
each displayed respondent group.
Agree totally').
58.  On the required residence period, respondents were asked: "How many years, according to Danish/Swedish 
law, does an adult foreign citizen need to have lived in this country before he/she may apply for citizenship?" 
Response choices were: 3 years/ 5 years/ 9 years/ 'Don't know' (5 years is the correct response in Sweden, 9 years in 
Denmark).
59.  On the rights of immigrants' children born in country, respondents were asked: "What must a child born in 
Denmark do to acquire Danish citizenship, if his or her parents do not have it?" Response choices were: 'Nothing- 
being born in the country gives it automatically'/ 'Fill out a declaration of birth and residence in the country'/ Fulfill 
normal citizenship requirements him/herself (if over 18 years old), or get it together with parents who fulfill the 
requirements'/ 'Don't know' ('Fill out a declaration' is the correct response in Sweden, 'Fulfill normal requirements' in
Denmark).
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'don't know' N mean difficulty
(se)
Denmark ethnic minorities 23.7% 9.0% 44.2% 23.1% 156 1.27 (.08)
majority 25.6% 18.9% 17.8% 37.8% 90 0.88 (.11)
Sweden ethnic minorities 32.0% 13.6% 23.3% 31.1% 103 0.87 (.11)
majority 27.5% 7.2% 10.1% 55.1% 69 0.61 (.15)
Table 19. Knowledge of citizenship rules - requirement for non-citizens born in country, among ethnic-
minority and majority respondents (cells highlighted in gray are correct responses, response choices 
range from smaller to greater requirements, left to right). On right, mean estimates of requirement's diffi-
culty (with available responses valued 0-2) for each displayed respondent group.
Analysis shows that the relationship between years of education and actual knowledge of citizen-
ship rules is nearly the same in both countries, but that knowledge rules is higher in Sweden than
in Denmark among at all education levels. This difference between Denmark and Sweden is like-
ly due to the Danish citizenship rules' being much more complex (see Table 4 on p. 93), and to 
their having been changed multiple times over the past 10 years, while the Swedish rules have 
not been changed significantly in the same period. Yet surprisingly, when respondents were 
asked to gauge how well they understand the current citizenship rules, the difference between 
minority respondents in the two countries, while nearly significant, was very small, with the 
country difference explaining only 1.9 % of variance on that item (when controlling for age, gen-
der, years of education and time in country). When information from the two items is combined, 
we see that 32.3 % of immigrant-minority respondents (in the country 2+ years) answered nei-
ther of the questions correctly in Sweden, while 40.6 % answered neither correctly in Denmark. 
This difference is insignificant and not as large as one would expect, considering that the existing
citizenship rules in Denmark are much more complex than the Swedish rules. 
The relationship between respondents' actual knowledge of citizenship rules and their be-
liefs that they understood them was positive but slight--with the composite measure of actual rule
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knowledge accounting for only roughly 1% of the variance in perceived knowledge levels among
both majority and minority respondents (a non-significant relationship) when knowledge was 
measured 0-2, corresponding to the number of questions answered correctly. This was slightly 
improved with the dichotomous measure (0 for two incorrect/'don't know' answers, 1 for at least 
one correct answer)--this measure was significantly related to perceived knowledge, but only ac-
counted for approx. 2 % of the variance. 
To understand how actual policy translates into minorities' perceptions of citizenship 
availability for minority groups, we must examine the extent to which knowledge of existing 
rules is related to those perceptions. It turns out that it has an important role in explaining diver-
gence between minority perceptions in Denmark and Sweden widens as citizenship-policy 
knowledge increases. While there was no significant difference in perceptions of group citizen-
ship access (for co-ethnics or Muslims, respectively) among ethnic-minority or Muslim respon-
dents who answered incorrectly or 'don't know' to both knowledge questions, Swedish respon-
dents from those groups who answered at least one of the questions correctly had significantly 
higher perceptions of citizenship availability than Danish members of the same groups who an-
swered correctly (see Figure 15).
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Figure 15. Respondent knowledge of citizenship rules and perceived citizenship availability for co-eth-
nics (box 1) and Muslims (box 2), among ethnic-minority and Muslim respondents in Denmark and Swe-
den in the country more than 2 years (controlling for age, gender, years of education, time in country and
ethnicity (for co-ethnics question only)). Fitted values using OLS regression with robust std. errors, re-
sponses on citizenship availability scaled 0-6.
It is important to observe as well that the chief part of the difference in perceptions between 
those who know something and those who do not know much about the rules occurs on the 
Swedish side: that is, policy knowledge levels bring very little difference in the group-related 
perceptions of ethnic minorities and Muslims, respectively, in Denmark, but those with more 
knowledge in Sweden have noticeably more positive perceptions than those with little knowl-
edge. Incidentally, a similar divergence in perceptions of citizenship being available to ethnic mi-
norities and Muslims also arises between ethnic-majority respondents in the two countries, con-
ditional on knowledge of existing citizenship requirements. 
Thus I find, overall, that perceptions of citizenship availability are significantly higher in 
Sweden, where rules were generally seen to be 'good,' than in Denmark, where rules were per-
ceived as 'too strict' and 'unfair' (lending support to hypothesis Hc2, see p. 46). Yet this is chiefly 
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there is a significant number who do not know much about them. I must then conclude that 
markedly different citizenship policies do produce differing immigrant-minority perceptions of 
whether they and their minority group(s) as we would expect, but that uncertainty and lack of 
knowledge about what the policies actually are are blunting that effect.
5.2 Political Inclusion through Political Elite Attitudes
5.2.1 Politician Attitudes toward Co-Ethnics and Muslims
It is important, next, to examine perceptions of politicians attitudes toward ethnic minorities in 
general, toward co-ethnics (a separate question posed to all ethnic minorities) and toward Mus-
lims among majority and minority respondents in both countries--in this study used to represent 
perceived political inclusion of minority groups.60 Taking respondents in both countries com-
bined, minority respondents have significantly more negative perceptions of politician attitudes 
towards 'ethnic minorities' in general than ethnic-majority respondents do (p = .001). Examining 
respondents in each country separately, ethnic minorities have significantly more negative per-
ceptions of politician attitudes than majority respondents do in Denmark, but not in Sweden (see 
intergroup differences as reported in row 3, Table 20). However, minority perceptions in Sweden 
are still more negative than those of majority respondents; while the gap is smaller than in Den-
mark, that gap's insignificance may be partly due to lower respondent numbers in Sweden. Even 
greater differences are visible between Muslim and majority respondents' perceptions of politi-
cian attitudes towards Muslims, with significant Muslim/majority gaps in both countries (see in-
tergroup differences as reported in Table 20). Finally, there are significant differences between 
60. Respondents were asked, "What attitude do you think leading politicians in this country have toward: 
Immigrants/ [Co-ethnics]/ Ethnic minorities/ People with Danish background/ Muslims;" response choices were, 
'Very negative/ Somewhat negative/ Neutral/ Somewhat positive/ Very positive.' Responses for the items referring to
respondents' co-ethnics (which varied in reference to their self-reported ethnicity from the previous self-
categorization item) and Muslims are reported here.
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the perceptions minority and majority respondents in each country have of politician attitudes to-
wards their own ethnic group, with more respondents having more positive perceptions (see bot-
tom row, Table 20). This gap is somewhat larger in Denmark than in Sweden. Importantly, on all 
three measures of how minorities see politicians' attitudes towards minority groups, ethnic mi-
norities and Muslims in Denmark have significantly more negative perceptions than those in 









ethnic minorities .39  (.02) 141 - .11 ***  (p =   0.000) .50  (.02) 96
ethnic majority .50  (.02) 101 - .06  .56  (.02) 75
intergroup difference       ↕  - .11 ***  (p = 0.000) - .06   
Toward Muslims
Muslims .28  (.02) 119 - .12 ** (p = .002) .39  (.03) 61
ethnic majority .44  (.03) 101 - .09 *  (p = .023) .52  (.03) 75
intergroup difference       ↕  - .16 ***  (p = 0.000) - .13 **  (p = 0.003)
Toward Co-ethnics
ethnic minorities .41  (.02) 144 - .08 *  (p = 0.010) .49  (.02) 90
ethnic majority .75  (.02) 101 - .006 .75  (.03) 75
intergroup difference - .33 ***  (p = 0.000) - .26 *** (p = 0.000)
Table 20. Perceived politician attitudes toward ethnic minorities, co-ethnics (only ethnic minorities were 
asked) and Muslims among ethnic minority, Muslim and majority respondents in Denmark and Sweden. 
Intergroup and inter-country means and differences of means (results of t-tests). Responses are scaled 0
(very negative) to 1 (very positive).
Figures 16 and 17 below compare minority/majority perceptions of politician attitudes towards 
'ethnic minorities' in general and towards Muslims in each country as related to years of educa-
tion, while controlling for age, gender and time in country. As the table above shows, the majori-
ty/minority perception gaps are larger in Denmark, though the gap in Sweden widens when 
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Perceived politician attitudes to minorities, Denmark
Figure 16. Perceived politician attitudes towards ethnic minorities among ethnic-majority vs. minority re-
spondents in Denmark (left) and Sweden (right), as related to years of education (fitted values, controlling
for age, gender and time in country). Responses to question: "What attitude do you think leading politi-
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Figure 17. Perceived politician attitudes towards Muslims among ethnic-majority vs. Muslim respon-
dents in Denmark (left) and Sweden (right), as related to years of education (fitted values, controlling for 
age, gender and time in country). Responses to question: "What attitude do you think leading politicians 
in this country have toward ethnic minorities?", here scaled 0 (very negative) to 1 (very positive).
Figure 18 (the column of three boxes) compares the perceptions of similar groups of mi-
norities in the two countries--regarding ethnic minorities in general, toward members of their 
own ethnic group, and toward Muslims. These three analyses--which also 'control for' age, gen-
der and time in country--make clear that, in general, immigrant minorities' perceptions of politi-
cians' attitudes towards minority groups (in general and their own groups in particular) are con-
sistently lower in Denmark than in Sweden. However, this gap is smaller when respondents 
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convey their perceptions of politician attitudes 
towards people of their own ethnic group than 
those regarding Muslims or ethnic minorities in 
general. Interestingly, where these perceptions 
vary with education level, they do so negative-
ly; in other words, minorities with longer edu-
cations tend to have somewhat more negative 
perceptions than those with higher educations. 
I find minority perceptions in Denmark to be 
significantly lower than those in Sweden on all 
items (see Figure 18 and inter-country differ-
ences as reported in middle column, Table 20). 
Among majority respondents, percep-
tions of politician attitudes towards both ethnic 
minorities and Muslims were higher in Sweden 
than in Denmark, but that difference was only 
significant regarding politician attitudes to-
wards Muslims (see inter-country differences 
as reported in Table 20). 
Figure 18. Perceived politician attitudes towards ethnic minorities, co-ethnics and Muslims (boxes 1, 2 
and 3, respectively) among ethnic-minority and Muslim respondents in Denmark vs. Sweden, as related 
to years of education (fitted values, controlling age, gender, time in country and--for the coethnics ques-
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Overall, then, minorities in both countries perceived politicians' attitudes to be more neg-
ative than the national majorities do--but the gaps are greater in Denmark (where significant dif-
ferences exist regarding politician attitudes towards both ethnic minorities and Muslims) than in  
Sweden (where they only exist regarding attitudes towards Muslims). Both minority and majori-
ty respondents in Sweden perceived politician attitudes towards ethnic minorities and Muslims to
be more positive than their Danish counterparts did, with minorities in Sweden perceiving per-
ceiving attitudes as significantly more positive than minorities in Denmark on all three items--re-
garding ethnic minorities in general, co-ethnics in particular, and Muslims. Overall, this supports 
my expectation (Hc3, first presented on p. 47) that minorities in Sweden perceive more positive 
political elite attitudes towards their minority groups than their counterparts in Denmark do. Us-
ing a combined measure of politician attitudes towards one's minority groups--including the 'co-
ethnics' item for all immigrant minorities, and also including the 'Muslims' item for Muslims--I 
also see that the spread of minority perceptions on political elite attitudes is very different in the 
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Figure 19. Perceived politician attitudes towards own minority groups (index of 'coethnics' and 'Mus-
lims' items, where applicable) among ethnic-minority respondents in Denmark (left box) vs. Sweden 
(right box). Responses are here scaled 0 (very negative) to 1 (very positive).    
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As the charts indicate, while by far the most minority respondents in Sweden had neutral percep-
tions of political elite attitudes towards their groups (halfway between 'very negative' and 'very 
positive', in Denmark the modal response was within the negative part of the scale. 
What kinds of ideas inform these perceptions? When interviewed, minorities in both 
countries mentioned the populist parties most active in their country, the Danish People's Party or
the Sweden Democrats, when talking about political developments in the country. However, 
those who mentioned them in the two countries differed in the extent to which they linked the 
party to a more general trend or time in national politics or policy. Many of the references to the 
Danish People's Party referred to the general debate about immigration and integration in Danish
politics, and to the policy developments in those areas throughout the 2000s. One woman, born 
in Denmark to immigrant parents and now in her early 30s, even called the recent period (most 
likely the 2001-11 period where the DPP was support party for the center-right government) as 
the 'Pia-Kjærsgaard period" (Pia Kjærsgaard was the DPP's party leader from its inception in 
1995 until 2012). Several respondents in Denmark also spontaneously mentioned that they had 
seen more parties along the political spectrum adopt some of the DPP's positions. By contrast, 
minorities in Sweden most often mentioned the Sweden Democrats in a context of talking about 
recent developments in Sweden, but they did not draw a connection between the SD and other, 
more mainstream parties. More than one made explicit statements highlighting the SD's isola-
tion. A 29 year-old woman of Afghan origin, who had been in Sweden since the age of five, was 
one of these:
"I think the government and the other politicians are still pretty unanimous as well, quite 
alike except the Sweden Democrats" (SE Interview 3, December 2012). 
Another, 20 years old and born in Sweden to Kurdish parents, said, 
There has been this thing about-- the latest that is the Sweden Democrats' talk about im-
migrants. They have attacked a bunch of people [rhetorically, author's clarification]. And 
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that's when I'm like 'wow, they are a disturbance.' But then I also think about that the ma-
jority of the Swedes support the immigrants. (SE Interview 6, December 2012)
Thus it seems like while minorities in Sweden are certainly aware of the Sweden Democrats, 
their perception of that party's sway in Swedish politics, and concerning immigrant-related ques-
tions in particular, contrast markedly with the ideas that minorities in Denmark have about the 
Danish People's Party. The interview responses thus suggest that the more negative perceptions 
in Denmark are in part due to a larger perceived role for the populist party, an the spread of their 
ideas to a greater part of the mainstream political debate, that is seen by minorities in Sweden for
the Sweden Democrats.
In both countries, minorities told stories and expressed concern about discussion  ethnic 
minorities and Muslims, but only interviewees in Denmark mentioned negative talk about Islam 
and other ethnic groups that the majority within politics. As one 30 year-old woman, who has a 
Palestinian background and came to Denmark at age four, said: 
"It's not really hard to be a practicing Muslim and be able to function in a Danish context... 
What makes it hard to be a Muslim in Denmark is, again, the media and politicians" (DK In-
terview 3, January 2013).  
Another Muslim woman, 21 years old and in Denmark since she came with her Kurdish 
parents at the age of two, expressed frustration over an exclusionary politics that overgeneralizes 
when it comes to Muslims: 
On one hand, I'm pretty much satisfied with the Danish model, with the whole democracy, 
since I think it is uncommon to live in a society where things are structured as they are. On 
the other hand, I don't feel like the politics that are sort of, out front, represent me and my 
ideas well enough, and that a lot of things that come up into focus in Danish politics ex-
clude more than they include... Islamophobia and so forth--it went from being contained, 
to that you also have tendencies to it--to a milder degree, but tendencies--in the Social 
Democrats and maybe in a milder way also in the Socialists, and you want to say, 'Yeah, 
it's not all who are so extreme, that's not what Muslims exactly support." But on the other 
side you get frustrated that it should be necessary to point it out. That if you talk about 
Christians, then yeah, there are people who are extreme, but then you don't just take them
all as one lump category, but are actually capable of telling the difference between people.
But when it is about Islam, then it's like the population and the politicians too have a ten-
 179
dency to just look at the extremists. ... Like in the debate about headscarves, you don't 
take it into account.... Yeah, the politics here are not so good at bringing out those nu-
ances when people are Muslim. (DK Interview 5, February 2013)
Thus the interviews suggest that while a good number of Muslims in Denmark likely perceive a 
negative tone in discussion of Islam and Muslims within Danish politics, they do not suggest a 
similar dynamic within Sweden. While not offering a conclusive explanation of the more nega-
tive perceptions of political elite attitudes in Denmark, this difference together with the different 
perceived influence of the Danish People's Party from that of the Sweden Democrats help us bet-
ter understand some of the dynamics behind the survey data.
5.2.2 Politician Concern for People Like Oneself
To assess respondents' personal sense of political inclusion, the survey gauged their perceptions 
of politician concern for people 'like me.'61 Overall, ethnic-minority respondents had a signifi-
cantly lower sense of politicians' being concerned about people like them than ethnic-majority 
respondents: when the range of responses are scaled 0-1, minorities had a mean response of .47, 
while majority respondents had a mean response of .54, a significant difference. In addition, un-
certainty on this item was higher among minorities, who were nearly four times as likely to an-
swer 'don't know' to this question than majority respondents (see Table 21). 
mean (se) N % 'don't know' N
ethnic minorities .47  (.02) 223 12.5  % 32
majority Danish/Swedish .54  (.02) 169   3.4  % 6
difference -0.07 **
(p = 0.005)
9.1 % diff. total:
434
Table 21. Perceived politician concern, ethnic minority and majority group means and differences (on a 
0-1 scale).
61. Respondents were asked about politician concern in one of a series of items with the heading, "How much do 
you agree or disagree with each of the following statements." The item was phrased, "Political leaders in this 
country care about people like me," and possible responses were: 'Strongly agree/ Agree/ Neither agree nor disagree/
Disagree/ Strongly disagree/ Don't know.'
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This difference is significant even when controlling for age, gender and years of education. Per-
ceived concern rises with length of education among both groups (when controlling for age and 
gender), but the differences between minority and other respondents are similar at all education 
levels. 
However, when differences between majority and minority respondents are examined 
within each country, they are only found to be significant in Denmark (see Table 22). While 
standard errors among all groups are similar, the the inter-group range of perceptions is wider in 
Denmark than in Sweden. This is so because majority respondents have more positive percep-
tions of politician concern in Denmark than in Sweden, while minorities have more negative per-
ceptions in Denmark than in Sweden. Neither of these inter-country differences (among minori-
ties or majorities) is significant, however. It is interesting to observe, though, that uncertainty on 
this item was higher among Swedish minority respondents than any other group, with 19.6 % of 





N inter-country diff. (se)






ethnic minorities .45  (.02) 7.9 % 141 - 0.04  (not sig.) .49  (.03) 19.6 % 82
ethnic majority .55  (.02) 5.6 % 97   0.03  (not sig.) .52  (.03)  -- 74
intergroup 
difference
- .10  **











Table 22. Perceived politician concern among ethnic minority and majority respondents in Denmark and 
Sweden, respectively. Intergroup and inter-country means and differences of means (results of t-tests). 
Responses range from 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree) ('don't know' responses are not includ-
ed in calculation of means).
Digging into these differences with controlled analyses once more, we find that, overall, the rela-
tionship between education and perceived politician concern is somewhat stronger in Sweden--
though not significant--but negligible in Denmark. Further, majority/minority perceptions are not
significantly different at any level of education in Sweden, with perceptions among both groups 
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rising somewhat with education. However, perceptions of politician concern remain fairly con-
stant among minorities at all education levels in Denmark, but rise somewhat with education 
among the Danish majority--thus the majority/minority gap in Denmark increases with education
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Figure 20. Perceived politician concern among ethnic-majority vs. minority respondents in Denmark (left)
and Sweden (right), as related to years of education (fitted values, controlling for age, gender and time in
country). Agreement with the statement "Politicians in this country care about people like me," here 
scaled 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree).  
Deeper investigation into group differences reveals that there are immigrant-generational differ-
ences between minority respondents, but that these vary in the two countries. In Denmark, first-
generation immigrants (defined here as those who arrived in country at age 13 or above) have 
politician-concern perceptions similar to those of majority respondents, while 1.5 and 2nd-gener-
ation respondents' perceptions were significantly more negative. In Sweden, the two immigrant-
generation groups' levels are the reverse--among those with fewer years of education, immigrants
have much lower perceptions of politician concern than 1.5 and 2nd-generation respondents do; 
and perceptions become similar with more years of education (see Figure 21). However, the gen-
erational difference is not significant in Sweden--though this could very well be due to the small-
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Figure 21. Perceived politician concern among 1.5 & 2nd-generation vs. 1st-generation immigrants re-
spondents in Denmark (left) and Sweden (right), as related to years of education (fitted values, controlling
for age, gender and time in country). Agreement with the statement "Politicians in this country care 
about people like me," here scaled 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree).  
Comparing each generational group between the countries, Denmark's first-generation 
immigrants have higher perceptions of politician concern than Sweden's do, but the gap is not 
significant (in part due to a smaller number of respondents in that generational group). Danish 
1.5 and 2nd-generation respondents, however, have significantly lower perceptions than the same








1st generation .58  (.05) 32  .12   (not sig.) .46 (.05) 32
1.5 & 2nd generation .39  (.02) 97 - .12 **  (p =.005) .51 (.03) 47
intergroup difference     
↕  
.19  ***  (p = .001) - .05  (not sig.)
Table 23. Perceived politician concern in Denmark/Sweden among 1.5 & 2nd-generation immigrant re-
spondents vs. 1st-generation immigrant respondents. Intergroup and inter-country means and differ-
ences of means (results of t-tests). Responses are here scaled 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree).
Overall, immigrant-minority perceptions of politicians' attitudes towards 'people like 
them' are more positive in Sweden, but the differences are not so great as to demonstrate this 
clearly. The larger numbers of more recent immigrants in Sweden, and more restrictive immigra-
tion rules in Denmark (leading to a better educated population of young first-generation im-
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migrants in Denmark) likely contribute to the lack of consistency here; however, the clear gap 
showing more perceptions among 1.5 and 2nd-generation minorities in Sweden than in Den-
mark--a more comparable group between the countries--do suggest a more positive picture in 
Sweden. I conclude, then, that there is only partial support for my expectation (Hc4, first present-
ed on p. 47) that minorities in Sweden perceive more positive political elite attitudes towards 
people like them than their counterparts in Denmark do--the actual picture is mixed. 
Since few immigrant minorities are in direct contact with politicians, on what basis do 
they form their ideas of whether politicians 'care about people like them'? More specifically, to 
what extent are immigrant minorities' ideas of politician concern related to their perceptions of 
political elite attitudes towards their ethnic and religious groups, and might this differ between 
the two national contexts? I find that perceived politician concern has no significant relationship 
to group political inclusion among minorities in sweden, while the two are significantly linked 
for minorities in Denmark (see Figure 22).
 Figure 22. Perceived politician concern as related to politician attitudes toward one's ethnic and reli-
gious groups, among minority respondents in Denmark and Sweden in the country 2+ years (fitted val-
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In this analysis, the interaction between country and perceived political elite attitudes towards 
one's minority groups is significant (p = .020). Separate regressions for each country's minorities
indicate that the link is highly significant (p = .000) in Denmark, accounting for 14.6 % of the 
variance in minorities' perceived politician concern; while in Sweden it is slightly positive but 
not significant and accounts for virtually none of the variance (.01 %). 
Why would this be the case? This makes some sense when we reflect on the greater role 
of immigration, integration and minority-related questions in the Danish debate. This will be ex-
plored further, with more focus on the media, in section 5.4.
5.3 Social Inclusion
Having examined perception levels and differences relating to citizenship availability and politi-
cal inclusion, how do respondents from different groups in the two countries perceive social in-
clusion of themselves and of minority groups? The study's survey and interview data both indi-
cate this arena of interaction to be important for how young immigrant minorities view their 
place and belonging in society, so it is helpful, in this section, to examine how perceptions of so-
cial inclusion vary, between the two national contexts and between individuals in them.
5.3.1 Personal Social Inclusion and Experienced Discrimination
In the survey, personal social inclusion in society was measured in two different ways--in terms 
of respondents' perceptions of how others see and treat them in society, and in terms of whether 
they had experienced discrimination. First, the survey assessed perceptions of general social in-
clusion, with one item asking whether respondents thought others 'see them as Danish/Swedish,' 
and two items intended to measure respondents' beliefs about the extent to which they feel others
see them as equal in society.62 These questions were only put to those who had already reported 
62. Minority respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following three 
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having a background other than Danish/Swedish. Second, it included a number of items asking 
whether respondents had personally experienced discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender, 
religion, etc.,63 and it asked ethnic minorities whether they had experienced it on the basis of 
their ethnicity in several specific types of situations.64 This section outlines and compares minori-
ty levels of personal social inclusion in the two countries, beginning first with general percep-
tions of social inclusion and proceeding to experienced discrimination. 
Looking first at general perceptions of whether oneself is perceived as an equal member 
of society, I find--using a composite of the means of both the 'most see me as equal' items,65 that 
ethnic minorities in Denmark have significantly lower perceptions of social inclusion than mi-
norities in Sweden (see Table 24). Slightly more of the Swedish respondents than Danish respon-












ethnic minorities 5.2 % 147 .57 (.02) - 0.11  **   (p =  0.003) .68 (.03) 8.9 % 84
Table 24. Perceived social inclusion among ethnic minority respondents in Denmark and Sweden. Inter-
country means and differences of means (results of t-tests). Response values are here the means of the 
two 'most see me as equal' items, whose responses range from 0 (disagree totally) to 1 (agree totally). 
'Don't know' responses are not included in N or calculation of means).
statements: "Most people in this country consider me to be Danish/Swedish;" "Most people in this country consider 
me to be a member of society on equal footing with themselves; and "Most people I meet in my daily life consider 
me to be a member of society on equal footing with themselves." Response choices ranged from 1 (disagree totally) 
to 7 (agree totally), as well as 'Don't know.'
63. Respondents were asked: "In the past 12 months have you personally felt discriminated against or harassed in 
Denmark due to one or more of the following grounds? (Please check all the apply or choose 'none of these' below)."
Grounds that could be checked were: 'Ethnic or immigrant background,' gender, sexual orientation, age, religion or 
faith, disability, or 'none of these.'
64. The situation-specific question was presented as follows, with nine situations inquired about: "Now we would 
like to hear whether, during the past 5 years, you have been discriminated against in Denmark/Sweden due to your 
ethnic background ... when looking for paid work/ when in or trying to enter a cafe, restaurant, bar or nightclub/ 
when in a shop or supermarket/ by people working in (public or private) health services/ by people working in 
public employment or welfare offices/ by people working in a school, training or education institution/ when looking
for a house or apartment to rent or buy, either by people working in a public agency or by a private landlord or 
agency/ when trying to open a bank account or get a loan from a bank?" Response choices were: Yes/ No/ 'Yes, but 
on grounds other than ethnic background'/ 'Not applicable (have not been in this situation).'
65. The two 'seen as equal' items have a high reliability in representing a single concept; Cronbach's alpha = .89.
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This inter-country difference remains (at p = 0.005) when the analysis includes controls for age, 
gender and years of education (see Figure 23, where perceptions are displayed in relation to 
years of education). It also remains when either binary variables for ethnicity or group-level ran-
dom effects for ethnicity are included. 
Figure 23. Perceived social inclusion among ethnic minorities in Denmark vs. Sweden, as related to 
years of education (fitted values, controlling for age, gender and time in country). Means of 'equal' items,
whose responses range from 0 (disagree totally) to 6 (agree totally).  
An examination of the differences between respondents in the two countries reveals that, while 
there are substantial numbers of minorities in both countries who answer fairly positively on 
these items, there are many more who respond in the middle and bottom of the scale in Denmark 
than there are in Sweden. 
Turning to minorities' ideas of whether most people in Denmark or Sweden 'see them as 
Danish/Swedish,' I find that while perceptions are more positive in Sweden than in Denmark, the
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Figure 24. Perceptions of being seen as Danish/Swedish among ethnic minorities in Denmark vs. Swe-
den, as related to years of education (fitted values, controlling for age, gender and time in country). Re-
sponses range from 0 (disagree totally) to 6 (agree totally).  
The number of uncertain responders on this item was somewhat uneven in the two countries: 
while 6.5 % of Danish respondents who answered this question chose 'don't know,' 13.3 % of 
Swedish respondents did. The 1.5 and 2nd-generation group has significantly more positive per-
ceptions on this dimension than first-generation immigrants (in contrast to most other inclusion 
perceptions reported in this chapter). When individuals from the 1.5/ 2nd-generation in the two 
countries are compared to each other, those in Sweden have significantly more positive percep-
tions than those in Denmark do. However, this gap is lessened somewhat when controlled for 
age, gender and years of education--with those in Sweden still higher but the difference not quite 
significant. Interestingly, more minority women than men believe that most people think of them 
as Danish/Swedish. Even when controlled for country of residence, age, length of education and 
time in country, women had significantly more positive perceptions of this than men (p = .002). 
Further investigation of this gender gap reveals that it is non-existent among first-generation im-
migrants, but is present among 1.5 and 2nd-generation immigrants. This gender gap in perceived 
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This gender gap was not among the study's prior theoretical expectations. However, a re-
view of psychological literature reveals a debate between those who argue, essentially, that mi-
nority women are more likely to experience greater discrimination due to their double minority 
status, and others who argue that minority men are more likely to do so because they are the pro-
totypical members of their minority groups (Sidanius and Pratto 1999; for an overview of this 
debate, see Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008; Navarrete et al. 2010). Most recently, more evi-
dence seems to point towards men experiencing higher levels of bias and discrimination (Veen-
stra 2013).66 This study's finding that women feel significantly more recognized by others as part 
of the national community lends support to that perspective.
The study's interviews suggest that for many young people of immigrant background, the 
idea of being seen by others in society as being Danish or Swedish revolves heavily in both soci-
eties with being visibly (physically) different from the national majority. When asked whether 
they think that most people in the country think of them as Danish/Swedish, young adults of dif-
ferent minority backgrounds in both countries mentioned the importance of physical difference 
as a barrier to being seen as a national:
No, I don't believe they think about me as--no, they can see that I don't come from Den-
mark. Like, physically--they can see it on me. 
- Woman, 18, born in Denmark to Kurdish parents 
   (DK Interview 1, January 2013) 
I am just as much a Dane as you are, I just don't have blue eyes and blonde hair. But it's 
just that that point of view doesn't exist in most people's heads--that you are a Dane no 
matter what your skin color. Unfortunately. 
- Woman, 30, grown up in Denmark, immigrated from Turkey as a child 
  (DK Interview 3, January 2013)
66. Some scholars have, however, interpreted this as a negative for women, asserting that their lack of prototypical 
status as, for example members of their ethnic group, actually renders them 'invisible' as members of those groups 
(Sesko and Biernat 2010).
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It's this thing with the physical appearance--you see ethnic Swedes do a certain thing [re-
acting to your appearance], and you can definitely feel that you don't belong here.
- Man, 25, grown up in Sweden, immigrated from Eritrea as a young child 
  (SE Interview 2, December 2012) 
The Swedish people have like a style in how they look--they are blonde, most of them they
have blue eyes, with light skin. But I have brown hair, brown eyes and skin that is a little 
dark, so if you see me I would say a 100 % you would say I'm not Swedish even though I 
speak fluent Swedish. If you see Swedish people, you know straightaway whether they are 
Swedish or not. 
- Man, 24, Lebanese immigrant, arrived in Sweden one year before 
  (SE Interview 5, January 2013).
I wouldn't say that it's hard [being minority and Danish]. It's very hard for me to blend in, 
physically, so that's already there. But people don't see me immediately as a Dane the first
time they seem me--for example, they speak to me in English.
-Woman, 22, born in Denmark, Vietnamese background 
  (DK Interview 7, April 2013)
Some interview subjects, however, stressed that this dynamic is quite different when interacting 
with strangers than with people who already know them. For example, the 25 year-old Swede 
originally from Eritrea (who was also cited above) added that people he knows think of him as 
Swedish despite first appearances:
It depends on what you mean--if they just see me in town and don't know me, they they 
go on what they have. What we identify with the nationality or Swedish is still quite cou-
pled to appearance and when you think about a certain appearance, and then you don't 
think straight off that I'm Swedish. But people I spend time with, who I have a lot of con-
tact with ... who know me, I would say they see me as Swedish, for the most part at least. 
(SE Interview 2, December 2012) 
A 28 year-old man, born in Denmark with Pakistani roots, described the contrast between being 
seen as Danish by colleagues at work, and seen as different by strangers:
Where I really feel it is that you are respected equally on the job-market, you know? With 
all my other Danish colleagues, I feel clearly--I am just as Danish as they are. While, if I look
at what happens out on the street, then I don't feel so good--there it's as if people look a 
little crooked at me, you know? Because I look different from them. So they don't see me 
as a Dane, but more as a foreigner. (DK Interview 9, May 2013)  
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However, some pointed out that they find other characteristics can also 'make you stick out'--like 
language, accents, and even opinions. A 20 year-old woman, in Sweden since she arrived from 
Bosnia as a small child, described how a stranger (himself of Asian origin) identified her as non-
Swedish, based on the way she speaks: 
If they have never met me before, well, then I look pretty Swedish. And then there are peo-
ple who--well, it was a guy on the train [who said], 'I knew you weren't from Sweden.' 
'Why is that, then?,' I said. 'Well, you talk like a dark-skinned person [en blatte]67.' 'Okay,' I 
said, 'never heard that before.' 
(Interviewer: 'What does he mean by that?')
That I talk sort of ungrammatically, something in my pronunciation. 
  (SE Interview 1, December 2012)
A 28 year-old man, immigrated from Turkey for studies four years before, expressed the feeling 
that others in Sweden saw him as un-Swedish not only due to his appearance, but also when he 
makes gestures to strangers--even helpful ones--that are unusual:
Yeah, of course I can feel it... It's not very easy. Not only am I not looking Swedish, I am 
doing something that's not very Swedish as well. Yeah, of course - you see those eyes, 
you feel that - that you're not welcome. If I help someone, if i give them my seat -- that's 
something that is not Swedish at all, which is very dumb in my opinion -- you know in 
Turkey, you help pregnant people, you help old people, you make sure the kids get a seat. 
Here they don't even see people, I don't know, they don't give a fuck about each other. 
But then, when you try to be a nice person, then you're different again. (SE Interview 9, 
December 2012)
The interviews indicate, therefore, that minorities in both Denmark and Sweden make 
similar kinds of reports about been seen as 'other,' and at times being treated differently because 
of their difference from the ethnic majority. Discrimination and negative speech about and to-
wards minorities exists in both the Danish and the Swedish societies. Many (though not all) of 
67. The label assigned to the way she spoke was 'blatte,' which is a Swedish term that means a dark-skinned person,
but is a slang word that is seen by minorities as an insult when used about them by majority-ethnic people; at the 
same time, many young minorities use it among and about themselves. In this sense, its use could be seen as being 
similar to 'nigger' in the United States (about or among black people), 'paki' in the United Kingdom, or 'perker' in 
Denmark. It is interesting to note, however, that the Swedish word is used among immigrant-background people 
more broadly, and not only those who are visible minorities: the same interviewee, who is Bosnian and describes 
herself as not dark-skinned, used the word in her interview about her sister -- who she said "acts blatte and talks 
blatte with with her friends."
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the respondents from both countries also expressed positive relationships when dealing with peo-
ple they know, and at their place of study or work. Thus a mixed picture emerges about the envi-
ronment for minorities in both countries. It is, furthermore, difficult from interview responses to 
gauge the comparability of these conditions for minorities. Yet one thing that does emerge is that 
somewhat more of the interview respondents in Denmark reported experiencing this due to their 
being Muslim; and several mentioned, as well, a general problem of discrimination against Mus-
lims within Danish society. By contrast, few references were made in Sweden to mistreatment or 
discrimination due specifically to being Muslim; there, references that came up tended to refer 
more to visible ethnic differences.
Turning to experienced discrimination as reported on the survey, a larger proportion of 
minority respondents in Denmark reported experiencing discrimination on ethnic or religious 
grounds during the previous 12 months (see Figure 25). However, when the differences are ana-
lyzed with controls for gender, education and time in country, only the difference for religious 
discrimination remains significant. 
Figure 25. Percentage of ethnic-minority respondents who experienced discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity and religion in past 12 months (N=176 DK, 121 SE; significance of differences between means 
controlled for age, gender and years of education, ***  p < 0.001).














































Similarly, proportionately more Danish respondents reported experiencing discrimination
on ethnic grounds in specific situations (this in the previous five years), for all situation types 
asked about except that of seeking housing (see Figure 26), which was slightly higher in Sweden.
When these proportions were analyzed with controls for gender, education and time in country, 
the differences in situations involving health care, educational settings and shopping remained 
statistically different.
Figure 26. Experienced discrimination on the basis of ethnicity among ethnic minorities in specific situa-
tions in past five years in Denmark (left bar in each set) and Sweden (right bar). (N=142 DK, 96 SE; sig-
nificance of differences controlled for age. gender and years of education, with ethnic group-level ran-
dom effects: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001).
Thus, while differences are sometimes not so large as to be statistically significant, ethnic mi-
norities in Denmark report report experiencing discrimination at higher rates than those in Swe-
den do. This is especially clear with religious discrimination, where the inter-country difference 
is significant, but is also indicated by the consistently higher rates of ethnic discrimination in 
Denmark, with significant differences existing along experienced ethnic discrimination in several
types of situations. This seems consistent with the data collected by the Fundamental Rights 
Agency in 2009 in the EU-27 (see Figure 8 on p. 110). 






































Taking together the data for perceptions of personal social inclusion and (self-reported) 
experienced discrimination among immigrant minorities, some analyses show significantly more 
positive perceptions in Sweden, while others show little significant difference between the coun-
tries. Thus I find partial support for hypothesis Hc6 (see p. 48), that minorities in Sweden per-
ceive more social inclusion to themselves personally than their counterparts in Denmark do.        
5.3.2 Perceived Social Treatment and Discrimination of Ethnic Minorities and Muslims 
Respondents perceptions of group social inclusion in society were assessed with ques-
tions asking all respondents to what extent they agreed that ethnic minorities and Muslims (two 
different items) 'are treated badly' in Denmark/Sweden.68 
These indicators show some intriguing differences between the two countries. First, 
taking all respondents together, the overall perceived treatment of both ethnic minorities and 
Muslims is higher in Sweden than in Denmark. It is in the comparison of minority and majority 
respondents in each country that the contrasts become clear. In Denmark, ethnic minorities and 
Muslims held significantly lower perceptions of treatment of ethnic minorities and Muslims, re-
spectively, than Danish-majority respondents did (see left column, Table 25). This minority/ma-
jority gap was larger regarding treatment of Muslims than treatment of ethnic minorities. Minori-
ty/majority gaps are smaller, and not significant, in Sweden; and crucially, regarding both 
treatment of ethnic minorities and Muslims in the country, Swedish-majority respondents actual-
ly held more negative perceptions than ethnic-minority or Muslim respondents did. Regarding 
the treatment of both groups, then, ethnic-minority and Muslim respondents in Sweden had 
68. These items were included in a battery that asked respondents, "How much do you agree or disagree with each 
of the following statements?" The two statements were: "Ethnic minorities are often treated badly in Denmark/
Sweden;" and "Muslims are often treated badly in Denmark." Response choices were: Strongly agree/ Agree/ 
Neither agree nor disagree/ Disagree/ Strongly disagree/ Don't know.  
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(highly) significantly more positive perceptions than their counterparts in Denmark (see middle 













Treatment of ethnic minorities
ethnic minorities .45  (.02) 10.4 % 138 - .12 **  (p = 0.001) .57  (.03) 13.1 % 86
ethnic majority .53  (.02) 2.0 % 99   .02       (not sig.) .51  (.03) 6.6 % 71
intergroup difference ↕ - .08 *  (p = 0.020)  .06  (not sig.)
Treatment of Muslims
Muslims .42  (.03) 4.8 % 117 - .18 ***  (p = 0.000) .61  (.04) 15.3 % 50
ethnic majority .55  (.03) 2.0 % 99    .02        (not sig.) .52  (.03) 4.0 % 72
intergroup difference ↕ - .12 ** (p = 0.001)  .08    (p = .073)
Table 25. Perceived treatment of ethnic minorities and Muslims in Denmark/Sweden among ethnic mi-
nority, Muslim and majority respondents. Intergroup and inter-country means and differences of means 
(results of t-tests). Responses to 'minorities/Muslims are treated badly' statement are reverse-scored 
here, scaled 0 (agree strongly) to 1 (disagree strongly).
A somewhat higher proportion of all Swedish respondent groups answered 'don't know' on these 
items. The largest gap in 'don't know' responses came regarding Muslim treatment in the country:
while 15.3% of Swedish Muslim respondents who answered the item chose 'don't know,' only 
4.8% of Danish Muslim respondents did so.
Figures 27 and 28 show these treatment perceptions among the Danish and Swedish ma-
jority, ethnic minorities and Muslims in relation to respondents' years of education, controlling 
for age, gender and time in country. It is clear the wider minority/majority gaps in Denmark be-
come slightly smaller among those with longer educations, while the relationship is more com-
plex in Sweden.  While Swedish-majority respondents with short educations saw treatment of 
ethnic minorities more positively than minority respondents with similarly short educations did, 
that pattern reversed among those with long educations (though these differences are not signifi-
cant at the .95 level). Regarding treatment of Muslims, perceptions were very similar among 
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Muslims and Swedish-majority respondents, and lowered with longer education among all 
Swedish respondents. However, among all those with middle-long educations perceptions of 
treatment of both ethnic minorities and Muslims were very similar among both majority and mi-
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Figure 27. Perceived treatment of ethnic minorities in Denmark/Sweden among ethnic minority vs. ma-
jority respondents, displayed in relation to years of education. Fitted values, controlling for age, gender 
and time in country. Responses to 'ethnic minorities are treated badly' statement are reverse-scored 
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Figure 28. Perceived treatment of Muslims in Denmark/Sweden among Muslim vs. majority respon-
dents, displayed in relation to years of education. Fitted values, controlling for age, gender and time in 
country. Responses to 'Muslims are treated badly' statement are reverse-scored here, scaled 0 (agree 
strongly) to 1 (disagree strongly).
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Comparison of ethnic-minority and Muslims respondents' perceptions of group treatment be-
tween the two countries reveals, once again, significantly more positive perceptions in Sweden 
than in Denmark (see Figure 29).
Figure 29. Perceived treatment of ethnic minorities 
(box 1) and Muslims (box 2)  among ethnic-minority 
and Muslim respondents, in Denmark vs. Sweden, 
displayed in relation to years of education. Fitted 
values, controlling for age and gender. Responses 
to 'minorities/Muslims are treated badly' statement 
are reverse-scored here, scaled 0 (agree strongly) 
to 1 (disagree strongly).
Examining minority-group perceptions 
further, I find significant differences between 
immigrant generations. In both countries, first-
generation immigrants have significantly more 
positive perceptions of ethnic minority treat-
ment in the country than 1.5- and 2nd genera-
tion respondents do. Yet in Denmark this gap is 
larger, and mean perception levels lower for 
both generational groups, than in Sweden (see 
Table 26). These generational data should be used cautiously to make general claims about the 
country due to the small number of respondents in each group, and the small number of first-gen-
eration respondents in particular keep the inter-country difference among that generation from 
being statistically significant. Yet the gaps between the generational groups in each of the two 
countries, and between 1.5 and 2nd generation respondents in the two countries, are so large as to
remain statistically significant. Importantly, the gap between 1.5 and 2nd-generation respondents 
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gender and education (analysis not shown), indicating that it is not caused by such demographic 








Treatment of ethnic minorities
1st generation .58  (.06) 30 - .05     (not sig.) .63  (.04) 35
1.5 & 2nd generation .40  (.02) 97 - .11 *  (p = 0.011) .52  (.04) 48
difference       ↕  .17 **  (p = 0.002) .11 *  (p = 0.044)
Treatment of Muslims
1st generation .64  (.08) 20 - .04      (not sig.) .67  (.05) 23
1.5 & 2nd generation .37  (.03) 90 - .17 **  (p = 0.006) .54  (.06) 25
difference       ↕  .27 ***  (p = 0.000) .13   (p = 0.071)
Table 26. Perceived treatment of ethnic minorities and Muslims in Denmark/Sweden among 1.5 & 2nd-
generation immigrant respondents vs. 1st-generation immigrant respondents. Intergroup and inter-coun-
try means and differences of means (results of t-tests). Responses to 'ethnic minorities/Muslims are 
treated badly' statement are reverse-scored here, scaled 0 (agree strongly) to 1 (disagree strongly).
These data seem to support the expectation (Hc5, see p. 48),indicating that immigrant minorities 
in Sweden tend to have more positive perceptions of minority-group social inclusion than those 
in Denmark do.
Taking account of all these data on perceptions of legal, political and social inclusion for 
oneself and for minority groups in the two countries bring two major findings to light: 1) gaps 
between ethnic-majority and minority/Muslim perceptions are on all measures larger in Denmark
than in Sweden; and 2) ethnic minorities and Muslims in Denmark have consistently more nega-
tive perceptions personal and group-related inclusion of all types than their counterparts in Swe-
den. While limited by the parameters of this study's respondent group and may thus not be fully 
representative of the attitudes of young minority and majority adults in the two countries, the dif-
ferences found among study's arguably comparable sample and respondent groups point to some 
marked contrasts in immigrant-minority perceptions between the two countries. The following 
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chapter proceeds to examine whether and to what extent these types of inclusion play a role in 
immigrant-minority identification and participation in the two countries.
5.4 The Role of the National Media Environments
Observing such different perceptions of inclusion in the two countries, it is useful to consider 
what factors may be driving it. While this thesis's argument asserts that minorities' inclusion per-
ceptions mirror the 'working national identities' operational in the two countries as they are sig-
naled to minorities, do we have any indications of how this might occur?  One possibility is that 
media are a key channel of communication for such national-identity signals. To what extent, 
then, are minorities in the two countries exposed to media coverage of issues relating to immi-
gration and integration? And further, how is seeing media coverage of such issues related to their
perceptions of inclusion?
To allow for this investigation, the survey posed two questions to gauge respondents' me-
dia consumption in general,69 and several more to assess how often they had seen coverage of 
immigration and integration-related issues.70 Immigrant minorities in the two countries reported 
patterns of media consumption more similar to one another than those of Danish and Swedish-
majority respondents (see Table 27). More ethnic-majority young adults read print and online 
media in Sweden than in Denmark; likewise, minorities in Sweden read media slightly more of-
ten than their Danish counterparts, but--while minorities in Sweden read Swedish media some-
69. To gauge media consumption, respondents were asked: "How often ... do you read Danish/Swedish newspapers,
either online or in their paper format? / do you watch Danish TV news?" Response choices were: Every day/ A few 
times a week/ Occasionally/ Very seldom/ Never.
70. To learn about exposure to media coverage of immigrant and integration-related issues in the media, 
respondents were asked: "How often have you heard about the following issues in Danish politics, or in the media?  
Immigration/ Integration of immigrants/ Language requirements for immigrants/ Rules for permanent residence/ 
Citizenship rules/ Islam." Response choices were: Never/ Rarely, but have heard about it/ Occasionally/ Fairly often/
Very often.
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what less than majority individuals do--minorities in Denmark actually report reading Danish 
media somewhat more than majority-Danish respondents do. The patterns are reversed for 
watching news coverage: overall rates are higher in Denmark than in Sweden, though this gap is 
larger between the majority groups than between minorities in the two countries. And here, mi-
norities in Sweden watch Swedish news more often than their majority counterparts, while mi-
norities in Denmark less often than theirs. When responses for both media types are combined, 
there is not a significant inter-country difference among between either minorities or majority re-















Read .81 (.02) -.01 (.03)
t = -0.35
.82 (.03) .75 (.03) -.11 (.04)
t = 2.97 **
.87 (.02)
Watch .78 (.03) .09 (.04)
t = 2.09 *
.70 (.03) .82 (.02) .15 (.04) 
t = 4.00 ***
.67 (.03)
(combined) .80 (.02) .04 (.03)
t = 1.13
.76 (.02) .79 (.02) .01 (.03)
t = 0.47
.77 (.02)
Seen coverage of immigration/integration-related issues
Immigration .71 (.02) .06 (.04)
t = 1.81
.65 (.03) .77 (.02) -.002 (.03)
t = -0.06
.77 (.03)
Integration .74 (.02) .15 (.04)
t = 3.90 ***
.59 (.03) .77 (.02) .05 (03) .72 (.03)
Language 
requirements
.58 (.03) .13 (.04)
t = 3.39 ***





.54 (.03) .15 (.04)
t = 4.01 ***
.39 (.03) .53 (.03) .10 (.04)
t = 2.39 *
.43 (.03)
Citizenship rules .55 (.03) .19 (.04)
t = 4.71 ***
.36 (.03) .51 (.03) .20 (.04)
t = 4.53 ***
.31 (.02)
Islam .73 (03) .08 (.04)
t = 2.14 *
.64 (.03) .64 (.02) .04 (.04)
t = 0.96
.60 (.03)
(All themes combined) .64 (.02) .13 (.03)
t = 4.42 ***
.51 (.03) .64 (.02) .07 (.03)
t = 2.39 *
.57 (.02)
(3 common themes: 
imm., integ., Islam)
.73 (.02) .11 (.03)
t = 3.34 ***




Table 27. Reported media consumption and exposure to immigration/integration-related issues in the 
media. T-tests comparing immigrant-background respondents (in the country 2+ years) and ethnic-ma-
jority respondents in Denmark vs. Sweden. 
When asked how often they have seen coverage of immigration, integration or related 
themes in the media, respondents in Denmark consistently report seeing more coverage of such 
issues than respondents in Sweden do, as the table above indicates. Using the 3-item composite 
measure (scaled 0 to 1), Figure 30 displays this difference among minorities, which is fairly con-
stant across different levels of education. Those with more education report seeing more cover-
age of integration-related issues in the media (even when media consumption is added to the 
analysis, not displayed here).
Figure 30. Exposure to integration-related media coverage, as reported in by immigrant minorities in 
Denmark vs. Sweden, as related to years of education (fitted values, OLS regression with robust std. er-
rors, controlling for age, gender and time in country).
The inter-country differences in reported exposure to such media coverage are, for most issues, 
bigger among minorities than the ethnic majorities, and, unsurprisingly, are quite large for 
measures over issues that have especially been more politicized in Denmark in the past decade 
(rules concerning language requirements, permanent residence and citizenship). However, the 
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and here the distance between minorities in the two countries outpaces that among the ethnic 
majorities.
I have already shown that minorities in Denmark report seeing these issues covered in the
media more often than those in Sweden do. Yet the debates suggesting that the Danish and 
Swedish media often use a different tone in addressing these issues indicate that the coverage 
they do release may have a different effect on minorities. While realizing that reported media ex-
posure to specific issues is somewhat endogenous to respondents' political perceptions and 
awareness (in that they are more keen to notice, or even seek out, coverage of certain issues), I 
examine whether minority perceptions of political inclusion are differently related to having con-
sumed media coverage of integration-related issues. 
I find that frequency of seeing such media coverage is significantly and negatively related
to perceptions of both group political inclusion and group social inclusion in society (if causal di-
rection from media exposure to inclusion perceptions is assumed) in Denmark, but not related at 
all in Sweden; Figure 31 shows this difference in relation to perceptions of political elite attitudes
to respondents' ethnic and religious groups (a composite measure). 
Figure 31. Differing effects of seeing integration-related media coverage on perceptions of political elite 
attitudes towards minority group(s), among immigrant-minority respondents in Denmark vs. Sweden (fit-
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time in country and self-reported reported media consumption).
Thus, in Denmark, those who see media coverage of integration-related issues often have signifi-
cantly more negative perceptions of politicians' attitudes towards their groups than those who 
seldom see it, while there is no such difference in Sweden. Separate analyses (not displayed here)
show that in Denmark, frequency of having seen such coverage 'explains' 8.9 % of the variance 
in minorities' perceptions of social inclusion of their groups (p = .008), and 17.5 % of the vari-
ance in their perceptions of political elite attitudes towards their groups (p = .000), but it bears no
influence on such perceptions in Sweden.  
The data themselves do not explain why this is so, but this effect difference seems consis-
tent with plausible expectations we might raise based on the widening difference in tone--itself 
of course partially relaying national political debates that also differ in tone--that has been identi-
fied  in recent periods as existing between the two countries' media discussion of immigration, 
immigrants and immigrant-minorities (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). 
Further, I find that exposure to such coverage moderates the way in which minorities re-
ceive signals about inclusion or exclusion. Data from the study's survey-experiment demonstrate 
that previous exposure to integration-related media coverage weakens the effect that a one-time 
inclusion or exclusion message has on minorities' perceptions of group inclusion (see Figure 32).
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Figure 32. Change in perceptions of minority political inclusion from survey experiment, by previous ex-
posure to integration-related media coverage. Immigrant-minority respondents randomly assigned to 
positive or negative treatment conditions. Fitted values, OLS regression, robust std. errors.
As the figure shows, those minorities who had seen little coverage of integration-related issues 
were quite receptive to the experiment's treatment (see left side of the scale), showing a marked 
positive/negative change in their perceptions of political group inclusion from the main survey in
accordance with the treatment. This effect disappeared among those who had reported seeing 
such coverage often when they took the main survey. While this is not so surprising, it shows that
the perceptions of those minorities who have seen more integration-related media coverage are 
more fixed than those who have not. Given the different levels of exposure to such coverage that 
minorities report in Denmark and Sweden, we can theorize that in general, the perceptions of mi-
norities in Denmark about their own and their groups' inclusion or exclusion may be more fixed 
than those of their counterparts in Sweden.
5.5 Indexing Perceived Inclusion for Analysis
To enable analysis of how these different types of inclusion influence minority individuals' natio-
nal identification and political participation (outlined in the following chapters) the citizenship, 
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to individual and group inclusion along these three dimensions. Two key individual inclusion 
measures are already singular and so need not be indexed: the constructed measure of individual 
citizenship availability (see p. 162 above for description of this) and the measure of politician 
concern for 'people like me' (described above). For each dimension, the item measuring per-
ceived inclusion of respondents' co-ethnics was combined with the item measuring inclusion of 
Muslims for Muslims only; for non-Muslim minority respondents, the group indices continue to 
reflect only the co-ethnic referent item; among Muslims, for whom both items contributed equal-
ly the group indices, Cronbach's alpha was calculated and found to be at a level sufficient to be 
considered reflective of a common concept (.930 for group citizenship availability, .669 for 
group political inclusion, and .807 for group social inclusion - see Table 28 below).   These en-
able incorporation into the analysis of the effects of perceived inclusion of Muslims only for 
Muslim respondents, while still allowing unified analysis of how different levels of perceived 
personal and group inclusion along the three dimensions impact civic identification and engage-
ment levels among immigrant minorities. For all ethnic-minority respondents, the three items as-





original items conditions index name Cronbach's α
citizenship -
group
1. Most [co-ethnics] can become citizens






1. Politician attitude to co-ethnics






1. Most people see me as equal
2. Most people I meet in daily life see me as 
     equal




1. [my ethnic group] is treated badly in society 
     (reversed)
2. Muslims are treated badly in society 





Table 28. Overview of indices created from inclusion-perception items for use in main analyses, with 
Cronbach's alpha as calculated using responses from minority respondents in the country at least two 
years.
Using these combined items, we can review the comparative levels of perceived inclusion
among study respondents in the two countries more succinctly. Further, since the comparison 
may be distorted by there being more immigrants, and somewhat more recent immigrants, within
the Swedish respondent group, we can do best to compare levels among the minority respondent 
groups as a whole, and among 1.5 and 2nd-generation respondents only. The results are dis-
played in Table 29.
All immigrant minorities 
  (in country 2 + years)
1.5 & 2nd generation
Denmark
N = 124-136








Citizenship - personal .82 (.03) .07 (.04)
t = 1.79 
.89 (.03) .91 (.02) .08 (.03)
t = 2.55 *
.99 (.01)
                   - group .51 (.03) .15 (.04)
t = 3.50 ***
.66 (.03) .49 (.03) .16 (.05)
t = 3.17 **
.65 (.04)
Political      - personal .43 (.02) .05 (.04)
t = 1.38
.48 (.03) .39 (.02) .13 (.04)
t = 3.09 **
.52 (.03)
                   - group .35 (.02) .11 (.03)
t = 3.82 ***
.46 (.03) .34 (.02) .14 (.04)
t = 3.75 ***
.47 (.03)
Social         - personal .57 (.02) .12 (.04)
t = 3.18 **
.69 (.03) .57 (.03) .16 (.05)
t = 3.52 ***
.74 (.04)
                   - group .42 (.02) .16 (.03)
t = 4.58 ***
.57 (.03) .38 (.02) .15 (.04)
t = 3.74 ***
.53 (.03)
Table 29. Comparisons of inclusion perception levels among immigrant minority-respondents and 
1.5/ 2nd-generation respondents in Denmark vs. Sweden, using inclusion indices. Results of t-tests,  * p 
< .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Most noticeable here is that inclusion perceptions are, across all dimension, higher in Sweden 
than in Denmark. Only for personal citizenship availability and personal political inclusion is 
that gap not significant, and when we look to the comparison of 1.5/2nd-generation groups in the
two countries--where the larger proportion of somewhat more recent immigrants in the Swedish 
group cannot have an effect--the inter-country differences on these measures as well are signifi-
cant. Additionally, we can see another pattern of perception variation that was identified in the 
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examination of some measures earlier in the chapter. While, for obvious reasons, citizenship is 
personally more available/ perceived to be so among 1.5 and 2nd-generation respondents than 
among minorities as a whole group, perceptions of both group citizenship availability and group 
social inclusion decrease somewhat when only 1.5 and 2nd-generation respondents are include, 
meaning that 1.5/2nd-generation levels on these measures are lower than among the first-genera-
tion respondents. Further, we see that for several measures--personal and group political inclu-
sion, and personal social inclusion--the 1.5/2nd-generation group in Sweden has higher percep-
tions when taken alone than when combined their first-generation counterparts, while the 
1.5/2nd-generation group in Denmark has slightly lower than or roughly the same perception 
levels as when including the first generation. Thus, in a clear pattern of overall higher experi-
enced inclusion in Sweden, the trend of change from first to second generation is also somewhat 
more negative in Denmark than in Sweden. 
Yet what difference does such inclusion, as perceived by immigrant minorities, make for 
their civic integration? The following chapter examines whether and how it is related to their 
identification with the national community, and Chapter 7 presents analyses on whether and how 
inclusion and identification play a role in driving political participation.
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Chapter 6. 
Findings: How Inclusion Shapes National Identification
The experiences and perceptions of inclusion investigated in the preceding chapter are interesting
in themselves, but I wish ultimately to know what influence, if any, they have on young im-
migrant minorities' civic integration. We have now reached the first of these investigations: do 
such 'working national identities,' as experienced and perceived by immigrant minorities, influ-
ence their levels of identification with their national community?  
Chapter 2 specified why and how the different types of perceived inclusion--legal, politi-
cal and social, towards individuals personally and towards their minority group(s)--are likely to 
influence immigrant minorities' levels of national identification. Put briefly, each type of inclu-
sion, in both the personal and group-related forms, is theoretically expected to be positively relat-
ed to national identification levels (hypotheses Hi1 - Hi6). Yet the effects of group-related inclu-
sions in particular, I also argued, may be modified by the salience of minority group-related 
issues in a given society (Hi7), or may be modified by the individual's own level of identification
with the ethnic or religious minority groups in question (Hi8). To what extent do this study's data 
support or disconfirm these expectations? And further, are alternative factors at work that play a 
significant role in driving identification? The following sections investigate these questions.
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6.1 The Roles of Legal, Political and Social Inclusion
In this section, I investigate the relationships between the three types of inclusion, as perceived 
personally and related to minority respondents' ethnic and religious groups, and national identifi-
cation. I conduct these analyses using the combined (4-item) measure of national identification 
presented in section 4.4. Group-related inclusion perceptions are included in analyses using the 
composite measures presented in the final section of the previous chapter (see Table 28 on p. 
206). 
As the legal boundary of membership in each state, citizenship signifies membership 
within the corresponding national communities as well. Yet the question remains as to whether it 
actually functions as a key boundary mechanism in signifying to immigrant minorities their ac-
ceptance as members in such a way as to affect whether they identify with the nation. To investi-
gate this, I examine the relationship between immigrant minorities' perceptions of whether citi-
zenship is available to themselves personally, and of whether it is available to people of their 
minority ethnic and religious groups, and their national identification. 
In bivariate analyses (not shown), minorities' national identification levels are positively 
and significantly related to their personal access to citizenship, but not to their perceptions of ac-
cess for their minority groups (using the combined 2-item index). Yet when the analyses take ac-
count of key background variables (gender, age, employment, years of education, and time in 
country), both links are insignificant. To remind the reader, this analysis does not show results of 
actual naturalization, but of the perception of access to it, in order to prevent estimates from be-
ing distorted by effects of self-selected naturalization. The effect of personal access to citizenship
represents the difference in national identification levels (on a 0 to 1 scale) between those who 
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already have citizenship or perceive it to be accessible at present (= 1), and those who do not per-
ceive it to be accessible even in the future (= 0; no access at present but likely access in future is 
assigned the value of .5). The effect of group access to citizenship estimates the difference in 
identification between those who 'disagree totally' and those who 'agree totally' with statements 
that it is possible for most in their ethnic and religious group(s) who wish it to get citizenship 
(0-1). The combined group measure is an index of those two (ethnic and Muslim) items; for non-
Muslims, it reflects only the ethnic-inclusion item.  As the table shows, national identification is 
estimated to increase by .13 on average, with a full increases in perceptions of personal access 
(Models 1), but this effect is not significant. Models 2-4 show national identification to be posi-
tively, but insignificantly or marginally significantly affected by perceiving citizenship to one's 
ethnic group (among all minority respondents), to Muslims (among Muslim respondents only), 
or using the index of these (the effect of access to one's ethnic group was similar when tested 









citizenship access, personal .13 (.15) 
citizenship access, coethnics .07 (.04)
citizenship access, Muslims .06 (.05)
citizenship access, groups .08 (.04) !
gender (0/1) .07 (.03) * .07 (.03) * .08 (.03) * .07 (.03 ) *
employed (0/1) .07 (.04) .07 (.05) .08 (.05) ! .07 (.05)
time in country .006 (.004) .009 (.004) * .003 (.005) .009 (.004) *
constant .55 (.16) *** .64 (.05) *** .63 (.05) *** .63 (.05) ***
N 194 194 141 194
R2 .104 .113 .109 .117
adj. R2 .075 .085 .069 .089
Table 30. Influence of perceived citizenship availability on national identification among immigrant mi-
norities, both countries. The dependent variable, national identification level, is continuous and ranges 
from 0 to 1. OLS regression models, robust std. errors. Age and years of education were also included 
(coefficients not displayed here, all insignificant) (! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
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Thus the data indicate a positive but uncertain relationship between how minorities see citizen-
ship access and their national identification levels: while the effects of both personal and group 
access on national identification are positive, there is little support for their having definite, con-
sistent effects (expected to be positive according to Hi1 and Hi2). Interestingly, women (gen-
der=1 in the analyses) identify with the national community at higher levels than men in each 
model; this is similar to the findings of Schneider et al. (2012). And not surprisingly, national 
identification levels are also shown to be higher among those who have spent more time in the 
country.
I now turn to the relationship between political inclusion in the national community 
(through political elite attitudes, as perceived by immigrant minorities towards 'people like them' 
and towards their minority ethnic and religious groups) and minorities' national identification 
levels. I argued in Chapter 2 that such political elite attitudes were likely to function as a signal 
to immigrant minorities of whether they are accepted as part of the national community, and con-
sequently is likely to have an impact on the extent to which they identify with it. 
The survey data reveal that minorities' national identification levels are significantly and 
positively related to their perceptions of political elite attitudes regarding both 'people like them' 
and their ethnic and religious groups. Table 31 below displays models of analysis including per-
ceptions of politician concern to 'people like me' and towards respondents' own ethnic groups, 
and towards Muslims. Initial inspection reveals that minorities' national identification levels do 
not vary consistently with their perceptions of politician concern for people like them (scaled 0 
to 1, varying from 'no concern' to 'cares very much'; see Model 1); however this has a positive, 
marginally significant effect. However, national identification is an estimated .17 higher, on aver-
age, among those who see politicians as having 'very positive' attitudes towards their minority 
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groups (using the index, Model 4), than among those who perceive 'very negative' attitudes, a 
positive and significant effect. Examining the effects of perceived political inclusion of coethnics
and Muslims (the latter among Muslims only), I find that the degree of inclusion of Muslims per-
ceived has, the greater effect on national identification; this comparison holds when coethnic po-




pol. att. to coethnics
Model 3:
pol. att. to Muslims
Model 4: 
pol. att. to group(s)
politician attitudes: 'people like me' .11 (.06) !
politician attitudes: coethnics .11 (.07)
politician attitudes: Muslims .20 (.07) **
politician attitudes: group(s) (index) .17 (.07) *
gender (0/1) .10 (.03) *** .10 (.03) *** .11 (.04) ** .10 (.03) ***
employed (0/1) .06 (.04) .06 (.04) .03 (.04) .06 (.04)
time in country .007 (.004) ! .006 (.004) ! .005 (.005) .007 (004) !
constant .61 (.06) *** .61 (.05) *** .62 (.05) *** .60 (.05) ***
N 166 166 123 166
R2 .137 .134 .149 .148
adj. R2 .104 .101 .105 .116
Table 31. Influence of perceived political elite attitudes on national identification among immigrant mi-
norities, both countries. The dependent variable, national identification level, is continuous and ranges 
from 0 to 1. OLS regression models, robust std. errors. Age and years of education were also included 
(coefficients not displayed here, all insignificant) (! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
As an extra check, the models including the co-ethnic dimension and index were also run includ-
ing binary variables for each of the major ethnic groups within the sample, to ensure that the 
model was robust when accounting for ethnic background (results not displayed); this had no 
bearing on these findings. The data thus lend support to the idea that politicians' attitudes matter 
for minorities' national identification--with partial support for the idea that elite attitudes towards
'people like them' have a positive effect (Hi3), and stronger support for attitudes towards their 
groups doing so--especially relating to Muslims (Hi4). Here, as in the analyses of citizenship ac-
cess, gender remains a highly significant predictor of national identification levels. The data thus 
indicate that women have higher levels of identification with their national communities that are 
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not accounted for by differing levels of perceived political inclusion; the role of gender in shap-
ing identification levels is intriguing, and will be examined more closely as this chapter 
continues. 
As argued previously in this dissertation, national communities are defined not only 
through citizenship and political dynamics, but are also defined socially. To what extent are im-
migrant minorities' national identification levels then influenced by the degree of social inclusion
they experience in society--whether towards themselves personally or towards their ethnic and 
religious groups?
I proceed by testing the relation of national identification to these perceptions. I find, 
first, that personal social inclusion (as perceived) has a substantial positive effect on minority re-
spondents' national identification levels. Analyzed in concert with control variables (Model 1 in 
Table 32 below), it accounts for 14.4 % of the variance in minorities' national identification lev-
els,71 and the model as a whole accounts for approximately 24 %. This is a more influential factor
for national identification, it seems, than any of the other inclusion variables yet examined. Sec-
ond, I find that national identification is positively linked to perceiving minority groups to be 
treated well in society; the link is significant when testing the effects of perceived treatment of 
Muslims, and using the index of group perceptions (Models 3-4). 
71. Partial R-squared values in this study are calculated using Owen/Shapley values (with Stata module 'Rego,' 














personal social inclusion .26 (.06) ***
soc. treatment of eth. minorities .08 (.06)
soc. treatment of Muslims .12 (.06) *
soc. treatment of group(s) .12 (.06) *
gender (0/1) .07 (.03) * .10 (.03) ** .13 (.03) *** .09 (.03) **
employed (0/1) .06 (.04) .06 (.05) .06 (.05) .07 (.05) 
time in country .005 (.003) .007 (.004) .003 (.004) .007 (.004) !
constant .51 (.05) *** .62 (.05) *** .58 (.06) *** .60 (.06) ***
N 163 163 119 163
R2 .236 .125 .181 .135
adj. R2 .207 .092 .137 .102
Table 32. Influence of perceived social inclusion on national identification among immigrant minorities, 
both countries. The dependent variable, national identification level, is continuous and ranges from 0 to 
1. OLS regression models, robust std. errors. Age and years of education were also included in all mod-
els (coefficients not displayed here, all insignificant) (! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
The data thus lend some support to the expectation that the social inclusion of minority groups 
positively influences immigrant minorities' national identification (Hi5), especially when it re-
gards how Muslim minorities respond to the treatment of Muslims. However, they indicate un-
equivocal support for the idea that personal social inclusion, as perceived by minorities, has a 
positive effect on their national identification (Hi6). As with the previous analyses, gender re-
mains a positive predictor of national identification levels in these models. Women are likely to 
identify more strongly than men even when influential perceptions of personal social inclusion 
are accounted for (Model 1), with gender accounting for an estimated 5.8 % of the variation in 
national identification levels.
The reader will remember that in addition to this observational data from the main sur-
vey, this study also encompassed a follow-up survey experiment among those respondents from 
the main survey who volunteered to be contacted again. It was intended to test whether minori-
ties' national identification levels are differently affected by (randomly-assigned) inclusion vs. 
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exclusive messages about immigrant minorities' membership in society (see Appendix 5 for its 
form and content). If different effects were observed, it was thought, the experimental design 
would indicate a clearer causal relationship between inclusion/exclusion signals, minorities' per-
ceptions, and their identification levels. However, the experiment showed little change in nation-
al identification levels (between the main and follow-up surveys) between those respondents who
were shown texts emphasizing inclusion vs. exclusion. Figure 33 shows the changes among re-
spondents of both treatment groups, as relating to their previous levels of national identification 
(as measured in the main survey). 
Figure 33. Results of survey experiment: no significant difference in changes of national identification 
levels between minority respondents shown a negative vs. positive treatment about immigrant minori-
ties' inclusion in society. National identification measures (previous and difference between main and fol-
low-up surveys) based on the 4-item index used in other analyses in this chapter. Marginal effects calcu-
lated using OLS regression, robust std. errors. 
As the figure shows, those who read an text emphasizing exclusion actually increased somewhat 
in their responses about national identification, on average, whereas those who read a text stress-
ing inclusion showed less change. The difference between the groups is not significant, yet on its
face this difference is curious. However, a look at how the two groups--whose treatment assign-
ments were completely randomized within each sub-sample group, without regard for their main 
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slightly higher (.04 out of 1) previous national identification levels than those in the negative 
group. In keeping with ordinary variation between responses at different points in time, it is more
likely that the levels of those with quite low previous identification rates will go up, than those 
with high previous rates; since there were slightly more of these in the negative group, this seems
to have occurred. Why might it be the case that the experiment had so little effect on respondent 
national identification levels? First among likely reasons is the likelihood that it is difficult to in-
fluence people's national identification levels using experimental conditions, especially when the
treatments used are as brief and non-invasive as those used here. Such identification is developed
over a long period of time and on the basis of many experiences, so it is perhaps not surprising 
that the treatments in this survey experiment had little effect. While this non-finding does not 
help this study to gain greater insights on its questions, it is perhaps somewhat encouraging as to 
the nature of minorities' identification with the national community: quite stable over time, and 
not fluctuating easily when confronted with one-time messages about inclusion or exclusion.
This study's observational data, then, must form the basis for its investigations. Until 
now, this chapter's analyses have shown that the perceptions minorities have formed (over a long 
period of time in Danish and Swedish society) inclusion and exclusion of their minority groups 
and themselves within society influence their national identification levels. The following sec-
tions examine these dynamics further on the basis of the main survey data. 
6.2 The Gender-Specific Effects of Inclusion
Since the analyses have shown gender to be a consistent factor in immigrant minorities' national 
identification, it becomes relevant to examine whether and how gender interacts with the other 
factors examined here: do they affect minority men and women's national identification differ-
ently? Running the same analyses again for minority men and women separately, I find that fac-
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tors of group-related inclusion, in particular, have differing effects among men and women. Co-
efficients for each variable, both estimated in separate models (including control variables) and 
in a combined model with the group-inclusion indices, displayed in Table 33.
Men Women
separate models combined separate models combined
Citizenship 
access
personal .29 (.15) ! .25 (.20) .41 (.29) .36 (.30)
coethnics .16 (.08) ! .02 (.06)
Muslims .12 (.10) .04 (.05)
 group (index) .16 (.09) ! .00 (.08) .02 (.05) -.01 (.05)
Political elite
attitudes
personal .18 (.11) .10 (.10) .10 (.08) .07 (.08)
coethnics .20 (.13) .02 (.09)
Muslims .22 (.14) .10 (.08)




personal .30 (.11) ** .26 (.11) * .20 (.08) ** .19 (.08) *
eth. minorities .14 (.10) .03 (.07)
Muslims .24 (.10) * .02 (.07)
 group (index) .18 (.10) ! .03 (.09) .04 (.06) .03 (.07)
employed (0/1) .07 (.05) .11 (.06) ! .03 (.06) .04 (.05)
time in country -.003 (.005) -.006 (.006) .010 (.007) .006 (.005)
constant -- .17 (.19) -- .28 (.30)
N 64 (48/51) 64 81 (59/60) 81
R2 -- .244 -- .221
adjusted R2 -- .102 -- .109
Table 33. Gender differences: Influence of inclusion variables on national identification among im-
migrant-minorities men vs. women, both countries; models testing effect of Muslim inclusion conducted 
only with Muslim respondents within each gender (Ns in parentheses). OLS regression models, robust 
std. errors. Age and years of education were also included in all models (coefficients not displayed here, 
all insignificant) (! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
Several findings are worth noting. First, both men's and women's national identification levels 
are most significantly related to their perceptions of personal social inclusion, confirming that the
large and highly significant effect of those perceptions already observed among the entire minor-
ity respondent group holds among both genders. Second, in each separate model testing the ef-
fect of perceptions of how minorities' own ethnic groups and Muslims are included--through citi-
zenship access, politician attitudes, and treatment in society--these are estimated to have 
markedly larger effects on minority men's national identification than on women's. Though these 
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are not significant among the male respondent group in all cases--in part due to the small sample 
size--several are significant or marginally significant among men, yet none are so among 
women; and all are several times larger among men than women. And finally, national identifica-
tion likely to be somewhat higher among minority women who have spent more time in the 
country, as compared to those who have lived there for a shorter time, as expected; but there is 
no such positive relationship to be observed among men--when analyzed with or without inclu-
sion-related variables.
It is also important to note that the effects of group-related perceptions on national identi-
fication that are seen among minority men in their separate models are substantially reduced in 
the combined model. This suggests that men's sense of their own social inclusion may be mediat-
ing the effect of these group-related ideas on national identification. In simpler terms, men's per-
ceptions of how their groups are included may be shaping their ideas of how they themselves are 
included, which in turn forms their national identification. 
The analyses above have already shown that men's national identification levels are relat-
ed to their group-related perceptions of inclusion and to personal social inclusion. To further test 
whether such a mediation of group-inclusion effects is occurring, I first examine whether men's 











group citizenship access .30 (.10) ** .22 (.11) * .109
politician attitudes to group(s) .46 (.11) *** .31 (.11) ** .088
social treatment of groups .29 (.11) * .12 (.12) .048
(control variables)
constant .42 (.06) *** .40 (.06) *** .46 (.06) *** .28 (.08) ***
N 76 76 76 76
R2 .192 .182 .127 .280
adjusted R2 .146 .136 .078 .217
Table 34. Group inclusion influences men's perceptions of own social inclusion. Relation of per-
ceived personal social inclusion to perceived group inclusion among minority men, both countries. OLS 
regression models, robust std. errors. Age, years of education and time in country were included in all 
models (coefficients not displayed here) (! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
As the table shows, I find that men's sense of their own social inclusion is substantially and posi-
tively related each type of group-related perceptions. When these links are analyzed separately 
(as in the first three models above), politicians' attitudes towards minority men's own group eth-
nic and religious groups has the largest effect on their sense of personal inclusion, but perceived 
group citizenship access explains the largest share of variation in perceived personal inclusion, in
both single and combined models. Yet however their influence compares, the most important 
point here is that among minority men, group-inclusion perceptions have a substantial influence 
on their ideas of how they personally are included in society. This gives support to the notion 
that, among minority men, group-inclusion perceptions may have a positive effect on national 
identification via personal social inclusion. In further support of this, mediation analysis suggests
that the effect of each type of group-inclusion perception on national identification is substantial-
ly reduced, and thereby likely accounted for, when personal social inclusion is added to the same
model (see Table 35).
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Group cit'ship.
access + pers. soc. 
inclusion
Pol. attitudes
to groups + pers. soc.
inclusion
Social treatment
of minorities + pers. soc.
inclusion
group cit'ship access .16 (.09) ! .06 (.08)
pol. attitudes to group(s) .21 (.13) .07 (.11)
social treatment of 
groups
.19 (.10) ! .08 (.09)
personal social inclusion .26 (.11) ** .27 (.10) *** .27 (.10) *
constant .55 (.07) *** .45 (.09) *** .58 (.06) *** .46 (.09) *** .55 (.07) *** .44 (.09) ***
N 65 65 65 65 65 65
R2 .113 .204 .088 .201 .097 .207
adjusted R2 .038 .121 .011 .118 .020 .125
Table 35. All three types of group inclusion possibly mediated by personal social inclusion among 
minority men. Relation of national identification to perceived group inclusion + personal social inclusion 
among minority men, both countries. OLS regression models, robust std. errors. Age, years of educa-
tion, employment (0/1) and time in country were included in all models (coefficients not displayed here) (!
p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
Though mediation analysis can only suggest the nature of these links, these models lend support 
to the account that the inclusion immigrant-minority men perceive to be extended to their ethnic 
and religious groups influences their sense of being personally included, and in turn their nation-
al identification. Among minority women, however, group-inclusion perceptions have less con-
sistent influence on their sense of personal social inclusion, and little effect on their national 
identification. 
I thus find that both men and women's national identification levels are heavily influ-
enced by the extent to which they feel socially included in society. However, factors of group in-
clusion extended towards minorities' own ethnic and religious groups--through citizenship ac-
cess, political elite attitudes, and social treatment--only have marked effects on men's national 
identification, and these most likely through their perceptions of personal social inclusion. As the
figures below show, the difference in group-inclusion effects on minority men and women's rates
of national identification are manifested especially in gaps between women and men with more 
negative perceptions of inclusion: the more negative minorities' ideas of their groups' inclusion in
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society are, the more likely it is that women 
identify more highly with the nation than men. 
We might even say that there is an exclusion-
gender gap that is causing minority men and 
women to differ in how much they feel they be-
long in society.
Yet if group-inclusion factors have little 
impact on minority women's belonging, what 
does? In a partial answer to this question, I find 
that women's national identification is more 
likely to increase as they spend more time in 
the country independent of other factors than 
men's. This gender-by-time interaction is statis-
tically significant, and indicates that this very 
basic fact of immigrant minorities' lives--how 
long they have been in their country of resi-
dence--may have disparate effects on men and 
women minorities. Figure 34 shows the rela-
tionship of minority men and women's national 
identification levels in relation to how long 
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Figure 34. The influence of time in country on national identification among men vs. women. Fitted val-
ues, using OLS regression, robust std. errors, controlling for age.
As may be seen, it is quite a stark contrast. In separate analyses using the same simple model 
(controlling only for age), time in country is estimated to account for 7.4 % of the variance in mi-
nority women's national identification levels, but only 0.5 % of that in men's. Yet might this be 
due to minority women out-performing men educationally, especially among the 1.5 and second-
generation groups? Interestingly, the figure remains virtually unchanged if years of education 
and being employed (or under education) are controlled for in the estimation of effects; that is to 
say, no meaningful part of this contrast in time-in-country effects is accounted for by eventual 
differences in men's and women's education rates or labor-market activity. Is this contrast then 
accounted for by the factors that have been in focus here, where minorities perceive the extent to 
which they are included in society based on signals in the legal, political spheres? When the oth-
er factors that have been included in this chapter's analyses (personalized and group-related per-
ceptions of inclusion through citizenship access, political elite attitudes and social treatment, as 
well as an indicator for employment) are accounted for, the spread is somewhat diminished (see 
Figure 35); however, the effect difference continues to be significant, and a clear gap remains be-
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Figure 35. The influence of time in country on national identification among men vs. women. Fitted val-
ues, using OLS regression, robust std. errors, controlling for age, years of education, employment (0/1), 
and both personal and group-related inclusion perceptions.
This suggests that when minority women's identification increases more with time in country 
than men's does, some part of this is due to the effects of the inclusion they perceive, and possi-
bly also to the exclusion of minorities having different effects on them (as already observed). Yet
it also makes clear that there are further gender differences in national identification levels that 
are not accounted for by these factors: as minorities' time in country increases, women are likely 
--even when education length, being employed, and perceptions of inclusion are accounted for--
to identify more highly with the national community than men do. This is a fascinating finding 
that is difficult to explain in the scope of this study, but it indicates that further research of this is 
needed. 
These findings about between gender and national identification open new considerations
for how we think about the process of civic integration, for how different factors shape im-
migrant minorities' belonging and participation. What is especially interesting here is that, 
though gender and race scholars have for several decades highlighted how minority men and 
women often have different experiences as minorities, based on their family, work and communi-
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ty roles, this study's data indicate that they may also respond differently to those experiences, in 
particular to the perceptions they form of how their groups are included or excluded in the soci-
eties they live in. While this study's data indicate that women and men in similar societal con-
texts sometimes perceive different degrees of inclusion (with women on average having more 
positive perceptions), this chapter's analyses suggest that the signals they receive indicating in-
clusion or exclusion of their ethnic and religious groups seem only to affect men's sense of natio-
nal identity. Less affected by this, women's national identification is more likely to rise with 
time. But there is little guarantee of it doing so among men. Likely implications of these gender 
effects differences, for civic integration in Denmark and Sweden as well as for how we theorize 
civic integration in general, will be explored further in the following chapters, not least in the 
concluding Chapter 8. 
6.3 Moderators of Group Inclusion Effects
I have already found, unexpectedly, that group-related political inclusion tends to matter more 
for minority men's perceptions of social inclusion, and in turn for their national identification, 
than for minority women's. Yet I have also argued, in Chapter 2, that it is theoretically reasonable
to expect the effects of group-related inclusion (or the lack thereof) to be moderated by two fac-
tors: 1) the extent to which minority individuals' actually identify with their minority ethnic and 
religious groups, and 2) society-wide salience of minority-related issues. In this section, I exam-
ine whether there is support for these expectations. 
6.3.1 Minority Identification Levels
As described in Chapter 2, people have selves that contain different aspects and social identities. 
When a person is a potential or peripheral member of a community (as immigrant minorities usu-
ally are), we expect that signals from that community indicating acceptance (or the lack of it) of 
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some minority social identity that the person carries will matter for whether he identifies with the
community to the extent that he places emphasis on the minority identity in his self-concept.  I 
therefore expect that--where inclusion of minority groups within the national community is 
linked to national identification--it will have a greater impact on national identification levels 
among immigrant minorities who identify more strongly with their minority ethnic and religious 
groups. Yet does this hold empirically? To examine this, I test for interaction effects between mi-
nority group identification and group inclusion perceptions in affecting national identification 
levels. 
I begin by testing whether the extent to which minority men identify with their ethnic 
groups moderates the effects that their perceptions of co-ethnic or ethnic-minority inclusion in 
society have on their national identification--with separate analyses for each of the three dimen-
sions of inclusion (citizenship access, political elite attitudes, and social inclusion). Results are 
displayed in the left-hand column of Figure 36 below for tests of effects differences relating to 
each dimension. 
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Figure 36. Effect differences with minority identification? Tests for whether ethnic (left column) or reli-
gious identification (right colunm) moderates effects of group-related inclusion perceptions on national 
identification among immigrant minorities, both countries. OLS regression models, robust std. errors. 
Age, years of education and time in country were included in all models (coefficients not displayed here) 
(! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
Contrary to expectations, I find no significant interactions. Further, the only interaction term that 
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influence of perceived social inclusion of ethnic minorities on national identification (see bottom
left)--is negatively related to national identification, opposite to the expected effect. This indi-
cates that the national identification levels of minorities who only identify with their ethnic group
to a low or moderate extent are somewhat more likely to be influenced by the treatment of ethnic
minorities than those who identify with their ethnic group to a higher extent. It is difficult to in-
terpret why this might be the case; one can surmise that minorities who identify more highly with
their ethnic groups may be more established in their ethnic and local communities, making their 
likelihood of identifying with the national communities less susceptible to being damaged by 
negative signals in society. However, these are only interpretations, and the data are do show this
dynamic to be definite. Conducting similar tests for whether inclusion/exclusion of Muslims 
matters more for national identification among Muslims who identify more highly with Muslims 
as a group, I find no significant moderating effects. While religious identification has a some-
what positive (strengthening) effect on the this link in continuous analyses, these are not signifi-
cant; as the figures above show, there is little overall difference between individuals with low/
moderate religious identification and those with high. 
Yet it might be that it is not religious identification, per se, that matters for intensifying 
the effect of Muslim inclusion/exclusion in society on Muslims' national identification, their lev-
els of religiosity instead? To examine this, I conducted similar analyses testing for an interaction 
effect between perceived inclusion of Muslims and religiosity (measured using a 4-item index as 
outlined in section 4.4). Similar to those testing for identity effects, these reveal no significant 
moderating effects of religiosity. 
Taking the examination of effects differences based on ethnic and religious identification 
together, I find little consistent evidence in support of my expectation that the effects of group-
 227
related inclusion on national identification are greater among those minorities who identify more 
strongly with their ethnic and/or religious group, or even among those Muslims who are more re-
ligious (Hi8). I conclude that the data overall do not offer support for it. This is rather surprising: 
why should it be that minorities who feel looser ties to their ethnic or religious group react just as
much, or in some cases even more than, those who feel close ties? It is difficult to explain this 
with any certainty, but may be that minorities incorporate signals about the political and social 
status of their ethnic or religious groups less on the basis of how strongly they themselves identi-
fy with those groups, and more due to their being attributed those identities by society at large. 
This is somewhat supported by the perspective expressed in some of this study's in-depth inter-
views (as presented in the previous chapter and in a later section of this one), where young mi-
norities mentioned the importance of others' seeing them as outsiders for their own sense of be-
longing. Since one is not labeled by other people in society as being 'different' based on one's 
own personal identifications, but on how others' suppose one to be affiliated--and since it is 
reasonable to believe that minorities know this--it is very plausible that minority identification 
does not significantly moderate the effects of group inclusion signals in this chapter's analyses. 
6.3.2 Salience of Minority Issues at Societal Level
I turn now to the study's other hypothesized moderator of minority group-related inclusion on 
immigrant minorities' national identification: the salience of minority-related issues in the nation-
al society. Within this study I examine the role of such societal salience of issues related to immi-
gration, integration and minorities using measures of majority and minority exposure to media 
coverage of them. Section 5.4 in the preceding chapter presents these measures, comparing mean
levels of reported exposure to such coverage among both ethnic-majority and minority respon-
dents in Denmark and Sweden (see Table 27 on p. 201). While the inter-country gaps are larger 
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among immigrant minorities than among ethnic-majority respondents, significant differences be-
tween these respondent groups in the two countries show a consistently higher level of exposure 
to media coverage of these issues in the media in Denmark than in Sweden. Based on these find-
ings as well as on existing work comparing the two countries' media debates and political cul-
tures regarding immigrant and integration-related issues, I therefore consider minority-issue 
salience to be generally higher in Denmark than in Sweden. 
Building on my expectation that societal minority-issue salience moderates the effect of 
group-related inclusion on minorities' national identification level, I therefore test whether that 
impact is greater among immigrant minorities in Denmark than among their counterparts in Swe-
den. I examine whether respondents' country interacts significantly with their (composite) per-
ceptions of group inclusion in terms of citizenship availability, political elite attitudes and social 
inclusion. For all citizenship access signals, I find a null effect; for political elite attitudes toward
coethnics and social treatment of minorities, I find interaction effects in the expected direction 
(with slightly smaller effects in Sweden), though these are far from significant (see Table 36 be-
low, showing results of these analyses among minority men, since they have been shown to be 
more affected by group-inclusion signals).
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Citizenship access (CA) Political elite attitudes (PI) Social inclusion (SI)
Group CA + country + inter-
action
Group PI + country + inter-
action































































N 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77
R2 .139 .142 .142 .120 .123 .126 .127 .129 .137
adj. R2 .079 .069 .055 .058 .048 .037 .066 .055 .049
Table 36. Country-inclusion effect differences? Tests for whether national context moderates effects of 
group-related inclusion perceptions on national identification among immigrant minority men, both coun-
tries. OLS regression models, robust std. errors. Age, years of education and time in country were in-
cluded in all models (coefficients not displayed here) (! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
These findings indicate that it may be the case that signals of minority-group inclusion or exclu-
sion matter somewhat more for the national identification of minorities in the Danish context 
than in the Swedish, but this difference is very uncertain. The survey data thus give little support 
to the expectation that the effect of group inclusion or exclusion differs with societal context (see
hypothesis Hi7); however, the study's interviews suggest that group dynamics may matter more 
for minorities in Denmark. Interestingly, I find that perceiving oneself to be personally socially 
included corresponds more closely to seeing one's ethnic group and Muslims being treated well 
in society among minorities in Denmark than among those in Sweden. This divide is especially 
evident among those with the most negative perceptions of group social inclusion (see Figure 
37). 
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Figure 37. Relation of perceived personal social inclusion to perceived treatment of groups, minority 
men in Denmark vs. Sweden. Fitted values, OLS regression, robust std. errors (controlling for age, length
of education and time in country). 
The moderating effect of country on the influence group inclusion seen here is marginally signif-
icant (p = .077). Accordingly, separate analyses indicate the effect to be substantial and margin-
ally significant in Denmark (coefficient size of .29, p = .055), where it is estimated to account 
for about 8.8 % of the variance in perceive personal social inclusion; but not in Sweden (-.07, 
non-sig.), where it accounts for about 0.5 % of the variance. These effect sizes and differences 
remain virtually unchanged when the analysis includes respondents' levels of ethnic identifica-
tion. Thus I must revise this chapter's findings on the importance of group-inclusion factors for 
national identification, and specify that they are more important among minority men in Den-
mark than among the other respondent groups. 
6.4 National Identification among Young Minorities: Insights from Interviews
When young minorities with immigrant background are asked in personal interviews whether 
they personally feel Danish or Swedish and would call themselves such, how do they describe 
their feelings of identification, and what kinds of experiences or other factors do they bring up in 
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that access to citizenship contributes positively to feelings of belonging in society for some (as 
well as to certain rights and practical advantages); that negative political discussion and mes-
sages about groups in society create a feeling of 'discrimination' or lack of welcome that, for 
some, makes them feel less a part of the community; but that for most minorities, identification 
with the national community is most linked to a sense of being personally either accepted or 
made to feel 'other' in their interactions within society. In other words, minority individuals men-
tion effects on belonging when talking about citizenship and politics in the two countries, but 
most--when asked about how they identify--relate it most closely to the social dimension. 
Citizenship policy looms large in many scholarly accounts of how states define and limit 
the national community determining immigrant minorities, and of aspects thought likely to influ-
ence the process of immigrant integration into national societies. Yet both this study's survey data
(as shown above) and its in-depth interviews indicate that, while access to citizenship matters in 
both symbolic and practical ways for immigrant minorities, it has less influence on their sense of 
national belonging than social and political factors. Interview respondents varied in whether they
expressed that having or being able to get citizenship--or not being able to get it--made a differ-
ence for their feelings of belonging. Several respondents expressed both a sense of the practical 
benefits that come with a Danish or Swedish passport, along with one of the deeper signal they 
see in citizenship--that the naturalized person is a full member of society. On being asked how he
felt when he got Danish citizenship, a 22 year-old man with Arab background (who came to Den-
mark as a small child) replied:
For me it was first of all a really good thing practically--because I was stateless, so I didn't 
have a passport; I didn't belong to a country. And you can imagine, when you don't belong
to a country, you're very limited. So it's a practical benefit, first and foremost. And beyond 
that, it gives me a status in society that means that I have more of a say in the integration 
debate. I have a certain status in that I have a Danish passport. Not a very large status, and
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definitely not an equal status with an ethnic Dane, but a bigger one than if I just had a resi-
dence permit. (DK Interview 4, February 2013)
He regards his Danish citizenship as bringing useful practical rights and a deeper 'status' that--
while he doesn't feel it makes him equal to a majority-ethnic Dane in society--signifies that he 
has more right to voice his opinions in society, and most specifically about integration issues 
when they are debated. Another Danish respondent, a 30 year-old woman with Kurdish back-
ground and a Danish citizen, also felt the practical and symbolic worth of citizenship:
I was really happy about [getting citizenship]. You have to think about the fact that before 
that, I had, I think it was called a 'travel document,' but you couldn't travel anywhere with 
it... I couldn't really travel anyplace without applying for visas, and I don't know what else. 
It is so liberating and nice to be able to travel as a totally normal Dane, and to be able to 
enjoy it. And besides that I think it is a recognition that even though some Danes would not
see me as a Dane, I have something legal that says that I am a Dane. And of course I am 
glad of that. (DK Interview 3, February 2013)
What this woman mentions first is the travel rights and freedoms that having a Danish passport 
gives her; this freedom affects her life, and she feels it each time she travels, as she puts it, 'as a 
totally normal Dane.' But she also expresses the idea that citizenship serves as a recognition of 
her membership in the national community--and this 'something legal,' this document and legal 
status that citizenship gives, stays with her. As she expresses it, this legal status acts as a sort of 
rebuke to Danes who might not accept her as a full member of the nation. A 31 year-old man, 
who came from Kosovo as a child and is a naturalized Swedish citizen, mentioned appreciating 
both these aspects as well:
[The feeling of getting citizenship] was good, great... It was the best you can experience in 
Sweden... I can take my traveling bag and go where I want. Swedish citizenship stands for 
me having rights, that I am Swedish on paper at least. (SE Interview 4, December 2012)
Several interviewees emphasized that citizenship gives rights, for participation and for 
protection, for example if something happens to them while traveling abroad. Regardless of any 
deeper meanings of citizenship or the lack of them, most immigrant minorities have a sense of 
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the practical benefits of having Danish or Swedish citizenship. Several respondents just men-
tioned the practical aspects. An 18 year-old woman born in Denmark to Kurdish parents and a 
Danish citizen who does not identify as a Dane, appreciates the practical advantages of citizen-
ship when she needs to travel, and sees her rights in comparison to those with citizenship: 
Of course I don't think about having to take a test when I am going to travel, because I 
have a Danish passport--it's harder [when you don't have it] to come through, for example,
to USA. I have an Afghan friend, she's an Afghan citizen, and she had to visit the American
embassy... So [the meaning of it] is a little more practical. But I don't walk around thinking, 
'Yes!'  It's just a little folder. (DK Interview 1, January 2013)
This mix of responses make clear that for some immigrant minorities, citizenship and access to it
does have meaning for whether they feel they belong. But it is important to note that few men-
tioned citizenship explicitly when asked about whether they feel Danish/Swedish. As mentioned 
above, most responded to such questions by talking about the social dimension, and a few the po-
litical. Their statements about citizenship and its meaning, by and large, came instead when 
asked directly about how they felt when they were naturalized, or how they feel about having 
voting rights, or about the meaning of citizenship rules themselves. As the survey data and analy-
ses above in this chapter suggest, citizenship does not seem to be foremost in the minds of most 
immigrant minorities when they are asked about their identity. It is not something they think 
about very often, and when they do, most tend to focus on its practical benefits as those that af-
fect their lives the most. As the interview excerpts highlighted in this and the previous chapter in-
dicate, it is the social, and to some extent also the political, environment they live in that seems 
to have most direct bearing on whether, and to what extent, young immigrant minorities identify 
with the national community.
It is clear that the question of national identification is, for most of these individuals, far 
from simple. Most of them describe an ongoing process of developing and re-evaluating their 
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identities, where they reflect on both their personal feelings of belonging and the standards of be-
longing at work in the larger society. A 22 year-old man of Arab background in Denmark, who 
arrived as a small child, on being asked whether he personally feels Danish, answered: 
Yes and no. I feel that I am living out a Danish 'culture,' so in that way, yes. And on the 
other side no, because I am only considered to be a Dane to a certain extent by my co-citi-
zens. (DK Interview 4, February 2013)
In this way, he describes own 'Danish' way of living, within a Danish context, as being in conflict
with the limits placed by others on whether he can be Danish. On being asked whether his feel-
ings of being Danish had changed over the past several years, the same young man then respond-
ed that he 'feels more Danish,' because
I can abstract more from politics and news; and that means that I feel less discriminated. 
Because much of that feeling of discrimination that I have had, it comes from politics and 
news. And besides that, I think I have come to terms with these issues, surrounding inte-
gration in Denmark. Because I have worked with it and been active in it. So I have felt that I
have my place. I feel more now that I have my place in this society and that I participate to 
it, and that I live-- I have become more conscious of the cultures I am walking around with.
And so just getting clearer about some things, I have of course come to feel more Danish. 
(DK Interview 4, February 2013)
He first describes that a previous focus on Danish politics, and allowing his own identity to be 
tied to it, had given him a feeling of being discriminated against and making him feel less of a 
sense of belonging--similar to the relation between group political exclusion and lowered identi-
fication found among men using the survey data as presented in the previous sections. But he 
says that it has decreased now that he is more able to distance his own feelings from the political 
sphere. It is worth noting that he describes a process in which his engagement in working active-
ly on integration issues in society (through a job and through association work) has given him a 
sense of having a role in society, which makes him feel more Danish. This portrays political or 
societal engagement as leading to identification (rather than the reverse, as theorized in this dis-
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sertation), so his account is also worth noting for pointing out that the process of civic integration
may flow from engagement to identification instead of, or as well, as the reverse. 
A 22 year-old woman of Vietnamese background, born in Denmark, described a process 
in which her feelings of not being very Danish, due to her physical difference from ethnic-major-
ity Danes, were challenged by a more cultural-practice definition of being Danish, and by a 
friend considering her to be Danish:
I think, 'I don't don't look like the others;' people can quickly spot me on the street, like 
when I'm out with my friends. But it also depends on how you define Danishness. That's 
where it lies. If you define Danishness as something where you are fond of the Danish cul-
ture--you celebrate Christmas and all that--then I suppose I see myself as a Dane. But I 
actually had a fun conversation: I did this little quiz with a girlfriend, and I asked her, 'Do 
you see me as a Dane?' And she said, 'Yes.' And that surprised me. Because I didn't see 
myself as a Dane, but maybe more as a Vietnamese person. But that is maybe more the 
culture and values that I have been brought up with. I would maybe say half-half, maybe 
more to the Vietnamese side. (DK Interview 7, April 2013) 
Despite applying a physical definition of 'Danishness' to herself, she also uses a more cultural de-
finition, which in fact includes her. To these is added the realization of being considered to be 
Danish by her friend, which also seems to have made an impact on how she sees herself; and she 
lands at a combined identity.
While for some minorities the experience of being classified as 'other' has a strong influ-
ence on whether or not they identify with the nation, for others it is their own sense that they are 
a part of society that overrides negative experiences to some extent. One might say that for these 
people, their will to belong, and a certain normative idea that they should be able to call them-
selves Danish (regardless of how policy, politicians or other people may define it) actually in-
stills a sense of national identity in them. This dynamic--which we might call the 'will factor'--is 
not reliably measured in existing survey data, but it is nevertheless present in multiple inter-
views, and so should not be ignored. For these people, the idea of their own sense of identity ex-
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ists in tension with, but overrides, exclusionary definitions that others may hold. A 25 year-old 
Swedish man of Eritrean origin (who has grown up in Sweden since early childhood) expressed 
it this way:
I feel Swedish; but then I am also Eritrean and a little of other stuff too--so in my eyes it 
doesn't make me less Swedish even if it can do it in others' eyes--'You are Eritrean'--for 
my part, I feel Swedish... I do not see it competing with Swedishness in any way; I see that
I have an origin there. If I should choose one thing--it would be a very artificial choice--but 
I'd say I was more Swedish. But I never see it as a choice to make, not for myself anyway--
even if others can questioning your loyalty when you think that you belong to something 
else too. (SE Interview 2, December 2012) 
This young man has experienced that others may not always see him as Swedish, and may even 
insist to him that he is Eritrean rather than Swedish; but he insists that it should not have to be a 
choice, and declares that he feels Swedish anyway.  A 30-year old woman, a Dane of Palestinian 
origin, expresses a similar sentiment, but with more clarity about what she bases her feeling of 
being Danish on:
Yes, of course I consider myself to be Danish...It's that being Danish, for me, is not skin 
color or that my name is Anne or Lotte or whatever it could be. [It's] that I am a part of so-
ciety, that I contribute to society, that I feel myself a part of society. Those are just as im-
portant mechanisms for me. (DK Interview 3, January 2013) 
She acknowledges that definitions of Danishness based on skin color and having a typical Danish
name exist in some way in society, even as she rejects them for herself and bases her definition 
of a Dane in part on a contributive ideal and on feelings of belonging.
Interestingly, the individuals that seem to express the most satisfaction are those who de-
scribe having come to terms with holding two cultures within themselves and their way of doing 
things. They describe multiple identities that shift in salience by situation, but which they also 
hold simultaneously. A 20 year-old Swede of Bosnian background, a woman who has been in the
country since she was a small child, expressed this, and mentioned that her Bosnian identity 
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comes out in her doing certain things in ways that are a little different than what many Swedes 
would do:
I am both Swedish and Bosnian. It depends on the situation, but here in Rosengård center,
I am Swedish most of all. When you go there, you can see how everyone speaks their lan-
guage; I want to speak Swedish so that everyone understands: 'yes, but I am this as well.' 
So I want to be Bosnian this way and be the people we are--very open and fun, instead of 
planning something long ahead. [I] might be knocking on [the door], 'hey, are you at home,
can I have a cup of coffee?' (SE Interview 2, December 2013)
She carries both identities with her, and feels especially Swedish when she is in Rosengård, a 
neighborhood in Malmö with a high concentration of immigrant-background residents. While 
she prefers to speak Swedish to communicate to others that she is Swedish, she is also happy that
her Bosnian 'side' makes her more spontaneous than she sees most Swedes as being, and causes 
her to do things a little differently.
A Dane with Kurdish background, a 26 year-old woman, described the development of 
her present dual identity. While she only wanted to be Danish as a teenager, with time her aware-
ness of her other identities grew:
I don't feel like the Danish [part] has changed. But I feel that I have become more aware of 
my other backgrounds.... I have become more aware that I can easily be Kurdish and Turk-
ish--I know that my parents are not Turkish, but there is so much of Turkey in my life, and I 
can't be without it. I have become more aware of my Muslim identity. So I don't feel like 
my feeling of being Danish has changed, but it could seem like it has grown smaller be-
cause I have added more. Not because I think that it has become more or less. 
(DK Interview 8, April 2013).
As those other identities grew, she expressed elsewhere in her interview, she became more satis-
fied that she speaks several other languages; she began to see it as a strength rather than a charac-
teristic that revealed her difference. She expressed pride in holding and using good aspects from 
her different identities.
For some individuals, experiences of being perceived as not belonging to the nation they 
live in has been coupled with a corresponding experience visiting their family's 'homeland,' 
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resulting in a sense of rootlessness. A 22 year-old woman with Somali background in Denmark 
described her experience of this:
I don't know anything other than the Danish, to be honest. There where I come from, we 
fled from there when I was little. We were in Kenya for a couple of years and then we 
moved again to come here. I don't know anything else. I can barely [get along in] my own 
language. I cannot write my own language. I don't know what it means when people say, 
'If you want to be Danish, you may be Danish.' But again, on the other side, I will never 
consider myself as Danish because I don't have blonde hair and blue eyes, and light skin... 
I feel lost. I feel that I have no country-- countryless. That's what I feel. ... [This feeling] is 
actually something that has come [over time]. Because I was on summer holiday in our 
own homeland--where I really felt foreign--and I thought, I didn't belong at all down there. 
So it was like, 'Okay, I don't belong here at any rate.' (DK Interview 11, May 2013) 
Another young woman in Denmark, 18 years old and born in Denmark to Kurdish parents, told 
nearly exactly the same story:
I've come to the conclusion that I don't feel Danish, but don't feel Kurdish either. I don't 
really know what I am--because, on one side, I will disappoint and make them happy, and 
on the other side I will disappoint them, and so you sort of sit like--okay. A little lost on 
both sides. 
(Interviewer: Are you okay with the way you feel about it now?)
Not at all. It's not great. I went back to Kurdistan almost three years ago, after not being 
there for eight years. And it was day number two that I was there, someone told me that I 
am a European kid... It was a little like, 'okay, I get it!' But then when you come up here 
and walk along the street, then people can see that you aren't a Dane. So when I'm here, I 
know I'm an immigrant; and when I travel over there, I'm still an immigrant. So it's like--
well, I can't really go home, in a way. (DK Interview 1, January 2013) 
For this young woman, a sense of alienation in both her parents' home country and in Denmark 
combines to make her feel 'lost,' just as the interviewee with Somali background just above. Sto-
ries of country-of-origin experiences acting as catalysts for identity formation such as these were 
also told by other respondents; though for some others, those experiences (of feeling alienated in 
the 'home country' or realizing in that context how much one's thinking or behavior was quite 
Danish/Swedish) were instrumental in giving them a firmer sense of their Danish or Swedish 
identity.
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Finally, for those who immigrated as adults or as older children, it can simply be difficult 
to think of oneself as 'Danish' or 'Swedish.' As a 28 year-old man who immigrated to Denmark 
from Syria in 2009 said, 
No, I grew up in Syria, from 'old roots' there. But I can still pay attention to what is hap-
pening in society... Not [so much] integrating, but [more] 'living with.' (DK Interview 2, Jan-
uary 2013)
Another man, who is 31 years old and has lived in Sweden since immigrating from Bosnia at 
about 11 years old, said that he did not think he could fully become Swedish: 
I will never be Swedish and I will never become Swedish, unfortunately it's just something 
you cannot just get. Maybe someday my future children or grandchildren will be Swedish. I
was not born in Sweden, my parents were not born in Sweden; when we arrived in Swe-
den we didn't even know where Sweden was ... (SE Interview 4, December 2012)
While it might be possible for his own descendants to be Swedish, his being an immigrant and 
memories being totally foreign in Sweden when he first arrived mean for him that he will never 
fully be a member of the national community. 
While these accounts of Danish or Swedish identity and identity formation (or its lack) 
cannot confirm or disconfirm this chapter's analyses on how national models drive identification,
they describe the kinds of experiences that inform immigrant minorities' levels of identification, 
and the feelings that accompany them, adding an extra dimension to our understanding of what 
leads to such identification. They also lend support to the notion that, while citizenship and polit-
ical inclusion matters for some individuals' national identification, it is the social dimension of 
interaction within a society that seems to shape it most.
6.5 The Inclusion-Identification Model: Belonging in Denmark and Sweden
Overall, then, can we say that working national identities operating in these two national con-
texts, as perceived by immigrant minorities, actually influence those minorities' national identifi-
cation, and what can we say about how they do so? In brief, I find that signals of inclusion in the 
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national community do matter for national identification, but that personal social inclusion in 
particular is influential. Signals about whether minority groups are included legally, politically 
and socially in the national community (as perceived by minorities) matter more for minority 
men's national identification than women's; among Muslims, inclusion of Muslims as a group is 
more influential than inclusion of their ethnic groups or ethnic minorities in general. Somewhat 
surprisingly, these group-inclusion effects are not clearly moderated by minorities' own levels of 
identification with their ethnic or religious groups. They are also not significantly different in the
two national contexts studied--though they are slightly stronger among minorities in Denmark. 
These group-inclusion effects among men also seem chiefly to occur through personal social in-
clusion. In interviews, young minorities mentioned political and social inclusion (or exclusion) 
more in relation to their feelings of national belonging, more than citizenship and access to it. In 
the interviews, more of the respondents in Denmark mentioned being affected by group dynam-
ics in society--for example the debate around immigration and integration, while fewer did so in 
Sweden. While it seems like the process of forming a sense of national belonging is more influ-
enced by societal debates about immigrants, integration and Islam in Denmark than in Sweden--
where those issues are less persistently politicized--the survey data do not give strong conclu-
sions on this point. However, they indicate that minorities' national identification is greatly 
shaped by the social inclusion they perceive, that men's and women's identification is differently 
affected by group-inclusion dynamics, and that women are somewhat more likely than men to 
identify nationally as they have spent more time in the country.
Given the findings presented in this chapter, and the indications that minorities in Sweden
have on average more positive perceptions of inclusion in the national community on most per-
sonal and group-related dimensions than those in Denmark do (presented in Chapter 5), to what 
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extent do identification levels differ between the two countries? While the study's data may not 
be fully representative due to the potential for non-response bias, they give some important indi-
cations of how young immigrant minorities identify with the two national communities.
In absolute levels of national identification, minority respondents in Sweden are found to 
identify slightly more highly with the national community as a group than their Danish counter-
parts do (an insignificant difference of .036, out of 1). When controlling for gender age, years of 
education and time in country, the difference accounted for by country remains at a similar .029. 
However, this chapter's findings--of higher levels of national identification among minority 
women than men, and of different responses to group inclusion among men and women--indicate
that it may be helpful to compare perceived inclusion levels among men and women in the two 
countries, and in turn examine whether these are leading to meaningful differences in identifica-
tion outcomes. 
Focusing here on the inclusion dimension indicated to have the strongest effects on mi-
norities' national identification levels, social inclusion, I compare perceptions among minority 
men and women in the two countries. Figure 38 below shows their perceptions of the treatment 
of minorities in Denmark (left box, using the same 2-item index outlined in the previous chap-
ter), and of their own personal social inclusion (right box, with the 3-item index used 
previously).
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Figure 38. Social inclusion perceptions among minority men and women in Denmark vs. Sweden--relat-
ing to ethnic minorities and Muslims (left box) and to respondents' own personal inclusion (right box). 
For the group-related perceptions, mean levels of ethnic-majority responses are also displayed. 
Comparisons based on simple t-tests. 
These graphs give further insight to the study's comparisons of how immigrant minorities per-
ceive inclusion in Denmark vs. Sweden (presented extensively in Chapter 5) by showing those 
perceptions among the two gender groups in each country in relation to one another and to their 
same-gender counterparts in the other country. As the left-hand graph shows, minority men in 
Denmark have the most negative perceptions of group inclusion; their perceptions are far lower 
that those of minority men in Sweden, and somewhat (though not significantly) lower that those 
of minority women in Denmark. Minority men and women in Sweden have quite similar percep-
tions, with those of men slightly higher, on average. It is interesting to compare the distance be-
tween the group-inclusion perceptions of each gender-country group of minorities with those of 
their ethnic-majority counterparts of the same gender, in the same country. In Sweden, both eth-
nic-majority men and women perceive similar levels of inclusion for ethnic and Muslim minori-
ties, in fact both slightly more negative, on average, than those of minorities in Sweden. Among 
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women in Denmark, the perceptions of minority and ethnic-majority women are also similar. But
among men in Denmark, the quite negative perceptions of minority men stand in sharp contrast 
to those of ethnic-majority men, which are the highest of any group. Thus minority men in Den-
mark, see a situation for minorities in their country that is much more negative than that seen by 
either ethnic-majority men of the same age, by minority women in Denmark, and by similar mi-
nority men across the border in Sweden. 
The right-hand graph shows perceptions of personal social inclusion among these same 
groups. Once again, minority men in Denmark feel least included, followed by women in Den-
mark, then men in Sweden. Minority women in Sweden feel the most included of all groups, on 
average. The differences between men in Denmark and Sweden, and women in Denmark and 
Sweden are significant; while the difference between minority men and women in Sweden is 
marginally significant (p  = .07).
These comparisons are consistent with the comparisons displayed in Chapter 5, showing 
consistently higher levels of inclusion perceived by immigrant minorities in Sweden than by 
those in Denmark. However, these numbers (together with the perceptions of other forms of in-
clusion not shown here) tell us that there are important differences between minority men and 
women. In Denmark, where the gender divide in perceptions is widest, minority men have con-
sistently more negative perceptions than minority women. In Sweden, minority men and women 
either have similar perceptions, or women have more positive perceptions. It is not possible with-
in the scope of this study to determine whether it is the case that minority men and women expe-
rience different levels of inclusion in society, or whether they form different perceptions of inclu-
sion even under similar conditions an experiences. However, the data indicate that men tend to 
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have less positive perceptions than women in similar contexts; in this, the study joins in an ongo-
ing dialogue about how minority experience may differ between the genders.
Sociologists and social psychologists have long examined whether men or women mem-
bers of groups with low- or questionable status experience more bias and societal exclusion. Be-
ginning this debate were those who argued that minority women are subject to 'double jeopardy,' 
experiencing bias relating to both their gender and their ethnic-minority group affiliation (Beale 
1970; Reid and Comas-Diaz 1990; Epstein). They were answered by others who argued that mi-
nority men are more likely than women to experience bias because they are perceived as 'proto-
typical' for their minority group. Beginning with Sidanius and Pratto's (1999) 'subordinate male 
target hypothesis,' this has been further investigated and has also been termed 'intersectional in-
visibility,' since ethnic-minority women are not likely to be 'seen' as prototypes of either their 
gender or their ethnic group (Purdie-Vaughns et al. 2008). Recent empirical investigations 
comparing these theories have lent more support to this latter--finding minority men to experi-
ence somewhat more biased treatment (Sesko and Biernat 2010; Navarrete et al. 2010; Veenstra 
2013). By indicating that immigrant-minority women perceive more inclusion than men in the 
societies they live in, this study's data do not dispute those more recent findings. 
It is not clear whether there is a good explanation for the comparatively larger gaps be-
tween perceived inclusion among minority men and women in Denmark, as compared to Swe-
den. This study's survey data cannot determine why this is the case. However, it may be that such
a divide tends to become more evident in contexts where the overall level of inclusion is lower--
minority men and women's perceptions may vary more when faced with sharper levels of exclu-
sion in a given context, than when there is little to confront; yet this is guesswork, and must be 
food for future research.
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Yet this chapter's analyses have revealed is something not so different from the supposi-
tion just made--that when minority men and women have formed perceptions of their own and 
their groups' inclusion in society, men with quite negative perceptions are likely to express lower 
levels of national identification than women with similar perceptions. We are thus seeing a pro-
gressive worsening (from a perspective that values positive civic integration outcomes) in the 
process from country context to perceptions to identification for minority men in Denmark that is
likely to leave them with the lowest national identification levels. Assuming that it is correct that 
the Danish context sends more exclusionary signals to minorities than the Swedish (based on our
knowledge of the two cases, as presented in Chapter 3), minorities in Denmark form more nega-
tive perceptions than those in Sweden, with those of minority men in Denmark more negative 
than those of minority women in the same country. There are thus more minority men than 
women in Denmark who have quite negative perceptions; of those who have similarly negative 
perceptions of their groups' inclusion, the men are likely to have significantly lower levels of na-
tional identification than the women. 
Examining levels of national identification among immigrant-minority men and women 
in the two countries, this is in fact what I find. The figures below compare national identification 
levels of minority men and women in the two countries (upper box), and since there are some-
what more recent immigrants in the Swedish group, of 1.5 and 2nd-generation only (lower box). 
Both graphs also show the mean levels of identification among ethnic-majority respondents of 
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the same gender and country for compar-
ison. The graphs report mean levels for 
each group, and significant differences 
while controlling for age, years of educa-
tion, employment and time in country.
In the upper graph--which in-
cludes young immigrant minorities of the 
first, 1.5 and second generation (N=220), 
we observe a marked difference between 
minority men and minority women over-
all and within each country, with only a 
slightly difference between men in the 
two countries, and virtually no difference 
between women. The only group to have 
a national identification level that is sig-
nificantly lower than ethnic-majority re-
spondents of the same gender and coun-
try are minority men in Denmark; 
though, it must be pointed out that ethnic-majority male respondents in Sweden reported identi-
fying somewhat lower than those in Denmark did (.76 in Sweden as opposed to .80 in Denmark).
Yet there are comparatively more first-generation immigrants in the Swedish immigrant-minority
group than the Danish; how do national identification levels compare among only those who 
have been in the country since age 12 or longer (1.5 and 2nd generation)? The lower graph dis-
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plays this, and here we see a greater (though not quite significant) gap between minority men in 
Denmark and Sweden, and a small gap between minority men and women in Sweden. Minority 
women in each country have higher national identification levels than the men, with a significant
men/women gap in Denmark; and the groups in Sweden have higher levels than their counter-
parts of the same gender in Denmark. Though the small numbers of respondents (N = 167) keep 
most of these gaps from being statistically significant, they reveal a clear patter in how gender 
and context are forming different levels of national identification. 
Since majority respondents from Denmark and Sweden (sampled and surveyed using ex-
actly the same methods as the minorities in focus here) differ somewhat in their national identifi-
cation levels (with Danish-majority men identifying slightly more highly than majority-Swedish 
respondents), a comparison that takes different typical levels of identification in each national 
context into account seems likely to present a more accurate picture. To do so, I calculated a pre-
dicted national identification level for each minority individual based on those of ethnic-majority
respondents in each country, and taking account of each respondent's gender, age, years of educa-
tion and whether they were employed. Taking the difference between each minority individual's 
reported national identification level and the individual predicted level, I now compare im-
migrant-minority men and women in the two countries, in terms of that difference from the pre-
dicted, national-majority based level. This is, then, a comparison of national identification levels 
between minorities in the two countries, presented in terms of how much they differ, on average, 
from the levels of ethnic-majority respondents of the same gender and employment status, and of
similar age and length of education. Figure 39 displays these comparisons, first among all im-
migrant minorities in each country (left box, controlling for time in country), among all im-
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migrant minorities separated into gender groups (middle box, controlling for time in country), 
and finally among 1.5 and second-generation minorities (left box).
Figure 39. Differences in national identification levels by country and gender among immigrant-back-
ground minorities in Denmark vs. Sweden, in terms of mean differences from predicted level (as based 
on national majority respondents, taking gender, age and years of education into account). Left box: mi-
norities in DK vs. SE; middle box: minority men and women in DK vs. SE; Right box: 1.5 & 2nd-genera-
tion men and women in DK vs. SE.
The comparison of national identification levels with minorities in each country (left-hand box) 
shows that those in Sweden have somewhat higher levels, as compared with ethnic-majority indi-
viduals, than those in Denmark do; but this overall difference is not significant. However, when 
country and gender, and their interaction, are taken into account using this same measure (middle
box), I find almost no difference between men and women in Sweden, who identify slightly less 
than ethnic-majority individuals of similar gender, age, length of education and employment sta-
tus; but I find significant differences between men and women in Denmark (p = .028), and be-
tween men in the two countries (p = .047). The third analysis, including only 1.5 and second-
generation minorities (right-hand box), is similar but--as with the comparisons of absolute levels 
previously) shows an even clearer gap between men and women in Denmark: 1.5 and second-
generation men in Denmark report identifying with the national community .10 lower, on aver-
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age, than ethnic-majority men of similar age, education and employment status; while women in 
Denmark and both men and women in Sweden report levels that are very similar to those of sim-
ilar ethnic-majority respondents.
The study's overall expectations--that differing levels of inclusion in the two countries 
would likely result in higher levels of national identification among immigrant minorities in 
Sweden than in Denmark--turn out only to be true among minority men. Given the consistently 
observed gaps in perceived inclusion in the two countries (as shown in Chapter 5), it is perhaps 
surprising that these gaps are not larger. Yet as some of this chapter's analyses indicate, the ef-
fects of inclusion perceptions on national identification are clearest when those perceptions are 
more negative, and the inclusion of minority groups has a considerable effect on men's national 
identification, but little on women's. It is likely that this state of affairs, where some inclusion 
perceptions have larger effects in some cases than others, and among men more than women, 
dampens the overall effect that the quite different levels of perceived inclusion can have in the 
two countries--while a marked difference in national identification levels was expected, only a 
partial difference is found. 
These findings will be further discussed in Chapter 8. There they will be combined with 
insights from Chapter 7, which examines how different types of inclusion in the national com-
munity, and identification with it, influence immigrant minority political participation.
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Chapter 7. 
Findings: How Inclusion and Identification Affect Political Participation
In investigating the impacts of working national identities on civic integration outcomes, this 
study now proceeds to examine whether and how inclusion and identification play a role in dri-
ving young immigrant minorities' political participation. I begin this chapter with an overview of 
reported levels of participation--through voting and through other forms of political action--
among the groups of interest. 
I then examine whether and how perceived inclusion levels affect political participation--
first as voting or intending to vote (section 7.2), and second as participating in other forms of po-
litical action (section 7.3). For each of these two types of participation, I first investigate the rela-
tions between (perceived) inclusion and participation, and then examine whether national identi-
fication plays a role in driving it. In Chapter 2 I argued that inclusion and identification are likely
to affect participation in particular via four key facilitating attitudes: political interest, civic 
norms, trust in political institutions, and political efficacy. I therefore investigate the extent to 
which inclusion and identification may be said to influence such attitudes, and in turn how such 
attitudes affect participation. And finally, I examine the role of associational engagement in 
spurring participation. I then reflect on the extent to which these support or disconfirm the partic-
ipation-related hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 (Hi9-Hi23). Finally, the chapter concludes 
with an examination of the extent to which differences between minority participation in Den-
mark and Sweden, where they exist, are explained by these dynamics. 
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7.1 Reported Political Participation
Before examining what factors influence young immigrant-background minorities' participation 
in elections and other forms of political action, let us examine the rates at which this study's ma-
jority and minority respondents reported participating in both Denmark and Sweden. Though 
these reports may not fully represent participation rates (and factors influencing them) among 
young minorities in the two countries more generally, they offer a basis for comparison. In gener-
al, electoral participation (both reported and intended) is somewhat higher among majority than 
minority respondents and higher in Sweden than in Denmark, while reported engagement in oth-
er kinds of political action is more varying between the groups and countries. The following sub-
sections present this in more detail.
7.1.1 Electoral Participation
As described in section 5.2, the study measured electoral participation by asking respondents 
whether they:
• voted in the last parliamentary election;
• voted in the last local election; 
• would vote if the election were held tomorrow (and they were eligible to vote).
Response options for actual voting questions were 'yes/ no/ was not eligible'; response options 
for whether they 'would vote' were simply 'yes' or 'no'.72 
Using simple comparisons of reported rates of voting and intended voting among young-
adult respondents of majority and immigrant-minority background in each of the two countries, I
find that rates of both reported and intended voting are higher in Sweden than in Denmark, and 
72. As described in section 5.2, I exclude from calculation of voting rates those who reported not being eligible or 
who had not reached voting age when the last parliamentary or local election was held in each country, to ensure that
reported voting rates are as equivalent as possible. 
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in each country are higher among majority 
than minority respondents. As shown in the 
figures below, nearly all ethnic-majority 
Swedes reported voting in the last parliamen-
tary election (97.1 %), compared to 92.6 % 
of majority Danes. In each of the two coun-
tries, significantly fewer minority than ma-
jority respondents reported voting in the par-
liamentary elections than their majority 
counterparts (including only those who were 
eligible to vote, due to age or legal status)-
-83.3 % in Sweden, and 77.1 % in Denmark, 
in both countries a gap of 14-15 percentage 
points. Turning to local voting, we see even 
wider inter-country and majority/minority 
gaps: while 92.6 % of ethnic-majority 
Swedes report voting in the latest local elec-
tion, only 79.2 % of majority Danes do. In 
each country, ethnic minorities lag behind by 
approximately 20 percentage points (a sig-
nificant difference in both cases), with 72.6 
% of minorities in Sweden saying they voted, and 59.3 % of minorities in Denmark saying so. 
Figure 40. Reported voting and intentions to vote among ethnic-majority and immigrant minority respon-
dents in Denmark and Sweden (who have been in the country 2+ years); significant differences displayed
are results of t-tests.
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There is, however, an important difference in the two countries' electoral institutions that 
help explain the greater difference between parliamentary and local voting rates in Denmark than
in Sweden. Local voting rates in Sweden are almost surely increased by the structure of Swedish 
elections, which organizes voting for municipal, regional and parliamentary candidates to be held
at the same time on the second Sunday in September every four years, meaning that all voters 
who come out to vote in national elections are also presented with the local and regional ballots. 
This is not the case in Denmark, where municipal/regional and parliamentary elections each fol-
low their own schedule -- with municipal elections on the third Tuesday of November every four 
years, and parliamentary elections held no less often than every four years, at the sitting govern-
ment's discretion. The last elections to be held before this study's data were collected were as 
follows:
• Sweden - 19 September 2010 (municipal/regional/parliamentary)
• Denmark - 15 September 2011 (parliamentary), 17 November 2009 (municipal/regional)
Due to this structural difference, and because many of the young minorities whose politi-
cal participation and attitudes we wish to study were either too young or did not have voting 
rights at the time of the election, it is helpful to examine their intentions to vote (assuming eligi-
bility) as an alternative measure to reports of actual voting. In addition, since the latest elections 
were held well before the survey data were collected (1-3 years prior), intended voting may en-
able a more accurate analysis of how the way minorities experience conditions in society relates 
to their willingness to participate politically. As an attitudinal measure of intended participation, 
however, it is only a very approximate measure of likely participation. 
A greater proportion of respondents of both majority and minority background in both 
countries responded that yes, they would vote in an election, were it held tomorrow and they had 
eligibility, than reported voting in actual elections. In Sweden, 100 % of ethnic-majority respon-
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dents answered affirmatively, while 93.3 % of minorities did so. The numbers were slightly low-
er in Denmark, with 95.1% of majority respondents and 88 % of minorities saying yes. Thus the 
likely voting numbers follow reported voting behavior in being lower in Denmark than in Swe-
den and lower among minorities than majority respondents, but those gaps are much smaller for 
this measure. 
The study's respondents report participating at a higher rate than recent election studies in
the two countries indicate, among both the Danish and Swedish ethnic majorities and ethnic mi-
norities. For instance, Bhatti and Hansen report (2010, using official participation data) that 
while 67.6 % of ethnic-majority Danes (age 18 +) voted in the 2009 local election, only 36.9 % 
of immigrants and 31.7 % of descendants from non-Western countries did so. For all groups, 
these numbers are well below those reported (in the middle box on the previous page). Likewise, 
77 % of majority-Swedish 18-29 year-olds voted in the 2010 local election, while only 54 % of 
18-29 year-olds with foreign background did so; among those 30 years or older, those rates were 
87 and 61 %, respectively (Olofsson 2012).  This upward distortion of self-reporting is likely due
to two factors: first, because self-reported voting rates tend to be inflated due to respondents' be-
lieving it to be a desirable response (though this is likely mitigated somewhat by the survey's 
self-administered format) (Belli, Traugott and Beckmann 2001; Kreuter, Presser and Tourangeau 
2008); and second, it is possible that those individuals from the study's representative sample 
who chose to participate are more active, participatory individuals than those who did not re-
spond to the survey. Thus the data may actually be closer to reflecting the behavior and attitudes 
of this study's respondents than they at first appear when compared to overall election data from 
the two countries, and--given the assumption argued for in Chapter 4 that the study's respondents
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in the two countries similar enough to provide good ground for comparison, may thus still pro-
vide an opportunity to analyze factors that influence participation and willingness to participate.
In addition, comparison with other survey data conducted among people of ethnic-majori-
ty and immigrant background in Denmark does not point to this study's reported voting levels be-
ing distorted more greatly than self-reports from larger, more representative studies. By contrast, 
Danish young adult respondents of majority and minority-ethnic background aged 18-34, re-
sponding to the Integration Ministry's 'civic citizenship' study, reported having voted in the 2007 
parliamentary election at 95.5 % and 80.6 %, respectively; reported having voted in the 2005 lo-
cal elections at rates of 93 % and 75.6 %, respectively; and answered yes to the 'would vote' 
question at rates of 98.6 % and 97.6 %, respectively (majority N = 217, minorities N = 1234) 
(Government Working Group for Better Integration 2011).
Taking these aspects into account, the voting and intended voting data in this study still 
provide some interesting ground for comparison between majority and minority young adults in 
the two countries. However, the small number of respondents and the limited variation in voting/
intended voting outcomes observed among them are likely to somewhat limit the study's 
analysis.
7.1.2 Political Action
As outlined in Chapter 4 above, political action was measured through a series of yes/no items  
asking respondents whether they had been involved in different forms of action 'to positively af-
fect something in Danish/Swedish society' within the past 12 months; these were then grouped 
into five types (see Table 16, p. 157): volunteering, engaging with money by donating or boy-
cotting, contacting political decision-makers, writing into newspapers or discussion forums, or 
engaging in activities that involve physical presence such as meetings or demonstrations. Using 
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these types, a total measure is taken of how many types of political activity each respondent has 
engaged in. 
Figure 41 below shows reported rates of participation in each type of political action 
among ethnic-majority and minority respondents in the two countries. More respondents respon-
dents in all four groups reported engaging in action through money--including donating money, 
buying certain products and boycotting certain products--than in any other type. 71 % of ethnic-
majority Danes and 81.3 % of majority Swedes reported doing so, while 63.4 % of minorities in 
Denmark and 61.3 % of those in Sweden said they had done so. Comparing these rates of in-
volvement, only those of majority and minority respondents in Sweden were significantly differ-
ent from each other. 
The second most reported type among three of the four groups was action through written
communication--which included signing petitions (in paper or online), writing to a newspaper or 
news site, writing online posts, and contacting media with concerns. Majority and minority re-
spondents in Denmark report having engaged in this written form of political action at nearly 
identical rates (44% and 41.8%), while in Sweden significantly more majority than minority re-
spondents have participated this way (61.2 %, as compared to 46.2 %). 
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Figure 41. Engagement in political action, by type, as reported by ethnic-majority and minority respon-
dents in Denmark and Sweden. Group means and intergroup comparisons (T-tests). 
The third type of political action, which includes contacting local or national political 
leaders, public employees or civic associations, is that with the lowest reported participation 
rates among most groups. While in Denmark minorities engaged in such action at a higher rate 
(20.5 %) than ethnic majority young adults (12.1 %), in Sweden it was significantly more majori-
ty than minority individuals who reported doing so (30.7 %, as compared to 16.7 %). 
The last of the four types includes the more collective forms of action--attending meet-
ings and demonstrations, collecting funds for causes, and working in a political part. More young
adults from Denmark than from Sweden reported participating in at least one of these ways. In 
both countries, minorities reported doing so at higher rates than majority-background respon-
dents. Minorities in Denmark reported engaging in such 'activist' political action more than any 
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other group--44 % of them, significantly more than the 27 % of ethnic-majority Danes who did 
so. In Sweden, 31.2 % of minorities reported such involvement, as compared to 24 % of ethnic-
majority Swedes. One can say that the general differences between rates of involvement in these 
four different types of action reflects, in part, the attention, time and possibly social resources 
they involve: while participating through one's wallet may be, for most people in Danish or 
Swedish society, the least intensive forms, actively contacting officials or engaging in collective 
action may be said to be the most intensive. However, this chapter's analyses will examine how 
different factors involving inclusion and other experiences may help to explain why some people
(in certain groups) engage these ways, while others do not.
In addition to these four 'types' of political action, it is helpful to compare these young 
adults' rates of involvement in political action generally, by combining the measures. As de-
scribed first in section 4.5, to do so I have constructed a simple composite measure that reflects 
the sum of types each individual has reported engaging in. The mean political action scores for 
ethnic-majority and minority respondents in each of the two countries are reported in Figure 42. 
Figure 42. Mean number of political action types engaged in, as reported by ethnic-majority and minori-
ty respondents (in country 2+ years) in Denmark and Sweden (with intergroup comparisons, T-tests). 
Possible range: 0-4.
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As may be seen here, ethnic-majority Swedes engage, on average, in significantly more types of 
political action than ethnic-majority Danes and than minorities in Sweden. As the Figure on the 
previous page indicates, this is largely accounted for by their higher rates of involvement in ac-
tion through money and in written communication (top two types shown in Figure 41). In Den-
mark, however, it is minority individuals who tend to participate in more types of political action
than their ethnic majority counterparts (thought the difference is not significant). This is largely 
accounted for by their higher rates of participation in contacting officials and media and in more 
activist forms of political action. Most, thought not all, of the analyses of factors influencing po-
litical action in section 8.3 will use this composite measure. 
In Chapter 2, I theorized that national identification, as well as social and political inclu-
sion themselves, were likely to influence political participation among immigrant-background 
minorities. In particular, I presented expectations that higher levels of national identification (it-
self shown in the previous chapter to be influenced by political and especially social inclusion) 
were likely to increase political participation rates (Hi9), in part via increased interest in politics 
within society (Hi10) via and holding of valued civic norms (Hi11). I also hypothesized that 
higher levels of (perceived) social inclusion, more positive political elite attitudes and greater na-
tional identification were likely to increase minorities' trust in political institutions and their 
sense of political efficacy (H12-14, H17-18). Political trust, I argued, was likely to affect voting 
positively (H15) but other forms of political action negatively (H16); while political efficacy was
likely to affect both kinds of participation positively (H19-20). I then presented some alternative 
arguments suggesting that more negative perceptions of political inclusion of minority groups 
might actually spur greater political participation (H21). And finally, I suggested that engage-
ment in associational life was expected to increase both electoral and non-electoral participation. 
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To investigate these, sections 7.2 and 7.3 examine, first, the relationships of the main 
forms of perceived inclusion and of national identification to voting and then to other types of 
political action. Each section (focusing on voting and political action, respectively) then investi-
gates whether inclusion and identification seem to affect that form of participation via the politi-
cal attitudes theorized to be likely influencers of participation--political interest, civic norms, po-
litical trust and political efficacy. Finally, each looks at the relation of several forms of 
associational engagement to participation, on their own and in conjunction with inclusion and 
identification factors. The chapter concludes with reflections on how we may understand these 
processes and whether they are bringing divergent outcomes in Denmark and Sweden.
7.2 Inclusion and Identification's effects on Electoral Participation
Similar to the analysis of national identification in Chapter 6, I first examine whether and to what
extent the different forms of inclusion theorized in this project have an impact on young adult 
minorities' voting. Since a good number of this study's respondents ineligible to vote in the previ-
ous elections due to being too young or to not having voting rights (and since differences in citi-
zenship rights are a part of the two national models whose effects are investigated here), I believe
it is preferable to conduct the main analyses using a measure of respondents' intention to vote, 
rather than reported voting behavior. This not only makes it possible to investigate the theorized 
relationships among more of the study's respondents; it also ensures that the analysis can include 
individuals with various levels of political rights in both national systems in as equivalent a 
manner as possible.
As described previously, respondents were asked whether they 'would vote if the election 
were held tomorrow and you were eligible to vote.' To what extent was minorities' intention to 
vote related to perceived inclusion of oneself and one's minority groups in the form of citizenship
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availability, political elite attitudes and social inclusion, in comparison to other factors such as 
gender, age, education and time in country? To analyze this, I use logistic regression to estimate 
the likelihood of intending to vote, with separate models for the three inclusion types (in personal
and group forms), followed by a combined model, and finally a simpler model including the fac-











   - personal 2.61 (2.83) 2.66 (3.04)
   - group -.14 (1.02) -1.66 (.90)
political elite att.
   - personal 4.55 (1.29) *** 5.11 (1.51) *** 5.09 (1.21) ***
   - group 1.58 (1.84) 2.09 (1.66)
social inclusion
   - personal 1.70 (1.04) 1.10 (1.00)
   - group 1.28 (1.09) -.84 (1.18)
gender (1=woman) .37 (.60) .19 (.65) .17 (.61) .08 (.70) .21 (.65)
age (years) .12 (.16) -.00 (.11) .04 (.11) .09 (.18) .00 (.10)
education (years) -.07 (.14) -.07 (.16) -.07 (.15) -.09 (.16) -.07 (.16)
time in country -.14 (.16) -.06 (.09) -.07 (.09) -.17 (.19) -.06 (.08)
constant -.11 (2.67) .30 (.67) .87 (.87) -1.84 (2.97) .65 (.61)
N 152 152 152 152 152
pseudo-R2 .028 .181 .057 .220 .171
Table 37. Effects of perceived inclusion on intended voting (0/1) among immigrant-background minori-
ties in the country 2+ years (logistic regression, robust std. errors); ! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p 
< .001).
As the table shows, of the inclusion dimensions examined, only political elite attitudes as per-
ceived towards 'people like me' have a significant impact on whether or not immigrant minorities
as a whole group intend to vote, in both the inclusion-type models and the combined model.73 
Using the 'simple model' reported above, such perceived concern accounts for approximately 
16.2 % of the variance in probability of intending to vote (Shapley value indicating the marginal 
73. These coefficients are not meaningfully different when each level (personal vs. group) of each inclusion 
dimensions is analyzed in separate models. (Additional checks with centered versions of the continuous background 
variables--age, years of education and time in country--revealed no meaningful differences in coefficients, etc.).
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pseudo-R2).74 In these models, the effects of personal access to citizenship and perceived politi-
cian attitudes to respondents' own groups are insignificant in the combined model, but retain sub-
stantial effect sizes. Further analysis with personal access to citizenship reveals that it explains 
little variation in intended voting among minorities as a combined group. However, upon closer 
inspection I find that the respondents' likelihood of voting is somewhat more closely tied to 
whether they see politicians as having negative attitudes toward their ethnic and religious groups 
in Denmark than in Sweden (see Figure 43). 
Figure 43. Intentions to vote as related to perceptions of politician attitudes to minority groups, Denmark
vs. Sweden. Marginal effects, logistic regression, controlling for gender, age, years of education and 
time in country, robust std. errors.
As the figure above shows, the difference lies chiefly between minorities in the two countries 
who see politicians as having more negative attitudes towards their ethnic groups and towards 
Muslims: whereas minorities in Sweden with such perceptions generally intend to vote, fewer of 
those in Denmark do so. At the same time, minorities in the two countries with quite positive 
perceptions intend to vote, on average, at equal rates. In logistic regression, the influence of per-
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74. All marginal pseudo-R2 statistics for maximum likelihood models estimated using the user-created "Shapley2" 
module in Stata (author Florian Wendelspiess Chavez Juarez). 
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country (i.e., the interaction term is not significant), yet as the figure shows, the likelihood of mi-
norities' intending to vote is marginally significantly (p = .096) and substantially related to their 
ideas of how politicians approach their groups in Denmark, while it is not in Sweden. This is 
reminiscent of the suggestive findings made in relation to identification in the previous chapter, 
where group-inclusion effects were somewhat stronger (thought not significantly so) in Denmark
than in Sweden. It also corresponds somewhat to findings from interviews presented in Chapter 
5, which indicated that more interviewees mentioned noticing and being affected by political dy-
namics relating to minorities specifically in Denmark than did so in Sweden. Additional analyses
reveal that politician attitudes towards minority groups, as minorities themselves perceive them, 
have a greater effect (interaction term marginally significant at p = .060) on how much minori-
ties in Denmark think politicians 'care about people like them' than it does on the extent to which
those in Sweden do (see Figure 44). 
Figure 44. Minorities' perceptions of politician concern to perceptions of politician attitudes to minority 
groups, Denmark vs. Sweden. Marginal effects, OLS regression, controlling for gender, age, years of ed-
ucation and time in country, robust std. errors.
Separate analyses reveal this relationship--of minorities' sense of whether politicians care about 
'people like them' with how they see them approaching their ethnic groups and Muslims--to be 




















0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Perceived politician attitudes to group(s)
Denmark SwedenN = 177
Do effects differ by country?
Politician attitudes to group(s) and perceived concern
 264
considerably smaller and insignificant in Sweden (.16, p =.323). Accordingly, perceptions of 
group political inclusion are estimated to account for about 16.1 % of the variation in how mi-
norities in Denmark see politicians' concern for 'people like them,' but only about 1.9 % of the 
same variation in Sweden (with each analysis controlling for gender, age, years of education and 
time in country). 
Since politicians' attitudes towards minority groups (as perceived by minorities) have an 
effect on whether minorities in Denmark intend to vote, and on whether they perceive politicians 
to care about people like them, it is possible that such perceived politician concern is mediating 
the effect of group political inclusion on intended voting. And indeed, mediation analysis among 
the Danish minority respondents suggests that this may indeed be the case--with the direct effect 
of group political inclusion on intended voting decreasing when perceived concern is accounted 
for. The main effect of politician concern on intended voting, indicated to be so dominant in the 
tables above in this section, holds to a similar extent among minorities in both countries--though 
somewhat stronger in Denmark, this difference is small, and the overall relationships resemble 
one another (see Figure 45).
Figure 45. Intentions to vote as related to perceptions of politician concern for 'people like me', im-
migrant minorities in Denmark and Sweden. Marginal effects, logistic regression, controlling for gender, 
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Following my previous findings that indicate the importance of gender in some of these 
processes, I perform an extra check to examine whether politician concern differentially affects 
intended voting among men and women minorities. Using a slightly larger group of respondents 
(since there are fewer variables on which to account for missing responses), I repeat the simple 
model above, then add an interaction term for politician concern with gender. The two analyses 
are reported in Table 38 here. 
Politician 
concern
+ interaction  
    term
politician concern 4.16 (1.14) *** 6.47 (2.73) *
                  * gender -4.29 (2.95)
gender (1=woman) .47 (.54) 1.66 (.90)
age (years) .00 (.07) .00 (.07)
education (years) -.02 (.12) -.05 (.13)
time in country -.01 (.06) -.00 (.06)
constant .55 (.48 .04 (.64)
N 180 180
pseudo-R2 .142 .167
Table 38. Effects of perceived politician concern on intended voting (0/1), with test for differential effects
among men and women (middle column) among immigrant-background minorities in the country 2+ 
years (logistic regression, robust std. errors); ! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
As shown here, the interaction term (of gender with perceived politician concern) itself is not 
significant (p = .146); however, the model indicates that the importance of perceived politician 
concern for intended voting is substantially larger among men than among women (with the dif-
ference between effects for the two groups expressed in the interaction term). Other things being 
equal, women are showed to be significantly more likely than men to intend to vote (see the main
effect term for gender in the interaction model) when this effect difference is taken into account. 
As Figure 46 shows in relation to both intended voting and to reported voting in the last parlia-
mentary election, this gap is chiefly accounted for by differences between men and women with 
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Figure 46. Perceived politician concern as related to intending to vote 'if the election were held tomor-
row,' among men and women of immigrant-minority background in country 2+ years. Fitted values, bina-
ry logit regression, robust std. errors; controlling for age, years of education and time in country.
However, as stated above, the interaction of gender with perceived politician concern is not sig-
nificant for intended voting (p = .146), and only marginally so for reported voting (p = .093). 
Having found perceived politician concern to be the inclusion factor most influential for 
intended voting, I then examine whether intending to vote is related to national identification lev-
els. Given the study's findings about gender differences in civic integration processes thus far, I 
also test whether national identification seems to have different effects on participation among 




+ interaction  
    term
national identification 2.64 (1.15) * 4.73 (1.54) **
                  * gender -4.65  (2.33) *
gender (1=woman) .31 (.46) 3.47 (1.70) *
age (years) .04 (.06) .05 (.06)
education (years) .01 (.11) .01 (.11)
time in country -.04 (.06) -.03 (.06)
constant .19 (.85) -1.04 (.92)
N 209 209
pseudo-R2 .053 .083
Table 39. Effects of national identification on intended voting (0/1), with test for differential effects 
among men and women (middle column) among immigrant-background minorities in the country 2+ 
years (logistic regression, robust std. errors); ! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
As the table indicates, national identification has a positive and effect on intended voting--im-
migrant minorities with higher levels of national identification are, on average, significantly 
more likely to intend to vote than those who identify less strongly with the national community. 
In addition, I find a gap in its effects on such intentions among men and women. While im-
migrant-minority women are quite likely to intend to vote (or indeed to report having voted, I 
find in a separate analysis) regardless of their level of national identification, other things being 
equal, men with low identification are significantly less likely to do so, whether examined in re-
lation to intended voting or to reported voting in recent elections (see Figure 47). 
Figure 47. National identification as related to intending to vote 'if the election were held tomorrow' (left 
box), and to reported voting in parliamentary elections (right box), among men vs. women of immigrant-
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for age, years of education and time in country.
The interaction of identification with gender in influencing intentions to vote is found to be sig-
nificant at the p = .045 level. For reported voting in the latest parliamentary election, that inter-
action influence was even more certain, significant at p = .003. As the reader may remember 
from the preceding chapter, minority women identify more highly with the national community, ,
on average, than minority men do. This compounds the impact of this gender effects difference, 
since there are more men with low national identification levels to then be disproportionately 
likely to not (intend to vote). 
In trying to understand how political mobilization of young adults occurs in these soci-
eties, and what dynamics are unique to immigrant minorities, I wish to learn whether intended 
voting is related to politician concern and national identification in a similar way among ethnic-
majority young adults as we have seen among immigrant minorities. Examining this, I find that 
ethnic-majority young adults are quite likely to intend to vote, other things being equal, whether 
they perceive politician concern or identify highly or not--though those majority individuals with
positive perceptions of politician concern are slightly more likely to intend to vote than those 
with negative perceptions are, the difference is not significant. By comparison, each of these fac-
tors has a slightly stronger effect among ethnic-minority young adults, but the effect difference 
(interaction term) between majority and minority-background young adults is, at least in the con-
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Figure 48. National identification as related to intended voting among respondents of ethnic-majority vs.
immigrant-minority background (marginal effects, logistic regression, robust std. errors; controlling for 
age, gender, years of education and time in country).
The most we can say, then, is that while the effects differences are not significant, perceived 
politician concern and national identification are significantly related to intended voting among 
ethnic minorities as a group, while they are not so among those with only Danish/Swedish back-
ground. As suggested by the previous analyses, the small majority/minority gap that does exist is 
accounted for by minority men. Immigrant-minority women are quite likely to vote regardless of 
their level of national identification--similar to ethnic-majority individuals; but immigrant-mi-
nority young men are distinct from the other groups. While those minority men who identify 
highly with the nation are just as likely to vote as majority individuals, those with low identifica-
tion are significantly less likely to vote than others with similar identification, and significantly 
less likely to do so than minority men who highly identify.
It is worth investigating whether perceived politician concern, which I showed  in Chap-
ter 6 to be significantly related to national identification, may influence intended voting via na-
tional identification, as originally modeled in the study's overall expectations. Though I recog-
nize that mediation analysis is causally problematic, it is helpful to learn the extent to which 
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these variables' effects are interrelated; it is also helpful to compare their relative influences on 









politician concern 4.16 (1.14) *** 3.79 (1.18) **
national identification 1.66 (1.29) 2.77 (1.29) *
gender (1=woman) .47 (.54) .29 (.56) .37 (.52)
age (years) .00 (.07) .03 (.08) .05 (.07)
education (years) -.02 (.12) -.03 (.12) -.01 (.11)
time in country -.01 (.06) -.03 (.07) -.06 (.06)
constant .55 (.48) -.42 (.87) .08 (.91)
N 180 180 180
pseudo-R2 .142 .158 .061
Table 40. Effects of politician concern and national identification on intended voting (0/1), compared 
alone and combined (middle column) among immigrant-background minorities in the country 2+ years 
(logistic regression, robust std. errors); ! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
The findings are mixed. After first re-examining the relation of intended voting to perceived 
politician concern, I add national identification to the model. This reduces the impact of politi-
cian concern by a small amount, but not substantially; further, national identification's relation to 
intended voting is not significant when analyzed together with politician concern (as compared 
to its significant effect on intended voting when analyzed with only control variables, in the 
right-hand column). I also observe that the model with only politician concern (plus controls) ex-
plains a far greater share of the variance in intended voting than the model with only national 
identity does: approx. 14.2 %, compared to 6.1 %. The combined model explains only slightly 
more variance than politician concern 'alone': 15.8 %. 
The two variables' relationships to intended voting, then, are partially co-linear; this alone
is not very surprising, give our expectations. However, the comparisons indicate that politician 
concern is not primarily affecting intended voting via national identification but more directly. 
This partially disconfirms the expectation within the study's general theoretical model that forms 
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of national inclusion--among them perceived politician attitudes--were likely to influence partici-
pation via national identification.  The following section will proceed to investigate the extent to 
which each of the two--politician concern and national identification--affects intended voting 
through certain civic attitudes, as projected in Chapter 2. 
7.2.1 Via Civic Attitudes
The models above tested direct relationships between the study's inclusion and identity variables 
and voting or intended voting. These revealed strong links between perceived politician concern 
for 'people like me' and immigrant minorities, and that among men, higher national identification
leads to an increased likelihood of voting. In Chapter 2, I suggested that such effects, where 
found, may occur via civic attitudes believed to affect participation. Does this seem to be the 
case, and if so, to what extent? 
Before examining these relationships, it is first interesting to compare the levels of these 
facilitating attitudes among majority and minority-background young adults in the two countries.
Political interest. For this study, interest in politics was measured using four items, relating to 1) 
politics in general, 2) local politics 3) national politics and 4) politics in one's family's country of 
origin.75 The figures below display levels of reported political interest in the national and local 
spheres for majority- and minority-background respondents in the two countries.
75. The questions were worded as follows. For general politics: "How interested are you in politics generally?" 
And, for the other items: "People are different in terms of their interest in politics. How interested are you personally
in the following areas of politics?  City or local politics; Danish/Swedish national politics; Politics in your family's 
country of origin (Response options: Very interested/ Somewhat interested/ Not very interested/ Not at all interested/
Don't know). 
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Figure 49. Interest in local and national politics among ethnic-majority and immigrant-minority re-
spondents in Denmark and Sweden. Results of t-tests including those minorities in the country 2+ years.
Interest in local politics was much lower among these young-adult respondents, across the board,
than interest in national politics. Relating to local politics, there were no significant differences 
between the interest levels of either ethnic-majority or immigrant minorities in Denmark vs. 
Sweden, but minorities in both countries reported having significantly less interest in local poli-
tics than ethnic-majority respondents. Yet Interest in national politics was a different story. While
majority respondents in the two countries did not report significantly different levels of interest, 
immigrant-minority young adults were significantly more interested in Denmark than in Sweden,
and minority interest levels in Denmark were not significantly different from majority levels. It is
difficult to fully account for this, but interviews with young immigrant minorities indicate that 
the larger politicization of immigrant-related issues in Denmark draws many young minorities to 
pay more attention to national politics. While only a few interviewees in Sweden mentioned im-
migration or integration politics as issues that draw their focus, most of those in Denmark did. 








































t = 2.99 **




































t = 3.06 **




When asked why they followed those issues, several respondents said they do so because inte-
gration politics affects them and those they know personally. As one 28-year old man of Afghan 
origin, who had been in Denmark since he was 16, said, 
It's natural that immigration politics interests me a lot. That you prick up your ears when 
you hear about immigration politics76... It has something to do with my identity, you might 
say, that I relate it to-- that immigration politics has to do with me. (DK Interview 6, March 
2013)
Another man, 27 years old and born in Denmark to Turkish parents, expressed it in a similar 
way:
I mean, it has always been that way--that it interests me, because I am a part of it. Be-
cause I am a part of the polemics. (DK Interview 15, May 2013)
Thus while it is difficult to explain the gap in national political interest based on the survey data 
alone, the interview provide this insight, that the greater politicization of immigration and inte-
gration-related issues in Denmark likely contributes to it--because many people of immigrant 
background, even many among the second generation, see these areas of debate and policy as re-
lating to themselves and affecting the lives of them and many others they know. For them, these 
political issues capture their attention as naturally as debates about student stipends do for uni-
versity students (also mentioned by some young interviewees). This can also help us to under-
stand why the gap between majority- and minority-background individuals' interest in national 
politics (where these issues are debates) is almost non-existent in Denmark, while a gap persists 
relating to local politics; while such a gap exists relating to both national and local politics in 
Sweden. 
76. It is important to note here that the word most Danish interviewees used the phrase "udlændingepolitik," which 
literally means "foreigner politics." In Denmark, this area is used to describe politics relating to immigration of new 
immigrants and integration of people with foreign backgrounds already in the country. In Danish political and media
discourse, the phrases "immigration politics," "immigrant politics" and "integration politics" are also used, but less 
commonly so. No Swedish interviewees used such a phrase to describe this area, but a few mentioned "immigration 
politics" or "things that have to do with immigrants." 
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Additionally, while interest in national politics has classically been found to be lower 
among women than men (Verba, Burns and Schlozman 1997), and this is indeed found to be the 
case among ethnic-majority respondents for national politics, there is no significant difference 
between the genders in interest in national or local politics among minorities. However, minority 
men are similar to their majority-Danish or Swedish counterparts in professing themselves more 
interested in politics 'in general' than women in those same groups do. For analysis, the measures
of interest in local and national politics were combined into a single measure (Cronbach's α = 
.661).
Civic norms. The extent to which individuals hold civic norms are important in the context of 
this study for two reasons: first, because individuals' holding such norms may in itself be thought
of as a sign of civic engagement, since it indicates that they share norms that are held by many 
others in society and are important for the maintenance of the civic democratic order; and sec-
ond, because their holding such norms may be a meaningful factor for whether or not they ac-
tively engage in political life. In this study, civic norms were assessed by asking respondents 
how important they thought it was to do each of several behaviors 'in order to be a good citizen,' 
previously used in a 2011 study for the Danish Integration Ministry (Government Working 
Group for Better Integration 2011). The behaviors included were voting in local and national 
elections, calling the police to report a serious crime, and keeping oneself informed about what is
happening in Danish/Swedish society.77 Using these four items, an index was created (Cronbach's
α = .805), and scaled 0 to 1. Figure 50 displays mean levels of importance that ethnic-majority 
77. The question was worded as follows: "To be a good citizen, how important is it to ...  keep yourself informed 
about what is happening in Danish/Swedish society?  report it to the police, if it comes to our attention that a serious 
crime has been committed?  vote in parliamentary elections (if one has the right to vote)? vote in local elections (if 
one has the right to vote)? (Response options: 1-Not important at all..2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9...10-Very important/ Don't 
know.)  
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and immigrant-minority respondents place on these civic behaviors for being a 'good citizen' in 
the two countries .
Figure 50. Importance of civic norms (4-item index) among ethnic-majority and immigrant-minority re-
spondents in Denmark and Sweden. Results of t-tests including those minorities in the country 2+ years.
As the figure shows, immigrant minorities in both countries place a high level of importance on 
these four civic behaviors that is very similar to--even slightly higher than--that among ethnic-
majority respondents. Though interestingly, among minorities, women were found to have hold 
these norms at a somewhat higher rate than men, with a marginally significant difference.
Political trust. To examine the role of trust in political institutions in relation to civic integration, 
the survey asked respondents about the extent to which they trust various political and societal 
institutions, and their answers regarding Parliament, the government and political parties were 
combined into an index to indicate level of political confidence.78 These items were then indexed 
(Cronbach's α = .883), and scaled 0 to 1.

















78. The question was worded as follows: "To what extent would you say you have confidence in the following 
institutions?"  (Response options: Not at all/ Not very much / Quite a lot / A great deal)  Institutions asked about 
were: the media, Parliament, the government, political parties, the public sector, the health service, the police, the 
justice system, unions, the Danish Lutheran church, the EU, and the UN. Here, 'trust in political institutions' has 
been operationalized using an index combining respondent answers regarding Parliament, the government and 
political parties (by taking the mean of all non-missing responses from those three items for each respondent), and 
the combined index has been scaled 0-1.
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Figure 51. Trust in political institutions (4-item index) among ethnic-majority and immigrant-minority 
respondents in Denmark and Sweden. Results of t-tests including those minorities in the country 2+ 
years. 
Noting that trust in political institutions is quite high in Scandinavia when compared to many 
other regions, we see some important variation. While in Sweden trust in political institutions is 
not significantly different between ethnic-majority and minority respondents, it is significantly 
lower among immigrant-background minorities in Denmark than among the ethnic-Danish ma-
jority, and significantly lower than among minorities in Sweden. Meanwhile, there there is no 
significant difference between majority respondent groups in the two countries (though levels are
lower in Denmark), nor between majority and minority respondents in Sweden. Interestingly, 
while there is only negligible difference between the trust levels of minority men and women in 
Sweden, in Denmark minority men reported significantly lower levels of institutional trust than 
minority women did. 
Political efficacy. For this study, external political efficacy beliefs, or the extent to which people 
think that they can have an influence on their government (Balch 1974), were measured by ask-
ing survey respondents about the extent to which "people like me can have an influence on polit-

















































ical decisions in Denmark/Sweden.79 As the figure below shows, immigrant-background minori-
ties in Denmark and Sweden hold a sense of political efficacy that is quite near to that of ethnic-
majority young adults in each country, perhaps remarkably so.
Figure 52. Sense of political efficacy among ethnic-majority and immigrant-minority respondents in 
Denmark and Sweden. Mean levels; t-tests including those minorities in the country 2+ years reveal no 
significant differences between minorities in the two countries, and none between . 
Interestingly, however, when 1.5 and 2nd-generation respondents are compared on their own, 
those in Denmark reported a significantly weaker sense of political efficacy that their counter-
parts in Sweden did.
Having measured and compared these attitudes among the study's respondents, I proceed 
to look at whether they play a role in facilitating the effects of national inclusion and identifica-
tion on political participation among immigrant minorities. To investigate this, I first examine the
extent to which perceived politician concern and national identification (since these were the fac-
tors shown to have influence on intended voting above) have an effect on four civic attitudes 
thought likely to influence participation rates: interest in politics, civic norms, trust in political 
institutions, and political efficacy. Table 41 below shows results for four separate models ana-





































79. Response options were: Strongly agree/ Agree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Disagree/ Strongly disagree/ Don't 
know.
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lyzed, each testing the effects of politician concern and national identification on one of the four 
likely facilitating attitudes.
dependent variable → political 
interest      
civic 
norms   
political 
trust        
political 
efficacy
explanatory variables   ↓
politician concern .08 (.08) -.04 (.06) .46 (.06) *** .37 (.08) ***
national identification .18 (.10) ! .19 (.07) * .25 (.08) ** .22 (.10) *
(controls, not displayed)
constant .40 (.08) *** .72 (.06) *** .04 (.06) .26 (.08) **
N 163 163 163 163
R2 .051 .081 .338 .189
adj. R2 .014 .045 .313 .158
Table 41. Effects of perceived politician concern and national identification on key attitudes be-
lieved to facilitate political participation among immigrant-background minorities in the country 2+ 
years. Each column contains coefficients for effects on one of four attitudes (OLS regression; all models 
included gender, age, years of education and time in country (coefficients not reported here); ! p < .10, * 
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
I find that both trust in political institutions and political efficacy beliefs are positively and sig-
nificantly related to perceived politician concern. All four facilitating attitudes are positively re-
lated to national identification, though the relation of political interest is only marginally so. 
Next, I examine the extent to which each of these four civic attitudes is related to voting, 
in order to learn whether it is relevant to test each for a facilitating role. As expected, I find that 
each of these four attitudes is positively related to voting or intending to vote. Results of the 
twelve analysis models testing these relationships--each testing the relationship of each form re-
ported/intended voting to each of the four attitudes (with control variables in all models) are dis-
played in Table 42. 
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dependent variable  → voted local    R2 voted parl.    R2 would vote    R2
attitude   ↓
political interest 1.48 (.97) .167 1.58 (1.39) .126 3.58 (1.60) * .097
civic norms 3.18 (1.16) ** .200 1.38 (1.39) .119 3.95 (1.21) ** .103
political trust 2.05 (1.16) ! .176 -.36 (1.49) .108 6.00 (1.45) *** .207
political efficacy 1.93 (1.06) ! .179 1.60 (1.14) .129 5.14 (1.50) *** .219
N 99 111 165
Table 42. Effects of key political attitudes on voting and intention to vote among immigrant-background 
minorities in the country 2+ years. Coefficients (std. errors) for effects of each attitude (each scaled 0-1) 
on each measure of voting/intention to vote (scaled 0/1 or 0-1). Logistic regression; all analyses with ro-
bust std. errors, controlling for gender, age, years of education and time in country (coefficients not 
shown; the latter three variables centered). 
As the table shows, all four civic attitudes have a positive and significant effect on intended vot-
ing, with political trust and efficacy having both the largest effects and explaining more of the 
variance (approx. 21 % and 22 %) in voting intentions, with more statistical certainty, than either
political interest or civic norms. Civic norms is most highly related to reported local voting (ex-
plaining 20 % of the variance), with trust and efficacy showing marginally significant links to lo-
cal voting. Surprisingly, none of the four attitudes were significantly linked to reported voting in 
parliamentary elections.
Yet to what extent do these civic attitudes mediate the effects of perceived politician con-
cern and national identification on voting? I have already shown that perceived politician con-
cern is positively and significantly related to trust in political institutions and to a sense of politi-
cal efficacy, and that each of these is positively and significantly linked to voting or intending to 
vote. I now investigate the extent to which these attitudes--political trust and efficacy--seem to 
mediate the effect of perceived politician concern on voting. Table 43 shows a progression of re-
gression models; I begin with an examination of the relation between perceived politician con-
cern and voting (left-hand column), proceed to examine the comparative effects of political trust 
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and efficacy in two separate models, and finish with a model including politician concern and 
both potential mediators (right-hand column).   
Effects on 















politician concern 3.13 (1.29) * .075 .99 (1.38) .041 1.72 (1.51) .046 .71 (1.48) .025
political trust 5.29 (1.79) 
**
.148 4.34 (1.89) 
*
.113
political efficacy 4.13 (1.39) 
**
.153 3.31 (1.33) 
*
.118
(gender, age, years of 
educ., time in country)
-- -- -- --
constant 1.22 (.59) * .49 (.64) -.17 (.74) -.62 (.79)
N 160 160 160 160
pseudo-R2 .087 .200 .218 .285
Table 43. Effects of perceived politician concern and national identification on intended voting, via
political trust and efficacy among immigrant-background minorities in the country 2+ years (logistic re-
gression; all models included gender, age, years of education and time in country (coefficients not re-
ported here); ! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
As shown here, adding either political trust and efficacy each reduces the coefficient and the 
marginal R2 for politician concern (in the table's second and third models) considerably. Political 
trust mediates more of the main effect than political efficacy, though political efficacy accounts 
for slightly more of the variance in intended voting. In the combined model, we see that the the 
effect of politician concern is reduced further, though not considerably more than the mediating 
model including trust. Thus I find that trust and efficacy mediate most of the effects of perceived 
politician concern on intended voting, with trust the more effective mediator of political inclu-
sion's influence on voting. We could interpret this to mean that when immigrant minorities per-
ceive that politicians care more about people like them, they come to trust the national institu-
tions more, which in turn makes them more likely to (intend to) vote. However, it is also 
conceivable that trusting in political institutions actually causes minorities to perceive more con-
cern from politicians, and so on--that perceived politician concern mediates the effects of politi-
cal trust on voting. Both are plausible stories; in reality, political trust and perceptions of politi-
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cian concern likely both have an effect on the other, in a reciprocal system. Acknowledging this, 
and considering existing studies showing changes in political trust over time among minorities 
(Michelson 2003; Maxwell 2010), I prefer within the context of the present study to conceive of 
perceiving politician concern as causally prior to political trust. 
In a similar way to the analysis just conducted to test for mediation of the effects of 
politician concern on voting, I do the same to test for mediation of the effects of national identifi-
cation. In the previous pages I have shown that national identification is positively related to 
each of the four civic attitudes, and that each of them is significantly related to intended voting. I 
proceed to test whether the four civic attitudes mediate the effects of national identification on 













& pol. efficacy with all mrg. 
R2
Nat'l. ident. 3.64 (1.37)** 3.46 (1.50) * 2.89(1.45) * 2.24 (1.50) 2.33 (1.52) 1.61 (1.71) .020
political 
interest 3.35 (1.47) * 1.75 (1.55) .032
civic norms 3.26 (1.42) * 1.55 (1.67) .035
political 
trust 5.53 (1.71)** 3.79 (1.89) * .102
political 
efficacy 4.59 (1.39) *** 3.13 (1.47) * .107
(control var.)
constant .04 (.91) -1.43 (1.20) -2.11 (1.35) -.61 (.99) -1.20 (1.05) -3.25 (1.81)
N 165 165 165 165 165 165
pseudo-R2 .093 .158 .147 .232 .245 .341
Table 44. Effects of national identification on intended voting, via political interest, civic norms, 
political trust and political efficacy among immigrant-background minorities in the country 2+ years 
(logistic regression; all models include gender, age, years of education and time in country (coefficients 
not reported here); ! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
I find that, while the inclusion of each four attitudes lowers the direct effect of national identifi-
cation on intended voting to some extent, political trust and efficacy do so to the greatest extent 
and have larger effects on likelihood of intended voting than either political interest or holding 
civic norms. In the combined (right-most) model, furthermore, trust and efficacy are the only at-
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titudes with significant effects on intended voting; with each of them accounting for over 10 % 
of the variance in such intentions. 
Thus, while mediation analysis is an imperfect method for making inferences about 
causal chains, these analyses suggest that political trust and efficacy both 'mediate' the effects of 
perceived politician concern and national identification on intended voting. This is a partial con-
firmation of several of the study's hypotheses expecting positive influences of inclusion and 
identification on trust and efficacy, and their positive effects in turn on voting; however, it sug-
gests disconfirmation of the hypotheses expecting political interest and civic norms to mediate 
effects of national identification on participation.
7.2.2 In Conjunction with Associational Involvement
Associational life is a vital part of public life and democratic political processes, since associa-
tions play a role in equipping people--as individuals and as groups--with knowledge and skills to 
more effectively participate in political processes, and are instrumental in recruiting and mobiliz-
ing people to engage in political action. As such, it is likely that involvement in associations in-
fluences whether young immigrant minorities' vote and engage in other political action.
The study's survey respondents were asked about what kinds of associations where they 
are members. It is likely that their responses are not representative for individuals of their age 
group in general in the Danish and Swedish societies, since the study's respondents may be more 
engaged in civic and associational life than young adults in general. Still, assuming that the Dan-
ish and Swedish respondent groups are comparable to one another, it may still provide some kind
of rough comparison of how on-the-ground associational engagement may differ among im-
migrant-background minorities and ethnic-majority young adults in the two countries. Since the 
precise rates are not so indicative in themselves of civic integration in the two countries, I will 
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only summarize them here, before continuing to a brief consideration of whether being involved 
in different types of organizations contributes to voting. 
Reported political party membership was quite low across the board, though membership 
rates were slightly lower among immigrant minorities in Denmark than in Sweden (4.8 %, com-
pared to 7.1%. While in Sweden this minority rate of party membership was quite close to, and 
even slightly higher than, the membership rate among ethnic-majority respondents (6.8%), in 
Denmark the it was somewhat lower than the majority rate (7.2%). Rates were only slightly 
higher for engagement in religious associations among minorities in Denmark vs. those in Swe-
den (16.1% and 14 %, respectively). However, larger differences were revealed in relation to two
types of association types. Rates of membership to ethnic associations were much higher among 
minorities in Denmark than in Sweden (23.2% in Denmark, as compared to 8.2% in Sweden). 
And finally, more immigrant-background minorities in Denmark reported being a part of one or 
more civic associations (not including parties, ethnic or religious groups) than those in Sweden 
did (77.6%, as compared with 53.5% in Sweden. However, it is worth noting that the civic asso-
ciation involvement rate was also higher among ethnic-majority Danes than ethnic-majority 
Swedes (87% to 69.3 %). Membership rates in one association type in particular within this civic
category--unions--is responsible for some of this gap: while in Denmark, 36 % of minorities and 
47 % of ethnic-majority respondents reported being members of a union, only 10.7 % of minori-
ties and 16 % of ethnic-majority individuals in Sweden did so.80    
80. It is difficult to know whether these numbers are representative of union membership among young minorities 
in the two countries, as there are no existing data that reliably and comparably represent minority participation in 
these association types for both countries. In the two countries in general, union membership has been recorded to 
be similarly high: 70.4 of all non-self-employed individuals in Sweden were members of unions in 2011, and 67 % 
of those in Denmark were so in 2010 (source: European Industrial Relations Observatory, using data on Denmark 
from Due and Madsen 2010, and on Sweden from Kjellberg 2012). In a comprehensive survey of minorities in 
Denmark done in 2009, 47 % of immigrant-background minorities aged 18-34 reported being members 
(Government Working Group for Better Integration 2011).
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It is difficult to know whether these numbers are representative of associational involve-
ment among young minorities in the two countries as there are, to my knowledge, no existing 
data that reliably and comparably represent minority participation in these association types for 
both countries. However, a comparison of survey data from among second-generation Turkish 
and Kurdish young adults in Denmark and in Stockholm (from the European TIES study and a 
2009 Danish Integration Ministry survey) replicates this study's findings of starkly different civic
association rates' being due to very different union membership rates (in those data about 52 % 
membership in Denmark, but only 1.9 % in Sweden), as well as a somewhat different ethnic as-
sociation involvement rate (21 % and 17 %), though this latter gap smaller than the one indicated
by my own data (Ibid.; Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). Those data indicate quite low party in-
volvement rates in both countries (1.5 % in Sweden, 2.6 % in Denmark). The various data thus 
leave an unclear picture; yet how can we understand minority associational involvement in these 
countries, from the perspective of associations? 
My own background interviews with leaders of these types of associations--which fo-
cused on their recruitment, education and mobilization activities and how they reach minority 
young people in particular--gave indications of how minority member recruitment works on the 
ground. For parties, my own survey data suggest low engagement in both countries, but some-
what higher in Sweden than Denmark. This is supported by my interviews with centre-left and 
centre-right youth party organizations (which are technically separate from, but operate as youth 
wings and feeder organizations for the political parties). In Denmark, the groups were aware that 
their minority recruitment was weak, with leaders from the Social Democratic Youth (the party 
with historically strongest support among most immigrant communities) reporting that at their 
most recent national gathering of several hundred youth leaders, "there were about four who had 
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minority background" (Interview, May 2013). Minority recruitment challenges were similar for 
the Swedish youth parties, though they reported more organizational discussion and strategy re-
lated to the problem than the Danish groups. The Swedish Social Democratic Youth stood out 
among the youth parties in terms of minority engagement; their representative (himself a child of
Kurdish immigrants) reported that four of eleven board members had another ethnic background 
than Swedish. Improved minority recruitment is a part of the organization's agenda, he said, but 
ultimately it depended on the priorities of the officers; there were no concrete recruitment or rep-
resentation targets for minorities such as those that exist for gender equality (Interview, February 
2013). Yet for all the youth parties interviewed in both countries, the interviews indicated, minor-
ity recruitment suffers mainly because the groups recruit new members through existing mem-
bers--who go to their schools and former schools to speak to potential members--and through ex-
isting institutional channels, which primarily target academically inclined youth. A large majority
of youth party members were university bound or at universities, and many of them within the 
social sciences. Recruitment of trade, technical and science or engineering students--among 
whom ethnic-minority youth are overrepresented--is almost universally weak.
My interviews gave few insights into why union recruitment of minority young adults 
may be stronger in Denmark (as the present survey data suggest)--enlarging the figures for civic 
association engagement in Denmark vs. Sweden. However, one factor that may contribute is that,
in the words of a Swedish union representative, the Swedish unions have "not been very good at 
following along with society," with recruitment occurring chiefly through workplaces, with job 
types linked to certain unions for a given profession or education. A similar dynamic still oper-
ates in many settings in Denmark, but open competition between unions--no longer only linked 
to certain trades or professions--has created a fiercer marketplace where unions compete for 
 286
members. A large Danish union umbrella organization reported member recruitment activities 
and advertisements not only at trade schools, but at various youth events such as rock festivals.
My interviews with religious organizations supported the story told by survey data: that 
engagement in them is largely driven by religiosity. Yet why the indicated difference in ethnic as-
sociation engagement between youth minorities in the two countries? In both countries, umbrella
bodies facilitate the establishment and recruitment of minority organizations in both countries--
for example, members of the Danish Youth Council's staff dedicated to the task, and the Muslim 
Ibn Rushd organization in Sweden--both of which distribute government funds to associations 
with a board, a budget and certain numbers of events, based on their membership numbers (Inter-
views, April 2013). Neither this, nor the survey data help us to discern why minority engagement
in ethnic associations is higher in Denmark, even when ethnic identification is controlled for. The
survey data do not indicate ethnic associational involvement to be linked at the individual level 
to perceptions of group exclusion, yet may it still hold at the societal level? Despite a lack of link
at the individual level, are more ethnic associations started and established in Denmark in order 
to address or correct perceived problems facing minorities? It is impossible to conclude within 
the scope of this study whether this dynamic differs between the countries overall, but my inter-
views with ethnic associations in Aarhus and Malmö suggest that some different dynamics may 
be at work in the two contexts. While the Swedish groups I spoke with reported a focus on cul-
tural activities to bring young people of the same ethnic background together, or to bring them 
together with those of Swedish background, in Denmark some groups pursued the ethnic-cultural
focus but others focused on helping youth with immigrant background build educational or pro-
fessional networks (Interviews, May-July 2013). Yet these background-interviews accounts are 
not extensive enough to be representative. However, the study's individual interviews also sug-
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gested such a dynamic for why some organizations are built, and indeed why some individuals 
become volunteers in them. Two minority respondents from Denmark reported being active as 
volunteers or leaders in organizations with a focus on improving the capacities and experiences 
of youth with immigrant background--through such activities as tutoring, speaking at schools or 
youth groups. One, an engineer with Afghan background who immigrated as a teenager, ex-
plained why he volunteers to speak to groups of teenagers of all backgrounds, but especially 
those with immigrant background:
I tell my story. And the goal is to motivate people, especially those with another ethnic 
background than Danish, to take an education, because one might not have the same op-
portunities that one does as an ethnic Dane who's born here and has Danish parents. So 
you have to struggle a little more with some things if you come, for example, as a refugee. 
(DK Interview 6, March 2013)
It is clear that for some individuals, participation in minority-ethnic organizations is motivated 
by a need in society to address inequalities in both conditions and outcomes for minorities. And 
in reality, these kinds of organizations are not the classic 'ethnic associations,' but are really 
organizations made up of ethnic minority leaders and volunteers, with civic purposes that are 
aimed primarily at helping people with minority backgrounds.
Indeed, similar concerns undoubtedly also lead many minority young adults to engage in 
specific organizations that are technically civic but have a target group in the minority communi-
ty. One respondent, born in Denmark to Turkish immigrant parents, had started a local soccer 
club in the neighborhood he came from (which has a large minority population) to help get 
young boys "away from the street" and give them a good club experience where they are not seen
as 'the other':
As long as I can get one, two, three away from the street, I'm happy. And then they should
be able to play in a club where they are not looked at differently, like maybe [happens] in a 
Danish club. Because I've experienced that myself. My friends have experienced it. My big 
brother has experienced it. That's why I don't want for them to be seen with other eyes. 
They should have precisely the same opportunities as a young Danish boy. That's why. I 
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don't want them to have to go through the same thing that I've been through... if you just 
meet a trainer who has prejudices and racist thoughts, then it's a problem, then you can't 
play. And I just don't want for these young people, that they have to experience that. Now 
it's 15 years since I experienced it, right? And now we have to get past it, now we have to 
move forward. That's why I've signed up to be involved in the club and [laughing] to be-
come its director. (DK Interview 15, May 2013).
Thus to some extent, minority involvement in civic organizations that main target minorities are 
in some cases a result of experiences of discrimination or exclusion, combined with a desire to 
work to correct poor social conditions or inequalities in society that are affecting minorities, es-
pecially minority youth. 
How does voting and intended voting relate to being involved in these types of associa-
tions--political parties, and ethnic, religious and civic associations--especially among immigrant-
minority young adults? In order to test this, I include dummy variables indicating whether indi-
viduals reported being involved in each of these four association types, along with politician con-
cern, national identification, and the main background variables, and run analyses of their rela-
tionships to reported and intended voting. Results are displayed in Table 45.
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concern 1.88 (.97) ! 1.95 (1.02)! 1.86 (1.14) 1.73 (1.16) 3.41 (1.33) * 3.01 (1.40) *
Nat'l. ident. 1.42 (1.21) 1.68 (1.27) .21 (1.35) .01 (1.43) 2.64 (1.38) ! 2.65 (1.47) !
Pol. party .31 (.84) -.08 (.89) 1.22 (1.18) 1.19 (1.24)
Ethnic assoc. .43 (.68) .43 (.73) .10 (.76) -.01 (.77) .24 (.72) .19 (.76)
Religious 
assoc. -1.46 (.72)* -1.42 (.79)! -1.09 (.78) -.97 (.79) -1.08 (.65) ! -.97 (.72)
Civic assoc. .69 (.52) .92 (.54) ! .03 (.66) .16 (.68) -1.54 (1.08) -1.27 (1.09)
Gender .17 (.48 ) .43 (.46) .20 (.51) .21 (.55) .43 (.53) .27 (.58) -.01 (.62) .51 (.56) -.12 (.63)
Age .12 (.07) ! .12 (.07) ! .12 (.07) ! .01 (.09) .01 (.09) .00 (.09) .16 (.12) .09 (.10) .14 (.12)
Education (yrs.) -.15 (.09) -.15 (.09) -.17 (.10) ! -.03 (.13) -.02 (.13) -.02 (.13) -.06 (.13) -.01 (.11) -.04 (.13)
Time in country .13 (.06) * .14 (.06) * .14 (.06) * .22 (.09) * .23 (.09) * .24 (.09) * -.14 (.11) -.09 (.09) -.15 (.11)
constant -1.13 (.88) .24 (.45) -1.87(1.02) .54 (1.03) 1.36 (.57) * .64 (1.21) -.67 (.92) 3.55 (1.05)*** .71 (1.42)
N 116 116 116 111 111 111 170 170 170
pseudo-R2 .169 .158 .210 .150 .154 .176 .167 .091 .206
Table 45. Effects of associational engagement (four types) on reported and intended voting among
immigrant-background minorities in the country 2+ years (logistic regression; ! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p 
< .01, *** p < .001.
I find that only engagement in religious associations has an effect on voting -- and that a negative
one. Specifically, it is found to be negatively and significantly related to local voting, and nega-
tively (but only with marginal significance) to intended voting. Thus the data suggest that mi-
norities who are involved in religious organizations are less likely to vote in local elections, and 
to intend to vote in future elections, than other minorities are. 
Yet is it actually involvement in religious associations that reduces likelihood of voting in
local elections and intending to vote? For minorities as a broad group (as in the models just 
above), it seems so: checking the analysis by adding a measure for religiosity to the model, I find
that religiosity does overtake (or account for) this religious-association effect when including the 
whole respondent group. However, running the same check with religiosity among Muslim re-
spondents only suggests that, among Muslims, it is religiosity rather than religious-association 
involvement per se which is linked to a lower likelihood of voting. However, reflecting back to 
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Chapter 6's analysis of national identification in light of this, I re-examine the same factors' influ-
ence on such identification among Muslims. It is interesting to note that among Muslims, neither 
involvement in religious associations nor higher levels of religiosity have a negative effect on na-
tional identification--thus more religious, more associationally involved Muslims are just as like-
ly to identify with the nation as less religious Muslims, but they are less likely to vote.
These analyses, since they include reported as well as intended voting, also reveal one 
other important factor to be important for reported voting: time in country. The models testing ef-
fects of associational and background factors on reported voting in local and national elections 
(left and middle sections of Table 45 above) both indicate that those immigrant minorities who 
have been in the country longer are more likely to vote. This is not due to increased voting rights,
since only those respondents who were eligible to vote in local and national elections were in-
cluded, respectively, in those models. Further, since the models also take account of national 
identification levels, they indicate that there is a positive time-in-country effect on voting behav-
ior that operates independently of national identification.
7.3 Inclusion and Identification's Effects on Political Action
After learning more about how national models of inclusion affect voting, and how civic atti-
tudes and associations play into that process, I examine whether similar dynamics occur in mobi-
lizing young immigrant minorities to other kinds of political action. As outlined in Chapter 4, re-
spondents were surveyed about whether they had participated in each of 15 types of political 
action; these were then grouped into four types--concerning action with money, writing to media 
or online about issues, contacting organizations and public officials, and participating in activism
(see Table 16 on p. 157). Using those measures, and a combined sum measure of types engaged 
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in, this section examines whether inclusion and identification have an effect on political action 
among immigrant minorities in Denmark and Sweden. 
As with voting, I initially examine whether the different forms of inclusion that I have ar-
gued constitute 'working national identities' influence young minorities' political action engage-
ment. These analyses are displayed in Table 46; the table shows models analyzing effects of each
type of inclusion and then national identification on political action (including control variables),
followed by a comprehensive model, and finally a simple model including only those substantive











Simple model Marginal 
R2
citizenship avail.
   - personal 1.10 (1.05) 1.22 (.99)
   - group .03 (.30) .18 (.32)
political elite att.
   - personal -.33 (.44) -.29 (.44)
   - group -1.10 (.49) * -1.27 (.54) * -1.38 (46) ** .051
social inclusion
   - personal .22 (.39) .06 (.42)
   - group -.76 (.41) ! -.60 (.42)
national ID 1.46 (.56) * 1.61 (.52) ** 1.64 (.52) ** .061
gender (1=woman) .24 (.20) .28 (.20) .27 (.20) .12 (.20) .17 (.20) .14 (.20) .007
age (years) -.06 (.04) -.05 (.03) -.07 (.03) ! -.07 (.03) * -.01 (.03) -.04 (.03) .030
education (years) .04 (.04) .02 (.04) .02 (.04) .03 (.04) .02 (.04) .01 (.04) .002
time in country .00 (.04) .00 (.03) .02 (.03) .01 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.02 (.03) .007
constant .55 (1.04) 2.22 (.27) *** 1.84 (.35) *** .60 (.44) .05 (1.05) 1.02 (.45) *
N 146 146 146 146 146 146
R2 .067 .102 .081 .108 .185 .158
adj. R2 .027 .063 .041 .076 .118 .122
Table 46. Effects of perceived inclusion on political action engagement (composite measure of number 
of types engaged in) among immigrant-background minorities in the country 2+ years (OLS regression, 
robust std. errors; all models included gender, age, years of education and time in country; ! p < .10, * p 
< .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).
I find that national identification has a positive and significant effects on political action. Howev-
er, political elite attitudes towards minority groups are shown to have a negative and significant 
relationship to political action. Using the 'simple model,' national identification is suggested to 
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account for more of the variance in political action engagement than the others, but only slightly 
more than the influence wielded by group political inclusion. In addition, time in country is sig-
nificantly and negatively related to political action, meaning that those immigrant-background 
minorities who have been in country for a shorter time report being more active than those who 
have been there longer, or have spent their whole lives there. 
Having until now seen important differences in how inclusion and identification variables
affect other outcomes among men and women, I run the same models separately for men and 
women to test whether the same factors are influential among both genders. Table 47 displays the
findings in a simplified form, indicating the effects of perceived political elite attitudes towards 
respondents' ethnic and religious groups, and of their national identification levels, on their en-
gagement in each of four types of political action, plus a sum measure.81
dependent 
variable →









All  (n = 188-192)
Pol. attit. to groups -.84 (.78) -1.29 (.77) ! -1.38 (1.07) -1.22 (.79) -.93 (.45) * .029
National ID .80 (.85) 1.66 (.87) ! 2.54 (1.04) * -.20 (.82) .84 (.48) ! .017
Men (n = 79-82)
Pol. attit. to groups -1.14 (1.08) -3.12 (1.42) * -5.42 (2.09) ** -1.16 (1.20) - 1.71 (.62) ** .085
National ID -.13 (1.23) 1.12 (1.28) 4.36 (1.82) * -1.74 (1.31) .29 (.71) .001
Women (n = 109-110)
Pol. attit. to groups .11 (1.24) .68 (1.14) .41 (1.32) -.72 (1.17) .09 (.64) .003
National ID 2.23 (1.27) ! 3.90 (1.26) ** 2.41 (1.25) ! 1.30 (1.22) 1.93 (.59) ** .068
Table 47. Effects of politician attitudes to groups and of national identification on political action among 
men, women and all immigrant-background minorities. Logistic regression for the 'type' political action 
analyses, OLS for the sum measure, robust std. errors; each analysis included both pol. attitudes to 
groups and identification, along with gender, age, years of education, and time in country (not dis-
played); ! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001).  
81. Political action--by type or using the summed measure--was not found to be significantly related to any of the 
other inclusion variables when tested among men and women separately.
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I find, first, that minority men's political action engagement is negatively related to their percep-
tions of political elite attitudes towards their ethnic and religious groups, across the different 
types of political action as well as the sum measure of types engaged in. This relationship is in 
particular significant for political action involving written communication and contacting organi-
zations or officials, and it is also significant for how many types of political action men reported 
engaging in. Their perceptions of political elite attitudes was found to account for approximately 
8.5% of the variance in their overall political action engagement (using the sum measure). By 
contrast, political action was not significantly or consistently linked to the same perceptions 
among women, which accounted for virtually none of the variance in their political action (0.3 
%, or a marginal R2 of .003). 
Thus, I find that men who perceive more positive political elite attitudes towards their 
minority groups are less likely to participate in non-electoral political action than those with neg-
ative perceptions; they are also less likely to engage than women with similarly positive percep-
tions. Interestingly, personal citizenship access is not shown to be significantly related to politi-
cal action, in this somewhat larger respondent group (larger because the models included fewer 
items, so fewer respondents were removed due to missing items). Figure 53 shows the gender 
difference graphically. 
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Figure 53. Relationship between perceived political elite attitudes towards one's minority group(s) and 
engagement in more types of political action, among immigrant-minority men vs. women. Fitted values 
using OLS regression with robust std. errors, accounting for age, years of education and time in country.
This indicates that immigrant-minority men are most likely to engage in political action when, 
other things being equal, they perceive political elites as holding quite negative attitudes towards 
their minority ethnic and religious groups; yet such engagement drops among those men who be-
lieve elites to hold more positive attitudes. By contrast, among minority women are generally 
equally likely to engage in political action negative or positive elite attitudes--as likely as men 
who perceive quite negative attitudes and treatment. The finding that political exclusion of cer-
tain groups is likely to spur political action minority men supports hypothesis 21 as presented in 
Chapter 2, being in line with some previous findings in social movement and political 
scholarship. 
Yet it is surprising that it should be so only for minority men. As with the other gender ef-
fects differences found in the study in relation to effects on national identification and voting, 
women seem to engage in political action at quite high rates, regardless of how they perceive 
their groups to be treated in the political sphere. What is driving women to such 'exemplary' en-
gagement, even when they hold negative perceptions? One factor is their national identification 
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positively related to their national identification, across types of action and the sum measure. The
link is significant for the overall measure as well as for political action through written commu-
nication; and it is marginally significant for action with money and through contacting organiza-
tions and officials. National identification accounts for approximately 6.8 % of women's overall 
political engagement. Among men, national identification has a significant and positive effect on 
one type of political action--contacting organizations and officials--but has no such effects on the
other types or the sum measure, and accounts for virtually none of the variance in how many 
types they engage in (0.1 %)
 The positive impact of women's national identification levels on their political action en-
gagement lend support to hypothesis 9, which proposed in Chapter 2 that greater national identi-
fication was likely to bring more political participation. Yet again, since men's national identifi-
cation do not have a similarly consistent, positive impact on their political action, the support for 
this hypothesis is also highly contingent. This difference again leads me to ask whether there is a 
fundamentally different dynamic between mens and women's national identification levels and 
their participation, or whether the greater importance of other (exclusion-related) factors on 
men's outcomes overshadow would-be effects of national identification. Some of these questions 
may not be answerable using the study's data, but I will examine this further in the subsequent 
analyses, and return to it with some theoretical suppositions in Chapter 8.
7.3.1 Via Civic Attitudes
In the analysis of direct effects above, engagement in political action was found to be positively 
and significantly related to national identification, and negatively to political elite attitudes to-
wards respondents' minority groups (especially among minority men). In accordance with the ex-
pectations set out in Chapter 2, I will now examine whether, and to what extent, these inclusion 
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and identification factors affect political action engagement through political interest, civic 
norms, political trust and political efficacy. As I did with electoral participation, I first test 
whether group political inclusion and national identification are related to these attitudes, then 
whether the attitudes in turn have effects on political action engagement. As an extra check, I 
conduct mediation analysis to examine the extent to which the civic attitudes that are shown to 
be related to both the inclusion/identification factors and to political action seem to mediate some
of those factors' effects on such action.
I begin, once again, by examining the extent to which these factors seem to influence the 
four civic attitudes expected to facilitate political engagement. Since I have already found per-
ceptions of political elite attitudes to be significant for political action among men, I test whether
these civic attitudes have the potential to mediate the effects of that perceived group political in-
clusion among men only (see Table 48).
dependent variable → political 
interest      
civic 
norms   
political 
trust        
political 
efficacy
explanatory variables    ↓
pol. attit. to group(s) -.01 (.19) .02 (.12) .70 (.10) *** .31 (.16)
(controls, not displayed)
constant .72 (.10) *** .81 (.06) *** .16 (.04) *** .46 (.07) ***
N 71 71 71 71
R2 .056 .079 .359 .116
adj. R2 -.002 .023 .320 .062
Table 48. Effects of perceived political elite attitudes (to one's minority groups) on key civic atti-
tudes believed to facilitate political participation among immigrant-background men in the country 
2+ years. Each column contains coefficients for effects on one of four attitudes (OLS regression; all 
models included, age, years of education and time in country (coefficients not reported here); ! p < .10, * 
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
I find that only trust in political institutions is significantly related to men's perceptions of politi-
cal elite attitudes towards their minority group(s). The relationship is positive and highly signifi-
cant (p = .000), and an analysis of comparative influence suggests that minority men's ideas of 
these political elite attitudes account for approximately 34.7% of the variance in their political 
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trust (marginal R2 of .347). By contrast, their levels of political interest, civic norms and political 
efficacy are not shown to be significantly related to perceived group political inclusion. The 
strong link between men's perceptions of such inclusion and their political trust indicate that such
trust should be further examined as a potential mediator of inclusion effects on political action 
among men. 
Similarly, I examine whether any of these civic attitudes are potential mediators of the ef-
fects of national identification on political action seen among women minorities (see Table 49).
dependent variable → political 
interest      
civic 
norms   
political 
trust        
political 
efficacy
explanatory variable    ↓
national identification .11 (.16) .14 (.10) .27 (.10) ** .20 (.18)
(controls, not displayed)
constant .58 (.13) *** .77 (.08) *** .24 (.07) ** .45 (.15) **
N 97 97 97 97
R2 .046 .070 .079 .040
adj. R2 .005 .029 .038 -.002
Table 49. Effects of national identification on key civic attitudes believed to facilitate political par-
ticipation among immigrant-background women in the country 2+ years. Each column contains co-
efficients for effects on one of four attitudes (OLS regression; all models included, age, years of educa-
tion and time in country (coefficients not reported here); ! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Again, only trust in political institutions is indicated to be consistently related to national identi-
fication; while the other three civic attitudes are not. The link between national identification and
political trust is positive and significant (p = .018). National identification is indicated to account
for approximately 4.2 % of the variance in political trust, showing that it has a meaningful influ-
ence but not close to that wielded by men's perceptions of group political inclusion on their trust 
levels. This link among women indicates that political trust may be a mediator of national identi-
fication's effects on political action already observed among women.
Overall, I find that immigrant minorities' trust in political institutions is positively and 
significantly related to their perceptions of political elite attitudes towards their own ethnic and 
 298
religious groups and to their levels of national identification; but that their level of political inter-
est, placement of importance on key civic values, and sense of political efficacy are not meaning-
fully influenced by their ideas of elite attitudes or their national identification. 
In light of the gender-differentiated findings from the study thus far, do these perceptions 
of politician attitudes towards minorities' own groups and their sense of national identification 
affect civic attitudes differently among men and women?  Examining this, I find no significant 
differences in how these attitudes are linked to men's and women's own national identification 
levels (interaction terms are insignificant). It is interesting to note here, though, that men's levels 
of political trust are somewhat more strongly affected by their national identification levels than 
women's are--with an effect size of .50 (p = .000) (as compared to .27, p = .018, among women),
and an approximately explained variance of 14.0 % (as compared to 4.2% among women). 
Looking at perceived political elite attitudes and trust, I find that men's levels of political trust 
are significantly more closely related to their perceptions of politicians' attitudes toward their 
groups than women's trust levels are to their perceptions (interaction significant at p = .003; see 
Figure 54); the difference retains significance (p = .012) even when national identification is ac-
counted for. 
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trust in political institutions, among immigrant-minority men vs. women. Fitted values using OLS regres-
sion (including a quadratic term for political elite attitudes) with robust std. errors, accounting for age, 
years of education and time in country.
The figure makes the it clearer where the difference arises--among those who perceive politician 
attitudes as being most negative. Among those with more positive perceptions, political trust ris-
es moderately with those perceptions among both men and women. But while women with nega-
tive perceptions maintain moderate levels of political trust, men with similarly negative percep-
tions have significantly lower trust levels. While political trust is found to be positively and 
significantly linked to perceptions of political elite attitudes among women, the effect size is un-
der half that observed among men (.28, p = .027, compared to .70 among men ( p =.000)); and 
those perceptions of political group inclusion only account for approximately 7.2% of the vari-
ance in women's political trust levels (compared to 34.7 % among men). It is also very interest-
ing that while the link is similarly influential among minority men in Denmark and Sweden, 
country-separate tests among women reveal that this relationship is really only evident among 
women in Denmark, while it is negligible among women in Sweden (meaning the marginal-ef-
fect line in the graph above would be flatter if drawn only for women in Sweden); however, the 
interaction between gender and group political inclusion in influencing political trust is signifi-
cant in both countries. 
This difference is nearly identical to that shown in relation to national identification in 
Chapter 6, which indicated it to be more closely linked to perceived politician attitudes among 
men than among women. Both findings rest on the same group of minority men who perceive 
negative attitudes among leading politicians in their country, and whose national identification 
levels and political trust levels are lower than women's with similarly negative perceptions. In 
both cases, it is men who follow our expectations of how minorities 'are likely to' respond to po-
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litical exclusion; while women defy them, on average, and maintain quite positive outcomes re-
gardless of negative perceptions. While finding these 'effects' of perceived political exclusion 
among men might tempt us to focus on what makes some men respond so, we might just as well 
or perhaps even more appropriately ask what hinders such negative responses among most 
women. Either way, what, if anything, differs between men and women that can help us under-
stand why they react differently? This question will be more explored in Chapter 8. 
Even with these interesting findings pointing to disparate effects of perceived political 
elite attitudes on young minorities' political trust levels, such trust is only likely to be a mediator 
for the effects of those attitudes on political action if trust itself is significantly linked to it. How-
ever, I find that it is only tenuously so. While political trust is in most cases negatively related to 
political action, the data give no indication that engaging in political action (whether specific 
types or a greater number of types) is consistently and significantly related to trust in political in-
stitutions. Therefore, none of the civic attitudes, including trust, are likely to be meaningful me-
diators of the effects of political inclusion, social inclusion or national identification on political 
action. 
7.3.2 In Conjunction with Associational Involvement
Having now seen that political elite attitudes towards minority groups matter negatively for mi-
nority men's political action, and that national identification has a positive effect for minority 
women's, it is helpful to learn the extent to which political action is shaped by involvement in as-
sociations. As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is believed that participating in associations can both 
equip and mobilize individuals for political participation. I proceed now to examine how associa-
tional involvement plays into whether young minorities engage in political action. Since men and
women are differently affected by inclusion and identification, I examine these effects separately 
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for the two genders. Analyses are conducted (as with similar the analysis for voting in section 
7.2.2 above), by including the main factors of the model found to be relevant for political action 
thus far, and adding dummy variables representing whether immigrant-background minorities re-
ported being involved with each of four types of association--political parties, and ethnic, reli-
gious or other civic associations. Results are reported in Table 50.
Minority men Minority women













Pol. elite attit. to 
groups -1.72 (.79) * -1.84 (.75) * .075 .50 (.61) -.05 (.57) .001
Nat'l. ident. .35 (.79) .29 (.75) .002 2.07 (.66) ** 2.08 (.61) *** .076
Political party 1.11 (.61) ! 1.50 (.61) * .052 1.11 (.51) * 1.01 (.50 ) * .040
Ethnic assoc. .95 (.37) * .82 (.37) * .068 .61 (.34) ! .51 (.33) .043
Religious assoc. .52 (.51) .48 (.50) .012 .65 (.33) * .71 (.31) * .057
Civic assoc. .15 (.34) -.01 (.33) .008 .34 (.25) .44 (.24) ! .037
Age -.05 (.04) -.05 (.04) -.04 (.04) .018 -.05 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.03 (.03) .028
Education (yrs.) .04 (.06) .03 (.06) .02 (.06) .003 -.05 (.04) -.04 (.04) -.05 (.04) .021
Time in country .01 (.03) .03 (.03) .02 (.03) .002 -.01 (.03) .01 (.03) -.02 (.03) .010
constant 2.04 (.55) *** 1.23 (.28) *** 1.84 (.61) ** -.05 (.61) 1.36 (.21) *** -.36 (.60)
N 77 77 77 105 105 105
R2 .104 .168 .239 .146 .228 .312
adj. R2 .041 .084 .137 .103 .173 .247
Table 50. Effects of associational engagement (four types) on political action (sum of types en-
gaged in)  among immigrant-background minorities in the country 2+ years (OLS regression; all models 
included gender, age, years of education and time in country (coefficients not reported here); ! p < .10, * 
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Most notably, these models indicate that being a member of a political party increases political 
action among both men and women, explaining about 4-5 % of the variance in political action 
types engaged in. Second, I find that among both genders, being engaged in one or more civic as-
sociations has less impact on political action than the other three types, though it has a marginal-
ly significant, positive effect on women's political action in the combined model. Third, being in-
volved in an ethnic association positively affects political action among both men and women, 
but this is only significant among men and explains more of the variance in men's political action
 302
(approximately 6.8 %, as compared to 4.3%). Fourth and conversely, while being involved in a 
religious association has a positive effect among both genders, its effects are only significant 
among women; it explains approximately 5.7% of the variance in women's political action, but 
only 1.2 % of men's. Interestingly, including religiosity, religious identification or ethnic identifi-
cation in these analyses has virtually no effect on the predicted effects of religious or ethnic 
organization involvement; this confirms that it is involvement in religious or ethnic associations 
itself, rather than levels of religiosity or religious/ethnic identification, which influences the ex-
tent of minorities' political action. Note also that this positive effect of religious association in-
volvement on political action stands in contrast to its negative impact on voting in local elections
and intending to vote, as displayed in section 8.2.2.
7.4 Inclusion, Identification and Participation in Denmark and Sweden
In this chapter I have shown, first, that the perceptions that immigrant-minority young adults 
form of political elite attitudes matter for their political participation through voting and other 
forms of political action. With regard to voting, their ideas of how much political leaders 'care 
about people like them' matter greatly for whether or not they vote and intend to vote. The data 
suggest that this occurs to some extent via trust in political institutions: politicians' concern raises
their levels of trust, which in turn raises their likelihood of voting. The effect of politician con-
cern is somewhat stronger among minority men, especially among those who perceive politicians
not to care very much: those with lower perceptions of politician concern are less likely to vote/
intend to vote, especially if they are men. With regard to political action, it is minorities' ideas of 
political elite attitudes towards their ethnic and religious groups in particular that matter, and 
mater negatively, for whether and how extensively they engage in such action. Yet this effect is 
consistent and significant only among minority men, while it is only tenuous among women. 
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While such perceptions have a meaningful influence on minorities' trust in political institutions--
again stronger among men--such trust does not consistently lead in itself to more or less political 
action; so it does not mediate the effects of perceived political inclusion or exclusion to political 
action. 
Second, I have shown that national identification--itself shown in Chapter 6 to be affected
by social inclusion and, especially among men, by political inclusion in the national community-
-generally has a positive effect on political participation. For voting, this effect is smaller than 
that of politician concern but is stronger among men, and matters most among those men with 
quite low levels of identification. They are less likely to vote or intend to vote than women mi-
norities with similarly low identification levels; the women, by contrast, are quite likely to vote, 
on average, regardless of their national identification levels. This dynamic is different for non-
electoral political action. It is shown only to be significantly related to women's national identifi-
cation levels, while being hardly shaped at all by men's. 
In addition, being involved in a religious association had a generally negative effect on 
voting among minorities; but among women minorities, it has a positive effect on other kinds of 
political action. It had little effect, however on minority men's political action rates; among men, 
it was being involved in an ethnic association that made a greater difference for the extent of 
their political action. 
I turn now to examine how any differences we observe in political participation between 
minorities in the two countries (in this study sample) may be understood, considering the extent 
to which they can be explained by factors related to the national models of inclusion. At the be-
ginning of this chapter, I showed the comparative reported rates of voting, intended voting, and 
political action among ethnic-majority and minority respondents in the two countries. Since the 
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chapter's analyses have revealed that gender also moderates some key factors influencing this 
participation and thus suggests that accounting for inter-country differences may be enlightened 
by considering gender, in this section I will compare participation factors and outcomes in the 
two countries with attention to the similarities and differences among and between men and 
women.
7.4.1 The National Models' Resulting Participation Gaps--among Men
While conclusions from these data are someone tentative since they are only based on moderate 
numbers of respondents and were gathered in a survey with low response rates, they illustrate 
how the different contexts in Denmark and Sweden influence minority political participation in 
the two countries: the two political contexts produce inter-country gaps among minority men, but
not among minority women. These may be chiefly accounted for by the different levels in per-
ceived political inclusion among the two countries--which, as shown in the previous sections, is 
found to have a greater impact among men. 
In relation to voting or intended voting, I have already shown that those who perceive 
greater politician concern are more likely to vote--and that this effect is somewhat stronger 
among minority men than women. As shown in Chapter 5, minorities' perceptions of politician 
concern is somewhat lower in Denmark than in Sweden; and interestingly, while these percep-
tions are significantly lower among immigrant-background minorities than among ethnic-majori-
ty respondents in Denmark (.14, on a 0-1 scale, p < .001), there was only a negligible minority/
majority difference in Sweden (.03, non-sig.). Correspondingly, I find minority participation lev-
els--in absolute terms and in terms of majority/minority differences--to be lower in Denmark 
than in Sweden. Yet interestingly, due to the greater influence of politician concern among men, 
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but the inter-country gap is larger among minority men than women, and is only significant 
among men (see Figure 55).
Figure 55. Comparison of voting/intended voting rates among minority men and women in Den-
mark and Sweden (controlling for background variables). Uses an index of reported national voting and 
reported intentions to vote; Dotted lines indicate ethnic-majority means. Controlled means and confi-
dence intervals, and differences in terms of t-values, calculated using OLS regression, controlling for 
age, years of education and time in country, ! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
As the figure shows, minority men in Denmark report voting in national elections and intending 
to vote at significantly lower rates than minority men in Sweden who are similar in terms of age, 
length of education, and time in country. They also lag significantly behind ethnic-majority men 
of similar age and education length in Denmark, while this is not the case (at least within this 
study's respondent group) for minority women in Denmark nor for either gender in Sweden. The 
voting gap among minority men in the two countries is partially accounted for by their differing 
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levels of politician concern, when investigated using regression models including that factor. 
However, it is even more convincingly accounted for by their levels of trust in national political 
institutions. As I reported in section 7.2.1, such political trust is an important mediator of the 
politician concern-to-voting link, but it actually seems to "account for" somewhat more of the 
gap than perceptions of politician concern themselves do. I thus find that minority young adults 
in Denmark have, on average, lower perceptions of politician concern and lower levels of trust in
political institutions, than those in Sweden do. As these perceptions and attitudes have a greater 
influence on minority men's voting, these differences are leading to a gap in minority men's vot-
ing, such that minority men in Denmark are, on average, significantly less likely to vote and in-
tend to vote than minority men in Sweden.
Indeed, political trust is not only an interesting factor that affects participation in this 
process, it might also be identified as being an important outcome for civic integration in itself, 
since it is a measure of individuals' confidence in the national political system that is likely to be 
persistent over time and thus affect their civic engagement for some time to come. As explored in
section 7.2.1 in this chapter, it is generally found to be related to minorities' perceptions of politi-
cian concern, and this applies to both men and women. However, it is related significantly to per-
ceptions of politicians' attitudes towards one's own ethnic and religious groups only among mi-
nority men (as explored in  7.3.1). This results in a trust gap between minorities in Denmark vs. 
Sweden that--while present among both men and women--is more than twice as large among mi-
nority men as among minority women, also when controlling for relevant background factors and
for generalized social trust (which is also thought to contribute to political trust). Figure 56 dis-
plays mean levels of political trust for men and women minorities in each country, as compared 
to each other and to ethnic-majority respondents of the same gender.
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Figure 56. Comparison of trust in political institutions among minority men and women in Den-
mark and Sweden (controlling for background variables). Dotted lines indicate ethnic-majority means. 
Controlled means and confidence intervals, and differences in terms of t-values, calculated using OLS 
regression, controlling for age, years of education, time in country, and generalized social trust; ! p < .10,
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
As the figure shows, minority men in Denmark have significantly lower levels of political trust 
than any other similar group, significantly lower than minority women in Denmark and men in 
Sweden, and significantly lower than ethnic-majority men in Denmark as well (and this remains 
the case when ethnicity or national origin is accounted for). While minority women in Denmark 
also have significantly lower trust than those in Sweden, the gap is .09, as compared to .24 be-
tween minority men in the two countries. As noted above, this disproportionately low trust 
among minority men in Denmark is chiefly due to these men's (negative) perceptions of politi-
cian attitudes towards minorities having a greater, more corrosive effect on their political trust 
levels, than women's perceptions--formed in the same political context--do on theirs.
As the analyses in section 8.3 show, political inclusion also has an influence on non-elec-
toral forms of political action--but chiefly in the form of perceived politician attitudes towards 
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minority groups, and bringing more engagement with perceptions of negative than positive 
politician attitudes--but only among minority men. Among minority women, political action en-
gagement is little affected by such perceptions, but rises with their level of national identifica-
tion. In these two national contexts, this contributes to minority women in the two countries hav-
ing fairly similar levels of political action involvement, while minority men in Sweden have 
somewhat lower involvement than men in Denmark and minority women in Sweden (see Figure 
57). 
Figure 57. Mean levels of political action engagement among men and women minorities in Den-
mark and Sweden (controlling for background variables). Dotted lines indicate ethnic-majority 
means. Controlled means and confidence intervals, and differences in terms of t-values, calculated using
OLS regression, controlling for age, years of education and time in country, ! p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01,
*** p < .001.
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Can this gap be traced back to the two national models of inclusion and the correspond-
ing differences perceived among minorities? While the study's data may not be fully representa-
tive, they offer some important insights. As the previous section's analysis indicated, minority 
women's involvement increases in relation to their national identification, more so than men's 
does. This, in combination with other influential factors,  the involvement of minority men in 
Denmark is increased--compared with men in Sweden in particular--by their higher sense that 
their ethnic and religious group(s) are politically marginalized, but also by their greater involve-
ment in ethnic associations and higher levels of interest in national politics. While these latter 
two factors are not themselves are not necessarily related to higher or lower perceived inclusion, 
the study's follow-up interviews with young minorities suggested that among some, focus on na-
tional politics is heightened on issues concerning immigration and integration--which are more 
politicized in Denmark than in Sweden (as I highlighted when presenting general levels of politi-
cal interest in section 8.2.1). Those interviews also suggested that some minorities also partic-
ipate in associations with an ethnic-minority membership or target group to address perceived 
problems facing ethnic minorities within society--such as education gaps or discrimination with-
in mainstream organizations. Thus it seems that the two countries' approaches to inclusion are 
having both direct and indirect effects on immigrant minorities' political action engagement, but 
that these vary between men and women. Among women, the strong effect of social inclusion on 
national identification is partially translated into increased political action engagement--though a 
relatively small spread between the national identification levels among minority women in the 
two countries, combined with other influential factors, means that there is no significant differ-
ence in their levels of political action involvement. Among men, on the other hand, influential 
factors related to the political inclusion of and debate concerning immigrants and minorities 
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seem to be causing a gap in political action involvement--with feelings of minority political ex-
clusion, heightened political interest and greater ethnic association involvement are spurring 
greater involvement among men in Denmark, while lower levels of those factors are failing to do
so in Sweden. 
Thus I have found, overall, that young immigrant minorities' political participation--in 
terms of voting and other forms of political action--is somewhat affected by their national identi-
fication levels, but even more so by their perceptions of political elite attitudes about people like 
them or their minority-ethnic and religious groups--in some cases via or in conjunction with cer-
tain civic attitudes and associational involvement. However, factors of political inclusion seem 
consistently to have a greater effect on men's participation than women's--and this translates into 
more noticeable gaps between participation outcomes among minority men in Denmark vs. Swe-
den than for those among women. These different dynamics among the genders--where factors of
political inclusion have different outcomes among minority men and women's participation as 
well as national identification--present possibilities for new thinking about how civic integration 
is likely to work in a variety of settings. Chapter 8 explores the implications of the study's find-




Refining the Model: Civic Integration in a Diverse Europe
Over the previous three chapters, this study has examined how the Danish and Swedish ap-
proaches to including immigrant minorities influence those minorities' perceptions of their inclu-
sion in society, their identification with the national community, and their political participation 
in it. 
In Chapter 5, I showed that different contexts and national approaches are reflected in in-
ter-country differences in minorities' perceptions--more positive in Sweden than in Denmark re-
garding citizenship access, social inclusion and political elite attitudes, for themselves personally
and for their minority groups. Social exclusion of minorities continues to occur in both societies, 
but minorities' perceptions and reported rates of discrimination differ between the two countries, 
and questions of immigration and integration are more highly politicized in Denmark than in 
Sweden. While the difference in perceptions of citizenship access is significant, it is perhaps not 
so large as one might have expected, given the very different citizenship policies in the two 
countries; and this is largely because many minorities do not have a high degree of knowledge 
about what citizenship policies actually are--especially in Denmark, where they are more com-
plex and have been changed multiple times in recent years. Finding immigrant minorities to have
markedly different experiences in the two countries is expected in this study but not without sig-
nificance in these two national contexts; in each, debate has raged comparing the national model 
of receiving and integrating immigrant minorities with that of the Scandinavian 'brother country' 
to the north or south. My findings speak in particular to the media debate in Denmark, which has 
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often suggested that the Swedish majority holds attitudes towards immigrants that are similar to 
that of the Danish majority, but are suppressed from speaking of them due to Swedish 'political 
correctness.' This study's findings demonstrate, however, that young immigrant minorities are ac-
tually experiencing different levels of inclusion on the ground. Though they may not fully repre-
sent dynamics among these minority populations in general, they indicate even more marked dif-
ferences along the social dimension than those of citizenship or political elite attitudes. It is also 
intriguing (and somewhat concerning) that at the same time, majority-Danish young adults have 
in general a more positive picture of the situation for minorities in their society than majority-
ethnic Swedes do. The distortion between majority and minority perspectives is simply greater in
Denmark, where minorities report living with lower levels of inclusion.
Chapter 6 demonstrated that immigrant minorities' national identification is heavily influ-
enced by the level of social inclusion that they perceive in society. Such identification is positive-
ly related to whether or not minorities see citizenship access as available to them and perceive 
politicians to be concerned about them and their groups, but these are less consistently influential
than perceived levels of social inclusion. Interestingly, women are consistently likely to identify 
more highly with the national community than men. Time in the country has a positive effect on 
national identification among minorities in general, but is somewhat more influential among 
women. Men, for their part, are more influenced by political inclusion of their group(s) than 
women are--with political elite attitudes toward minority groups (as well as treatment of their 
groups in society) shaping men's national identification levels, but not women's. Together, these 
factors are largely responsible for a gap in national identification levels of minorities in the two 
countries: minority men in Denmark identify significantly less highly with the national commu-
nity than women in Denmark and minorities of both genders in Sweden. 
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Finally, Chapter 7 investigated how the levels of inclusion experienced by immigrant mi-
norities in the two societies--in conjunction with other key factors--affect their political participa-
tion, in terms of voting and other forms of political action. Minorities' participation has little link 
to citizenship access and social inclusion directly, but is affected by their perceptions of political 
inclusion, as well as by the extent to which they identify with the national community. Yet these 
effects vary, especially between men and women. While rates of voting and intended voting are 
quite high in Scandinavia, I find them to vary among minorities with their perceptions of politi-
cal elite attitudes towards 'people like them.' Those perceptions are themselves influenced by the 
political inclusion of minority groups in Denmark, but not in Sweden; in turn, they seem to have 
somewhat more influence on whether men intend to vote than whether women do so. They may 
also influence minorities' voting via political trust--perceiving greater politician concern raises 
their level of trust in political institutions, which in turn raises the likelihood that they will (in-
tend to) vote. In addition, minorities who identify more highly with the nation are also somewhat
more likely to vote, controlling for other relevant factors. For other, non-electoral forms of politi-
cal action, minorities' perceptions of political elites' attitudes towards their ethnic and religious 
groups matters a great deal--but only among men, and negatively so: men who see their groups 
as marginalized, in terms of politicians' attitudes, are more likely to engage in such political ac-
tion. Among minority women, however, such perceptions seem to have no effect on the extent of 
political action involvement; instead, they are more likely to be engaged in it as they identify 
more highly with the national community. Being a member of a political party makes minorities 
of both genders more politically active. And, while being involved an ethnic association makes 
minority men likely to engage in more types of political action, involvement in a religious one 
makes minority women likely to do so. Finally, political participation in general (through voting 
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and political action) increases with political interest. Since such interest is higher among minori-
ties in Denmark--in part because immigrant-related issues play a more prominent role in Danish 
politics--this factor raises minority participation in Denmark more than in Sweden. All together, 
these dynamics bring gaps in minority political participation between minority men in Denmark 
vs. Sweden, but not women: while (intended) voting rates are lower among minority men in 
Denmark than all other groups, political action involvement is higher among minority men in 
Denmark than among their counterparts in Sweden.
Overall, then, I find that the different contexts for integration in Denmark and Sweden are
producing:
• significantly different perceptions of inclusion in the form of citizenship access, political elite
attitudes and social treatment among immigrant-background minorities in the two countries, 
with more positive perceptions in Sweden than Denmark;
• a significant gap in national identification levels of minority men in the two countries, with 
those in Sweden identifying at a rate similar to ethnic-majority individuals and those in Den-
mark significantly less than the ethnic majority (while minority women in the two countries 
have similar identification levels);
• significantly different rates of participation among minority men in the two countries; while 
those in Sweden are more likely to intend to vote, those in Denmark engage more highly in 
political action.
With these findings, this study contributes two main insights to the literature on civic integration 
and engagement among immigrant-background minorities; and perhaps to broader literatures on 
civic engagement as well. First, it highlights that while citizenship policies still matter greatly as 
institutions that reflect national identities and determine who has certain social and political 
rights, they do not have much effect on civic integration outcomes when compared with that of 
the social and political environment in which they are crafted, and in which immigrant minorities
live their lives. Social and political forms of inclusion have varying, even contradictory effects 
on the elements of civic integration, and they interact with the greater salience of integration is-
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sues that seems to co-occur with more exclusionary dynamics in society and politics. Second, the
study indicates that social and political inclusion (or exclusion)--especially towards minority 
groups--have greater effects on minority men than on minority women. Both of these enable bet-
ter understanding of civic integration processes in countries of immigration and how we might 
expect them to differ between societal contexts, and provide new theoretical insights to test in fu-
ture research.
8.1 Social and Political Inclusion Shape Civic Integration, Intensified by Issue Salience
Despite the extension of most economic, social and even political rights to resident non-citizens 
in many liberal democratic countries, citizenship policy is still the primary means by which 
states can define national membership. The growing body of scholarship that theoretically and 
empirically compares national integration and citizenship regimes is important and useful, since 
those regimes not only reveal something about conceptions of national identity; they of course 
determine who may constitute each national citizenry, and--some have argued--are likely to in-
fluence the process and outcomes of immigrant integration. In this study, I have sought to inves-
tigate the extent to which that is the case with regard to the incorporation of young adults of im-
migrant background into the civic community in particular--whether they identify with and 
participate in it. Yet simply to study citizenship access as a factor, without considering more 
comprehensively how signals of national boundaries are communicated to immigrant minorities, 
would risk a distorted picture of how citizenship policies affect civic integration processes. I 
have therefore combined access to citizenship with political elite attitudes and social treatment or
inclusion, to form a three-dimensional concept of 'working national identity' that encapsulates 
how a national identity exists at a given point in time: as manifested in policy, political debate 
and society at large toward immigrant minorities who live in that society. 
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Assessing the perceptions of inclusion along these dimension held by young-adult im-
migrant minorities, I have found marked differences between those in Denmark and Sweden on 
all three dimensions. I have further found that minorities' national identification and political par-
ticipation were not much affected by believing that they could get citizenship, in comparison 
with the effects of social and political inclusion. While some minorities had strong feelings about
citizenship policy--especially where it is restrictive--and mentioned the meaning of having it 
when asked directly, the direct influence of citizenship access on their identification and engage-
ment was rarely apparent, from either the survey data or the study's interviews. Instead, young 
minorities are much more influenced by the social and political environments in which they live 
on an ongoing basis. Why might this be the case?
While citizenship policy both reflects, and influences, these environments, minorities do 
not often meet with citizenship policy and its implications in their daily lives. Not all immigrant 
minorities confront naturalization as a personal issue--for example, if they were naturalized as 
children or at birth on the basis of their parents' having acquired citizenship. Yet even for those 
who do, it is relegated to a one-time interaction with the state bureaucracy (though one that 
varies greatly in ease and length depending on the person's situation, and varies greatly Denmark
and Sweden). From then on, it is personally experienced through the rights it gives: both practi-
cal, allowing more convenient travel within Europe and visa-waiver countries than most had with
their previous nationality; and political, allowing them to vote in national elections and to stand 
for public office, should they wish to. To be sure, minorities express happiness at these rights, 
with more commenting on the practical benefits than other aspects. There is also a marked differ-
ence in the ideas young minorities in Denmark and Sweden express about the citizenship policies
in their countries--while few commented on them in Sweden, several respondents in Denmark 
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expressed dismay at the 'unfair' nature of the Danish laws--either towards children of immigrants
born in the country (a group that includes some of the respondents themselves), towards people 
who contribute to society but cannot qualify due to language problems, or because they see the 
content of the citizenship exam as irrelevant or unreasonable. However, even with these expres-
sions of experience and opinion about the citizenship rules, there is little evidence that identifica-
tion and participation is much conditioned on whether they have access to citizenship, when so-
cial and political inclusion are also accounted for. 
It is rather the level of social inclusion that immigrant minorities experience that has the 
greatest influence on their national identification; and the ideas they form about whether politi-
cians' 'care about people like them' that most determines whether they are likely to vote. Neither 
of these links is in itself surprising. But interestingly, I find indications that the levels of personal
social and political inclusion seen by minorities in Denmark are more closely linked to their per-
ceptions of how well their ethnic and religious groups are social and politically included that 
than those of minorities in Sweden are. In other words, the social and political treatment of mi-
nority ethnic and religious groups in Denmark is having a greater effect on how minorities there 
see themselves as being included, and by extension on their own national identification and vot-
ing, than such treatment is having in Sweden. These differences--while marginally significant--
are also found while controlling for perceived levels of group identification, so are not likely to 
be occurring due to immigrant minorities in Denmark feeling greater affinity for their minority 
groups than those in Sweden do. I interpret these effects differences as support for the idea that 
group-related inclusion or exclusion has a greater influence on civic integration where minority- 
and integration-related issues are more salient in society, as was also suggested by the study's in-
depth interviews. Where questions of integration are more politicized and salient, as in Denmark,
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the effects of group inclusion (or more accurately, exclusion) on civic integration outcomes are 
magnified. 
This indicates that social and political inclusion matters more for civic integration in soci-
etal settings where exclusionary messages are more prevalent. And it suggests that civic integra-
tion outcomes in a society can be expected to be more readily damaged by, say, moving from a 
neutral to a more exclusionary integration politics in relating to minorities as minorities, than 
they might be improved by moving from a moderate to quite inclusive one. It may be that this 
occurs because the factors of what I here have called 'group inclusion'--of political elite attitudes 
and social treatment toward minorities in particular--are less salient to minorities where they are 
'better,' more inclusive. In more inclusive societal contexts, minorities are more likely to base 
their identification and participation on their own personal situation and experiences, and their 
sense of being personally politically included and enfranchised--in essence, the same kinds of 
factors that determine non-minorities' civic engagement. Minorities' own sense of these positive 
factors may indeed be higher--and are generally be likely to be so--in a more inclusive societal 
context; but in speaking of the importance of how minority groups are included in social and po-
litical life, we might even say that exclusion has more influence than inclusion on civic integra-
tion outcomes--dampening national identification levels and hindering traditional participation, 
yet spurring activism.
How might these findings--of a smaller effect of group inclusion in Sweden, and a larger 
of group exclusion in Denmark--be seen by policy-makers and key actors in the two societies? It 
is not really negative, from the perspective of those who wish immigrant minorities to become 
part of the civic community through identification, that those in Sweden seem to do so less on 
the basis of how minority groups are included, and more on the basis of basic inclusion in social 
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and political life that applies to all members of society. This does not conflict with the direction 
and intention of citizenship and integration policy and practice in Sweden--where principles of 
rights-based universalism and anti-discrimination have been aimed to ensure that immigrants be 
treated in much the same way as all others (though of course without always succeeding). Yet in 
Denmark, the greater reaction of minorities to the variation and, overall, more negative levels of 
inclusion that they find there, in terms of their identification and participation, is not in general 
an intended consequence of Danish citizenship policy, political signals or social practice. There, 
citizenship policy was made to restrict access to only the well-integrated--thereby producing a 
more competent, engaged citizenry; most political signals sent to and about immigrant minori-
ties--and certainly the loudest ones--were explicitly created to influence non-immigrant audi-
ences; and social treatment of immigrants simply a reflection of the populations' point of view, 
not the object of intervention. Minorities' greater responses to these factors are perhaps a natural 
consequence of the issue salience they create, but can best be understood as unintentional, and 
unhappily so. 
However, I find that the dynamics of exclusion, where politicized, also work to raise mi-
norities' participation by heightening their political interest. Where questions relating to integra-
tion and immigrants' rights or status in society are more politicized--as in Denmark--they consti-
tute a key issue that many individuals with immigrant background follow in the public sphere 
more than others, for some increasing their attention to national politics in general. 
In addition to having higher levels of political interest, minorities in Denmark are also 
significantly more likely than those in Sweden to take part in another aspect of civic life that 
seems to have a positive effect on political action engagement, at least among men: ethnic asso-
ciations. It is somewhat unclear whether this is due to the more restrictive political and social en-
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vironment in Denmark. However, the study's interviews suggested that some minorities who par-
ticipate in ethnic associations do so to address problems of bias in society, meaning that it is 
possible to that the greater ethnic association involvement in Denmark is a result of the more ex-
clusionary dynamics there. If that is the case, those dynamics can be seen to have positive effects
on political action engagement both through an increased sense of group exclusion and via 
greater ethnic association engagement. 
Taking these dynamics together, we begin to form a picture of the multiple and contradic-
tory effects of more exclusionary politics and social treatment on civic integration, as compared 
to those of more inclusive ones. While political and social forms of exclusion are likely to lower 
minorities' national identification and traditional political participation (as well as their political 
trust levels), group political exclusion makes minority political action more likely. At the same 
time, political and social exclusion occur in a climate that raises political interest and awareness 
among some minorities, so as to make them likely to be more politically engaged. They further 
seem to co-occur with higher rates of activity through minority organizations, which can increase
political mobilization. 
It is difficult to say with any certainty that more exclusionary national approaches to im-
migrant incorporation are generally likely to wield both of these contradictory effects--hindering 
identification and traditional participation yet raising interest--more than less exclusionary ap-
proaches, since this study compares processes and outcomes within only two national settings. 
Yet there is reason to believe that they tend to go together--that exclusionary citizenship policies, 
political rhetoric and social environments that have these civic integration dampening effects on 
minorities (while at the same time spurring other kinds of political action) will usually co-occur 
with the greater integration issue salience that not only to intensifies the effects of group inclu-
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sion/exclusion factors, but also raises minorities' political interest and in turn their participation. 
Why should we expect that this likely to be so?  
The answer, I contend, is that exclusionary politics and practices typically create integra-
tion issue salience not only for majority voters--among whom they are more often intended to do 
so--but among immigrant minorities; while inclusive politics and practices de-emphasize inte-
gration and the treatment of minorities as salient issues. In the political sphere, integration is 
rarely much politicized by those who would emphasize inclusive politics and policies; where in-
clusive rhetoric dominates, the issue is taken more as a matter of course. Instead, integration is 
usually politicized by politicians who wish to win electoral and political support by appealing to 
a populist, usually anti-immigration base. In most cases, then, integration only looms large on the
political scene when and where the loudest voices are anti-immigrant ones.
This also holds with implementation of citizenship policies: relatively open access to nat-
uralization--conditional only on a few minimal requirements and not even requiring that one give
up previous nationality, as in the Swedish case--quickly becomes a procedural matter, one that 
does not provoke a great deal of thought or discussion among those who must apply for citizen-
ship nor the population in general. By contrast, more restricted access--administered through a 
web of rules and requirements that block some people from citizenship and force others to prove 
their compliance or competence, as in Denmark--becomes a meaningful barrier and process for 
many of those who undergo it. This does not go unnoticed by many other minorities who have 
not themselves gone through the process (because they either got citizenship under previous 
rules or have not attempted to get it yet). The minority audience of a restrictive citizenship 
regime is thus much larger than those who attempt to naturalize alone--though, as this study's 
data show, their perceptions of that regime may be distorted by lack of knowledge about it.
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Further, this salience of exclusion can also be said to apply to society's social dimension. 
Where people perceive a higher level of inclusion, they often do so based on an absence of expe-
riences that  differentiate treatment of themselves or their groups, from the treatment they believe
most others in society receive. Where inclusion is high, it often ceases to be an 'issue' for minori-
ties. Yet where they perceive inclusion to be low, they do so because they have felt or heard that 
minorities are not treated well--through concrete personal experiences, or stories about others' 
experiences relayed through the media. 
Thus it is reasonable to expect that the different dynamics and outcomes I find in the 
Danish and Swedish settings are likely to hold more generally in other national settings that can 
be characterized, respectively, to have more exclusionary or more inclusive working national 
identities, as I have defined them here. More exclusionary approaches are likely to dampen over-
all  national identification and traditional participation among minorities, and perhaps to spur 
more political action engagement, other things being equal. Yet they are also likely to increase 
the salience of integration and minority-related issues for minorities--both increasing the effect 
of group-inclusion dynamics, and heightening minority political interest, spurring more tradition-
al and activist engagement. However, given its limited number of settings and the moderate num-
ber of subjects involved, this study must be considered only one piece of a larger research agenda
facing scholars of identity dynamics, integration and civic engagement in such immigration set-
tings. These links--between different forms of 'working national identities' on the one hand, and 
minority national identification and participation on the other--must be further explored, along 
with further investigations of how these dynamics proceed differently in these varied settings.
Problems may be raise with this account, however. Though all the study's analyses take 
account of respondents' gender, ages, education length and time in country; and though extra 
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checks were conducted using self-reported income, average district-level income, minority 
identification, ethnicity, religion, and more, my causal claims of these relationships are not with-
out problems. It is possible, as mentioned in Chapter 2, that some of the 'causal arrows' I have 
drawn actually point the other way: for example, that minorities' ethnicity, family history, socioe-
conomic status or interactions in society bring them to identify to a certain extent, and that they 
are more likely to report positive perceptions of inclusion on this basis. After all, the criticism 
could be, these are all attitudes. While the study's survey experiment was intended to address 
some of these concerns, it yielded little. However, I believe there is still a fundamental argument 
that can be made as to the order in which most immigrant minorities are likely to experience 
these: certainly if they are first-generation immigrants, and possibly as well if they are 1.5 or sec-
ond-generation, they are likely to form ideas of how they and their groups are included in society
prior to establishing a level of identification with the nation. It might also be that their participa-
tion makes them more likely to identify with the national community, rather than the reverse re-
lationship that I have advanced. These charges relating to causal order cannot be fully answered 
within the scope of this study; though I have tried to theoretically ground and empirically test my
account, these questions remain somewhat open, and remain a challenge to future work. Future 
research on these questions must also confront a question that this survey-based study has not 
been able to adequately address: as mentioned in Chapter 2, the processes studied here are most 
likely iterative, occurring through many interactions within a given societal context.
In addition to the modeling problems just mentioned, the study could also be criticized 
for its relatively small number of respondents. Though designed to recruit a considerably larger 
number of respondents, the survey suffered from a low response rate. The resulting respondent 
group consists of young adults who are, on average, better educated than immigrant-background 
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young adults in theses population generally are; and they likely differ from the general popula-
tion of young adults from the target groups in other ways that are relevant for this study, such as 
in civic attitudes and engagement. However, as argued in Chapter 4, the respondent groups from 
Denmark and Sweden are quite comparable on a number of important indicators. The resulting 
study, then, allows comparison of how the two national systems and inclusion/exclusion factors 
are having an impact on young adults with better-than-average education and accompanying 
characteristics. It is conceivable that the main factors investigated may actually have different ef-
fects on identification and participation among other parts of the immigrant-background popula-
tion (for example, with lower education or social backgrounds). There is little theoretical reason 
to think that perceived inclusion or exclusion have vastly different effects among other young 
adults of similar backgrounds, but it quite is possible that socioeconomic factors, such as income 
and length of education, would prove more influential among a broader group of minorities--pos-
sibly reducing the explanatory role of the inclusion variables. This cannot be corrected, nor the 
extent of it fully tested, with the data available. However, the study's analyses have consistently 
taken these factors into account, and point to some important differences between these national 
contexts, and among the respondent groups, that can defensibly be argued to apply in a broader 
number of contexts and populations.
Further, the study could be criticized for the limitations imposed by its chosen national 
contexts. Could be that the Scandinavian, welfare-state settings used in this study--while provid-
ing comparison of the effects of exactly these factors in mostly similar national systems--actually
constitutes an 'easy test' for the effects of the inclusion/exclusion factors in focus here? The ab-
sence of broader social inequality, it might be argued, might allow them to have greater effects 
on civic integration outcomes than they would have in settings with greater inequality--where 
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greater variation (and majority/minority disparities) in income, education and other attributes of 
socioeconomic status might be shown to have greater effects. It is obviously impossible to refute 
this idea within the current study; yet I contend that the broad controls provided by taking two 
national systems that share cultural, political and economic characteristics allow a more robust 
comparison than other national case comparisons would do--more precisely identifying patterns 
of how national incorporation models shape civic integration outcomes. More research is needed 
in this area, using a broader number of national contexts  more representative respondent 
populations. 
One specific challenge such future work should address is a better operationalization and 
investigation of integration issue salience. In the current study, integration salience at the societal
level was roughly approximated by comparing mean levels in Denmark and Sweden of previous 
exposure to media coverage relating to a number of issues relating to immigration, integration 
and Islam. It is also assumed in this study, to some extent, based on current knowledge of the 
policy and political environments in the two countries (as described in Chapter 3). It is crucial to 
improve on this. First, further investigations with better measurement will enable us to test that 
the dynamics here interpreted to be due to differences in integration issue salience in Denmark 
and Sweden are not simply occurring due to other factors that differ between the two countries. 
Second, they will ensure a more precise assessment of integration issue salience itself, and there-
fore better tests of its effects. It could be better measured, I believe, through both observation of 
actual mentions of certain issues in political debates and media in a given setting, and by survey-
ing individual perceptions of issue prevalence and importance--as respondents see them in socie-
ty more generally, and for themselves personally. More precise measurement of integration issue 
salience among both majority and minority populations will enable more robust investigations of
 326
how such salience moderates effects of different forms of inclusion on civic integration--as well 
as a broad range of other social and political phenomena. 
Further, as mentioned above, it is important to note that many of the effects of inclusion 
or exclusion uncovered in this study, with resulting civic integration outcomes, were found to oc-
cur differently among minority men and women. This is a very important caveat, and one of the 
most game-changing findings of this study. It is examined more closely in the following section.
8.2 Gender Moderates the Effects of Group Exclusion
For several decades, some scholars of migration, minorities and politics have explored how gen-
der shapes the experiences, attitudes and political behavior of immigrants and minority individu-
als (see, for example Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Pessar 2003; Mahler and Pessar 2006). 
Much of this literature explores how men and women of immigrant or minority background have
differing experiences in society based on differences in family, work or volunteer roles; cultural 
expectations; or social networks. Scholars that have found different outcomes among men and 
women, in terms of identity, participation or other kinds of achievement in society such as in ed-
ucation, have typically pointed to different experiences of discrimination and different resources 
(usually based on these roles and networks) as key causes (e.g., Pollard 1993; Jones-Correa 
1998; López 2002; Qin 2009). Yet this study makes a novel contribution by indicating that men 
and women with similar perceptions of inclusion or exclusion respond differently to such experi-
ences, in terms of their identification and participation. 
In building this account, there are indeed interesting insights to be gained by examining 
whether men and women's perceptions of inclusion differ, and how they may do so, even before 
proceeding to findings about their responses to such inclusion (or exclusion). Among immigrant-
minority respondents within this study, women reported more positive perceptions than men re-
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lating to inclusion through citizenship access, political elite attitudes and social treatment (both 
personally and regarding their minority groups), though these differences were not generally sta-
tistically significant.
Yet while there are not significant differences in the extent to which men and women 
with immigrant-minority background perceived their minority groups to be included or excluded,
I have found that factors of group inclusion consistently wield greater effects on minority men's 
rates of national identification and political participation than they do women's. Men's levels of 
national identification are, on average, significantly linked to their perceptions of their groups' 
inclusion in social and political life, while women's are not. In addition, perceived politician atti-
tudes towards respondents' own ethnic and religious groups have significantly greater effects on 
men's political trust and the extent of their political action engagement than it has on women's. 
By contrast, women are more likely than men to identify with the national community, intend to 
vote and engage in political action regardless of they level of group inclusion they perceive. This 
is an important finding for how we understand processes of how immigrant minorities become a 
part of the civic communities they live in. Yet can we really maintain that men and women so 
differ in their responses to group inclusion and their processes of civic integration, given scholar-
ship within political science and migration studies have thus far found little evidence of this? 
Much literature highlighting 'gender' in migration or integration experiences has either fo-
cused exclusively on women's experiences, or has described--as mentioned above--the different 
experiences that men and women with immigrant backgrounds have. Any differences in out-
comes have usually assumed to be due to those differences in 'inputs,' rather than potentially dif-
ferent response dynamics. Those findings were often insightful, but because of the data used or 
the method of analysis, or both, most of these studies could not test whether different dynamics 
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were at work. Yet this may also have been due to an implicit assumption on the party of many re-
searchers that they were unlikely to find that men and women follow different cognitive process-
es in their responses to experiences. This may even have been linked (however unconsciously) to
a norm that such theoretical perspectives should not be nourished. In other words, scholars found
little reason, and perhaps had no wish, to undermine a broadly held assumption in social science: 
that while biological and social factors condition some roles and experiences to be different for 
men and women, their cognitive processes are similar. According to this, similar perceptions 
should in general shape similar responses among men and women. Yet this study's data indicate 
that men and women with similar perceptions respond differently to group inclusion or exclu-
sion, and more generally to situations faced as immigrant minorities in society. How can we un-
derstand this?
I admit that on finding these response differences, I initially wondered if they might be 
particular to the target minority groups within this study: mostly Muslims, most of middle-east-
ern origin. It might be possible, after all, that the experience of being a young man  in Denmark 
or Sweden with background from a Muslim-majority country was different from that of being a 
young women of similar background, in such a way as to make group-related dynamics more rel-
evant for men. For example, if a young woman of Iraqi background (and Arab appearance) inter-
acts with strangers while not wearing a headscarf, ethnic-majority persons may respond to her 
more positively than to a man with similar age and background (or a woman with headscarf), 
since they will be likely to make the assumption that the young woman is 'well-integrated' or not 
very religious. The man, on the other hand, is given no such 'boost' in strangers' estimation; he is 
rather, as the 'subordinate male target' theorists mentioned above have argued, seen as his ethnic-
ity. However, while this may actually occur, a further look at research on gender, identity and re-
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sponses to discrimination experiences revealed a number of studies from sociology and educa-
tion research suggesting that this dynamic--of minority men and women of similar background 
and situation responding differently to their experiences--is likely to not be a result of gender dif-
ferences in Islamic practice and their results, but rather much more widespread than this study's 
particular contexts and study population. 
For example, sociologist Nancy López found, in her in-depth study of Dominican youth 
in New York City, that girls tended to respond to discrimination experiences with increased de-
termination to succeed through education, boys were more likely to withdraw from school as a 
site of achievement--hence the title of her book, Hopeful Girls, Troubled Boys (2003). While it is
focused on minorities' approaches to education as a means to succeed within society, López's 
work thus finds outcomes that diverge among the genders in a pattern similar to what I have 
found here. López's explanation, though, points to minority boys being subjected to more severe 
treatment than girls in school settings, to the different nature of the bias they experience, and to 
the different patterns of socialization and social capital boys and girls are met with in their fami-
lies and communities. She thus argues that their different outcomes are due to different inputs, in 
the form of experienced bias, and to girls' having different resources with which to confront their
challenges. Relating more directly to identity, other researchers investigating educational and 
economic success among young people with immigrant background have suggested that minority
girls more readily combine ethnic and broader societal identities more readily than boys do (Wa-
ters 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Qin 2006). These studies generally find that minority girls 
are more likely to experience social control from their parents while growing up than boys are, 
and that this makes them more likely to have success in school while giving them strong social 
capital based in their families and local communities. They also highlight that young minority 
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males are more likely to feel stigmatized by media and rhetoric linking young minority men to 
crime and anti-social behavior. 
Indeed, these dynamics are known to be present--gender differences in socialization in 
terms of family roles and expectations, in educational settings, and in societal rhetoric--and to af-
fect this study's minority population of interest in Denmark and Sweden. Therefore, it may be 
that some of the differences I observe between young minority men and women's perceptions of 
inclusion, and in the effects of those ideas on their identification and participation, are partially 
due to such factors. However, several lines of research within psychology indicate that these ef-
fects differences may be due to one or more cognitive mechanisms that tend to differ--whether 
socialized or innate--among men and women generally. 
Several lines of psychological research point to this possibility and give insights as to 
possible mechanisms. Specifically, they suggest that such a dynamic may occur due to gender 
differences in worldviews about group competition, in collective 'self-construal' or relational 
'self-construal.' First, scholars using 'social dominance theory' and related approaches have found
that men are more likely to believe group competition is zero-sum, so perceive greater threats in 
inter-group signals (Rabinowitz 1999; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Duckitt and Sibley 2010). Sec-
ond, others point to gender differences in levels of collective self-construal, or the extent to 
which people define themselves in reference to their group memberships. Though the literature 
on this is narrow, a group of self-construal scholars contend that men tend to do this to a higher 
extent than women (Baumeister and Sommer 1997; Maddux and Brewer 2005). Closely related, 
a number of scholars also contend that that women have more relational self-construals (the ex-
tent to which they define themselves in terms of their personal relationships)--implying that even
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if they identify highly with a group, they may cope better with group-related messages due to in-
creased benefits from social support from others (Cross and Madson 1997; Yoo and Lee 2005). 
If it is the case that these more general mechanisms are responsible for these dynamics, 
then it is likely that the kinds of effects observed here are likely to occur across settings and mi-
nority groups, or even involving social groups in general. In this study, these dynamics seem to 
have resulted in generally worse outcomes among minority men than women in terms of identifi-
cation, participation and facilitating attitudes like political trust in each of the two countries stud-
ied; and in marked gaps in those outcomes between minority men in Denmark and Sweden, but 
not between women in the two countries. If the mechanisms responsible are more general, as this
last body of literature suggests it to be, we should expect to find sharper divergences in the civic 
integration outcomes of restricted vs. open national incorporation models among among minority
men, than we find among minority women. And we should expect to find this across different 
settings and immigrant groups. 
There are reasonable grounds to believe, based on these theoretical perspectives, that this 
study's finding--that gender moderates how inclusive or exclusionary signals in society affect im-
migrant minorities' identity and participation--is likely to hold in a much broader set of contexts 
and cases, even beyond questions involving immigrant minorities and civic integration in partic-
ular. This provides ripe ground for future research, both observational and experimental. This 
line of investigation should particularly be pursued within political science, where the political 
and identity responses of minorities to their institutional and social environments have not often 
been studied in such a way as to test how gender could moderate civic integration processes.
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8.3 Conclusion: New Ground for Research
This project was designed to investigate an important question: how are the more open or closed 
approaches that different national communities are taking toward their immigrant-background 
minorities influencing those minorities' levels of identification with and political participation in 
those societies? Towards the beginning of this dissertation, I considered how we might expect 
national approaches to immigrant incorporation to shape immigrant minorities' identification 
with the national community and their political participation in it--their 'civic integration.' To 
operationalize these incorporation approaches, I introduced the concept of 'working national 
identities,' which I contended represent these national approaches as the aggregate levels of legal,
political and social inclusion which each immigrant-minority individual confronts at any given 
time in the context in which he or she lives. Though individual perceptions of these are likely to 
vary, I sought to examine the extent to which immigrant minorities in two national contexts 
thought to have contrasting working national identities across the three forms of inclusion (the 
Danish and Swedish) 1) perceived legal, political and social inclusion to be extended to them-
selves and to their ethnic and religious groups; 2) identified with the national community; and 3) 
participated in electoral and other forms of political action. 
To the first question, I found that the Swedish and Danish 'models' are producing marked-
ly different perceptions of inclusion among immigrant-background minorities--with more posi-
tive perceptions in Sweden along legal, political and social dimensions. This suggests that the 
differences in citizenship policies, political rhetoric and social attitudes towards immigrants 
among the general population documented by scholars and outlined in existing survey data (as 
outlined in Chapter 3) do in fact create divergent realities on the ground for immigrant minori-
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ties, with those in Sweden consistently perceiving more inclusion, as a group, than those in Den-
mark do. In researching the second and third I found that, despite the institutional importance of 
citizenship, policies for naturalization mean little for immigrant minorities' civic integration, 
compared with political and social levels of inclusion. In the previous sections, I outlined these 
findings, highlighting the role of integration issue salience and gender in moderating them. Over-
all, I find, the Danish and Swedish national approaches play an important role in producing 
meaningful disparities in national identification and participation between immigrant minorities 
in Denmark and Sweden. Due to the discovered gender-based effects differences, these inter-
country gaps are markedly larger among minority men than women. Minority men in Denmark 
lag behind minority women in Denmark and those of both genders in Sweden when it comes to 
national identification levels and rates of intended voting. Most affected by the social and politi-
cal exclusion of their ethnic groups and Muslims, and expressing the lowest political trust levels, 
minority men in Denmark are spurred to participate in political action at significantly higher 
rates than men in Sweden do; yet minority women in both countries do so at a similarly high 
rate, as they are more likely to do so on the basis of their high levels of identification rather than 
perceived group exclusion.
In all these findings, it is those involving gender that are some of the most intriguing--es-
pecially because gender has been until now been given little attention in much research on civic 
integration of immigrants. Though there is a growing field of ethnographic work on gender and 
migration or integration experiences (Mahler and Pessar 2006), and while some scholars have 
examine different roles of men and women in associational life and political mobilization work 
(refs), there has been little discussion that experienced exclusion in society may actually be af-
fecting men and women's identities and participation in divergent ways. This study pointed to 
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minority women as having generally higher levels of identification and participation than their 
male counterparts, less likely to be (negatively) influenced by factors of inclusion and exclusion, 
especially those regarding minority groups. Men's identification, traditional participation and po-
litical trust levels are more likely to be negatively affected when they perceive their groups to be 
politically or socially excluded than women's are, and this even when factors that could possibly 
be thought to account for gender differences in such outcomes--such as education, political inter-
est, ethnic identification, and more--are accounted for. In section 8.2 above, I presented some 
mechanisms identified by psychologists that may account for this; this is an important area for 
future research. Such research must examine further whether it is the case, in general, that men 
are more affected than women when their groups are excluded, and why this might be so. The 
question could also be phrased in reverse: why are women less likely to be affected when their 
groups are excluded? This work should also begin to learn what other societal outcomes such dif-
ferences play a role in shaping; it may be, for instance, that such dynamics can help to explain 
the persistent gaps in educational and career achievement between boys and girls, and men and 
women, of immigrant background that are observed in many settings and that tend to be wider 
than those among majority populations (Lopez 2003; Feliciano and Rumbaut 2005; Brunn and 
Kao 2008).
I have in this dissertation joined insights from disparate literatures--respectively focusing 
on national identity, citizenship and integration policy, integration politics, majority attitudes, 
identification and political participation--into a framework for studying immigrant-minority civic
integration. Presenting and using this framework, this study contributes to political science and 
to immigration and ethnic studies more specifically with findings about how and where restric-
tive vs. liberal regimes of immigrant-minority incorporation are likely to shape civic integration 
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outcomes, as it suggests that gender and minority-group dynamics interact in ways that may ex-
tend to a broader range of political phenomena. While citizenship access matters to many im-
migrant minorities, social and political inclusion are more influential factors. 
This raises the question of whether the concept of 'working national identity' developed 
for this study--which I have argued is defined by how a nation draws its boundaries through citi-
zenship, political rhetoric and social interaction--is ultimately a useful idea. I believe that it is, 
since it argues for a new conceptualization of 'national identities' as immigrant minorities actual-
ly experience them. It joins citizenship policy, immigration and integration politics and majority 
attitudes towards minorities together in a combined concept in a way that the previous, separate 
literatures have not. It is clear that each of these spheres sends signals to immigrant minorities 
about who belongs to the national community. However, with citizenship, it seems that actual 
policies are only partially understood by many immigrants, with the consequence that the 'sig-
nals' sent in this sphere are much less clear than we scholars would suppose. Given this, and that 
perceptions of citizenship access are found to have less influence on minorities' identification 
and participation than those of political and social inclusion, it is not clear whether, for the pur-
poses of  scholars who would know more about integration outcomes, including citizenship poli-
cy in this concept is useful or not. However, I contend that such a theoretical framework--identi-
fying factors of national identity as they are aggregated in society and communicated to 
minorities through repeated interactions--is of use, and should be further developed.
The field needs more research that examines on attitudes and political behavior among 
immigrant minorities, especially in terms of how they are related to national institutions and so-
cietal conditions. Yet this agenda must confront one of the major challenges of studying any link 
between policy, political or societal factors on the one hand, and individual-level outcomes on 
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the other: the role of perceptions in mediating macro-micro links. That is, system-level factors 
likely influence individual-level outcomes when, and because, they influence those actors' per-
ceptions. Acknowledging that role is necessary to understanding these relationships, but it also 
introduces causal uncertainty into the heart of the analysis: how can we know that the perception 
'precedes' the outcome, especially where that outcome is itself attitudinal? This may be said to be
the achilles' heel of studies like this one, and similar future work; yet their strength lies in recog-
nizing the actual role that perceptions play, and analyzing these links as they occur. Undoubtedly,
experimental studies will be an important part of this research agenda, as they present a partial 
solution to the 'perception problem.' There are multiple challenges to using them for studies that 
involve actual social identities and outcomes that, in the real world, are shaped over the long 
term through iterative processes--as this study's experimental module showed; but scholars of 
immigration and ethnic studies must continue to innovate, and experiments are likely to be a use-
ful part of the future studies agenda. 
In my own future work, I intend to continue studying the main questions of this disserta-
tion. I intend to partner with researchers who have collected data on immigrant-background Mus-
lims' attitudes in several Western European countries, including some more limited measures of 
perceived treatment and of nation identification (the 'EURISLAM' project). I hope with this re-
search to further investigate the links between national model to perceptions, to civic integration 
outcomes in focus here. In addition, I am about to launch a three-year project on whether gender 
moderates how group politics affect political trust levels among members of targeted groups--
motivated in part by this project's findings about gender-group interactions. This research will be 
survey-experimental in nature, and will investigate 1) whether this gender-group interaction 
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holds more broadly, and involving both ethnic-minority and professional groups; and 2) what 
mechanisms can most likely explain why such an interaction occurs. 
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contacted
(4235)
% of all 
'completers' 
(438)









289   6.8 % 22 (7.6 %) 33 (12.4 
%)
234 81.0 % 5.5 % 53.4 % 5.4 % 20.5 %
after call
only
15 0.4 % 3 (20 %) 2 (16.7 
%)
10 66.7 % 0.2 % 2.3 % 0.2 % 0.7 %
after 1st 
email












48 60 % 1.1 % 11.0 % 1.1 % 3.4 %
after fi-
nal email
30 0.7 % 9 (30 %) 4 (19.0 
%)
17 56.7 % 0.4 % 3.9 % 0.4 % 1.2 %




438 75.5 % 10.3 % 100 % 10.1 % 31 %




















750 738 224 61 / 52 79 10.7 % 35.2 %
Group 3: 
control
667 650 182 81 / 40 102 15.7 % 56 %









750 736 281 31 / 42 43 5.8 % 15.3 %
Group 3: 
control
667 660 260 37 / 54 79 12.0 % 30.4 %









Group 1: Arab 
name sample
36 9 6
Group 2: Turkish 
name sample
65 6 8
Group 3: control 48 1 1
Total 149 16 15
Sweden
Group 1: Arab 
name sample
95 11 6
Group 2: Turkish 
name sample
105 28 7
Group 3: control 94 2 3
Total 294 41 16
Active refusals, by sub-sample group and grounds
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Appendix 2. Political action: means and inter-country comparisons (t-tests), 
participation in each kind and (combined) type of political action, majority 









Boycotted .18 (.03) t = -2.69 ** .33 (.05) .24 (.05) t = -4.19 *** .55 (.06)
Bought certain goods .34 (.04) t = -0.67 .39 (.05) .40 (.05) t = -3.91 *** .70 (.06)
Donated money .55 (.04) t = 0.75 .50 (.05) .56 (.05) t = 0.06 .55 (.06)
Money .64 (.04) t = 0.27 .62 (.05) .73 (.05) t = -1.37 .82 (.05)
Written to a newspaper .11 (.03) t = -0.21 .12 (.03) .06 (.02) t = -1.67 .13 (.04)
Posted online .27 (.04) t = -0.72 .31 (.05) .14 (.04) t = -3.54 *** .37 (.06)
Signed petition .23 (.04) t = -0.73 .28 (.05) .39 (.05) t = -0.58 .43 (.06)
Contacted media .11 (.04) t = 0.76 .08 (.03) .08 (.03) t = -1.88 .18 (.05)
Write .43 (.05) t = -0.42 .46 (.05) .44 (.05) t = -2.10 * .61 (.06)
Contacted MP .07 (.02) t = 1.42 .02 (.02) .05 (.02) t = 0.50 .03 (.02)
Contacted local politician .03 (.02) t = -0.50 .05 (.02) .02 (.02) t = -1.87 .09 (.04)
Contacted assoc. or int. org. .16 (.03) t = 0.75 .13 (.04) .06 (.02) t = -2.69 ** .19 (.05)
Contacted public employee .05 (.02) t = -1.17 .09 (.03) .02 (.02) t = -2.73 ** .13 (.04)
Contact .21 (.04) t = 0.73 .17 (.04) .10 (.03 t = -3.61 *** .33 (.06)
Collected funds for cause .28 (.04) t = 2.81 ** .12 (.04) .09 (.03) t = 0.72 .06 (.03)
Worked in a party .02 (.01 t = 0.07 .02 (.02) .06 (.02) t = 1.33 .01 (.01)
Participated in demo. .21 (.04) t = 0.72 .17 (.04) .11 (.03) t = -0.00 .11 (.04)
Attended political meeting .16 (.03) t = 1.57 .09 (.03) .14 (.04) t = 0.60 .10 (.04)
Activism .45 (.05) t = 1.98 * .31 (.05) .26 (.05) t = 0.75 .21 (.05)
Sum types engaged in (0-4) 1.74 (.12) t = 0.95 1.56 (.14) 1.53 (.12) t = -2.47 * 1.97 (.13)
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Appendix 3. Main survey instrument content, English version
Note: This survey content used (in Swedish, Danish and English versions) between June and December 
2012. Content and recruitment & consent procedures approved by the Columbia University IRB as part of
Protocol AAAI0240, 2012; approval renewed on 24 Jan. 2013 and 14 January 2014. .
Thanks very much for taking part in our survey! Hearing about your experiences and ideas is a big help to us. Read 
the text on this page and answer below whether you want to participate or not. If you answer 'yes,' you will be tak-
en further to the survey.
[Informed consent- information and consent text]
If you understand and give your consent to participate in the 
survey, please click “YES” below, and you will be taken to the 
survey.
IF not, please click “NO,” continue to the next page, then close 
your browser window.
YES, I consent and agree to participate./
NO, I do not consent to participate in the study.
Are you a man or woman? Man/ Woman
What year were you born? 19__ 
How often do you use... the internet? Several times a day/ Several times a week/ About 
once a week/ Occasionally/ Very rarely/ Never
Facebook?
Taking all things together, how happy would you say that you 
are?
Very happy/ Fairly happy/ Not very happy/ Not at 
all happy/ Don't know
What is your current occupation or job? Apprentice or student at technical, business, high 
school/ Student in a short or intermediate higher 
education program (e.g., technical, social, peda-
gogical training/ University student/ Self-em-
ployed/ Public employee/ Private-sector employ-
ee/ Serving required military or national service 
duty/ Unemployed/ Homemaker/ staying at home 
without business-related work/ On public assis-
tance, re-training or long-term sick leave
What is your current education? Ordinary school exam/ Technical or other short 
education (1-year program)/ High school, gymna-
sium diploma/ Trade or business education/ Short 
higher education (1-2 years college)/ Bachelor's 
degree level, Medium-length higher education (3-4
years/ Master's degree or long higher education (4
or more years)/ Other (Which?) ___
What is your most recent completed education? 
(If completed in another country, choose the Danish/Swedish 
level that is most equivalent.)
Did not finish school/ Ordinary school exam/ Tech-
nical or other short education (1-year program)/ 
High school, gymnasium diploma/ Trade or busi-
ness education/ Short higher education (1-2 years 
college)/ Bachelor's degree level, Medium-length 
higher education (3-4 years/ Master's degree or 
long higher education (4 or more years)/ Other 
(Which?) ___
Including public/elementary school, how many years of educa-
tion have you had in all? 
(Type number of years.)  ___
Have you previously had a job? Yes, here in Denmark,Sweden/ Yes, in another 
country/ Yes, both in Denmark,Sweden and in 
another country/ No
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Have you been employed or a student (of any school or institu-
tion) within the past year?
Yes/ No
Do you think that your current or last job fit/fits your education 
and qualifications?
Yes/ No/ Don't know
Did your latest (completed or current) education take place in 
this country, or another?
This country/ Another country (type name of 
country) ___
How many people live in the city/place where you live now? Fewer than 2000/ 2001 - 5000/ 5,001 - 10,000/ 
10,001 - 20,000/ 20,001 - 50,000/ 50,001 - 
100,000/ 100,001 - 500,000/ More than 500,000/ 
Don't know
Were you born in this country, or another? This country/ Another country (type name of 
country) ___
Which language(s) did you speak at home as a child? 
(You may select more than one language.)
Danish-Swedish/ Arabic/ Kurdish/ Polish/ Serbo-
croatian/ Somali/ Turkish/ Another language (type 
which language) ______
Did you go to preschool/nursery school/daycare in Denmark-
Sweden as a child?
Denmark-Sweden/ Another country (type in name 
of country/ Both in Denmark-Sweden and another 
country (type in name of country)
What is your family's ethnic or na-
tional background?
(You may select more than 
one if, for example, your 
parents have different 
backgrounds)
Arab/ Bosnian/ Danish-Swedish/ Iranian/ Kurdish/ 
Pakistani/ Polish/ Serbian/ Somali/ Turkish/ Other 
(which?)
Where were your parents born? Was your mother born in Sweden/ Another country (type which country)/ 
Don't know
Was your father born in
What are your parents' native lan-
guage(s)?  (You may choose more 
than one language for each parent.)
Your mother Danish-Swedish/ Arabic/ Kurdish/ Polish/ Serbo-
croatian/ Somali/ Turkish/ Another language (type 
which language) ______
Your father
Did you live with your parents when you were 14? Yes, with both my parents (either together, or 
taking turns between them)/ With my father only/ 
With my mother only/ No, I did not live with my 
parents
In which postal number did you live in when you were 14 years 
old?
(type in):______ / Did not live in Sweden when I 
was 14/ Don't know
In the neighborhood you lived in 
when you were 14 years old, how 
many of the residents had Swedish
and immigrant backgrounds, re-
spectively? What about the neigh-
borhood you live in now?
The neighborhood you lived
in when you were 14
All or nearly all had Danish-Swedish family back-
ground/ Most people had Danish-Swedish family 
background/ There were about equal numbers of 
those with Danish-Swedish family background and
those with immigrant background/ Most people 
had immigrant background/ All or nearly all had 
immigrant background/ Don't know
The neighborhood you live 
in now
When you think about your parents
when you were about 14 years old,
could you say whether these state-
ments correctly describe your 
parents?
My mother liked to read 
books
Very much/ Somewhat/ A little/ Not at all/ Don't 
know
I discussed politics at home
with my mother
My mother liked to follow 
the news
My father liked to read 
books
I discussed politics at home
with my father
My father liked to follow the
news
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What is the highest education ... your father has completed? Did not finish school/ Ordinary school exam/ Tech-
nical or other short education (1-year program)/ 
High school, gymnasium diploma/ Trade or busi-
ness education/ Short higher education (1-2 years 
college)/ Bachelor's degree level, Medium-length 
higher education (3-4 years/ Master's degree or 
long higher education (4 or more years)/ Other 
(Which?) ___
your mother has 
completed?
In what year did you come to Sweden to live? _____
Did you come to this country for the first time ... as a child together with your parents/ 
as an unaccompanied child/
as an adult (18 years or older)
Did you (or your family, if you came as a child) come to this 
country for the first time ...
as a refugee/ through family reunification with a 
work permit/ as a student/ other/ don't know
Have you attended Danish-Swedish language instruction? Yes/ No/ Don't know
How long did you attend Swedish language instruction? Only a few times/ 1-3 months/ 4-6 months/ 7 
months - 1 year/ 1 - 1 1/2 years/ 1 1/2 - 2 years/ 2 
- 3 years/ More than 3 years/ Don't know
Which Danish-Swedish language 




"Svenskundervisning: 1" (SFI-kurs A & B, for those
with very little schooling or who cannot read in 
their own language)/
"Svenskundervisning: 2" (SFI-kurs B & C, for those
with a shorter educational background from their 
home country)/ 
"Svenskundervisning: 3" (SFI-kurs C & D, for those
with a medium or higher educational background 
from their home country)/
Have not attended any of the following language 
training tracks/ Don't know
Have you taken one of the follow-
ing Swedish language tests, as 
part of Swedish language instruc-
tion (SFI, SAS) or for another rea-
son? If yes, which is the highest 
you have passed?
No, I have not taken any of 
the following Danish lan-
guage tests/ 
Yes, but I did not pass/
Yes, exam after module 1/
Yes, exam after module 2/
Yes, "Prøve i Dansk 1"/
Yes, "Prøve i Dansk 2"/
Yes, "Prøve i Dansk 3"/
Yes, "Studieprøven"/ Don't 
know
No, I have not taken any of the following Swedish 
language tests/
Yes, but I did not pass/
Yes, exam in SFI, A-level/
Yes, exam in SFI, B-level/
Yes, exam in SFI, C-level/
Yes, exam in SFI, D-level/
Yes, exam in "Svenska som Andraspråk A"/
Yes, exam in "Svenska som Andraspråk B"/ Don't 
know
What is your civil and relationship status? Single/ In a relationship, but do not live together/ 
Living with partner/ Married (or in registered part-
nership)/ Separated or divorced/ Widow or 
widower
Do you have children? Yes/ No
Do you live with your parents or other adult family members 
(other than your partner or spouse)?
Yes/ No
Some people see themselves as belonging to a particular class.
Please tell me which social class you would say you belong to?
Lower class/ Working class/ Lower middle class/ 
Middle class/ Upper middle class/ Upper class/ 
Don't know
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What is the household's approximate total monthly income after
taxes?
0 - 5000 DKK / month
5001 - 10 000 DKK / month
10 001 - 15 000 DKK / month 
5 001 - 20 000 DKK / month 
20 001 - 25 000 DKK / month 
25 001 - 30 000 DKK / month 
30 001 - 35 000 DKK / month 
35 001 - 45 000 DKK / month 
45 001 - 55 000 DKK / month 
55 001 - 75 000 DKK / month 
75 000 - 100 000 DKK / month 
More than 100 000 DKK / month 
Don't know
Is your partner or husband/wife... an immigrant/ a child or grandchild of immigrants/ 
of Swedish background/ of both Swedish and oth-
er family background/ don't know
Does your partner or husband/wife have citizenship ... in Sweden/
in another country (type name of country)/
in both Sweden and another (type name of other 
country)/ Don't know
Does your significant other, partner or husband/wife come from 
the same ethnic or national background as you?
Yes/ No/ Don't know
How often do you go to meetings or activities in connection 
with your child/children's childcare or school?
Very often/ Fairly often/ Occasionally/ Rarely/ 
Never
What is your religion? Are you... Christian/ Muslim/ Another religion (type which) 
___/ No religion/ Don't know
Which branch of Islamic faith do you belong to? Sunni/ Shia/ Alevi/ Other (type which) ___/ No spe-
cific belonging/ Don't know
Which Christian church do you belong to? Swedish Lutheran/ Another Protestant church 
(e.g., Baptist or Pentacostal)/ Catholic/ Orthodox 
(e.g. Russian, Greek or other)/ No specific belong-
ing/ Don't know
How important is God in your life? 1 not important at all
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 very important
How important is your religion to you?
How often do you pray, not counting religious services or 
meetings?
Several times a day/ Every day/ Once a week/ Oc-
casionally/ Rarely/ Never
How often do you attend religious services or meetings (not 
counting meetings connected with events such as weddings, 
funerals and christenings)?
More than once a week/ Once a week/ Once a 
month/ Several times a year/ Only on holy days, 
special occasions/ About once a year/ Less than 
once a year/ Never, or almost never/ Don't know
As part of practicing your religion 
...
do you wear certain 
clothing?
Yes/ No
do you follow certain eating
habits?
Yes/ No
People may feel different levels of 
attachment to their town or city, to 
their ethnic or religious group, to 
their country or to Europe. To what 
extent do you feel...
part of your city or local 
community
To a great extent/ Somewhat/ Not really/ Not at all
Danish/Swedish






If you were to compare your feelings about being [Dan-
ish,Swedish] and being a part of your ethnic group, would you 
say that you feel ...
only [Danish,Swedish]/ more [Danish,Swedish] 
than [ethnicity]/ equally [Danish,Swedish] and [eth-
nicity]/ more [ethnicity]than [Danish,Swedish]/ only 
[ethnicity]
If you were to compare your feelings about being [Danish/
Swedish] and being [Muslim/Christian/a member of your faith], 
would you say that you feel ...
only [Danish,Swedish]/ more [Danish,Swedish] 
than [faith]/ equally [Danish,Swedish] and [faith]/ 
more [faith]than [Danish,Swedish]/ only [faith]
You have just answered how you 
see yourself generally in relation to 
certain groups. Now we would like 
to hear how you feel when you are 
in some certain places and situa-
tions. To what extent do you feel 
Swedish and [ethnicity] when you 
are ...
at home with your family? Swedish:
To a great extent/ Somewhat/ Not really/ Not at all)
[Ethnicity]:
To a great extent/ Somewhat/ Not really/ Not at all)
when you are at work or at 
your school, university or 
training institution?
are out in town with your 
friends?
ride in a city bus or a train?
have contact with the 
policy?
To what extent do you agree with the following?
I think it is possible to be both Muslim and [Danish/Swedish] 1-Disagree totally  2 3 4 5 6   7-Agree totally 
I think it is possible to be both [ethnicity] and [Danish/Swedish]. 
In general, people with [ethnic] background in [Denmark/Swe-
den] are much like typical [Danes/Swedes].
Generally, the typical Muslim in [Denmark/Sweden] is much like 
the typical [Dane/Swede].
How true do you think the following are?
Most [Danes/Swedes] think it is possible to be both Muslim and
[Danish/Swedish].
1-Not at all true  2 3 4 5 6   7-Completely true 
Most [Danes/Swedes] think it is possible to be both [ethnic] and
[Danish/Swedish].
To what extent would you say the following statements describe your feelings?
Living in [Denmark/Sweden] is an important part of who I am. 1-Not at all   2 3 4 5 6   7-Completely
Being [ethnicity] is an important part of who I am.
Being [faith] is an important part of who I am.
I want what I do to make things better for people in [Denmark/
Sweden], both now and in the future
To what extent do the following de-
scribe your feelings?   
I feel strong ties with ...
[Denmark/Sweden] 1-Not at all   2 3 4 5 6   7-Completely 
Other [people of ethnic 
background]
Other [members of faith]
How well do the following describe you?
I feel I am part of [Danish/Swedish] society. 1-Not at all   2 3 4 5 6   7-Completely 
I feel I belong to both those with [ethnic] background and to the 
[Danes/Swedes].
Sometimes I feel more like a [Dane/Swede], and sometimes 
more like a [person of ethnic background] - it depends on the 
situation.
I think that both I and my children will live in [Denmark/Sweden] 
most of our lives.
There are significant [ethnic] cultural resources in [Denmark/
Sweden] - there is a lot to get involved in if you want to.
There are many Muslim congregations, groups and cultural re-
sources to engage in here in Sweden if one wants to.
Next we will ask you some questions about politics and society and your interest in them -- thank you for staying 
with us!
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How interested are you in politics generally? Very interested/ 
Somewhat interested/
Not very interested/
Not at all interested/
Don't know
People are different in terms of 
their interest in politics. How inter-
ested are you personally in the fol-
lowing areas of politics?
City or local politics
[Danish/Swedish] national 
politics
Politics in your family's 
country of origin
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
Political leaders in this country care about people like me. Strongly agree/ 
Agree/ 




People like me can have influence on political decisions in [Den-
mark/Sweden].
I like contributing to the well-being of people in [Denmark/
Sweden].
I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important 
political issues facing our country.
People we elect as MPs try to keep the promises they have 
made during the election.
Ethnic minorities are often treated badly in [Denmark/Sweden].
Muslims are often treated badly in [Denmark/Sweden].
[Danes/Swedes] recognize that most immigrants contribute 
positively to society.
The average citizen has considerable influence on politics.
To be a good citizen, how impor-
tant is it to ...
keep yourself informed 
about what is happening in 
Swedish society?











report it to the policy, if igt 
comes to your attention 
that a serious crime has 
been committed?
have a job with which you 
can support yourself?
vote in parliamentary elec-
tions (if one has the right to 
vote)?
vote in local elections (if 
one has the right to vote)?
Do you have citizenship in: [Denmark/Sweden]/
another country (type name of country) ____ / 
both [Denmark/Sweden] and other country (type 
name of other country) ___
When did you become a [Danish/Swedish] citizen? At birth/
As a child before age 18 (Please type your age at 
the time you got citizenship) __ / 
As an adult (type which year) ____ / 
Don't know
How proud are you of being [Danish/Swedish]? Very proud/ Quite proud/ Not very proud/ Not at all
proud
Do you believe it is possible for you
to become a citizen:
right now, if you wished to? Yes/ No/ Don't know
in the future?
To what extent do you agree with the following?
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It is possible for most [co-ethnics] with immigrant background 









It is possible for most Muslims in [Denmark/Sweden] to become
[Danish/Swedish] citizens if they wish to.
The politicians in parliament would like as many immigrants as 
possible to get [Danish/Swedish] citizenship
I have a reasonable understanding of the [Danish/Swedish] citi-
zenship rules.
How many years, according to [Danish/Swedish] law, does an 
adult foreign citizen need to have lived in this country before he/




What must a child born in Sweden do to acquire [Danish/
Swedish] citizenship, if his or her parents do not have it?
Nothing - being born in the country gives it 
automatically/
Fill out a declaration fo birth and residence in the 
country/
Fulfill normal citizenship requirements him/herself 
(if over 18 years old), or get it together with par-
ents who fulfill the requirements/
Don't know
Some people say the following are 
important for being truly [Danish/
Swedish]. Others say that they are 
not so important. 
How important do you think they 
are for being Swedish?





not at all important/
don't know
To respect the country's 
political institutions and 
laws
To have Swedish ancestry
To be able to speak [Dan-
ish/Swedish]
To have lived for a long 
time in [Denmark/Sweden]
To be Christian
To follow [Danish/Swedish] 
customs and traditions
To feel [Danish/Swedish]
To what extent do you agree with the following?
Most people in this country consider me to be Swedish 1 Disagree totally   2 3 4 5 6   7 Agree totally/
Don't knowMost people in this country consider me to be a member of so-
ciety on equal footing with themselves.
Most people I meet in my daily life consider me to be a member
of society on equal footing with themselves.
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
Differences in income in [Denmark/Sweden] are too large. Strongly agree/
Agree/




It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differ-
ences in income between people with high incomes and those 
with low incomes.
The government should provide a decent standard of living for 
the unemployed.
The government should spend less
on benefits for the poor.
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What attitude do you think leading 












Thank you for staying with us so far! We will focus the last remaining questions on how you participate in society.
If there was a parliamentary election tomorrow and you had vot-
ing rights, would you vote?
Yes, I would vote/
No, I would not vote/
Don't know
Are you eligible to vote in [Denmark/Sweden? Yes, in both local and national elections/
Yes, in local elections only/
No, neither eligible for local or national elections
Did you vote in the last parliamentary election? Yes/ No
Did you vote in the last local election?
Why are you not eligible to vote? Not a permanent resident or a citizen/
Not a citizen/
Don't know
Have you tried to achieve improve-
ments or hinder things getting 
worse in the [Danish/Swedish] so-
ciety by doing the following within 
the past 12 months?
Boycotted certain products Yes/ No
Bought certain products for
political, ethical or environ-
mental reasons
Supported an organization 
by giving money
Supported an organization 
by giving money
Collected donations for an 
organization
Contacted media or ap-
peared in the media
Attended or participated in 
a political meeting
Written a letter to a 
newspaper, or a comment 
on a newspaper's website
Written a post or comment 
to some other online dis-
cussion forum
Participated in a Facebook 
group or other online cam-
paign about [Danish/
Swedish] politics or condi-
tions in society
Are you a member of any [Danish/Swedish] political party? Yes/ No/ Don't know
Many people feel a connection to one party's politics, whether 
or not they are members. How close do you feel to a [Danish/
Swedish] party?
1 Not at all close to any party  2 3 4 5 6 
7 Very close to a party/
Don't know
Would you say that there is a Muslim group or organization in 
[Denmark/Sweden] that speaks for you or represents you?
Yes (which?) ____ /
No/
Don't knowCan you think of a group, organization or leader outside [Den-
mark/Sweden] that you feel represents you politically?
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Do you feel that one of the [family homeland's government] rep-
resents you (i.e., you feel somehow connected to it, that it has a
certain authority you look up to?)
(governments referenced as follows:
[one of the Arab states' governments/ the Bosnian government/ 
the Iranian government/ the Polish government/ the indepen-
dent Kurdish government or authorities/ the Turkish govern-
ment/ Somali leaders or a certain group of Somali authorities/ 
the Pakistani government/ the Serbian government/ the govern-
ment in your family's country of origin])
Yes/ No/ Don't know
Have you tried to achieve improve-
ments or hinder things getting 
worse in the [Danish/Swedish] so-
ciety by doing the following within 
the past 12 months?
Contacted a politician in 
Parliament
Yes/ No
Contacted a local politician
Contacted an association 
or interest organization
Contacted a pubic employ-
ee at the national regional 
or local level
Worked in a political party
Signed a petition, either on 
paper on online
Participated in a pubic 
demonstration
Participated in a strike
In what city is the last stage of the bicycle race Tour de France 
held every year? [attention check]
Bankok/ New York/ Paris/ Abu Dhabi
Do you belong to, or are you in-
volved with, the following types of 
associations?
Political parties or groups Yes/ No
Religious or church 
organizations
Ethnic association or ethnic
cultural center
Social welfare services for 
elderly, handicapped or de-
prived people




Local community action on 
issues like poverty, employ-
ment, housing, racial 
equality
Third world development or
human rights
Conservation, the environ-
ment, ecology, animal 
rights
Youth work (e.g., scouts, 








You answered that you are in-
volved in the following types of as-
sociations. Do you perform volun-
teer (unpaid) work in these 
associations? [Note: only those in-
dicated in previous question are 
listed for respondent here]
Political parties or groups Yes/ No
Religious or church 
organizations
Ethnic association or ethnic
cultural center
Social welfare services for 
elderly, handicapped or de-
prived people




Local community action on 
issues like poverty, employ-
ment, housing, racial 
equality
Third world development or
human rights
Conservation, the environ-
ment, ecology, animal 
rights
Youth work (e.g., scouts, 








  do you read [Danish/Swedish] newspapers, either online or in  
  their paper format?
Every day/ A few times a week/ Occasionally/ Very
seldom/ Never
  do you watch [Danish/Swedish] TV news?
Do you have problems understanding...
  letters from your city/town?
Often/ Occasionally/ Only rarely/ Never/ Don't 
know
  [Danish/Swedish news broadcasts on TV?
How often have you heard about 
the following issues in [Danish/
Swedish] politics, or in the media?
Immigration Never/ 





Language requirements for 
immigrants




How often do you talk with your friends or family about [Danish/
Swedish] politics?
Very often/ Fairly often/ Occasionally/ Very little/ 
Not at all
Would you say that your closest friends are ... of your own ethnic background/
of an ethnic background different from yours/
a mixed group, with different backgrounds
Generally speaking would you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
0 You can't be too careful
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 Most people can be trusted
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Would you say that most people would try to take advantage of 
you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?
0 Most people would try to take advantage of me
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 Most people would try to be fair
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or 
that they are mostly looking out for themselves?
0 They are mostly looking out for themselves
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 People try to be helpful most of the time
How much confidence do you have
in the following institutions?


















The United Nations (UN)
In your opinion, how widespread is 
discrimination in [Denmark/Swe-
den] because of people's...










How do you feel that public em-
ployees (including the police) treat 
the following groups in comparison
to people in the country in general?






Ethnic minorities in general
People of your religion
Religion minorities in 
general
In the past 12 months have you personally felt discriminated 
against or harassed in [Denmark/Sweden] due to one or more of
the following grounds? (Please check all that apply or choose 
"none of these" below.)








Now we would like to hear 
whether, during the past 5 years, 
you have been discriminated 
against in [Denmark/Sweden] due 
to your ethnic background... 




Yes, but on grounds other than ethnic 
background/
Not applicable (have not been in this situation)
at work by people who you 
work for or work with?
when in or trying to enter a 
café, restaurant, bar or 
nightclub?
when in a shop or 
supermarket?
by people working in (pub-
lic or private) health 
services?
by people working in public
employment or welfare 
offices?
by people working in a 
school, training or educa-
tion institution?
when looking for a house or
apartment to rent or buy, 
either by people working in 
a public agency or by a pri-
vate landlord or agency?
when trying to open a bank 
account or get a loan from 
a bank?
How often must parliamentary elections be held in [Denmark/
Sweden]
At least once every 4th year/
At least once every 6th year/
The prime minister has full power to call elections 
when it suits him/her/
Don't know
What is the [Queen/King's] political power in [Denmark/
Sweden]?
[She/He] may adopt laws and control the military 
when [she/he] wishes to./
[She/He]has no political power, but must sign 
when new laws are passed and new governments 
are formed.
[She/He] may control [Danish/Swedish] diplomatic 
relations with other countries./
Don't know
[What festival do most Swedes cel-
ebrate in June each year?]




What do most Danes watch on 
television at 6:00 p.m. every New 
Year's Eve?
(Denmark only) The Prime Minister's new year's speech/
The Queen's new year's speech/
A church service from the Copenhagen Cathedral/
Don't know
[Recruitment to follow-up survey, interviews.]
Thanks very much for taking part in our survey! It is a big help to our project.
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Appendix 4. Follow-up survey: treatments and experiment-specific questions 
(unique in follow up, not used in main survey), English version
Note: This survey content used (in Swedish, Danish and English versions) between December 2012 and 
February 2013. Content and recruitment & consent procedures approved by the Columbia University IRB
as part of Protocol AAAI0240 in a modification Nov. 2012 ; approval renewed on 24 Jan. 2013 and 14 
January 2014. 
Thanks very much for taking part in our survey! Hearing about your experiences and ideas is a big help to us.
Please read the text on the next page and answer at the bottom of the page whether you want to participate or 
not. If you answer 'yes,' you will be taken further to the survey.
[informed consent procedure]
Please note:
You will recognize some of the questions we will ask you from the first survey -- we would like to ask you to an-
swer them again now, as it is an enormous help to us to be able to hear from you again now, after a little time has 
passed, about how you think about these things.
Please read the following, about an important issue affecting society today. Then answer the questions about the 
text before completing the rest of the survey.
Positive treatment condition & accompanying questions
Denmark Sweden
Despite the political debates now and then over inte-
gration of minorities, more and more people in Den-
mark think that anyone who wants to, can be Danish. 
Over time this is effecting how people treat each other 
in politics and in everyday life. This attitude is especially
prevalent among younger Danes, though it is on the 
rise among all age groups.
This development not only influences how people think 
about Danish society and behave toward one another. 
It is also having an effect on Danish democracy. The 
number of elected representatives with minority back-
ground in Parliament and in local city councils contin-
ues to grow--Nadeem Farooq, MP (R, pictured) is one 
of these. They represent the changing society, and they
have a role in forming Denmark’s future.
Despite the political debates now and then over integra-
tion of minorities, more and more people in Sweden think 
that anyone who wants to, can be Swedish. Over time this
is effecting how people treat each other in politics and in 
everyday life. This attitude is especially prevalent among 
younger Swedes, though it is on the rise among all age 
groups.
This development not only influences how people think 
about Swedish society and behave toward one another. It
is also having an effect on Swedish democracy. The num-
ber of elected representatives with minority background in
Parliament and in local city councils continues to grow--
Amir Adan, MP (M, pictured) is one of these. They repre-




Does the idea that Danish society is opening up to peo-
ple of many backgrounds surprise you, or is it something
you have often noticed yourself?






7 Have seen it often
Is this the first time you have thought about the growing 
number of Danish politicians and leaders with minority 
background, or have you thought about it often?






7 Have thought about it often
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Negative treatment condition & accompanying questions
Denmark Sweden
Despite the fact that many immigrants and their chil-
dren are now a part of Danish society, there is still a 
conflict about who may really belong to the country, 
and what it means to be Danish. While society is chang-
ing, there are still many Danes who have a hard time 
seeing people with other backgrounds as ‘Danish,‘ and 
this affects how people treat each other in politics and 
in everyday life. This attitude is especially prevalent 
among older Danes, but it exists among all age groups.
These ideas influence not only how people think about 
Danish society and behave toward one another. They 
also have an effect on Danish democracy. Some politi-
cians and parties say it is important that the Danish 
Christian cultural heritage continues to be a foundation 
of Danish values, and they have spoken of Islam as a 
threat to this. Among those are the Danish People’s 
Party (its leader, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, is pictured 
here).
Despite the fact that many immigrants and their children 
are now a part of Swedish society, there is still a conflict 
about who may really belong to the country, and what it 
means to be Swedish. While society is changing, there 
are still many Swedes who have a hard time seeing peo-
ple with other backgrounds as ‘Swedish,‘ and this affects 
how people treat each other in politics and in everyday 
life. This attitude is especially prevalent among older 
Swedes, but it exists among all age groups.
These ideas influence not only how people think about 
Swedish society and behave toward one another. They 
also have an effect on Swedish democracy. Some politi-
cians and parties say it is important that the Swedish 
Christian cultural heritage continues to be a foundation of 
Swedishness, and they have spoken of Islam as a threat 
to this. Among those are the Sweden Democrats (their 
leader, Jimmie Åkesson, is pictured here).
 
Is the idea that some Danes/Swedes still see people of 
other backgrounds as not belonging to the country 
something that surprises you, or is it something you 
have often noticed yourself?






7 Have seen it often
Is this the first time you have heard of politicians saying 
that Islam might be in conflict with Danish/Swedish val-
ues, or have you heard it often?






7 Have thought about it often
(repeat assessments of key inclusion, identification and participation intention variables, as in main survey)
If you think back to the text with picture you read at the beginning of this survey ...
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Did it say that many Danes.../ Swedes ... 1 Have a hard time seeing people with minority back-






7 Are open to people with minority background being 
Danish/ Swedish
Did it suggest that in Danish/ Swedish politics influence 









Appendix 5. Interview Guide, English version 
Note: This interview guide used (in Swedish, Danish and English versions) between December 2012 and 
May 2013. Content andand recruitment & consent procedures approved by the Columbia University IRB 
as part of Protocol AAAI0240 in a modification Nov. 2012; approval renewed on 24 Jan. 2013 and 14 
January 2014. 
This document is a guide for the interviewers; exact wording of questions, as sometimes indicated in the guide itself,
may be changed somewhat based on previous respondent answers or existing knowledge about the respondent (for
example, from the main survey module).
Throughout this document, R signifies the respondent, or interviewee. Where shorter points follow a question, they
represent question probes to be introduced by the interviewer if the respondent has not addressed them. Italics are
used for instructions to the interviewer and for probe reminders; normal text is used for questions.
[Informed consent process]
1. Can you tell me about yourself -- what do you do, where are you from, what interests you, what do you care a lot
about?
age
profession or current education
where from/ where R lives
what interests you/ what do you care a lot about
2. What would you like to be doing in 10 years?
2a. Where would you like to live at that time?
2b. What led to your wanting to do that?
2c. Do you feel like you have the opportunities that you need to make that happen?
Now I’d like to hear about your ideas about politics and how you are involved in your community:
3. Would you say that you are more or less interested in politics than you were 5 years ago?
3a. Why do you think that is?
What’s different now that has made the difference
4. I would like to hear what kinds of groups you are involved with -- as member, or volunteering, or attending meet-
ings with, and so forth (could be local groups or national or international -- you don’t have to tell me the names of
the groups, just what they are like and what they do.)
How long, how often
(if mentioned something, ask 4a and 4b)
4a. What got you involved with that (group) in the first place?
Friend, family, event or issue that brought R to it 
4b. What is it about (mentioned group or activity) that makes you want to be involved in that way?
(repeat 4a and 4b for each group or activity mentioned)
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(if did not mention something, ask 4c and possibly 4d)
4c. Is there a kind of group or community work that you would like to get involved with in the future?
4d. (If mentioned any groups in 5c) What is it about (mentioned group or activity) that makes you want to be 
involved in that way?
5. When you think about Danish/Swedish politics, what kinds of things do you think about?
Could be issues, events, people
5a. (iWhat’s the general feeling you get when you think of this?
6. What would you say are one or two things in Danish/Swedish politics that interest you most?
Could be issues, decisions, parties, problems
Could be local or national
Something that when it comes up, you are interested to hear about it
(if mentioned something, ask 6a and 6b)
6a. What about this is interesting to you -- why do you care about it?
(If not already mentioned in answer to 6)
6b. Can you tell me about when you first became interested in this?
Any specific event, or other person or group that brought it up for you
6c. How does caring about this affect you in terms of your feelings and being involved with other people 
around the issue.
Communicating to others about it
Group engagement around it Volunteer work
Political activism, etc.
Repeat 6a, 6b and 6c for each aspect mentioned.
7. Some people think that voting is important, and some think it is less important. What do you think?
7a. Why do you feel this way?
8. When it comes to voting, is the idea of doing it more or less important to you now than it was 5 years ago?
8a. Why is that?
Did something or someone make you decide that you felt it was more (or less) important
9. Do you personally have the right to vote?
9a. How does (not) being able to vote make you feel?
10. Can you describe what it means to be Danish/Swedish?
11. And what about for you personally-- would you say that you feel Danish/Swedish, and what does that mean for
you?
12. Some people have thought a lot about this -- their feeling as a part of the nation -- and some people have not
thought about it at all. What about you?
13. In what kinds of situations would you describe yourself as Danish/Swedish?
in different places
with different people
talking about certain kinds of things
14. Can you think of times or situations where you really strongly have the feeling of being Danish/Swedish, when
you feel connected with other Danes/Swedes as part of the same nation? -- Tell me about those.
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situations, or with certain people, certain events or times
14a. Why do you think that is?
What brings that about?
15. Can you think of times or situations where you did not feel Danish/Swedish? -- Tell me about those.
15b. Why, do you think?
What brings that feeling about?
16. What do you think your being and feeling Danish/Swedish (or living in Denmark/Sweden but not feeling Danish/
Swedish)--try to use R’s words from above-- mean for you in your life, in what you do or care about, for example?
17. Would you say that you feel more Danish/Swedish now than, say, 5 years ago, or less? 
17a. Why do you think that is?
What is different now, what has changed?
18. Do you think most other people in the country would think of you as Danish/Swedish? 
18a. Why/ why not?
18b. How do you feel about this?
19. Can you describe your family’s background?
When came to Denmark/Sweden
Came under what circumstances
Ethnicity
20. Where did you grow up and go to school? 
(If in Denmark/Sweden, 20b)
20a. What was that like?
20b. Were there people with different backgrounds there?
How mixed was the neighborhood in terms of ethnic backgrounds and so forth?
21. When you were growing up, did you think much about your having a (use R’s description of ethnicity, etc.)
background?
22. What about now -- how often do you usually think about the fact that you have a (use R’s words) background?
22a. (If 21 and 22 different) Can you remember when this changed for you?
22a. In what situations do you think about this, especially?
23. How is it being (ethnicity as R describes it) and Danish/Swedish (living in Denmark/Sweden, if R does not feel
Danish/Swedish), for you personally?
Is it very easy, fairly easy, a little hard, or very hard
23a. What does that look like in your everyday life?
Could be relationships with family and friends, work life, etc.
23b. Would you say it effects how you think about politics?
23c. In what you care about in society?
Groups, issues, etc.
24. What about your religion -- what religion do you belong to?
25. How is it important to you, in terms of how you live your life?
26. How is it being (religion as R describes it) and Danish/Swedish (living in Denmark/Sweden, if R does not feel
Danish/Swedish), for you personally?
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Is it very easy, fairly easy, a little hard, or very hard
26a. What does that look like in your everyday life?
Could be relationships with family and friends, work life, etc.
26b. Would you say it effects how you think about politics? 26c. In what you care about in society?
Groups, issues, etc.
27. How would you say the situation is for minorities and immigrants in Denmark/Sweden more generally?
Could be everyday experiences, politics, inequality
27a. Is this something you have thought a lot about, have thought about some, not thought much about, or 
not thought about at all?
(If thinks about it, 27b)
27b. When would you say you think about it most?
situations times people
28. Are you a citizen?
(If citizen, 29; If not a citizen, 30)
29. Have you been a citizen from birth, did you become a citizen as a child, or did you choose yourself to do it?
(If chose self, 29a; If not, 30)
29a. Why did you choose to become a citizen?
29b. Can you remember how you felt when you got citizenship? Tell me about that.
30. What does (not) being a citizen mean for you?
Feelings, things you do or are involved in, rights you have, things you are able to do
(30a only if not a citizen)
30a. Would you like to become a citizen?
31. Do you think that Denmark/Sweden has good citizenship rules, for who can become a citizen and when?
31a. Why/ why not?
Who do you think should be able to become a citizen?
31b. Is this something you have thought much about before, only some, or have you not thought about it?
31a. Do you think these rules really matter, or not?
Thank you very much for taking time to talk with me! I appreciate it very much.
(Debrief about project.)
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Appendix 6. List of respondents, follow-up interviews
Country Interview # Age Gender Ethnicity date
Denmark DK 1 18 F Kurdish January 2013
DK 2 28 M Arab January 2013
DK 3 30 F Arab January 2013
DK 4 22 M Arab February 2013
DK 5 21 F Kurdish February 2013
DK 6 28 M Afghan March 2013
DK 7 22 F Vietnamese April 2013
DK 8 26 F Kurdish April 2013
DK 9 28 M Pakistani May 2013
DK 10 23 M Turkish May 2013
DK 11 22 W Somali May 2013
DK 12 23 M Turkish May 2013
DK 13 26 M Pakistani May 2013
DK 14 27 M Arab May 2013
DK 15 27 M Kurdish May 2013
Sweden SE 1 20 F Bosnian December 2012
SE 2 25 M Eritrean December 2012
SE 3 29 F Afghan December 2012
SE 4 31 M Kosovar December 2012
SE 5 24 M Arab January 2013
SE 6 20 F Kurdish 9 Dec 2012
SE 7 31 F Iranian 17 Dec 2012
SE 8 24 M Serbian 19 Dec 2012
SE 9 28 M Turkish January 2013
SE 10 27 F Iranian 14 May 2013
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